Pruning the Bodhi Tree

THE STORM OVER CRITICAL BUDDHISM

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Introduction

Jamie Hubbard

Rumors of major controversies within the normally staid world of Japanese Buddhist studies have been reaching the West for a number of years, largely centering on the claims of the well-known scholars Hakamaya Noriaki and Matsumoto Shirō with regard to what Buddhism is and what it most definitely is not. To wit, the teachings of Buddha-nature, original enlightenment and the Kyoto school of philosophy are not Buddhist; the non-duality taught in the *Vimalakīrti Sūtra* is unacceptable, as well as the ideas of *tathatā* or "suchness," most of Ch'an and Zen Buddhism, and more. What, then, is Buddhism?

"Criticism alone is Buddhism." So states Hakamaya, in characteristically confrontational style, in his book *Critical Buddhism.* He goes on from there to oppose his notion of Critical Buddhism to "Topical Buddhism," a term coined to refer to an aesthetic mysticism unconcerned with critical differentiation between truth and falsity and not in need of rational demonstration, a kind of thinking that he feels actually dominates the Buddhist tradition. More properly, Hakamaya, Matsumoto, and others who agree with them feel that the denigration of language and rational thought implicit in much of the Buddhist doctrinal tradition leads to an erasure of the critical discrimination of truth that is at the heart of Buddhist realization as well as social justice. Where Śākyamuni realized the true nature of existence, vanquished suffering, and then taught that truth and the path to its realization for the benefit of all, Hakamaya and Matsumoto contend that much of the Buddhist tradition has subsequently been busy denying the very possibility of talking about truth. But it is not only the Buddhist tradition that they critique—the *tao* of Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu; the topos of Nishida Kitarō; the academic pretense to

objective and value-free scholarship; and a sloppy, reactionary, postmodern affirmation of everything as equally valid are also singled out as examples of topical philosophy that are completely contrary to the critical spirit of Buddhism yet often conflated with it by the weak-minded. Harshly critical of a great deal in the received traditions of Buddhist thought, Hakamaya and Matsumoto have set out to problematize what is taken for granted by numerous Buddhists in Japan as well as the West, and thereby combat what they take to be an intellectual disease and to clarify their notion of a Buddhism that is fully engaged in the critical appraisal of truth-claims and their doctrinal representation.

Entirely consonant with the demand for a Buddhism that is engaged in critical thinking is the social criticism of much of Hakamaya and Matsumoto's work. Clearly moving from the descriptive to the prescriptive, they are not at all reticent about using their notion of Buddhist truth as a yardstick by which to critique the ideological origins of cultural constructs that masquerade as Buddhism in Japan. Indigenous Japanese ideas and their Buddhist conflations have been singled out as contributing to social injustice, gender inequality, racism, institutional discrimination, imperialism, political repression, and environmental destruction. In particular the doctrines of original enlightenment (*hongaku*) and harmony (*wa*), the Kyoto school of philosophy, and the current fascination with theories of Japanese uniqueness are attacked as examples of such ideologies of discrimination and social injustice that pose as the highest reaches of Buddhist philosophy.

In the spirit of criticism advocated by Hakamaya and Matsumoto, each of the essays in this book examines their ideas and the ideas that they criticize. The impetus for this compilation was a panel presented at the national meeting of the American Academy of Religion in Washington, D.C. in November of 1993 titled "Critical Buddhism (*Hihan Bukkyō*): Issues and Responses to a New Methodological Movement." The panel, organized by Steven Heine, elicited considerable reaction and interest at the conference, and so plans were laid to attempt a fuller presentation of their ideas and the controversies surrounding their work. Our aim, then, is to introduce (and critique) the ideas of Critical Buddhism in relation to the targets of *its* critique, and to situate such an approach within current discussions of postmodern academic scholarship, the separation of the disinterested scholar and committed religious practitioner, and the place of social activism within the academy.

In putting the collection together, we have tried to strike a balance between presenting the work of Hakamaya, Matsumoto, and their cohorts (the vast majority of which has never been translated before) and providing the sort of lively discussion of their work that it tends to provoke. The selection of what to translate was a formidable task, as their output is prodigious, grows daily, and is relevant to a wide and varied range of topics. We have therefore chosen not to focus on a single topic and to include articles beyond the typical textual analysis of Japanese Buddhology, articles that demonstrate the terrain that the debate covers—detailed philological studies, social commentary, sectarian debates, cultural criticism, response and counterresponse to critiques, and essays on contemporary Japanese intellectual debates, philosophical critique, and scholarly method.

When we ask why such a polemic discourse is significant outside of the sectarian context, the first reason is simply that studying what Buddhists think is what Buddhist scholars have always done. Let there be no mistake: although Hakamaya and Matsumoto are arguing as Buddhists, they are first-rate Buddhologists in the traditional sense as well. Indeed, the numerous books and articles by Hakamaya and Matsumoto on Critical Buddhist themes are only a fraction of their oeuvre, and it is a significant testament indeed when somebody of Paul Griffiths's learning says that "[Hakamaya] has taught me more about Buddhism than anyone else.... [He is a] man who knows vastly more about almost everything than I." Still, given that arguments about the meaning and validity of the doctrine of *tathāgata-garbha* and related doctrines are as old as the ideas themselves, we can also ask if there is anything else in their arguments that warrants our attention anew. Although I believe that in a sense that question is best answered within the pages of the fine critiques presented here and by the passions that their writings have aroused throughout the world, there are yet a number of issues that I would point to in an attempt to provide a greater context for their critiques.

THE CONTEXT OF CRITICAL BUDDHISM

Although the issues dealt with in Critical Buddhism are by no means limited in relevancy to the Japanese context, we need first to consider the polemic of Critical Buddhism in the context of the oft-cited ethical and institutional crisis in contemporary Japanese Buddhism. In this sense the need to respond in a dynamic fashion to religious needs in contemporary

Japan is witnessed in such disparate phenomena as the phenomenal growth of new religious movements and the critical spirit of reform movements such as the Dōbōkai Undō within the Jōdo Shinshū. In this sense, then, perhaps the most obvious factor in stimulating the critical look at Buddhist ideas within the Sōtō Zen school was the shock of the so-called "Machida Incident" that stems from the 1979 World Conference on Religion and Peace. Machida Muneo, then president of the Buddhist Federation of Japan and secretary general of the Sōtō Zen sect, denied that any form of social discrimination existed in Japan. He subsequently recanted (in 1984) and the Sōtō sect admitted its long history of perpetuating social discrimination and established numerous committees to study and rectify the situation. Still, many of those involved began to look at the issue more deeply, wondering if there was any systemic reason why such practices could continue unquestioned for so much of Sōtō history.[1] Although to some these sorts of things might seem like a tempest in a Zen teabowl, it was not so then, nor is it now, either within the Sōtō sect or among the outcast groups in Japan. Hence Hakamaya's paper, "Thoughts on the Ideological Background of Social Discrimination" (included in this volume), was written within a committee appointed to study the problem, was presented not to an academic conference but at the Buraku Liberation Center in Osaka, and was subsequently appended to the official report submitted to the Director of Religious Affairs for the Sōtō sect.

Although the initial storm caused by the Machida Incident has somewhat abated, the Central Division for the Protection and Promotion of Human Rights of the Sōtō sect has continued to publish and distribute numerous books and other materials on the topic. The bitterness is still widely felt both within and without the Sōtō sect. Other issues examined by this committee have included the role of Komazawa University faculty during the war and the defrocking of the Sōtō monk Uchiyama Gudō, who was executed in 1911 for his role in the "High Treason Incident" but posthumously reinstated by the sect in 1993. Hakamaya, in turn, has resigned his prestigious position in the Komazawa University Faculty of Buddhism, as well as his clerical position within the Sōtō sect.

But the Machida Incident within the Sōtō sect is not the only context for Critical Buddhism; we must look also to the larger Japanese political and cultural world as the second important context of this debate. A decade has passed since many of their papers were first published

(1985–1986), but we need to keep in mind that it was around that time that Nakasone Yasuhiro was elected prime minister after a landslide Liberal Democratic Party victory at the polls, that Ronald Reagan was enjoying his second term as president of the United States, and that lines between left and right were being drawn in religious and cultural worlds no less than within political camps. The question of official government visits to Yasukuni Shrine was just as alarming in Japan as was the spectre of the radical Christian right dominating White House policy in the United States. In this climate the increasing level of "Japanist" (*Nihonjinron*) rhetoric and the cozy relationship between those who deployed such ideas and the government was a source of alarm for many for whom a return to totalitarianism was and is not an unimaginable prospect. Although in the West we do not hear much about the various debates surrounding the way that Japanese religion is presented in high school textbooks—whether the Emperor's funeral will be Buddhist or Shinto, or whether Japan should shoulder more of its defense burden—these are issues of grave concern for the Japanese and their Asian neighbors. Reference to these social issues of the moment constantly surface in the writings of Hakamaya and Matsumoto, indicating that the social engagement of Critical Buddhism must be seen in part, I think, as akin to the sorts of skirmishes waged in the "culture wars" throughout the West.

Thirdly, we need to keep in mind that Japanese Buddhist scholars have always had a somewhat more public voice than their Western, or at least American, counterparts. Japan, of course, is a Buddhist nation and a voracious reading public creates a huge demand for information about all aspects of Buddhist culture. Most well-known Buddhist scholars have written books for the general public at one time or another, and their articles regularly appear in the numerous weekly magazines and newspapers. At the same time, most Buddhist scholars have yet another role as head of a Buddhist temple, a role often ancient and important, giving them sectarian, institutional, political, community, and pastoral roles and voices. Hakamaya and Matsumoto are not by any means the first to have confounded the distinctions among these roles. Indeed, much of their criticism of individual scholars can well be seen as an attempt to force a recognition of the commitments hidden behind supposedly objective scholarship as well as an attempt to hold scholars accountable for the content of their public statements, sermons, and popular writings. In a recent conversation they remarked to me that, while the disastrous results of the

past collusion between Buddhist scholars and the political establishment may be a matter of historical interest, they believe this call for accountability to be even more important now, given the Japanese fascination with the occult and "new age" religions that emphasize the irrational and mystical experience— religions like Aum Shinrikyō.

CRITICAL BUDDHISM AND THE WESTERN CONTEXT

If the call for a critically engaged Buddhist scholarship is rooted in a Japanese religious, political, and cultural context, it also resonates with trends in Western academe as well. To begin with, we may mention the postmodern denial of the static, ahistorical certainties of positivist historiography and the related trend towards rejecting purely objective scholarship as either possible or desirable. No longer limited to the trendier branches of anthropology, women's studies, or comparative literature, the deconstruction of the vested interests of "objective" scholarship has become part of the natural sciences and even Buddhist studies is no longer immune.[2]

Related to this is a tendency in much of today's academic scholarship to be increasingly activist. That is to say, once one accedes to the notion that scholars in-scribe even as they de-scribe, the move to normative valuation seems the next natural step, perhaps even a morally obligatory step, so that entire fields such as cultural criticism and postcolonial studies seem to be activist almost by nature. In this sense, despite Hakamaya's complaint against what he takes to be the immoral and mushy relativism of "postmodernism," his own rejection of the objectivist or positivist approach and focus on the narrative of history seems not unlike the Western focus on the narrative (or metanarrative or master narrative) aspect of academic discourse, just as his call for critical judgment seems not unlike the activist thrust of so much in today's academic world.

Hence, rather than see Critical Buddhism as an echo of an earlier search for "original" Buddhism, it seems to me more accurate to see it as a complete rejection of that approach, an approach that attempted to make Buddhism a thing of scientific modernity by severing it from its *religious*—that is, subjective and judgmental—past. That Critical Buddhism does not refer to such a search for the historical Buddha is most obvious in Matsumoto's assertion that the critical attitude must be willing to criticize *even the teachings of the Buddha* if they contradict the teachings of depen-

dent origination or no-self. Critical Buddhism denotes a philosophically critical pursuit of truth, not a historical or textual search for origins.

Still, this critical agenda is pursued within a context of Buddhist truth, and it is as Buddhists that both Hakamaya and Matsumoto are arguing. Although this apologetic or "theological" stance is perhaps the most controversial aspect of the debates they have engendered, it, too, has strong resonances with currents within Buddhist studies in the West. Following Max Weber's call for a scientific study of religion, religious studies in the West has labored long to be free of its theological origins and establish itself as a respectable discipline within secular universities. Buddhist studies is no exception, and to date has largely followed its European origins in the philological study of texts. Yet just as Hakamaya and Matsumoto reject Weber's idea of objective and value-free scholarship, many Buddhist scholars in the West are arguing more and more openly that there should indeed be a place within academic discourse for the committed Buddhist to argue his or her ideas about Buddhist truth—some would say that many have already been doing just that, albeit without acknowledging those commitments.[3]

To be sure, most Western scholars of Buddhism do not have quite the same dual role as their Japanese counterparts noted above. Still, a growing majority nonetheless count themselves as practicing Buddhists and participate in Western Buddhist communities in various capacities. Donald Lopez, noting the presence of formerly ordained monks within the universities, has even gone so far as to suggest that in the absence of the traditional ordained sangha, "the role of the Buddhist monk as teacher is often, ironically, left to the academic."[4] And Robert Thurman, recalling both the origins of Western universities and the positive role that education plays in our lives, has often referred to academics as "Protestant monks." As Peter Gregory argues in his essay in this collection, the different situations that engender these different roles within the academy should give one pause to consider the modes in which knowledge is produced within different cultures. Hakamaya and Matsumoto's writings surely give impetus to just such considerations.

INDIVIDUAL CONTRIBUTIONS

The book itself is divided into three sections. Part One, "The What and Why of Critical Buddhism," attempts to give both substance and context

to the notion of Critical Buddhism itself. Paul Swanson's essay, "Why They Say Zen Is Not Buddhism," provides a detailed overview of the writings of Hakamaya, Matsumoto, and others on this subject as well as presenting some of the reactions that their work has aroused within the academic and sectarian worlds. He concludes that Critical Buddhism involves at least three levels of criticism: Buddhological, sectarian, and social. In "Critical Buddhism and Returning to the Sources," Dan Lusthaus takes a broader historical view, considering Critical Buddhism an inevitable response to a variety of historical developments, and seeing it as an extension (or recurrence) of the ancient lineage of debates surrounding *tathāgata-garbha*.

An essay by Hakamaya follows on "Critical Philosophy versus Topical Philosophy," in which he interprets this polarity in terms of the confrontation in Western philosophy between the critical method of René Descartes and the rhetorical emphasis of Giambattista Vico, denouncing the recent Japanese fascination with the latter as an intellectual disease. Noting that the prime danger of this malady is its "adopting the voice of authority in order to sell its own rhetoric," Hakamaya concludes by questioning his own use of the authoritative voice in his polemics. My own contribution, "Topophobia," attempts to clarify Hakamaya's critique of "topical" philosophy. I look at this idea in its original use within the Aristotelian logical canon, within the thought of Giambattista Vico, the eighteenth century champion of topical philosophy whose ideas Hakamaya assails, and in East Asian traditions such as Taoism and the Japanese philosophy of harmony, which Hakamaya attacks as an ideology of conformity or compliance.

In the next chapter, "Scholarship as Criticism," Hakamaya takes up the question of scholarly objectivity exemplified in Max Weber's influential essay "Scholarship as Vocation." In diametrical opposition to Weber—and, as noted above, in much better company with the more activist tendencies of the contemporary Western academy—Hakamaya finds the notion of the objective scholar to be another example of the authoritarian approach of topical philosophy in which neutral "facts" are supposedly discovered and displayed value-free, while in reality the very act of their (re)presentation smuggles in subjective opinions. Hakamaya parades a number of such examples before the reader. Echoing postmodern literary and critical trends, he rejects this appeal to an objectivist approach to the past, in favor, for example, of the narrative of history: "It

makes sense that those who exalt *topos* also exalt 'objective' facts, whereas those who value criticism value language. The latter have no choice but to elaborate language as criticism while the former have merely to discover the 'facts' as *topos*." If this means that even in the classroom the scholar must abandon the pretense of objectivity and risk being branded a demagogue, Hakamaya argues that this is the morally preferable path.

In "The Limits of Criticism," Paul Griffiths seeks to contextualize Hakamaya's notion of criticism in the philosophically more familiar terms of internalist and externalist epistemologies, arguing that the former, close to what Hakamaya is critiquing as topical philosophies, are to be rejected for the many problems that they pose. To illustrate his argument, Griffiths looks at the debate between Hakamaya and Schmithausen regarding the significance of "nature" in Buddhism in order to pose further questions about how far criticism can clarify what it means to be Buddhist.

The final, short essay in this section contains Matsumoto's response at the panel on Critical Buddhism at the AAR in 1993.

Part Two, "In Search of True Buddhism," opens with Matsumoto's "The Doctrine of *Tathāgata-garbha* Is Not Buddhist," one of the inaugural volleys in the Critical Buddhism debate. This paper, originally read at the 1986 meeting of the Japanese Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies, sets out Matsumoto's definition of *dhātu-vāda* as a form of generative monism that contradicts the teaching of *pratītyasamutpāda* and no-self and hence is to be rejected as not truly Buddhist. This is followed by Sallie King's article, "The Doctrine of Buddha-Nature Is Impeccably Buddhist," in which she argues that *tathāgata-garbha* and Buddha-nature should be seen as soteriological devices rather than substantival ontologies, and hence are, as her title indicates, "impeccably Buddhist." King also finds that there is no inevitable relationship between these doctrines and social discrimination; rather, they can and in fact have been used to justify and inspire social engagement.

One of the areas in which Matsumoto and Hakamaya pursue their arguments is the traditional mode of Buddhist scholarship, namely philological exegesis. Yamabe Nobuyoshi's contribution and the ensuing exchange with Matsumoto "The Idea of *Dhātu-vāda* in Yogacara and *Tathāgata-garbha* Texts," is an example of this method. In this essay Yamabe argues that the model of generative monism giving rise to discriminatory pluralism that Matsumoto stipulates to be the defining characteristic of *dhātu-vāda* thought cannot, in fact, be found in the Yogacara

sastras cited by Matsumoto. Although one would do well to read more of Matsumoto's original essays on these matters, his response and the final rejoinder by Yamabe ("A Critical Exchange") well illustrate the complexities of the arguments and the sophistication with which they are pursued. Both authors expressed the wish to pursue the debate and clarify their positions further, a wish that editorial constraints could not accommodate.

Although "Critical Buddhism" is most often associated with the polemic writing of Hakamaya and Matsumoto, they are of course not the only scholars engaged in critical Buddhist scholarship. The eminent scholar of Tibetan Buddhism, Yamaguchi Zuihō, is often mentioned by both Hakamaya and Matsumoto as their mentor and inspiration in this regard. His contribution, "The Core Elements of Indian Buddhism Introduced into Tibet," is one of the early inspirations for Hakamaya and Matsumoto and looks at Buddhism in light of the famous bSam yas debate. This is perhaps the best known debate between advocates of a nonconceptual original purity and its sudden apprehension, represented by the Ch'an master Mo-ho-yen, on the one hand, and the Indian tradition of the gradual cultivation of the six perfections advocated by Kamalaśīla, on the other. Critiquing the notion that the wisdom of bodhi is equivalent to the mystical intuition of "liberation" or "satori," Yamaguchi notes that "the purpose of Buddhism is not 'liberation' (*mukta*, *vimokṣa*) but the realization of 'wisdom' (bodhi) for the practice of 'great compassion' (*mahākaruṇā*)." He thus sides with Kamalaśīla to conclude that Buddhism is constituted by "the practice of perfect giving" and that this consists in the practice of the six perfections.

This sort of critique of Ch'an and Zen subitism is not new, of course, and as scholars in the Sōtō Zen tradition and teaching at Sōtō Zen universities, it is natural that both Hakamaya and Matsumoto should be personally involved in clarifying what Zen is all about. Matsumoto's 1993 book, *Critical Studies in Zen Thought*, presents a sustained criticism of much of what is held sacred in that tradition, particularly the very notion of dhyana or "zen" itself. As summed up in the excerpt included here, "The Meaning of 'Zen,'" Matsumoto claims that "if zen (the practice of dhyana) means the cessation of conceptual thought, then Zen thought is a denial of Buddhism itself." In a similar fashion, in his *Dōgen and Buddhism* (1992) Hakamaya has presented an extensive critique of the Sōtō tradition's understanding of their own founder, arguing that Dōgen's criticism of the doctrine of original enlightenment is foundational for

understanding his thought, and that this critique is best evidenced not in the standard 75-fascicle version of the *Shōbōgenzō* but rather in the 12-fascicle version, completed later in his life and intended to supersede the earlier 75-fascicle version. Steven Heine examines this argument in his contribution, "Critical Buddhism and Dōgen's *Shōbōgenzō*: The Debate over the 75-Fascicle and 12-FascicleTexts." Highlighting the way in which sectarian and scholarly hermeneutics are inevitably intertwined with contemporary social concerns, Heine also examines the difficulty of categorizing a method that makes simultaneous use of historical, philological, philosophical, and ethical approaches while confounding the boundary between academic and apologetic discourse.

The final four chapters in Part Two assess the merits of Critical Buddhism from a variety of perspectives. Peter Gregory's essay, "Is Critical Buddhism Really Critical?," takes the thought of Tsung-mi as a case study in order to ask whether the pursuit of "true Buddhism" is not in turn positing some sort of *dhātu-vāda*-like essence of Buddhism, hence mirroring the object of its own criticism. Preferring to see Buddhism as a "product of a complex set of interdependent and ever-changing conditions (*pratītyasamutpāda*)," he looks at Tsung-mi's thought not to determine whether or not it is "truly Buddhist" but in order to discover the causes and conditions that brought it into existence. In a manner similar to Sallie King's argument that Buddha-nature can be understood as a catalyst for positive social change, Gregory argues that for Tsung-mi the doctrine of original enlightenment was tied not to a linguistic transcendentalism but rather to an affirmation of language in response to the more radical critiques of the *prajñā-pāramitā* tradition.

As noted above, one of the most interesting aspects of Hakamaya's and Matsumoto's critiques is their resonance with so many of today's intellectual and moral issues beyond the narrow confines of Buddhist scholarship, and it is perhaps for this reason that they have aroused such strong reactions among scholars throughout the world. This resonance is admirably demonstrated in Lin Chen-kuo's essay, "Metaphysics, Suffering, and Liberation: The Debate between Two Buddhisms," in which he uses the thought of Heidegger, Adorno, Derrida, and Habermas, as well as the example of earlier "Critical Buddhists" in modern China, to elucidate a conflict between the programs of modernity and postmodernity and to suggest a way out of the contradiction between Topical and Critical Buddhism. In "Thoughts on *Dhātu-vāda* and Recent Trends in Buddhist

Studies," Takasaki Jikidō, perhaps the preeminent scholar of the *tathāgata-garbha* tradition and a teacher of both Matsumoto and Hakamaya, gives a thoughtful overview of *dhātu* in the Buddhist tradition and also considers the role of their method in the current state of Buddhist studies. Sueki Fumihiko of the University of Tokyo is one of the scholars who has responded to Hakamaya and Matsumoto's criticisms over the years. His essay, "A Reexamination of Critical Buddhism," presents a useful review of the many issues involved and his own contributions to the debate, concluding with ruminations on the role of Buddhist scholarship in cultural criticism.

One of the salient features of Hakamaya and Matsumoto's criticisms is that they are tied to a social critique. Part Three, "Social Criticism," presents four essays that address these issues directly. Hakamaya's "Thoughts on the Ideological Background of Social Discrimination," originally delivered at the Buraku Liberation Center in the context of the uproar over the longstanding practice of institutional discrimination within the Sōtō sect, presents his critique of Sōtō preachers who used the doctrines of original enlightenment and karma in order to justify social inequities. If the affirmation of causality and karma is perhaps the main thrust of Critical Buddhism, does this mean that social injustice can or must be understood as the inevitable outcome of one's evil actions in the past? Hakamaya concludes that an individual's personal understanding or experience of karma is not at all the same thing as the authoritarian use of karma as an ideology of acquiescence to the "thusness" of social inequity. Matsumoto's essay on "Buddhism and the Kami: Against Japanism" presents his critique of modern and contemporary proponents of Japanese racial uniqueness, including such luminaries as Kawabata Yasunari and Umehara Takeshi, linking their glorification of Japanese culture to the militarism of the *Kokutai no hongi*. He also looks at the Yogacara-like themes of Mishima Yukio's final writings, finding that his attempt to break free of his rational world of literary intellectualism into a world of pure action inevitably led to his death, because "pure Japanism is necessarily a philosophy of death."

The role of intellectuals in promoting Japanese ethnocentrism and cultural chauvinism has come under increasing scrutiny in recent years, and, as noted above, Hakamaya in particular has identified the doctrine of original enlightenment (*hongaku shisō*) as providing the ideological background for this ethos. In "Tendai *Hongaku* Doctrine and Japan's Ethno-

centric Turn," Ruben Habito draws our attention to a number of medieval documents. Echoing Tamura Yoshirō's findings of the pervasive influence of *hongaku shisō* and Kuroda Toshio's discussion of how this idea functioned to support medieval power structures, Habito finds that its absolute affirmation of the phenomenal world led to a "reverse Copernican turn" that saw Japan not as a land peripheral to India in the history of Buddhism but rather as the center of the universe, not mired in a time of degeneracy (*mappō*) but rather enjoying prosperity and able to look forward to the continued blessing of the gods and the "eternal reign of the descendants of Amaterasu." Matsumoto's closing essay on "The *Lotus Sutra* and Japanese Culture" continues the discussion of Japanese cultural chauvinism, challenging the idea that the message of the *Lotus Sutra* is one of harmonious inclusivism, and arguing that it has to be seen rather as teaching the exclusive path of the Mahayana and thus as opposed to the ideology of harmony so often attributed to the *Lotus Sutra*. Matsumoto also looks at the issue of stupa veneration in the context of the *Lotus*, concluding that "stupa veneration is simply the worship of relics of the Buddha which symbolize and project the idea of an eternal atman," which he finds contrary to both Buddhist teachings of causality and no-self and the message of the *Lotus Sutra*. As a closing reflection on how *dhātu-vāda* approaches to the *Lotus Sutra* have influenced interpretations of Japanese culture, he rejects the idea that the uniqueness of Japanese culture lies in some mystical harmony with nature: "The Japanese people are not perpetually in an ecstatic state induced by staring at flowers and trees. We are not vegetable-like human beings. What makes us distinctively human is the same thing that makes Westerners human: we can think."

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In the preparation of a manuscript of this length and scope, the number of people who have provided indispensable aid is large. To begin with I would like to extend my thanks to each of the individual authors, whose interest in the topic was great enough to carry them through the process of taking on yet one more commitment in spite of already overcrowded schedules; I would particularly like to thank Steven Heine for putting together the original AAR panel and helping me think through the logistics of the volume in the early planning stages. Paul Swanson, my coeditor,

arranged for me to spend a month at the Nanzan Institute for Religion and Culture, where we assembled the collection into its present form. For the long hours he added to an already demanding schedule, and especially for his warm friendship, I am deeply grateful. It feels as though nearly two decades of discussions and shared paths have come to a certain kind of fruition in this collaboration. I cannot be effusive enough in expressing appreciation to the many colleagues and friends at the Institute who gave unsparingly of their time and expertise as we worked over innumerable details of style, presentation, and technical production. Without the assistance of the office staff, our work would have been much more difficult than it was. The editorial assistance of Robert Kisala saved us any number of working nights, and knowing that Edmund Skrzypczak would go through the final copy with his keen eye and legendary zest for detail allowed me to rest at ease more often than otherwise. More than anybody else, though, recognition must be given to the director of the Institute, James Heisig, whose boundless energy, intense pace, unfailing humor, and intellectual gifts are well known to all who have had the good fortune to work with him. Whether chasing down an obscure Chinese or Latin quote whose source the author forgot; whipping up a new macro that auto-translates among the fourteen different word processors that individual contributors used; creating a new font for the one instance of Karoṣṭhī script that came up; enlightening off moments with stimulating discussions of Jung, Tanabe Hajime, or Ivan Illich; or simply regaling you with his endless supply of tales, he succeeds in creating a communal atmosphere of intellectual excitement and productivity unlike any that I have ever encountered. On top of all this his ability to rework stilted translations and pedantic English into flowing prose is a marvel to witness and it is much to be credited for making the ideas herein accessible and even enjoyable to read.

I would also like to extend my gratitude to the Association for Asian Studies, whose local travel grant allowed me to spend time with Hakamaya and Matsumoto during the final editing stage and to financially survive a month in Japan. Finally, I would like to extend my gratitude to Hakamaya and Matsumoto themselves; it was their probing critiques and brave stand that inspired us to undertake this task in the first place.

I first met Hakamaya in 1981, when he came to the University of Wisconsin-Madison for a two-year stay. In addition to numerous delightful late-night discussions with Hakamaya as well as lakeside picnics with

his wife and young children, I was privileged to partake in a seminar that he organized on the *Mahāyānasaṅgraha*, together with Paul Swanson, John Keenan, Paul Griffiths, and others who were at the time studying under the direction of Minoru Kiyota. Although I had to leave to pursue my dissertation research in Japan after only several months of the seminar, the group continued and eventually published *The Realm of Awakening: Chapter Ten of Asanga's Mahāyānasaṅgraha* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989); needless to say, given the material and the participants, the discussions around the seminar table were as lively as they were detailed, and the question of meaning ever resurfaced from the depths of textual detail. Looking back with the wisdom of hindsight, I now see many things from that time that seem to have led directly to this collection of essays, not least of which is my long friendship with coeditor Paul Swanson and so many of the other contributors to the volume.

Beyond this, however, the study of Buddha-nature and *tathāgata-garbha* was a regular part of the coursework at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, in part stimulated by the frequent visits of Takasaki Jikidō and others directly concerned with the topic. Equally important, though, was Kiyota's deep conviction that these topics provided not only an important window upon the development of Buddhist thought but also spoke to a vision of human dignity beyond the limited and ugly expressions of human ignorance that he himself had so often faced. Kiyota thus often taught and wrote on the subject, his colleague Geshe Sopa offered lectures on the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, numerous dissertations came to be written on one or another aspect of the subject, and the topic naturally became the organizing theme for *Buddha Nature: A Festschrift in Honor of Minoru Kiyota* (Griffiths and Keenan, eds.). At the same time, however, Kiyota always encouraged a critical and questioning attitude towards both the Buddhist tradition and social institutions, with the result that the question of the philosophical, moral, and soteriological meaning of the doctrine of *tathāgata-garbha* was frequently debated. Indeed, one question that a student could always safely prepare in advance of the Ph.D. examinations was whether or not the doctrine of *tathāgata-garbha* represented a form of monism. Another frequent topic of discussion from that time that I now see in the background of the Critical Buddhism debate was that of the sinification of Indian Buddhism, and under the influence of another Komazawa professor, Hirai Shun'ei, many students came to question Richard Robinson's assessment of Chi-ts'ang's ideas as

a mere restatement of Indian Madhyamika thought, preferring to see them instead as rather thoroughly colored by indigenous ways of thinking—exactly the sort of thinking that Matsumoto and Hakamaya contend is contrary to genuine Buddhism.

Shortly after leaving Madison to pursue my dissertation research at Komazawa University, I met Matsumoto Shirō. Upon hearing that I was from Madison, Matsumoto immediately engaged me in discussion about the program there, particularly Diana Paul's work on the *Śrīmālādevi Sutra*, as he had just finished writing an article on the *ekayāna* doctrine of that text. Some years later, when I heard him present his paper on "The Doctrine of *Tathāgata-garbha* Is Not Buddhist" at the annual meeting of the Japanese Association for Indian and Buddhist Studies in Tokyo, I was able to see how this early essay already provided a hint of the direction in which his research was leading. Matsumoto recently remarked to me that he hopes Western readers will not misunderstand his and Hakamaya's emphasis on the intellect to mean that they believe only in the rational and intellectual, or that they are so naive as to think that all things can be understood intellectually. The real impetus for his work stems rather from an optimism that things can get better, for individuals as well as societies. But this optimism is premised on our ability to think critically, express ourselves in language, change our ways, and thereby make progress. When a significant trajectory of the Buddhist tradition denies the usefulness of language and the rational process, and hence the very possibility of change or transformation, their optimism rises to the challenge.

Hakamaya once noted that it is only those who believe in language that can change their minds. I am not sure if this volume of essays will change any minds, but today, a full fifteen years after these initial encounters, I find it exciting to be able to share with others some of the intellectual stimulation, keen social concern, and warm friendship that I have been privileged to experience in the company of these extraordinary thinkers.

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"Critical Buddhism and Dōgen's *Shōbōgenzō*: The Debate over the 75-Fascicle and 12-Fascicle Texts" is an update of Steven Heine, "'Critical Buddhism' (*Hihan Bukkyō*) and the Debate Concerning the 75-Fascicle and 12-Fascicle *Shōbōgenzō* Texts," *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 21 (1994): 37–72.

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Bibliographic and Linguistic Conventions

In order to make the body of the text as readable as possible, the following conventions have been adopted throughout the book:

The notes and bibliography have been moved to the back of the book.

Bibliographical entries for Japanese works include the original title in Japanese characters, a romanized pronunciation, and an English tranlation of the title.

Complete bibliographical references for sources that appear in only one article are given in the endnotes. Bibliographical information for all other sources has been gathered into the general bibliography that follows the notes.

Chinese names and terms have been transcribed in the classical Wade-Giles system of romanization.

Chinese and Japanese characters have for the most part been eliminated from the body of the text and moved to the notes. The Sino-Japanese writing of proper names can be found in the cumulative index at the end of the volume.

Common or well-known Sanskrit and Pali terms have generally been left unitalicized and without diacritical marks, except when they appear in titles of works given in the original language. In principle, we have followed Roger Jackson's "Terms of Sanskrit and Pāli Origin Acceptable as English Words" (*Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 5, 1982: 141–2).

Japanese and Chinese proper names are given according to Asian usage, first the family or kinship name and then the personal name.

PART ONE

The What and Why of Critical Buddhism

Why They Say Zen Is Not Buddhism

Recent Japanese Critiques of Buddha-Nature

Paul L. Swanson

Early in AD 817, Saichō, the founder of Japanese Tendai, entered into a debate with Tokuitsu over the idea of Buddha-nature and universal enlightenment. Tokuitsu, a Hossō monk who lived in the Kantō region, had written a tract called "On Buddha-Nature" (*Busshōshō*), to which Saichō responded with "Vanquishing misunderstandings about the *Lotus Sutra*" (*Hokke kowaku*). For the next four years the two scholars engaged through essays and arguments in what grew to be one of the most important doctrinal debates in Japanese Buddhist history. In short, Saichō championed the idea of universal Buddhahood, the *ekayāna* ideal espoused in the *Lotus Sutra* that all beings are destined for the highest enlightenment of a Buddha, while Tokuitsu supported the Yogacara interpretation of five *gotra*, or five different potentials latent in sentient beings, including that of the *icchantika* who have no hope of ever attaining Buddhahood.[1]

What, one might ask, does this debate have to do with the contemporary study of religion and our understanding of Buddhism in Japan? Just this: we are in the midst of a very provocative "rethinking" of Japanese Buddhism by some prominent Buddhist scholars and thinkers who claim that Ch'an/Zen, the *tathāgata-garbha* ("seed," "matrix," or "womb" of the Buddha) tradition,[2] *hongaku shisō* ("original" or "inherent" enlightenment), and related ideas are "not Buddhism." This is tantamount to saying that most, if not all, of Japanese Buddhism is not Buddhist.

In a sense what these scholars are saying is not all that new: the *tathāgata-garbha* tradition and Buddha-nature ideas have always been open to the charge that they posit an un-Buddhist substantialist or atman-

like existence. This looks very much like the debate between Saichō and Tokuitsu transferred to our times and context. What is the meaning of Buddha-nature? What is the correct understanding of the teaching of the Buddha? Which, if any, of the many and varied strands of Buddhist tradition should be accepted as correct and proper, and which rejected as contrary to the Buddha-Dharma? What are the wider social implications of accepting or rejecting certain interpretations of the Buddhist tradition?

It is usually assumed that Saichō "won" the debate with Tokuitsu. Certainly Saichō's view of universal Buddhahood became the accepted presupposition for most of Japanese Buddhism, and in fact represents the dominant religious ethos in Japan. The idea of universal Buddhahood led eventually to *hongaku shisō*—a way of thinking that came to include such ideas as the inherent enlightenment of all things (including non-sentient beings such as grasses and trees, rocks and mountains); the identity of samsara and nirvana; nondifferentiation of the "indigenous" kami and the Buddhas and bodhisattvas; and the transcendence of all dualities, including good and evil—and this ethos grew to be pervasive and unquestioned in much of Japanese religious activity and thought. However, there have also been times, though few and far between, when the idea and implications of *hongaku shisō* were questioned. Now is such a time.

The current attack is led by two Buddhist scholars at Komazawa University (associated with the Sōtō Zen sect): Hakamaya Noriaki and Matsumoto Shirō. The main focus of their attacks is the *hongaku shisō* tradition (strictly speaking, the idea that all things are "inherently" or "originally" enlightened) and the implications of this kind of thinking (such as the ideal of *wa*, "harmony" or "conformity") that function as largely uncritical assumptions in Japanese society at large. In what follows I propose briefly to examine the development of this tradition in Japan, its significance for Japanese religion and society, and the recent critique of this tradition by Hakamaya, Matsumoto, and other Japanese scholars.

HISTORY OF *HONGAKU SHISŌ*

The term *hongaku* (Chin. *pen-chüeh*) has no Sanskrit equivalent;[3] it makes its first appearance in the *Awakening of Mahayana Faith* (T Nos. 1666, 1667), a text almost certainly compiled in China,[4] and in two Chinese apocryphal Buddhist texts, the *Jen-wang ching* (T Nos. 245, 246)[5] and the * *Vajrasamādhi Sutra* (T No. 273).[6] In the *Awakening of Mahayana*

Faith, hongaku is used in contrast to *shigaku*, the "inception" or "actualization" of enlightenment, that is, the process by which one realizes enlightenment in this life; hence the English rendering "original" enlightenment. The *Awakening of Mahayana Faith* teaches that

> "original enlightenment" indicates [the essence of Mind (*a priori*)] in contradistinction to [the essence of Mind in] the process of actualization of enlightenment; the process of actualization of enlightenment is none other than [the process of integrating] the identity with the original enlightenment.[7]

This idea of original or inherent enlightenment, along with the *Awakening of Mahayana Faith* in general, had an immense influence on the development of East Asian Buddhism.[8] To give but a few examples: Fa-tsang (643–712), the Hua-yen patriarch, is well known for his influential commentary on the *Awakening of Mahayana Faith*;[9] the idea was pervasive in the Ch'an tradition; and it contributed to the development of the concept of "the Buddha-nature in non-sentient beings" in the T'ien-t'ai tradition.

In Japan *hongaku* thought took on a life of its own. Its influence was felt in the Shingon school, particularly through Kūkai's extensive use of the *Shakumakaen-ron* (T No. 1668), an apocryphal commentary on the *Awakening of Mahayana Faith* attributed to Nāgārjuna. The development of *hongaku shisō* was especially extensive in the Tendai school. After the Tendai school was introduced into Japan by Saichō it underwent many developments,[10] one of which was the growth of an identifiably independent branch called *hongakumon*. Texts devoted to *hongaku shisō* made their appearance in the late Heian and Kamakura periods, some of them being attributed to prominent Tendai figures like Saichō, Genshin, and Ryōgen. These texts include the *Honri taikō shū*, attributed to Saichō, which interprets the most important Tendai teachings in terms of *hongaku shisō*; "Hymns on Inherent Enlightenment" (*Hongaku-san*), with commentary attributed to Ryōgen (*Chū-hongaku-san*) and Genshin (*Hongaku-san shaku*); and texts such as the *Shuzen-ji ketsu*, attributed in part to Saichō, which contains details on the oral transmissions (*kuden*) of *hongaku* ideas, practices, and lineages.[11] Such oral transmissions and the accompanying lineages form an important part of the *hongaku* tradition.

It is no accident that these developments took place contemporaneously with, and indeed were a part of the growth of, the syncretistic *honji-suijaku/shinbutsu shūgō* movement, the tendency to emphasize the unity

of Buddhist and "Shinto" deities and practices. The influence of *hongaku shisō* can be seen in the growth of Shugendō (the way of mountain asceticism), in Shinto, and in all of the Buddhist schools. Building on the Mahayana idea of the "identity of samsara and nirvana," *hongaku shisō* evolved into an ethos (to use Tamura Yoshirō's words) of "absolute nonduality" and "total affirmation" of the mundane world. The ideal is perhaps best expressed in the phrases *sōmoku kokudo shikkai jōbutsu* and *sansen sōmoku shikkai jōbutsu* (the grasses, trees, mountains, and rivers all attain Buddhahood), phrases that pop up almost incessantly in Japanese literature, art, theater, and so forth.[12] This religious ethos constituted the status quo for most of Japanese history, and continues to dominate today despite attempts by the State in the early Meiji period to forcibly "separate" Buddhist and Shinto elements (*shinbutsu bunri*).

A few exceptions to the dominance of the *hongaku* ethos in Japan stand out. Noteworthy is the work of Hōchibō Shōshin in the twelfth century.[13] Shōshin was critical of *hongaku shisō*, saying that one should not understand it to mean that sentient beings are "already" enlightened, and that such an interpretation denies causality and is the heresy of "naturalism" (*jinen gedō*).[14] It is often pointed out that what are called the "new" Kamakura Buddhist schools arose in reaction against the *hongaku* stance of the Tendai establishment, but I think it more likely that as these new movements became established sects, they soon "reverted to" what Hakamaya and Matsumoto criticize as a *hongaku* ethos. In the Tokugawa period Myōryū Jisan (1637–1690) and Reikū Kōken (1652–1739) of the Anraku school urged a revival of the keeping of the precepts based on the *Ssu-fen lü* (Jpn. *Shibun-ritsu*), in response to what they perceived as a decadence encouraged by *hongaku shisō*. This movement was exceptional, however, and the *hongaku* ethos has survived as an unquestioned assumption in much, if not all, of Japanese Buddhism.

RECENT CRITIQUES OF *HONGAKU SHISŌ*

The current controversy concerning *hongaku shisō*, as we noted, centers around Matsumoto Shirō and Hakamaya Noriaki, but is not restricted to them. It is not insignificant that these figures are all first-rate textual scholars and philosophers, as well as faculty members of the Sōtō-Zen-affiliated Komazawa University. Theirs are not casual criticisms leveled broadside by outsiders, nor are they based on slipshod scholarship or half-

baked social commentary due to a lack of familiarity with the Buddhist tradition and its texts. These are first-rate academic studies prepared by committed Buddhists.

Matsumoto Shirō, a specialist in Madhyamika Buddhism, published a collection of his essays in 1989 called *Pratītyasamutpāda and Emptiness—Critiques of the Doctrine of Tathāgata-garbha*. I begin with a résumé of the main points made in these essays.

The Doctrine of Tathāgata-garbha Is Not Buddhist

The first essay, provocatively titled "The Doctrine of *Tathāgata-garbha* Is Not Buddhist," leaves no doubt as to Matsumoto's position or intent.[15] If *tathāgata-garbha* thought is not Buddhist—what, then, *is* the teaching of the Buddha? Buddhism is the teaching of non-self (*muga*; *anātman*) and the teaching of causality (*pratītyasamutpāda*). This teaching of causality is not that of universal mutual co-arising and non-temporal causality developed later (as, for example, in the Hua-yen tradition), but the temporal, twelvefold chain of dependent arising as discovered by the Buddha during his enlightenment under the Bodhi tree and classically expressed in the *Mahāvagga*.[16] The crucial point is the denial of any eternal, substantial, underlying basis or locus on which everything else depends upon or arises from. This "locus" that is denied by the teaching of causality is given the name *dhātu*, and any teaching that implies the existence of a *dhātu* is called *dhātu-vāda* (a Sanskrit neologism coined by Matsumoto). *Dhātu-vāda* is antithetical to Buddhism, since it is the very teaching that Śākyamuni intended to deny. The idea of a *tathāgata-garbha*, the "womb," "matrix," or "seed" of Buddhahood inherent in all sentient beings, is a form of *dhātu-vāda* and thus is not Buddhist. *Dhātu-vāda* is depicted graphically and its steps outlined systematically (see page 170 below).

An important part of Matsumoto's argument is that the teaching of *dhātu-vāda* gives the false appearance of a teaching of "equality"—after all, it claims that all things are based on a single, universal, eternal reality. In practice it leads to discrimination, since if one assumes a single basis and underlying reality for all things—that good and evil, strong and weak, rich and poor, right and wrong, are fundamentally "the same"—there is no need or incentive to correct any injustice or right any wrong or challenge the status quo. In practice, then, *dhātu-vāda* supports and fosters discrimination and injustice. The idea of a universal, inherent Buddha-

hood appears optimistic, but in fact reinforces the status quo and removes incentives for improving the human condition.

The article closes with a three-part conclusion:

1. *Tathāgata-garbha* thought is a form of *dhātu-vāda*.
2. *Dhātu-vāda* is the object of Śākyamuni's criticism, and the correct Buddhist teaching of causality (*pratītyasamutpāda*) is a denial of *dhātu-vāda*.
3. Contemporary Japanese Buddhism can only claim to be truly Buddhist insofar as it denies the validity of *tathāgata-garbha* thought.

A Reinterpretation of Pratītyasamutpāda

Beginning with the second essay, "On *Pratītyasamutpāda*," the rest of Matsumoto's book expands on and gives detailed support to the basic assertions outlined above. Here he criticizes the work of many of the most prominent modern Japanese Buddhist scholars, among them Ui Hakuju, Watsuji Tetsurō, Hirakawa Akira, Tamaki Kōshirō, Fujita Kōtatsu, and Tsuda Shin'ichi.

Some of the more interesting points made in this long essay include the following: There is no religion without time. The correct understanding of causality is not that of a theoretical, spatial, or mutually inclusive causality, but of a temporal causality of an effect following on a cause. The twelve-linked chain of causation refers not to relationships between things, but to the temporal sequence from cause to effect. In terms of the scheme in Matsumoto's chart (see page 170 below), *pratītyasamutpāda* is a sequence of super-loci without an underlying locus; a sequence of properties and not things (dharmas). There is no reality (*dhātu*) beyond or underlying this temporal sequence. The concept of *hongaku* posits a "pre-time" or state beyond time from which all things arise, or in which all things are simultaneously and mutually related. This is *dhātu-vāda*.

Matsumoto adds that the *dhātu-vāda* way of thinking can be found in all ancient societies, both East and West. It is the idea that "all things arise from and return to an all-encompassing One." If so, it is possible to say that *tathāgata-garbha* thought/*dhātu-vāda* is the theoretical or philosophical development of "native" (*dochaku*—dare I say "primitive"?) animistic ideas and "folk religion" (*minzoku shūkyō*).[17] Some have claimed that the idea of "the Buddhahood of grasses and trees" is the climactic development of Buddhist thought, but for Matsumoto it is no more than

a form of animism. At no time in history has animism been held in higher esteem than it is today. At a recent conference in Japan, a certain scholar claimed that "The basis of the religious consciousness of the Japanese people is animism and ancestor veneration." This view of folk religion is closely related to *tathāgata-garbha* thought. Both are the theoretical development of "native" (*dochaku*) ways of thinking. Representative of this way of thinking is the "Japanism" (*Nihongaku*) of Umehara Takeshi, and it comes as no surprise to find him arguing in favor of both Japanese folk religion and *tathāgata-garbha* thought.

A Critique of "Japanism"

This last theme is taken up again in the third essay, "Buddhism and the Kami: Against Japanism."[18] Here Matsumoto criticizes the kind of easy "Japanism" and pro-Japan glorification represented by the *Nihongaku* of Umehara Takeshi. He first introduces the ideas of Umehara, which often speak of the superiority of the Japanese race and present Japanese Buddhism positively in terms of its *tathāgata-garbha* elements, the "Buddhahood" of inanimate things, and the emphasis on *wa* ("harmony"). He points out that ideas such as "no-thought and no-conceptualization" (*munen musō*), "direct intuition" (*chokkan*), and "non-reliance on words" (*furyū monji*), all of which have been proposed to the West as representative of "Zen," are in fact based on *tathāgata-garbha* and *hongaku* thought, and should not be considered positive Buddhist virtues.

The "Japanism" of Motoori Norinaga, Kawabata Yasunari, and Mishima Yukio are then briefly outlined in order to explain how each of these figures closely identified themselves with the country or concept of "Japan." Matsumoto concludes that such thinking is a "philosophy of death" (*shi no tetsugaku*), which as a Buddhist he must reject:

> The notion that the ancient Japanese view of life was optimistic and only turned pessimistic with the introduction of Buddhism is nonsense propagated by people who know not the first thing about the meaning of religion. In fact, the ancient Japanese had no ground for any kind of hope. Their lives were spent in the frightened but stoic anticipation of death and the journey to the dreaded land of darkness (*yomi no kuni*). Their first hope for life, the first conviction of resurrection in the next world, came through the encounter with Buddhism.

He closes with the personal observation that, in conformity with the Buddhist teaching of no-self, Buddhists should not be attached to patriotism towards their own country.

Other Essays in "Pratītyasamutpāda and Emptiness"

The fourth essay, "A Critique of Realism," deals with Tsuda Shin'ichi's criticisms of Matsumoto's position. Matsumoto makes a detailed, technical, and textual argument against understanding "dharma" as "existence," and expands on his critique of *dhātu-vāda*.

In the next essay, on "Liberation and Nirvana: Some Non-Buddhist Ideas," Matsumoto carries his critique a step further to argue that there is no greater misunderstanding than to say that the final goal of Buddhism is "liberation" (*gedatsu*; *vimukti*). The reason is that the idea of liberation (*vimukti*) is based on the non-Buddhist idea that there is a self (*ātmavāda*) to be liberated, which is an anti-Buddhist idea. Not only liberation, but nirvana, a concentrated state of mind (*jhāna*, *samādhi*), and even "mind" (*citta*), are all based on the non-Buddhist idea of a self. In this essay Matsumoto sets aside the ideas of *jhāna*, *samādhi*, and *citta* in order to concentrate on liberation and nirvana. In short, he argues that the ideas of liberation and nirvana presuppose a "self" to be liberated, and is thus a *dhātu-vāda*. He argues against the prevalent interpretation of nirvana as "extinction"—based on the etymology of *nir√vā*, to "blow out"—and instead argues for the etymology of *nir√vṛ*, to "uncover." A painstaking textual study in support of his contention concludes with four points:

1. The original meaning of "nirvana" was not "extinction" but "to uncover."
2. The basic idea of "nirvana" is "the liberation of the atman from what is not atman," and is thus related to the idea of "liberation" as the goal of Buddhism. Thus both ideas of "nirvana" and "liberation" are based on the idea of an atman.
3. The atman is often compared to "light" or said to give forth light. If one uncovers or takes away what is hindering the light, then the light can shine forth and illuminate the darkness. Thus the "extinction of light" cannot be the meaning of a liberation or "nirvana" of an atman.
4. "The liberation of the atman from what is not atman" is the liberation of the "spirit" from the "body." Thus, complete liberation is possible only by completely escaping the body, which is why this kind of liberation constitutes a "philosophy of death."

We have yet to see how far Matsumoto is willing to go in his rejection or reinterpretation of traditional Buddhist terms and concepts. As we shall see later, Takasaki Jikidō takes Matsumoto to task for going too far and leaving nothing that can be called "Buddhist."

The sixth essay, "The *Prajñāpāramitā* Sutras and *Tathāgata-garbha* Thought," shows how the *Prajñāpāramitā* sutras began (with the *Aṣṭa-sāhasrikā-prajñā-pāramitā*) as writings based on the idea of emptiness (sunyata); but as *dhātu-vāda*-type ideas gradually crept in, one must be careful to discriminate the contents of the texts. One of the main arguments here is that the earliest extant version of the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñā-pāramitā*, the Chinese translation made in AD 179 (T No. 224), does not contain the famous passage that the "mind is originally pure" (*prakṛtiś cittasya prabhāsvarā*), a passage used to support *tathāgata-garbha*-like ideas. Matsumoto concludes that the early *Prajñāpāramitā* sutras taught emptiness, but gradually incorporated *tathāgata-garbha* tendencies, culminating in the compilation of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*, an influential commentary on the *Pañcaviṃśati-sāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā Sutra* that embraces *tathāgata-garbha* ideas. Matsumoto advocates studying early versions of the *Prajñāpāramitā* sutras to help weed out these later, mistaken accretions.

The next essay, "The *Śrīmālādevī Sutra* and Ekayana Theory," is an early essay by Matsumoto, the arguments of which are better developed in other essays. By examining the *tathāgata-garbha* ideas in the *Śrīmālā-devī Sutra* Matsumoto concludes that

> Indian Mahayana Buddhism is usually considered to have had two major scholastic traditions: the Madhyamika and Yogacara. This is adequate for classifying the *scholastic* traditions, and I see no need to support the proposal that the *tathāgata-garbha* tradition was a third school. In India there were certainly scholastic debates within the Yogacara school and within the Madhyamika school, and there were also debates between the Yogacara and Madhyamika schools, but can it be said that there were debates between the *tathāgata-garbha* and Yogacara schools?

The question is rhetorical for Matsumoto. The context makes it clear that his answer is in the negative.

The final essay, "On Emptiness," discusses sunyata from the perspective of *pratītyasamutpāda*. Matsumoto argues that the main theme of Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamaka-kārikā* is not emptiness but *pratītya-samutpāda*. He does not claim that sunyata and *pratītyasamutpāda* are

opposing or contradictory concepts, but he does caution that sunyata must be understood in terms of *pratītyasamutpāda*, and not the other way around. If not, there is the danger of misunderstanding sunyata as a kind of *dhātu-vāda*.

Critical Studies on Zen Thought

In 1993 Matsumoto published another collection of essays, entitled *Critical Studies on Zen Thought*, in which he expanded on his critiques. The opening essay on "The Meaning of Zen Thought" presents an analysis of the teachings of Mo-ho-yen and Shen-hui, concluding that insofar as Ch'an/Zen thought insists on the denial or cessation of conceptual thinking, it cannot be regarded as Buddhist.[19]

The next two essays, "Shen-hui's Commentary on the *Diamond Sutra*" and "The Basic Thought of Lin-chi," take a closer look at the Chinese Ch'an tradition, concluding that Shen-hui and Lin-chi base their teachings on *dhātu-vāda*-like assumptions.[20]

The fourth essay, "*Padma-garbha* and *Tathāgata-garbha*," speculates on the development of *tathāgata-garbha* thought, and concludes that it derived at least in part from the idea of *padma-garbha* (the "Lotus matrix"), and that the whole *garbha* discourse is a reversion to a Vedic-type atman theory.

The fifth chapter, on Sanlun teachings, concludes that Chi-tsang denied *pratītyasamutpāda* and that his philosophy is nothing but *dhātu-vāda*.

The final chapter, on the "Jinshin inga" (deep faith in causality) chapter of the 12-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō*, consists of Matsumoto's criticisms of Hakamaya's views on the subject. Specifically, Matsumoto disagrees with Hakamaya's conclusion that Dōgen completely rejected Buddha-nature and *dhātu-vāda*-like ideas in his later years, claiming rather that Dōgen never completely rejected *tathāgata-garbha* ideas.

Despite this criticism, and as Matsumoto points out many times in his work, he considers Hakamaya Noriaki a colleague and confidante, whose thinking has developed in tandem with his own. This brings us to the critique of *hongaku shisō* developed by Hakamaya.

THE CRITIQUE OF *HONGAKU SHISŌ* BY HAKAMAYA NORIAKI

Hakamaya Noriaki, formerly a faculty member of the Buddhist Studies department of Komazawa University and currently Professor at Koma-

zawa Junior College, is a noted specialist on the Yogacara school. He is a prolific writer, scholar, and social critic with a long list of textual studies to his credit. He has published two collections of essays on the subject at hand: *Critiques of the Doctrine of Original Enlightenment* (1989) and *Critical Buddhism* (1990).

In his preface to *Critiques* Hakamaya clearly spells out his intent: to show that *hongaku shisō* is not Buddhism. In addition, he claims that Zen, the Kyoto school of philosophy, even the teaching of non-duality in the *Vimalakīrti Sutra*, are not Buddhist. And as a specialist in Yogacara, he hopes eventually to write an essay demonstrating that Vijñaptimātratā is not Buddhist!

Hakamaya understands *hongaku shisō* in a broad sense: a way of thinking that all things are embraced in a basic, singular, ineffable reality (a state of "original enlightenment") that functions as an authoritarian ideology and does not admit the validity of words, or concepts, or faith, or intellect. The structure of reality is expressed as consisting of a "pure" basis (object)—expressed as "original enlightenment," the basis, essence, or principle—and the results (subject) that are based on this reality—expressed as "actualized enlightenment," traces, function, or phenomena. This "basis," however it be called, is a *dhātu*, and Hakamaya maintains that anything that admits a *dhātu* is not Buddhist.

What, then, is Buddhism? In a substantial introduction,[21] Hakamaya lays out three defining characteristics of Buddhism as a rule by which to measure what is and what is not Buddhism:

1. The basic teaching of the Buddha is the law of causation (*pratītya-samutpāda*), formulated in response to the Indian philosophy of a substantial atman. Any idea that implies an underlying substance (a "topos"; *basho*) and any philosophy that accepts a "topos" is called a *dhātu-vāda*. Examples of *dhātu-vāda* are the atman concept in India, the idea of "nature" (Jpn. *shizen*) in Chinese philosophy, and the "original enlightenment" idea in Japan. These ideas run contrary to the basic Buddhist idea of causation.
2. The moral imperative of Buddhism is to act selflessly (*anātman*) to benefit others. Any religion that favors the self to the neglect of others contradicts the Buddhist ideal. The *hongaku shisō* idea that "grasses, trees, mountains, and rivers have all attained Buddhahood; that sentient and non-sentient beings are all endowed with the way of the Buddha" (or, in Hakamaya's words, "included in the substance of Buddha") leaves no room for this moral imperative.

3. Buddhism requires faith, words, and the use of the intellect (wisdom, *prajñā*) to *choose* the truth of *pratītyasamutpāda*. The Zen allergy to the use of words is more native Chinese than Buddhist, and the ineffability of "thusness" (*shinnyo*) asserted in *hongaku shisō* leaves no room for words or faith.[22]

The paradigm for these three characteristics, Hakamaya insists, is to be found in the thought and enlightenment experience of the Buddha himself. Śākyamuni realized (Hakamaya prefers the word "chose") the truth of causation during his enlightenment (Hakamaya prefers "thinking") under the Bodhi tree, resisted the temptation to keep the truth and bliss of enlightenment to himself in favor of sharing it for the benefit of others, and preached about his discovery of the truth of causation with words, appealing to people's intellect as well as to their faith.

This pattern, Hakamaya points out, is also found in T'ien-t'ai Chih-i's critique of Taoism. From the standpoint of Buddhism Chih-i rejected his country's native philosophy—one of the few to do so—because it does not recognize causality (*inga*), because it lacks the ideal of benefiting others (*rita*), and because it tends towards a denial of words (*zetsugon*).[23]

After briefly summarizing each of Hakamaya's essays in his two major collections, I will take up a few other representative essays.

Critiques of the Doctrine of Original Enlightenment (1989)

The first essay, on "Problems in Understanding Sunyata," concerns various uses and interpretations of sunyata in Buddhist texts and the importance of words (*logos, vāc*). The next essay, on "Critical Notes on the *Awakening of Mahayana Faith,*" consists of a critique of the concepts of thusness (*shinnyo, tathatā*) and "mind" in this text. The essay on "*Pratītyasamutpāda* and Suchness" is an important study originally included in the commemorative volume of essays in honor of Hirakawa Akira; it is a warning against understanding *pratītyasamutpāda* in terms of *tathatā* or "réalité." The fourth essay, on "Observations on Norinaga's Critique of Buddhism," and the sixth, on "Norinaga's Critique of Ryōbu Shinto: The Relationship between Thought and Language," address Norinaga's criticisms against Buddhism and *hongaku* influence in Ryōbu Shinto, emphasizing the importance of words as more than the proverbial "finger pointing at the moon."

The fifth essay, "Thoughts on the Ideological Background of Social Discrimination,"[24] is a talk given at the Osaka Buraku Liberation Center

in which Hakamaya addresses the role of *hongaku shisō* in encouraging and maintaining discrimination against outcasts in Japanese society. The seventh essay, on "Prolegomena to a Critical look at the 'Four Criteria'," is a warning against accepting the traditional Buddhist criteria that people should depend on the Dharma but not on people, on the meaning but not the words (of the teachings), on the "definitive meaning" but not on the "interpretable meaning," and on wisdom but not on consciousness.

The eighth essay, "Buddhism and the Kami: Against Japanism," complements an essay by Matsumoto of the same title.[25] The ninth essay, "Critique of the *Vimalakīrti Sutra*," is an early paper by Hakamaya on the idea that the teaching of non-duality in the *Vimalakīrti Sutra* is not Buddhist. First given at a conference of the Association for Indian and Buddhist Studies, it was one of the first volleys of Critical Buddhism and occasioned a famous exchange with Takasaki Jikidō.[26] The next essay is "A Critique of the Structure of Faith in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*," followed by "*Tathatā* as Topos," a critique of "topical philosophy" (*basho no tetsugaku*) in contrast to "critical philosophy" (*hihan no tetsugaku*).

The second section of the book consists of a series of essays on Dōgen. "The Definitive Standpoint for Understanding Dōgen" argues, against the majority view, that Dōgen should be understood as critical of *hongaku shisō*. Hakamaya then offers "How to Read the *Bendōwa*," followed by "A Reexamination of Theories Concerning the Compilation of the 12-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō*," which argues that the 12 fascicles written by Dōgen late in his life were critical of *hongaku shisō* and should replace the earlier fascicles of the *Shōbōgenzō*.[27]

In "Some Thoughts Critical of the 'Unity of the Three Teachings'," Hakamaya argues that Buddhism should not accept the fuzzy and mistakenly tolerant idea that the religious traditions of Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism are "fundamentally compatible." "A Critique of Understanding Dōgen in Terms of the 'Complete Unity of the Buddha Dharma'" is a response to comments by Hakamaya's colleague Ishii Shūdō, and is a critique of the interpretation of Dōgen based on the theory of one (*ichi*) and all (*zen*). This is followed by "The 'Transmission Outside the Teachings' and the Unity of Teachings and Meditation." This section closes with an essay on "What Dōgen Denied" in which Hakamaya claims that in later years Dōgen rejected the fuzzy spirituality based on *hongaku shisō*; and another essay on "The 'Arousing the Supreme Mind' Chapter in the 75-Fascicle *Shōbōgenzō* and the 'Arousing

Bodhicitta' Chapter in the 12-Fascicle *Shōbōgenzō*," arguing that both of these chapters deal with the same subject but come to completely different conclusions, thus showing that Dōgen's thought changed and that his final views are to be found in the latter work.

Critical Buddhism (1990)

Hakamaya's next collection opens with "Introduction to Critical Buddhism: 'Critical Philosophy' versus 'Topical Philosophy'."[28] Its point, in a word, is that to be a Buddhist is to be critical, that is, to be able to make distinctions; that the only truly Buddhist stand is to be critical; that Buddhism must be a "critical philosophy" able to make distinctions, not an experiential "topical philosophy" (such as *hongaku shisō*) that is "all-inclusive" and uncritically tolerant.

The first section begins with "A Critique of the Kyōto School," in which Hakamaya criticizes the idea of *basho* in the Kyoto school of philosophy (Nishida Kitarō and Nishitani Keiji) and argues that it is an extension of the non-Buddhist idea of *hongaku shisō*. The third essay, "Scholarship as Criticism," argues for the importance of a critical method for scholarship, and argues that what is wrong should be pointed out as wrong and not papered over for the sake of a shallow harmonious tolerance.[29] This is followed by "A Critique of Kobayashi Hideo's *My View of Life*."

The second section opens with "A Glance at the State of Buddhism in the United States: Remarks on a Paper Given by a Young Buddhist Scholar," a report on Hakamaya's experience at the U.S.-Japan Conference on Japanese Buddhism held at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, 25–28 August 1985, and in particular his agreement with the paper by Paul Griffiths, "On the Possible Future of the Buddhist-Christian Interaction."[30] The next essay, "*Tathatā, Dharmadhātu, Dharmatā*," discusses the non-Buddhist implications of these concepts. In "The Anti-Buddhist Character of *Wa* and the Antiviolent Character of Buddhism" Hakamaya argues that the idea of *wa* is not a positive Buddhist virtue, but in practice represents an excuse for uncritical syncretism and plays into the hands of the powerful in coercing conformity from above. True Buddhist virtue is antiviolent, and requires a critical stance against discrimination and injustice; "faith" should be the ideal, not *wa*. The essay on "Rejection of False Buddhism" stresses the importance of choosing what is right and rejecting what is wrong. The section closes with an essay on "Problems in Watsuji Tetsurō's Understanding of 'Dharma' and 'Emptiness'."

The last section contains two essays: "Thoughts on 'Truth' while Reading *Sickness unto Death*" and "*Vijñāpti-mātra* and *Anātman:* My 'Seated Meditation'."

Hakamaya continues to write prolifically, publishing highly technical textual studies as well as Buddhological essays and social criticism. As many of the points Hakamaya makes in his technical "Buddhological" essays are already covered in the above summary of Matsumoto's work, I will concentrate here on Hakamaya's social commentary.

"Wa," Antiviolence, and Buddhism

"The Anti-Buddhist Character of *Wa* and the Antiviolent Character of Buddhism" (1990)[31] opens with a lengthy quote from Nishitani Keiji on the increasing interest in religion in Japan, the cooperation between state and religion, and why this is a good thing for the country. Except for the dated style, one gets the impression that the quote was written quite recently, given the fact that Japan is now experiencing another *shūkyō būmu*. The perspective shifts, however, when one realizes that the quote was written in 1941 as Japan was feverishly engaged in a world war, religious persecution, and domestic repression. Hakamaya uses this quote as a springboard to argue that the idea of *wa* ("harmony") is promoted as a positive ideal in Japan, but in reality it is a repressive principle wielded by the powerful to maintain the status quo and social order, and to restrict criticism. For Hakamaya, the *wa* promoted since the time of Prince Shōtoku and his famous 17-Article Constitution is not a Buddhist virtue. *Wa* is an enemy of Buddhism and an enemy of true peace. Buddhists should not give in to a compromising and mushy "tolerance" that uncritically accepts all things as "equal."

Coeval with the ideal of *wa* is the religious ethos of *hongaku shisō*. Both support an attitude of uncritical tolerance, which Hakamaya compares to mixing *miso* and *kuso* (brown bean paste and dung—"curds and turds," if one is to preserve the play on words). Both support a superficial syncretism that ignores differences of right and wrong or good and bad, and thus ironically works to maintain discrimination and injustice and the whims of those in positions of power and authority.

Rather than *wa*, the Buddhist should emphasize faith. W*a* encourages acceptance of any teaching or idea, be it Confucian, Taoist, native Japanese animism, or un-Buddhistic *dhātu-vāda* tendencies. "Faith"

requires a firm belief in certain Buddhist truths and rejecting ideas that are contrary to these truths. Thus Buddhist faith (Jpn. *shin*, Skt. *śraddhā*) is the same as the Latin *credo*—one believes in order to be able to judge whether an idea is correct or not correct. This is "faith" as taught in the *Lotus Sutra*. The "faith" taught in *tathāgata-garbha* texts such as the *Ratnagotravibhāga* and *Awakening of Mahayana Faith*, in contrast, emphasizes the unity of the believer and the object of belief, and confidence in one's own Buddha-nature or potential to become a Buddha. The faith of the *Lotus Sutra*, on the other hand, means believing the words of the Buddha, and then distinguishing with one's intellect (*prajñā*) between the correct and the incorrect, and criticizing the incorrect with words.

Hakamaya argues that the *wa* ethos led people in prewar Japan uncritically to sacrifice themselves to the war effort and maintain silence. Buddhist faith requires intellect to critically respond with words and actions against mistaken notions and activity. This is the "antiviolence" stand of Buddhism. To oppose *wa* is to be truly antiviolent and antiwar.

Thoughts against the Emperor System

Hakamaya's essay, "Thoughts against the Emperor System" (1989), opens with a quote from Dōgen:

> Sentient beings should not be full of fear and take refuge in the mountain deities, *oni*, kami, and so forth, or take refuge in non-Buddhist (*gedō*) spiritual powers (*caitya*). There is no liberation from suffering by relying on such things. By following the mistaken teaching (*jakyō*) of non-Buddhist ways, …one does not attain any causes for liberation. The wise person does not praise these things; they add to suffering and not to good recompense. Thus one should not take refuge in mistaken ways, but should clearly exclude them.

Hakamaya takes the occasion of Emperor Shōwa's death, and the period of "voluntary restraint" (*jishuku*) among the Japanese people during the emperor's terminal illness, to comment on the place of the emperor system in modern Japan and its inherent dangers. He wonders how it can be claimed that Japan is a country "with unusual freedom of thought and expression" when social pressures during this period were so strong that hardly anyone dared to make any comment or take any action that could be construed as "inappropriate" to the occasion.

For Hakamaya, the emperor system is like the *hongaku* and *honji suijaku* ethos: it is an ineffable center, held together by a murky syncretism, and relies on the ideal of *wa* to muffle any ideological criticism. It is a non-Buddhist spirituality that Dōgen clearly rejected. Buddhists must be critical of the emperor system and its surrounding hothouse atmosphere that stifles dissent.

A Critique of Zen

In an essay entitled "A Critique of the Zen School," Hakamaya reiterates and expands his criticism that "Zen is not Buddhism," makes a blistering attack on the Zen interpretations of Yanagida Seizan and D. T. Suzuki, and responds to some questions raised by his colleague Ishii Shūdō.

One passage in particular clarifies the intent of Hakamaya's critique:

> I have said that "Zen is not Buddhism" but do not recall ever saying that "Chinese Ch'an is not Buddhism." This difference may appear minor, but it is an important distinction. The reason is that anything which shows no attempt at "critical philosophy" based on intellect (*prajñā*), but is merely an experiential "Zen" (*dhyāna*, *bsam gtan*), whether it be in India or Tibet or wherever, cannot be Buddhism.[32]

Hakamaya's harsh criticism of Yanagida Seizan and D. T. Suzuki is based on the idea that if, on the one hand, the correct Dharma (*saddharma*) of Buddhism is a critical philosophy and a foreign and imported way of thinking; if, on the other hand, Zen is a topical philosophy no different from the customs and ways of the culture into which it was imported, then the fact that both Suzuki and Yanagida wrote books concerning two phenomena that should be understood as diametrically opposed to each other, namely "Buddhism" and "Japanese culture," shows that they are not aware of the fundamental opposition between the two. According to Hakamaya, the triumph of Zen in China and Japan is the triumph of indigenous (*dochaku*) thinking in absorbing Buddhism into itself and neutralizing the critical thrust of the Buddha's teaching.

In concluding this essay and in response to questions from Ishii, Hakamaya clarifies his position on certain points. For example, he states clearly that there is no such thing as "good" *hongaku shisō*, as if certain parts of the theory could be accepted as Buddhist and others rejected. He also takes issue with Ishii's claim that the correct Dharma (*saddharma*) recognizes both sitting in meditation and various religious rituals as valuable,

and also recognizes a proper role for a teacher to guide one in the correct Dharma. For Hakamaya, one must completely reject the authoritarian idea that a teacher is absolute and never mistaken.

Buddhism as Critical of the Idea of "Nature"

In another 1990 article Hakamaya argues that Buddhism does not teach "oneness with nature" but rejects the atman-like idea of an all-encompassing "nature" (*shizen*); a Buddhist must escape from "nature" while yet protecting "nature" from destruction by becoming the "masters and possessors of nature" (*maîtres et possesseurs de la nature*). In his inimitable way Hakamaya adds:

> D. T. Suzuki never tired of praising the "Eastern" view of nature, and he certainly played a large role in implanting this mistaken view not only abroad but also in Japan. However, since Suzuki was a "Zen person" and not a Buddhist, perhaps we should not complain that he was always praising "nature." The real tragedy would be if Buddhists followed his example.[33]

Original Enlightenment and the Lotus Sutra

Hakamaya prepared a paper on "The *Lotus Sutra* and *Hongaku Shisō*" for a conference on the "*Lotus Sutra* and Japanese Culture" held at the University of British Columbia in August 1990.[34] This paper repeats and neatly summarizes many of his major points. He points out that the *Lotus Sutra*, since it claims to proclaim the only right and true Buddhism, and is an imported way of thinking, should be understood as antithetical to the indigenous ways of thinking in the countries it enters. *Hongaku shisō*, in contrast, is naturally amenable to indigenous ways of thinking. Thus, at least theoretically, these two standpoints stand in opposition to each other.

Mention was made above of Hakamaya's view that *hongaku shisō* is a *dhātu-vāda*, and that the three criteria for a "correct" Buddhism are that it teaches causality, that it promotes an altruistic, other-benefiting ideal, and that words are valued to express the truth. The *Lotus Sutra* meets all these criteria. The *Lotus Sutra* is a "critical philosophy" in contrast to the "topical philosophy" of *hongaku shisō*. It urges people to have faith, is critical of mistaken understanding of the Buddha Dharma, and values the skillful use (*hōben*, *upāya*) of language.

Unfortunately, Hakamaya says, for most of Japanese history the *Lotus Sutra* has been understood in an un-Buddhistic way. The interpretations of Seng-chao, Chi-tsang, and others, who understood the *Lotus Sutra* in terms of Taoist or Buddha-nature ideas, were imported into Japan from the earliest days, influenced the *wa* ethos attributed to Prince Shōtoku, and from the very beginning turned the critical *Lotus Sutra* approach into an overly tolerant ethos. Thus from the very beginning the *hongaku shisō* attitude won out over the radical, critical, and truly Buddhist approach of the *Lotus Sutra*.

Thoughts on Rituals for Removing Evil Karma

Hakamaya continues to write prolifically on a variety of subjects. One ongoing series of noteworthy articles, the sixth and most recent supplement having appeared in March 1996,[35] concerns rituals used for getting rid of evil karma, a practice that Hakamaya rejects as based on *ātmavāda*. In these articles his focus shifts to speculations on the origins of Mahayana Buddhism, in the course of which he argues that an important role was played by "supervisors" (*vaiyāvṛyakara*) who acted as a bridge between the ascetic home-departed monks and the lay believers who provided support for the Buddhist organization. These speculations, like Hakamaya's work in general, are part of an ongoing process of working out the implications of Critical Buddhism.

RESPONSES AND OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE ISSUE

Although Matsumoto and Hakamaya are the central figures in this controversy, there are other scholars who have made claims similar to theirs and otherwise have contributed to the debate. In this connections, the work of four more faculty members of Komazawa University merits attention.

Ishii Shūdō has published an important volume, *Studies on the History of the Ch'an School during the Sung Period* (1987). In his introduction he refers to the work of Matsumoto and Hakamaya and their conclusion that "Chinese Zen is not Buddhism (i.e., not anti-Upaniṣad)." He adds that "this may seem rather strange at first glance, but it corresponds to my understanding that 'the indigenous Taoist thought is not Buddhist,' and their statements promise to be valuable in my attempt to clarify the character of Chinese Ch'an."[36] Ishii is careful not to give full support to the

claims of Hakamaya and Matsumoto, however, and, as we have seen from Hakamaya's responses to Ishii's queries, both parties are currently engaged in a public debate to clarify their positions. Ishii appears willing to admit that "indigenous" elements have value and do not necessarily compromise Buddhism; Hakamaya will have none of it.

Yamauchi Shun'yū has published two massive tomes, *Dōgen's Zen and the Tendai Hongaku Tradition* (1985) and *Zen and Tendai Meditation* (1986). The former presents detailed studies on the development of *hongaku shisō* and underscores Dōgen's critique against it. In the preface to this work Yamauchi acknowledges that his studies are an extension of the work of Hazama Jikō and Tamura Yoshirō.

Yoshizu Yoshihide has published *Studies in the History of Hua-yen-Ch'an Philosophy* (1985), focussing on Fa-tsang, Ch'eng-kuan, and Tsung-mi, with special attention to the influence of *hongaku shisō*. He concludes that

> although the thought of original awakening (*hongaku shisō*) is said to have taken root in Japanese Buddhism from the Heian period through the Kamakura period, further research must be conducted on the contact and incurring differences [*sic*] between the Chinese meaning of original enlightenment, which I have called here Hua-yen-Ch'an, and the Japanese usage of the concept of original awakening.[37]

Itō Takatoshi has written a number of articles (compiled in his *Critical Studies on Chinese Buddhism* in 1992) on the early Chinese assimilation of Buddhism. He focuses on the work of Seng-chao and his influence on Chi-tsang, the systematizer of the Sanlun school. He notes the current view that these two figures were very influential in helping Buddhism take root in China, only to counter that in fact these two figures assimilated Buddhist teachings on the basis of indigenous Chinese ideas. In his essay on "matching terms,"—a phrase usually used to describe only the early, pre-Seng-chao phase of the introduction of Buddhism into China—Itō argues that "All of Chinese Buddhism, from the time of its introduction to the dominance of the Ch'an school, is a Buddhism of 'matching terms'."[38] In other words, Chinese Buddhism is always understood on the basis of the indigenous ideas such as *tao* and *li*. A Buddhism of "matching terms" is no more than an extension of indigenous Chinese ideas (*rōsō shisō*), and cannot be considered correct or proper Buddhism.

RESPONSES TO THE CHALLENGE BY BUDDHIST SCHOLARS

Tamura Yoshirō

The topic of *hongaku shisō* was brought to the fore of current Buddhist studies through the work of Tamura Yoshirō, who followed in the footsteps of Hazama Jikō and Shimaji Daitō in identifying *hongaku shisō* as a dominant ethos in Japanese Buddhism and religion. Tamura's study on the influence of *hongaku shisō* on the new Kamakura Buddhist movements (1965), and his work in the compilation of *hongaku* texts, laid the foundation for current studies on *hongaku shisō*.[39]

It was a great loss to the world of Buddhist scholarship when Tamura passed away in 1989. We can only speculate how he would have responded to the challenge presented by Matsumoto and Hakamaya. Tamura is on record as saying that *hongaku shisō* was the climactic development of Mahayana Buddhism, and he was a tireless advocate of the positive influences of this ethos, not only on Japanese religion but also in various areas of Japanese culture. What D. T. Suzuki claimed for "Zen," Tamura would probably have claimed for *hongaku shisō*.[40] Since he cannot respond directly to these new developments, his collected works on the subject (published in 1990) must serve as his "response" on the subject.

Takasaki Jikidō

The greatest authority on *tathāgata-garbha* thought in Japan today is Takasaki Jikidō, and his masterful *The Formation of Tathāgata-garbha Thought* was published in 1974. Both Matsumoto and Hakamaya did graduate work under Takasaki and quote his work with respect, while in certain recent publications Takasaki makes a preliminary response to their arguments.[41] Takasaki praises them for their careful scholarship and critical approach, but cannot accept their conclusion that *tathāgata-garbha* thought and *hongaku shisō* "are not Buddhist." He points out that the *tathāgata-garbha* texts themselves are constantly aware of the possible criticism that they are positing an atman, and deny the charge.[42] Yet their openness to this charge did not lead anyone in India to accuse them of being "not Buddhism." It is true that the Madhyamika school criticized the *tathāgata-garbha* and the Yogacara traditions in general for using expressions that implied substantial existence, but the Madhyamikas still accepted such language as being part of Mahayana Buddhism, even though they regarded it as an "incomplete" teaching. The *tathāgata-garbha* ideas were also accepted in Tibet as part of the Mahayana tradition.

As for Matsumoto's idea of a *dhātu-vāda*, Takasaki adds, it is a useful proposition with which to criticize *tathāgata-garbha* and Yogacara ideas, as it is indeed structurally similar to the Upaniṣadic idea of the unity of Brahman and atman. At the same time, Takasaki doubts whether it is necessarily always un-Buddhist or anti-Buddhist, and whether it can serve as a reliable litmus test to determine what is and is not Buddhism. Takasaki finds Matsumoto's defining characteristics of Buddhism too restrictive, and wonders if perhaps Śākyamuni himself was "poisoned" by *dhātu-vāda* influences. Matsumoto's logic should lead him to criticize the Madhyamika idea of "supreme truth" (*paramārtha-satya*), and eventually any and all aspects of the Buddhist tradition.[43] Matsumoto does admit that ultimately he can only rely on "an absolute Other," which leads Takasaki to wonder if Matsumoto will eventually embrace Christianity.

Hakamaya, Takasaki points out, attacks *tathāgata-garbha* more as a social critic, and there is no denying that Buddhism has contributed to social injustice and discrimination.[44] But the blame for these shortcomings cannot be laid solely at the feet of *hongaku shisō*, since a "pure" philosophy of emptiness could have led to the same results. In any case it is obvious that a Buddhist should have compassionate concern for others and not ignore proper practices. He also feels that Hakamaya's critique of language makes important points, and that logical, verbal expressions are important in Buddhism, but Takasaki thinks that one must recognize the limits of language. It is not anti-Buddhist to admit these limits.

Takasaki concludes his brief comments by noting that important questions have been raised, and it is time to rethink *tathāgata-garbha* ideas and the *Awakening of Mahayana Faith*, and for him personally to reconsider the conclusions presented in his early work.[45]

Hirakawa Akira

Hirakawa Akira, one of the deans of Buddhist studies in Japan, responds to Matsumoto's work in the leading essay of a collection of articles he edited on "*tathāgata-garbha* and the *Awakening of Faith*."[46] He begins with his own understanding of *tathāgata-garbha* as the "nature" or "potential" to attain Buddhahood. It is not static but is ever changing: this is the *tathāgata-garbha-dhātu*. *Dhātu* does not necessarily mean a substantial "foundation" or "basis" as Matsumoto claims. In fact there are passages in the Āgama sutras that identify *dhātu* with *pratītya-samutpāda*. The *Śrīmālādevī Sutra* itself says that the *tathāgata-garbha* is

not an atman (T No. 353, 12.222b19–21). Hirakawa agrees with Matsumoto that *pratītyasamutpāda*, sunyata, and *anātman* are the fundamental teachings of Buddhism, but cannot agree that therefore *tathāgata-garbha* thought is not Buddhist.[47]

Lambert Schmithausen

Lambert Schmithausen has published "Remarks on N. Hakamaya's view of the problem of 'Buddhism and Nature',"[48] where he criticizes Hakamaya's view of Buddhism and nature and concludes that, despite his espousal of a "genuine Buddhism," some of his ideas are borrowed from the Western tradition and are "rather Cartesianism in a Buddhist garb."[49]

RESPONSES OUTSIDE THE WORLD OF BUDDHIST SCHOLARSHIP

Response of the Sōtō Sect

The response by the Sōtō sect to Hakamaya's and Matsumoto's writings has been mixed.[50] The daily routine of Sōtō temples, like those of most other Japanese Buddhist sects, mostly involves funerary rites and is closely associated with the type of ethos that Hakamaya attacks.[51] On the practical level, the *hongaku* ethos is as prevalent in Sōtō circles as in any other Buddhist sect, and their economic base requires a continuation of the status quo. As for the theoretical level, what would be the reaction among church members in England if an established Biblical scholar or theologian at a major seminary (or Cambridge University) claimed that the Church of England is "not Christian"?

Hongaku shisō and Japanese Feminism

One of the most interesting responses to the critique of *hongaku shisō* comes from the side of Japanese feminists, who have picked up on the theme and applied it to their critique of contemporary Japanese society. Ōgoshi Aiko, Minamoto Junko, and Yamashita Akiko made a considerable splash with their best-selling book, *Buddhism as a Promoter of Sexual Discrimination*.[52] They point out that to date the feminist movement in Japan has largely consisted in activities and analyses influenced by Western models, and that if feminism is to take root and be meaningful for Japanese society, it must respond to the indigenous situation. In this context they refer to Hakamaya's critique of *hongaku shisō* and argue that this ethos has contributed greatly to sexual discrimination in Japan. They point out that the *wa* ethos puts the burden for staying at home and

maintaining the "harmony" of family life on women, and this acts to inhibit the liberation of Japanese women from restrictive traditional roles, not to mention its unconscious effect on all aspects of their daily life. Minamoto attacks *wa* as a repressive element of Japanism (*Nihonshugi*) and a discriminatory ethos based on *hongaku shisō*.

Surely no one familiar with the place of women in Japanese society can deny the claim that women are discriminated against in Japan. The claim that *hongaku shisō* is responsible is another matter, and requires further analysis.

Some Personal Observations

The question still remains whether or not all Buddha-nature formulations need to be classified *dhātu-vāda* and thus antithetical to Buddhism. There are certainly examples of Buddha-nature formulations that take pains to avoid such a substantialist interpretation. T'ien-t'ai Chih-i's concept of threefold Buddha-nature (*san'in busshō*), for example, proposes a synergy of reality, wisdom, and practice intended to avoid reliance on a substantial *dhātu*. Buddha-nature is threefold: Buddha-nature as the way things are (the "direct" cause of Buddhahood), the wisdom that illuminates the way things are (the "sufficient" cause of Buddhahood), and the practice that perfects this inherent disposition for wisdom (the "conditional" causes of Buddhahood). In order to avoid a simplistic treatment of whether or not Buddha-nature "exists," Chih-i interprets Buddha-nature in terms of the *ekayāna* principle of the *Lotus Sutra*: the promise of potential Buddhahood for all beings. Buddha-nature is thus not a static entity, and yet one cannot say that it does not "exist." Everyone is not a Buddha "just as they are"—a process is required to manifest the inherent potential of Buddhahood. Buddha-nature is part of a larger world of experience that involves three aspects: the way things are, the wisdom to perceive things correctly, and the practice required to attain this wisdom.[53]

As for *hongaku shisō*, perhaps the difficulty in rendering this term in English reveals the tension and danger in the term itself. For my part, I have always had reservations about the translation "original" enlightenment because it has too strong a temporal implication, and yet many of the interpretations of this term (and of the *Awakening of Mahayana Faith* itself) do indeed encourage such an understanding and hence provide Matsumoto and Hakamaya with sufficient cause to reject it as *dhātu-vāda*). The terms "innate" and "inherent" enlightenment also smack of a

substantialist heterodoxy. If indeed *hongaku shisō* and universal Buddha-nature are valid expressions of the Buddha Dharma, it is incumbent on the proponents of this kind of thinking to show how they can be reconciled with the basic Buddhist teachings of *anātman* (non-self) and *pratītya-samutpāda* (causality).[54]

Finally, apart from the technical argument as to whether Buddha-nature ideas and *hongaku shisō* are "orthodox" or "not really Buddhist," it cannot be denied that the ethos has failed to provide a broad ethical dimension or stimulate a social ethic in Japanese society. Japanese Buddhists may—and in fact have—argued that this is not a problem, and that for Zen (for example) the priority is for the individual to realize his/her own enlightenment, after which compassion and concern for others should "flow forth spontaneously." Nevertheless history has shown that this ethos tends to support the status quo; it provides neither a stimulus for necessary social change and altruistic activity, nor a basis to resist social structures that prey on the weak and oppressed. Was the Zen master who dismissed a beggar at the gate and refused him food and clothing saying, "He has the Buddha-nature," failing as a Buddhist to be compassionate; or was he merely following through with the implications that flow naturally from the Buddha-nature ethos?

RÉSUMÉ

The criticisms of Hakamaya and Matsumoto seem to be aimed at a number of different targets, often at the same time and not always clearly defined. In general, the targets touch on three levels: Buddhological, sectarian, and social criticism.

1. At the Buddhological level Hakamaya and Matsumoto are questioning the consistency of concepts such as Buddha-nature and *hongaku shisō* with other basic Buddhist concepts such as *pratītyasamutpāda*. They use textual and doctrinal arguments in an attempt to show that Buddha-nature ideas (*dhātu-vāda*) are incompatible with other, more basic, Buddhist teachings. Whether or not one agrees with the specifics of their argument, the time is ripe for a Buddhological, and Buddhist, reevaluation of the Buddha-nature concept.

2. At a sectarian level they are resisting what they perceive to be an incorrect understanding of Dōgen's teachings by their own Sōtō sect, and seek to reform the sect by reevaluating Dōgen's teachings, especially with regard to the idea of Buddha-nature.

3. At the level of social criticism they intend to show that the acceptance of the Buddha-nature/*hongaku shisō* ethos in Japan has led to objectionable social structures and attitudes, and that a recognition of the danger of this ethos is necessary to right this state of affairs. That such social criticism should arise at this time in Japanese society, and from within the Buddhist community itself, is a matter of great significance not only to those interested in Buddhism and its development in East Asia and its potential meaning for the West, but also to those interested in the dynamics of religious ideas and their influence on society, both in the past and in the present.

One concluding remark. The favorable yet stereotyped description of Japanese Buddhism, and Japanese religion in general, shows a stress on harmony with nature and a "harmonious" society; absolute immanence; an uncritical acceptance of phenomena as they are; the interdependence or identity of kami and buddhas; love of peace; an affirming and positive attitude toward life in this world; and so on. On the negative side, Japanese religiosity is said to show a lack of socio-ethical concern; an unquestioning support for the status quo; a weak idea of justice and social injustice, thus leaving people easy prey to political propaganda and social pressures to conform; an irresponsible "hands-off" disposition that contributes to pollution, reckless use of natural resources, littering, and destruction of public property, as well as a disregard for the interest of anyone outside of one's own "group"; and an absence of foundations for making ethical judgements between right and wrong, good and bad, correct and incorrect.

These may be no less an oversimplification of the Japanese religious ethos than were the simplistic attempts to blame the world-wide environmental destruction of the last century on the Biblical injunction in Genesis to "fill the earth and subdue it." In any case it is just this ethos that Matsumoto and Hakamaya see as encompassing the totality of their critical concerns. What is the true understanding of the Buddha Dharma? What are the social implications of various interpretations of the Buddha Dharma? What is the role of Buddhism in Japanese society today? How should developments in Buddhist doctrinal history be understood? What were the social, political, and economic influences in Japan of the uncritical acceptance of the idea of an inherent and universal Buddha-nature? Can contemporary Japanese society be criticized from a Buddhist perspective, and if so, how? The questions they ask cannot be ignored.

The sharpness of their critique demands no less a sharpness in the response. In this sense Critical Buddhism remains an unfinished task, and an ongoing challenge.

Critical Buddhism and Returning to the Sources

Dan Lusthaus

Critical Buddhism was inevitable. That it was given voice by prominent Japanese scholars noted for their work in non-East Asian Buddhism was also inevitable. That it has provoked strong, even hostile, reactions was inevitable as well. Inevitable means that the causes and conditions that gave rise to Critical Buddhism can be analyzed and understood to show that it has a context, a history, and a necessity. Critical Buddhism is necessary. Thinking about what arises through causes and conditions, especially in terms of how that impacts on cultural and social realities, is a principal component of both Critical Buddhism and Buddhism properly practiced.

This essay will examine some—but certainly not all—of the factors that have contributed to Critical Buddhism. Some arguments and observations will be offered that, while not retellings from the writings of the Critical Buddhists, run parallel to them. These parallels, which I offer as supplements, recast some of their arguments and focus on issues and areas germane to their undertaking. After discussing the inevitability of Critical Buddhism in the context of twentieth-century Japanese Buddhist scholarship, I will turn to some of the events that took place in China during the seventh and eighth centuries that were decisive for the prevalence in East Asia of the type(s) of Buddhism they criticize. This will be followed by a critique of what has happened to the notion of enlightenment in East Asian Buddhism, particularly in the Ch'an and Zen traditions, with reference to the problem of *hongaku* (original enlightenment) and the authority of lineage transmission. Then, stepping back into a wider context, I will suggest that, far from being the idiosyncratic, misguided departure depicted by its detractors, Critical Buddhism is the inevitable revisiting of a theme that has been central to Buddhism since its onset. All the above

points concern inevitabilities: the trajectory and accomplishments of Japanese scholarship in this century coupled with the crisis of Buddhism in the modern world; the decisive historical events that have established a pervasive ideological underpinning in East Asian Buddhism that Matsumoto and Hakamaya have labeled *dhātu-vāda*, combined with the exclusion of other, counteracting Buddhist tendencies found elsewhere in the Buddhist world, such as Buddhist logic; the undermining of certain foundational Buddhist notions, such as enlightenment, as a result of or in tandem with the growth of *dhātu-vāda* ideology; the persistent self-criticism and self-reevaluation that Buddhism has subjected itself to, often glorifying the critique and the critics (Nāgārjuna being the most famous example)—all these points have made it inevitable that Critical Buddhism appear today in Japan (and elsewhere). Finally, while examining an aspect of Matsumoto's critique of *The Record of Lin-chi*, I will suggest some tactical distinctions that should be considered by those critical of Critical Buddhism.

THE TWO INEVITABILITIES

Critical Buddhism has arisen from a convergence of two inevitabilities. I will mention but not document them here, and speak of them in general terms with a few illustrations.

The first is the prevailing sentiment over the last few decades that Buddhism, particularly East Asian Buddhism, and especially Japanese Zen, has become deficient in the area of ethics.[1] Conferences have been held and papers have been written decrying this deficiency, and various proposals have been advanced to remedy it. In Japan Buddhist insensitivity to the plight of minorities and oppressed people, and other lapses of strong ethical leadership, have raised questions in the mind of the Japanese public about the ethical backbone and vision of some Buddhist sects.[2]

The second inevitability, which is more far-reaching in terms of general Buddhist history, derives from the increasing attention Japanese Buddhist scholars have paid to Sanskrit and Tibetan materials over the last century. Such studies have forced a reevaluation of the East Asian sources and traditions. East Asian scholars, but most especially Japanese scholars, have also rediscovered India and the Indian materials, albeit sometimes in their extant Tibetan versions.[3] At the very least, these discoveries have dramatically recontextualized the East Asian understanding of India, leading to a questioning of age-old traditional East Asian

assumptions about, first, what was happening in India before and during the transmission of Buddhism to China. Until this century, there had been virtually no interest whatsoever on the part of Korean or Japanese Buddhists concerning Indian or non-East Asian Buddhist developments subsequent to the Sung dynasty. A second result of these discoveries is that there is a questioning of the traditional ways in which the East Asian traditions have anchored themselves to Indian Buddhism.

One can quickly gauge the increasing accuracy and sophistication with which Japanese and international scholars are rediscovering the Indian context by surveying some accomplishments of the last hundred years or so. Two bibliographical works written by Japanese scholars in English afford convenient examples for those unfamiliar with Japanese scholarship. Nanjō Bun'yū's English translation, published in 1883, of a Ming dynasty catalogue of Chinese translations of Indian materials—which was a great boon to Buddhist scholars of the day unfamiliar with East Asian languages[4]—offered reconstructed Sanskrit titles for the works listed. Those reconstructions were more often fanciful than correct.

Nearly one hundred years later Nakamura Hajime published his *Indian Buddhism: A Survey with Bibliographical Notes.*[5] While not entirely free of fanciful title reconstructions and East Asian presuppositions,[6] this work demonstrates how far Japanese scholarship had come.[7] Comparisons of the Chinese Buddhist corpus with extant versions of the same or related texts in Sanskrit and Tibetan are systematically undertaken; discussions of the East Asian corpus are frequently supplemented by analyses of Indian and Tibetan texts unavailable in Chinese; and bad, incomplete, and problematic translations are identified as such.[8] Nakamura, in a sense, presents a fuller reconstruction of the Indian Buddhist textual scene than East Asia had ever seen, since many of the materials he discusses had never been translated into Chinese and had therefore been unknown, unappreciated, and unaccounted for during the development and consolidation of East Asian Buddhism.

I do not mean to imply that Nakamura accomplished this single-handedly. On the contrary, his work became possible only because of the labors of fellow scholars who have perused, catalogued, and studied the widest range of Buddhist texts, from more cultures, more periods, and in more languages than has ever been possible in history. In short, Nakamura's survey shows a vastly superior familiarity with and command of the non-Chinese materials than did Nanjō's *Catalogue*. Yet his critical

appraisal of these materials is still tinged with a *dhātu-vāda* outlook, that is to say, he still interprets Buddhist literature through East Asian models and assumptions.[9] Nanjō offers erroneous "facts" or details; his catalogue merely lists texts with minimal information; he offers little if any interpretation. Nakamura has "corrected" many of the details, but the full import of the material he surveys *and interprets* for and from the East Asian vantage point has not yet become apparent.

As Japanese studies grew more sophisticated, noticeable subtle shifts in attitudes about Indian sources emerged. When D.T. Suzuki published his first solo English work in 1900, a translation of the Śikṣānanda version of the *Awakening of Mahayana Faith*,[10] he devoted much of his introduction to passionately defending the traditional East Asian belief that the *Awakening of Mahayana Faith* was an authentic Indian text authored by Aśvaghoṣa, and spared no sarcasm and scorn for those who might question that attribution. The *Awakening of Mahayana Faith* had long been suspected as a Chinese apocryphal text, in fact almost from the moment it appeared in China in the sixth century. By the early 1930s Suzuki had studied Sanskrit and Tibetan sources for his *Studies in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* (1930, repr. 1981) and his translation into English of the *Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* (1932; repr. 1978).[11] In *Studies*, he initially referred to the *Awakening of Faith* as Aśvaghoṣa's text but later hedges slightly with the phrase "usually ascribed to Aśvaghoṣa."[12] Two years later, in the introduction to *The Laṅkāvatāra Sutra* (xxxix), he wrote:

> *The Awakening of Faith in the Mahāyāna* is generally ascribed to Aśvaghoṣa. While *he may not have been the author* of this most important treatise, …there was surely a great Buddhist mind, who…poured out his thoughts in *The Awakening*. Some scholars contend that *The Awakening* is a Chinese work, but this is not well grounded. [emphasis added]

While still stubbornly rejecting Chinese authorship of *Awakening of Mahayana Faith* (scholars today almost unanimously consider it a Chinese creation), he was clearly backing off from his original position. In the thirty years between his first work and this revised opinion, Suzuki must have learned about Aśvaghoṣa, who was not a Mahāyāna Buddhist,[13] and whose extant Sanskrit works, such as *Buddhacarita*, bear no resemblance whatsoever to the *Awakening of Mahayana Faith*'s ideology.[14] That Suzuki's underlying commitment to East Asian assumptions only underwent minor modifications as his familiarity with Sanskrit and

Tibetan materials increased is evident throughout his *Laṅkāvatāra* works. His attempt in *Studies* to sharply distinguish between the "Zen" ideology of the *Laṅkāvatāra* on the one hand, and Yogacara on the other (oddly enough, on the grounds that Zen and *Laṅkāvatāra* are forms of "Transcendental Idealism," whereas Yogacara is not), is embarrassing and naive, and driven by his conviction that the *Laṅkāvatāra* lay at the core of Zen, a conviction that the Zen tradition has insisted upon for over a thousand years. The Ch'an opinion of Yogacara (or the Zen opinion of Hossō) has always been derogatory.

Such reexaminations of historical origins have been going on in earnest for many decades, the work of Yanagida Seizan and others on Zen lineages and history being the best known examples. These reexaminations have determined that many, possibly most, of the presumed connections between Indian Buddhism and the Ch'an schools—such as the transmission to China by Bodhidharma—are largely later East Asian constructions, as are many of the early Ch'an lineages, and for that matter, the patriarchal lineages of T'ien-t'ai, Hua-yen, and Pure Land.[15]

While it may appear that the need to validate historical claims should not be as urgent for East Asian Buddhism as it is for so-called historical religions, such as Christianity,[16] it is important nonetheless, especially for Zen, which has, with an air of weighty circumstance, rested the authority and validity of Zen on the notion of a transmission of "enlightenment" from teacher to disciple, thus making the validation of these transmission lineages themselves crucial for maintaining that authority. In other words, in the absence of *bone fide* lineages, Zen's own authority is in question, an issue I will return to later.

The East Asian traditions have always emphasized their perceived continuities with their Indian ancestors, rather than discontinuities or disparities, but the rediscovery of Indian Buddhism—based on both careful examination of a fuller range of Indian materials than had previously been available in Chinese translations as well as a reevaluation of the events and factors in Chinese, Korean, and Japanese history that have shaped East Asian Buddhism's self-image—has reasserted the disparities. These include elements of Indian Buddhism that were never adequately conveyed to China as well as elements with Indian precedents that, for various reasons, the Chinese and other East Asians have refashioned into theories and practices significantly removed from and even at odds with their antecedents. The full range of these disparities is too vast to list or

discuss here, but some fundamental features and their effects on contemporary East Asian scholarship may be cited.

DECISIVENESS OF THE SEVENTH AND EIGHTH CENTURIES FOR CHINESE BUDDHISM

One of the dominant forces affecting twentieth-century Japanese understanding of Indian and Tibetan Buddhism is the pioneering work of Ui Hakuju, who recognized the centrality of Yogacara thought for the development of East Asian Buddhism. While the work of Ui Hakuju did much to increase awareness of the importance of Indian thought for properly understanding East Asian Buddhism, his innovative studies of the relation between Indian and Chinese Buddhism viewed the former through the presuppositional prism of the latter, as, for instance, when he championed Paramārtha's sixth-century translations from Sanskrit into Chinese over those of Hsüan-tsang in the seventh century, despite the superior accuracy of Hsüan-tsang's works. Ui was echoing a decisive ideological decision made by East Asian Buddhists twelve hundred years earlier. The establishment of the hegemony of *dhātu-vāda* ideology in eighth-century China relied in no small part on the rejection of Hsüan-tsang's presentation of Indian Buddhist ideas, a rejection accompanied by a return to the ideology expressed in the works of Paramārtha and other earlier thinkers.

This moment in Chinese Buddhist history proved pivotal. East Asian Buddhism returned with deliberateness and passion to its own earlier misconceptions instead of returning to the trajectory of Indian Buddhism from which it believed it had been spawned. The history of the misconceptions leading up to these moments of the late seventh and early eighth century can easily be traced through the surviving texts of the earlier periods, and many are well known to present-day scholars: From the attempts by the early so-called Prajna schools to smuggle an eternal self or spirit (*shen*) into their formulations;[17] to the writings of Kumārajīva's contemporary, Hui-yüan, on the eternal spirit;[18] to the excitement created in China when it appeared that the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sutra*'s doctrine of Buddha-nature gave scriptural credence to the ubiquitous underlying metaphysical substratum that the earlier Chinese Buddhists had been so eagerly seeking; to the displacement of Nāgārjuna's actual Madhyamakan thought by the *Ta chih tu lun*, a text with *dhātu-vāda* tendencies that, because it was ascribed to Nāgārjuna, gave the Chinese an image of

Nāgārjuna as a *dhātu-vāda* thinker;[19] to the equivalence—frequently made—between the terms "spirit," "Mahayana" (which in Chinese and Korean writings often takes on a talismanic air rather than simply denoting a sectarian preference), and *tao*;[20] to the dominant notion of a pure, eternal consciousness or Mind in the sixth century;[21] to the full-fledged *dharma-dhātu(-vāda)* systems of the T'ang and Sung (Hua-yen, Ch'an, Pure Land, the short-lived Chinese Tantra school, and, to a lesser extent, T'ien-t'ai). The repeated attempts to return to this metaphysical foundation—though frequently challenged by other Chinese Buddhists—was always deliberate, but by the eighth century this turn had become decisive and irreversible. While one of the key slogans of the day was "return to the source," it was in many ways a "return" to Chinese metaphysical assumptions that had flourished in China before Buddhism's arrival. It was a "return" to an underlying, invariant, universal metaphysical "source" rather than a return to the sources of Buddhism, that is to say, Indian Buddhist thought. Fa-tsang, the seminal Hua-yen thinker, played a key role.[22] It might be useful to quickly recount some key events of this period.

Hsüan-tsang—the famous Chinese pilgrim who, after studying Buddhism in India for sixteen years, returned to China to translate seventy-four texts—devoted his life to recontextualizing the Chinese Buddhist thought of his day. While in India he recognized that the orientation of Chinese Buddhism was at variance in some very fundamental ways from what he was discovering in India. Some, but not all, of that variance coincides with what Critical Buddhism has labeled *dhātu-vāda*. When he returned to China he endeavored to bring Chinese Buddhism back into line with normative Indian Buddhist thought, in part by retranslating texts that were already popular in China, such as the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, which was the basic text of Paramārtha's school. Hsüan-tsang, to make sure this text would be understood properly, free of what he considered to be Paramārtha's distortions, also translated two commentaries on it, one by Vasubandhu and the other by *Asvabhāva.[23] Hsüan-tsang also introduced new materials with which the Chinese were not familiar, such as a Vaiśeṣika text,[24] and, most importantly, *he was the first ever to translate any Indian logic texts into Chinese*.

Medieval Indian Buddhist philosophy and Tibetan philosophy are virtually inconceivable without Dignāga and his logic. Hakamaya and Matsumoto propose that Buddhism should engage in critical, rational thinking, namely the sort of thinking for which Dignāga's logic became

foundational outside East Asia. While prior to Hsüan-tsang some of Dignāga's epistemological writings had been introduced by others,[25] Dignāga's works on the syllogism—precisely those works that had made him famous throughout India, even to non-Buddhists—remained unknown in China. Hsüan-tsang translated one of Dignāga's strictly logical works, the *Nyāyamukha*,[26] along with a synopsis of Dignāga's logical system by Śaṇkarasvāmin called *Nyāyapraveśa* (T No. 1630). Hsüan-tsang had discovered that Indian Buddhism was permeated with logic,[27] that in the seventh century the study and application of rigorous syllogistic logic was synonymous with the practice of Indian Buddhism, regardless of sect.[28] Yet nothing of this basic discipline, nothing of this fundamental method, was as yet known in China.[29] Despite Hsüan-tsang's efforts, the Chinese found Indian logic so arcane that by the end of the eighth century it was virtually forgotten.

Hsüan-tsang's translation work began in 645, when he arrived back in China, and ended with his death in 664. During his last years Fa-tsang briefly joined Hsüan-tsang's translation committee, but as Fa-tsang was already firmly attached to the sinitic "misconceptions" established by Paramārtha and others, he considered Hsüan-tsang to be a dangerous revisionist and left, finding support for his rejection of Hsüan-tsang's understanding of Buddhism in the teachings of Chih-yen (later considered the second Hua-yen patriarch, with Fa-tsang being considered the third). Chih-yen was critical of Hsüan-tsang's teachings and decried the strong influence they were then exerting on the capitol, and indeed throughout East Asia at that time, since Hsüan-tsang was clearly the most eminent and famous Chinese Buddhist of his day. Students came to him from Korea and Japan as well as from all over China.

When Hsüan-tsang died he was succeeded by K'uei-chi, whom Fa-tsang attacked, vying for the patronage and attention of Empress Wu. In the end Fa-tsang won out. His polemics against Hsüan-tsang's and K'uei-chi's version of Yogacara were encapsulated in several slogans: Yogacara was concerned with characterizing dharmas (*fa-hsiang*), whereas True Buddhism (i.e., Fa-tsang's sinitic version) dealt with Dharma-nature (*fa-hsing*); Yogacara's expertise was restricted to defiled consciousness (*wei-shih*, Fa-tsang's misinterpretation of *vijñapti-mātra*), while True Buddhism comprehended the One Mind that alone is the ground of reality (*wei-hsin*); Yogacara rejected the soteriological significance and ontological reality of *tathāgata-garbha*, while True Buddhism saw the latter as another

synonym for the ground of reality in its dynamic functioning; Yogacara understood the Three Self-Natures (*trisvabhāva*, *san tzu-hsing*) as ultimately affirming the causality of *pratītya-samutpāda* in terms of *paratantra* (*yi-t'a san-tzu-hsing*, "dependent on others nature"), while True Buddhism affirmed the non-obstructed mutual interpenetration of principle and events (*li-shih wu-ai*) as True Emptiness and Wondrous Being (*chen-k'ung miao-yu*) in terms of *pariniṣpanna* (*yüan-ch'eng san-tzu-hsing*, "perfected nature"). The question of whether Fa-tsang's characterization of Hsüan-tsang's teachings was accurate or not aside, it is clear that each of his preferred positions invokes the sentiments of *dhātu-vāda*.

This point bears emphasis. In early T'ang China (7th–8th century) there was a deliberate attempt to divorce Chinese Buddhism from developments in India. Ostensibly that move, promoted by Fa-tsang, Tsung-mi, and many others,[30] was cast as a turn from sastra to sutra, from the technical interpretive literature of the Indians to the texts purporting to record the words of the Buddha himself. Leaving aside the historical complication that the sutras to which they turned were invariably Mahayanic, which is to say, they were composed five or more centuries later than the last words ever uttered by the Buddha, and the further complication that some of the sutras they took to be genuine translations of Indian texts were in fact written in China, we can say that the key thrust of this turn (and its major consequence) was to deliberately free Chinese and other East Asian Buddhists from Indian interpretations and thereby open Buddhism to specifically East Asian readings and concerns. In short, the sensibilities of Indian Buddhism were intentionally displaced by East Asian models, such as Buddha-nature (*fo-hsing*), sudden versus gradual enlightenment, *p'an-chiao* (classification of teachings), and so on.

As I will argue shortly, these sorts of debates, between substrative ideologies and their deconstruction, have recurred throughout Buddhist history. The most significant series of debates for the development of East Asian Buddhism occurred between the sixth and eighth centuries, from the Sui through mid-T'ang dynasties. Hsüan-tsang, as it turned out, was in many ways the last chance for non-*dhātu-vāda* Buddhism to establish a firm root in China (though his works are not entirely devoid of those elements either). But Chih-yen and Fa-tsang ultimately prevailed. The polemical division drawn by Fa-tsang between *fa-hsing* and *fa-hsiang* (or between *wei-hsin* and *wei-shih)*, cuts remarkably along the same lines as those between *dhātu-vāda* and Critical Buddhism. It is *fa-hsing*, whose

central tenet is an ubiquitous underlying nature called *dharma-dhātu*, that has dominated Chinese, Korean, and Japanese Buddhism. We may even consider *fa-hsing* a synonym for *dhātu-vāda*.

Though the problem of *dhātu-vāda* ideology infiltrating Buddhism did not begin in China or East Asia, it intensified there, not only because the *dhātu-vāda* side gained hegemony, but also because the loyal opposition (with a few possible exceptions) virtually disappeared from the scene.[31] There can be no real debate with only one side present, and the intersectarian debates of East Asian Buddhism are all *between dhātu-vāda* schools, which is to say, the notion of *dhātu-vāda* is *not* what they are problematizing or questioning. By the eighth century the Chinese and other East Asians were no longer interested in Indian developments. Thus, Dignāga's logic, minimally introduced by Hsüan-tsang, is forgotten and abandoned; Dharmakīrti, Candrakīrti, and Śāntarakṣīta never appear in Chinese translations and thus never affect the East Asian intellectual scene. It is in these last-named thinkers that the weapons against *dhātu-vāda* were most sharply honed and deployed in India (and later in Tibet). Since missionaries continued to arrive in China to translate Sanskrit materials through the thirteenth century, one can only wonder why no one ever chose to translate the works of the most dominant thinkers on the Indian scene since the late seventh century.[32]

WHEN IS ENLIGHTENMENT NOT ENLIGHTENMENT?

Noticeable and radical shifts in methodology (*mārga*), affecting both theory and practice, occur between the Buddhism(s) of India and China, including: Indian syllogistic reasoning was displaced by Chinese hierarchical classification and crypto-Taoist dialectical reasoning;[33] the elaborate Indian meditation practices were ultimately reduced to "just sitting" (*shikan-taza*)[34] and "reciting a Buddha's name" (*nenbutsu*);[35] and, perhaps most significantly, the very notion of enlightenment itself was transformed from that of a *singular* ultimate peak experience that resolved all of life's difficulties, to the *multiple* awakenings one reads of in Ch'an and Zen biographies and autobiographies,[36] each subsequent awakening correcting and supplanting its predecessor. In India enlightenment was considered the culmination of one's practice of the Buddhist method (*mārga*). In China, Korea, and Japan that sort of culminating enlightenment gets deferred to a final, ultimate enlightenment, usually denoted in East Asian

texts by the transliterated phrase found in the *Heart Sutra* and elsewhere: *anuttara samyak sambodhi*, "unexcelled, complete awakening." Thus, as opposed to the single enlightenment one finds discussed in India, East Asian Buddhism proposes, on the one hand, multiple enlightenments, each successively superior to its predecessors, and, on the other hand, the notion of a final, culminating enlightenment. When speaking of "enlightenment" in the Zen tradition, one should keep in mind that the enlightenment being spoken of there may differ radically from what is meant by enlightenment in Indian Buddhism. As we shall see in a moment, the progressive enlightenments of East Asian Buddhists are not grounded in their *telos*, the final unexcelled enlightenment, but rather in an "original enlightenment" that is beginningless, ever-present, and yet-to-be-actualized for most if not all people. Moreover, by the Sung dynasty, "enlightenment" is no longer an enlightenment for humans only—as had been repeatedly stressed by Indian texts—but an enlightenment in which everything participates beginninglessly, including the non-sentient components of the universe.[37]

These complications derive from two basic sources:

1. Complex literature on the stages of a bodhisattva's progress that, as early as the dispute between Kumārajīva and Hui-yüan in the early fifth century, fueled opposing formulations and controversies in China, and seemed to be easily resolved or sidestepped by the universal Buddha-nature theory first brought to China from Central Asia with the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sutra*;[38] and
2. the famous passage in the apocryphal *Awakening of Mahayana Faith* that is also the seed of *hongaku* (original enlightenment) thought:

> On the basis of original enlightenment, there is non-enlightenment. On the basis of non-enlightenment, there is said to be initial enlightenment. Further, becoming enlightened to the Mind-Source is called final enlightenment.[39]

This passage is cryptic, illogical. What does it mean to say that non-enlightenment arises from or is produced by original enlightenment? This begs the classical problem of theodicy; how did evil (non-enlightenment) arise from an originally good world (original enlightenment)?[40] The rhetoric of "purity" that is attached to *hongaku*—especially by Hua-yen in China, but by virtually all Japanese Buddhist sects, including Tendai—only exacerbates the tension, since highlighting the "pure, good, universal,

ubiquitous" nature and principle of mind and *dharma-dhātu* logically precludes the possibility of ignorance, bad, or evil ever arising,[41] and it was precisely this that Sung T'ien-t'ai criticized in various "Off-Mountain" T'ien-t'ai groups that began to echo the Hua-yen rhetoric—indicating clearly that an awareness and critique of this problem has already occurred within Chinese Buddhism. The late Sung "On-Mountain" T'ien-t'ai group, especially the writings of Chih-li,[42] may have been the last concerted moment of Critical Buddhism in China, and, though further studies of these materials need to be done, perhaps this group was its finest, most rational and coherent, hour.

Not only did the above-cited passage from the *Awakening of Mahayana Faith* put the idea of an original, pure, eternal, immutable "enlightenment" on center stage,[43] it also introduced the distinction between "initial enlightenment" and "final enlightenment." The *Awakening of Mahayana Faith* treats initial enlightenment as a synonym for *bodhicitta* or *cittotpāda* ("arousing the aspiration for enlightenment"), which, in fact, is precisely the point of both its title and content.[44] Moreover, this formulation, as interpreted by its Chinese advocates, thereby conflated initiating the desire to *pursue enlightenment* with the *actual enlightenment* experience itself. Fa-tsang offered detailed rhetorical explanations for why just setting foot on the path with initial faith (the first stage of the ten or fifty-two bodhisattva stages) was tantamount to completing and fulfilling the path (the tenth or fifty-second stage)—analogous to his "ten coin" example (see below).[45] Tsung-mi (and later the seminal Korean Sŏn master Chinul) applied the distinction between initial and final enlightenment to the problem of sudden versus gradual enlightenment: Sudden enlightenment (= initial enlightenment) needed to be followed by gradual practice (the ten stages) in order to reach final enlightenment, which, in true *hongaku* fashion, amounted to original enlightenment recovering itself. In terms of Ch'an/Zen theory, the duration between initial enlightenment and final enlightenment can occasion multiple "provisional" enlightenments.

As mentioned earlier, research into the history of Ch'an has irrevocably undermined the traditional transmission legends of Bodhidharma and the six patriarchs, as well as the traditional accounts of lineage transmissions. For centuries these transmission stories had served as support and guarantee of the authenticity of Ch'an (tracing it back to Buddha himself) and of the authority and veracity of a particular teacher. But we now know that Ch'an did not come from India, much less Buddha; and with-

out certified lineages, how can an aspiring student assure herself that a "master" she studies with is either as enlightened as his position denotes, or even if the "enlightenment" he teaches reflects the type of enlightenment attained and taught by Buddha? If Hui-neng's "enlightenment" was not validated by Hung-jen, what, besides the weight of a tradition that has always assumed Hui-neng received the transmission from Hung-jen, assures us that Hui-neng was indeed enlightened, especially when we recognize that the redactions of *The Platform Sutra*—which even the tradition never claimed was actually written by Hui-neng—are so at variance with themselves and susceptible to being revised in conformity with ongoing polemics over the centuries, that we have no sure way of knowing what Hui-neng himself may have said or thought? The same doubts can be raised about Lin-chi (Rinzai) and "his" *Record*.[46] That certain readers may find these works edifying is insufficent.[47] Edification alone is not a sign of enlightenment.

The most common retort to this criticism is that Zen is valid with or without the support of any particular lineage; it validates itself existentially in the enlightenment experiences of its practitioners.[48] But this, in part, begs the question, since if the lineages do not record actual enlightenment transmissions, one simply falls back on blind faith when insisting that such things have been happening to someone, even if not those named in the lineages. And, as the multiple enlightenment stories recorded by the Zen tradition demonstrate, even the most earnest aspirant can believe mistakenly that some experience he has had is complete enlightenment when further experience shows that it is not. Even if we grant some sort of unrecorded "lineages" or transmissions, the notion of "enlightenment" itself becomes problematic in the Zen tradition, since there is no guarantee that what is being transmitted under the name "enlightenment" accords in any authentic sense with the experience of Siddhārtha under the Bodhi tree. Matsumoto and Hakamaya contend it does not.

IS CRITICAL BUDDHISM THE RECURRENCE OF AN INTRINSIC BUDDHIST DEBATE?

The lines cannot be drawn as sharply between India and East Asia as my preceding comments might suggest. The issues raised by Critical Buddhism revisit an old debate in Buddhism, one that has been occurring

almost since its inception—and perhaps, according to Matsumoto, since its inception, even in the mind or rhetoric of Buddha himself.[49] In simple terms, as one sees it highlighted in Nāgārjuna's Madhyamaka approach, it is the difference between holding a substrative metaphysics (*svabhāva*) as opposed to a vision of nonsubstrative causal conditions, conditions that, under analysis, decenter into other decentering causal conditions—what Candrakīrti called *pratyayatā matreṇa*, "utter conditionality."[50] Nāgārjuna, in other words, focuses on purifying one's thinking, one's cognitive actions, from any vestige of substrative, substantialistic, universalistic, essentialistic notions. Critical Buddhism focuses on the substrative metaphysics that have dominated East Asian Buddhism since the mid-Tang, which they have labeled *dhātu-vāda*. *Dhātu-vāda*—intimately connected with *tathāgata-garbha* thought, original enlightenment thought (Jpn. *hongaku*; Chn. *pen-chüeh*), mind-nature (Chn. *hsin-hsing*), original mind (Chn. *pen-hsin*), Buddha-nature (Chn. *fo-hsing*)—is a special form of substrative ontology, one that is monistic. But the usual Buddhist critique of substrative ontology is not confined to monistic substrates—any substrate conceived in terms of any individual entity or group of entities is rejected. Typical terms for this substrateless vision include non-self (*anātman*), non-self-nature (*niḥsvabhāva*), and purified *paratantra*.[51] In Medieval Indian philosophy, the Buddhist critique of substrates went beyond attacking theories of substance per se, and involved the critical rejection of universal classes, perduring entities, unchanging identity (which invariably presumes an abstract self-same substrate), and any claims touting unobservable "realities." In other words, for Buddhists the criterion by which something was deemed real (*dravya-sat*) was that it must discharge an observable effect. It had to display causal characteristics (*nimitta-kāraṇa*), and it was only real at the moment this effect was being caused,[52] which is to say, the essentialistic notion of latency or potentiality was also rejected, or at least made problematic.[53]

This last point is crucial. The first chapter of Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* begins by stating that nothing causes itself, is caused by another, both causes itself and is caused by another, or is neither caused by itself nor caused by another. This is frequently interpreted as a wholesale rejection of the very idea of causality itself. That interpretation is buttressed by repeated statements in *Prajñāpāramitā* sutras and other Mahayanic works about "non-arising" (*anutpattika-dharma*, *anutpāda*, etc.). It is not without significance that the first Buddhist texts to receive

serious, sustained attention in China, and around which the earliest schools arose, were *Prajñāpāramitā* texts. Where causality was so important in Early Buddhism that it may be fairly argued that for centuries theoretical Buddhism was little more than causal analysis, this new Mahayanic anti-causal rhetoric—initially promoted to strip earlier causal theories of their substrative assumptions and vestiges—becomes eventually part of the foundation for the establishment of a primordial Buddhist substratum: *dharma-dhātu* = Buddha-nature = emptiness = *dharma-kāya* = one mind = the beginningless, eternal, endless substratum. The notion of a primordial Nature, *mūla-prakṛti*, repeatedly rejected by Buddhists when, for example, asserted by the Sāṃkhya, thus begins to find a home in Buddhist language and settles beneath the edifice of the East Asian Buddhist sects.

All Indian Buddhist causal theories concern *efficient cause*. The formal and teleological causes advanced by orthodox Brahmanic thinkers were always sharply refuted by the Buddhists.[54] Chinese causal theory had a markedly different history than did the Indian theories,[55] and this shows itself most strikingly in the way Chinese Buddhists "interpreted" and reconstructed causal arguments from the Indian literature. *Efficient causality was transformed into formal causality.*[56] The best known examples are Fa-tsang's two causal arguments: the ten coins "cause" each other, and the roof beam is the "cause" of the house. In the first example, the first coin "causes" the second to be second, the third to be third, etc., and the tenth coin "causes" the first to be first, and so on. In the second example the crossbeam that holds up the roof is the "cause" of the house. As is evident neither example is a case of efficient causality; rather, both appeal to formal causal principles, especially the first example. The history of metaphysics amply documents the intimacy between substrative metaphysics and formal causal thinking; from the perspective of such metaphysics efficient cause only describes the less real "phenomenal" shadows (what Matsumoto calls "super-locus") of their formally causal ground ("locus").

The tension between causal vs. non-causal, or efficient causal vs. formal causal versions of "Buddhism" is only one place we find this Buddhist dichotomy. Critical Buddhism is largely a replay of various debates going back to Indian Buddhist thought, reargued under different venues and with different vocabularies in China, and then throughout the Buddhist world. In fact, one finds these debates everywhere in Buddhist history.

The most famous examples are:

1. No-self (*anātman*) vs. *pudgala-vāda*, and the complications introduced into the no-self doctrine by the implicit "self" implied by the jataka stories.[57]
2. Enlightenment conceived as pure *citta* (mind) vs. enlightenment as the dissolution of *vijñāna* (consciousness). Suggestions of both conceptions can be found in various sections of the Pali texts, and this debate reached center stage with the emergence of *tathāgata-garbha* thought. Since many texts and schools considered *citta* and *vijñāna* to be synonymous in many contexts, this tension cannot be solved satisfactorily by the typical East Asian move of treating *citta* as the metaphysical ground realized in enlightenment and *vijñāna* as the defiled consciousness that needs to be overcome.
3. *Tathāgata-garbha* and the *ātman* polemics of such texts as the *Laṅkāvatāra Sutra* and *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sutra* vs. the emptiness and radical *paratantra* of certain strands of the *Prajñāpāramitā Sutra*s as interpreted by Madhyamika and Yogacara. These were played out in the two versions of *trisvabhāva* (outlined below), one that privileges *pariniṣpanna* and the other that privileges *paratantra*.

Thus the tensions highlighted by Critical Buddhism are clearly discernible in various strata of the Indian Buddhist materials.

Some of these tensions can be neatly summarized by reviewing the two opposing interpretations of the *trisvabhāva*. Some texts, such as the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sutra* and *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, present both versions, sometimes only separated by a few verses. Other texts clearly side with one model over the other (see fig. 1). In terms of the Hsüan-tsang vs. Fa-tsang controversy mentioned earlier, Hsüan-tsang favored the first of the two models, while Fa-tsang vigorously argued for the second.

Model 1: In this version, *paratantra* (other-dependent) is the critical member. When obscured or contaminated by *parikalpita* (erroneous cognition) it is "defiled *paratantra*," but when devoid of *parikalpita* it is "pure *paratantra*." The "antidote" (*pratipakṣa*) to *parikalpita* is *pariniṣpanna* (perfected), which empties the *parikalpita* out of *paratantra*, leaving it pure. *Paratantra* in this model is synonymous with conditioned co-arising (*pratītya-samutpāda*), and purified *paratantra* is the culmination of one's practice. This sense of realizing the middle nature, *paratantra*, as the solution is one of the reasons for the title of the *Madhyānta vibhāga* (Discourse about the middle between extremes).

Fig. 1: The Two *Trisvabhāva* Models

MODEL 1

Parikalpita		*Paratantra*		*Pariniṣpanna*
(erroneous cognitions, false assumptions and projections; equivalent to *avidyā* [ignorance])		(other-dependent; dependent origination)		(equivalent to *śūnyatā* [emptiness])
	⇨		⇦	
(intrudes on and infects *paratantra*)		(when infected by *parikalpita* it is defiled; when *pariniṣpanna* eliminates the *parikalpita*, it is pure)		(the counteragent to *parikalpita*)

MODEL 2

Pariniṣpanna
(perfected True Nature; Suchness; neither arising nor ceasing; *paramārtha* [ultimate truth])

⇧

Paratantra
(provisional, *saṃvṛti* [mundane truth], conditioned)

⇧

Parikalpita
(falsity, delusion, etc.)

Model 2: Instead of viewing the three natures as dialectical interactions coming home to the Middle Way, this model takes them as a straight and ascending hierarchy. *Paratantra* (considered as *saṃvṛti*) is a median position on the way to *pariniṣpanna* (considered as *paramārtha*). *Pariniṣpanna* is the culminating, fulfilling eternal "purity" beyond the arising and ceasing flux of *paratantra*. It is suchness (*tathatā*), *dharma-dhātu*, etc. Thus *parikalpita* is the lowest, *paratantra* is higher, and the highest achievement is the pure *pariniṣpanna*. It is this version that presupposes and supports *dhātu-vāda*.

While model 1 promotes a clear rational understanding of causes and conditions and locates enlightenment and freedom *within* conditions, model 2 seeks to transcend or escape causality altogether, to merge with

an eternal, primordial ground. Throughout the ages Buddhist literature has given expression to this ambivalence.

Similarly, the problem of a transcendental subject lying behind the noetic act has been rigorously scrutinized by Buddhists, who, in the main, argue against it. However, one does find Buddhist literature that speaks about a "true" or "pure" self, particularly in the Tantric tradition (cf. *Guhyasamājatantra,* ch. 12 v. 4). East Asian Buddhism, especially in Japan, has developed an entire rhetoric about the "true" or "authentic self."

For instance, late in the *sagāthakam* portion of the *Laṅkāvatāra* (vv. 746–850) we find an entire section devoted to an oddly un-Buddhistic glorification of atman (self). Some examples (Suzuki's translation):

746. The ego (*ātma*) characterized with purity is the state of self-realization; this is the Tathagata's womb (*garbha*) which does not belong to the realm of the theorisers.…
753. The Mind, primarily pure, is with the secondary passions, with the Manas, etc. and in union with the ego-soul [atman]—this is what is taught by the best of speakers.…
755. The ego [primarily] pure has been defiled on account of the external passions since the beginningless past, and what has been added from outside is like a [soiled] garment to be washed off.
756. As when a garment is cleansed of its dirt, or when gold is removed from its impurities, they are not destroyed but remain as they are; so is the ego freed from its defilements.…
760. As the womb is not visible to the woman herself who has it, so the ego-soul is not visible within the Skandhas to those who have no wisdom…
763. When there is no true ego-soul, there are no stages, no self-mastery, no psychic faculties, no highest anointing, no excellent Samādhis.
764. If a destroyer should come around and say, "If there is an ego, show it to me"; a sage would declare, "Show me your own discrimination."

In these verses not only is the idea of atman promoted as if it were "good Buddhism," but rebuttals also are offered to some of the typical Buddhist arguments *against* the self, such as that there is no sixth thing in a person beyond the five skandhas, or the non-demonstrability of the "self." If there is any doubt as to the intent of these verses, the next four are unequivocal.

765. Those who hold the theory of non-ego [*anātman*] are injurers of the Buddhist doctrines, they are given up to the dualistic views of being

and non-being; they are to be ejected by the convocation of the Bhikshus and are never to be spoken to.

766. The doctrine of an ego-soul shines brilliantly like the rising of the world-end fire, wiping away the faults of the philosophers, burning up the forest of egolessness.
767. Molasses, sugar-cane, sugar, and honey; sour milk, sesame oil, and ghee—each has its own taste; but one who has not tasted it will not know what it is.
768. Trying to seek in five ways for an ego-soul in the accumulation of the Skandhas, the unintelligent fail to see it, but the wise seeing it are liberated.

Followers of *anātma-vāda* are to be ostracized as heretics, while visions of atman are liberating![58]

To be fair to the *Laṅkāvatāra*, it also offers many verses denouncing atman and proclaiming *anātman*, such as vv. 60, 281, and 728 in the *sagāthakam* section, but this only adds to the ambivalence. Not unexpectedly, when ambivalence and ambiguity pervade a text, a wide hermeneutic space allowing vastly disparate interpretations arises. A simple case in point is the following verse, also from the *sagāthakam* section:

419. Purity is not obtained by body, speech, and thought [i.e., karmic activity]; the Tathagata-lineage (*gotraṃ tathāgatam*), being pure, is devoid of karma. (my translation)

Gotra, which means "family" or line of descent, has since the earliest Buddhist texts been used to counter caste-consciousness by means of substituting a functional meaning for the term rather than an essential or ontological meaning.[59] Simply, one is what one does (*karmaka*), rather than what one claims to be (*ātmāna*). The *Sonadanda sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya* is a good example of this genre of redefining caste and class terms into functional, ethical terms, in that case through the word *brahmin* (priestly caste). A Brahmin is not such by virtue of birth or nature, it argues, but in virtue of personal character and present actions; hence even those not Brahmin by caste can be "functional Brahmins" if their behavior is upright. Thus the *Laṅkāvatāra* verse poses the paradox that those who functionally follow the Tathagata are acting without acting, i.e., their action does not produce karma. More specifically, it is claiming that "purity" cannot be achieved through karmic means, since purity signifies, by definition, the absence of karma. The point is methodological, procedural. D.T. Suzuki, accurately reflecting the East Asian tradition that

would be disposed to interpret these ideas essentialistically, not only so interprets it but also actually translates the above passage accordingly:

419. The pure [essence of Tathagatahood] is not obtained by body, speech, and thought; the essence of Tathagatahood (*gotraṃ tathāgatam*) being pure is devoid of doings. (insertions by Suzuki, *Laṅkāvatāra*, 258)

Suzuki has not only essentialized the verse, he has also obscured its basic point—the overcoming of karmic-activity. "Purity" becomes the property of an essentialistic ontological being, perhaps even an essential property, rather than the characterization of a methodological and behavioral condition. That this type of hermeneutic stance produces a rhetoric of "True Self" goes to the heart of the conflict between Hsüan-tsang and those Yogacaric schools and trends in China that he attempted to overcome. Some texts clearly side with one camp or the other, but the *Laṅkāvatāra* is all the more intriguing in that it offers both a *dhātu-vāda* ideology and that ideology's antithesis without resolving the tension. And as we see with Suzuki's "interpretation," a predisposition to read a text in a certain way will affect the meaning one derives from that text.

This sort of double possibility—reading certain passages in a functional way as opposed to reading them in an essentialistic way, and vice versa—remains an open hermeneutic space in many Buddhist texts. When a culture promotes and reinforces one reading while denigrating the other, the promoted reading will appear "obvious" to most readers. That is the danger, even for contemporary scholars, of the *dhātu-vāda* milieu. The full impact of that danger is only now starting to be challenged by Critical Buddhists. As an example we can note that, as a result of the foundational significance the *Hua-yen* (*Avataṃsaka*) *Sutra* has acquired in East Asian thought—especially in China and Korea, and to a slightly lesser extent in Japan (where the *Lotus Sutra* gained hegemony)—East Asian scholars until quite recently have assumed that an "Avataṃsaka" school must have flourished in India, despite the lack of any evidence in Indian sources for such a school and the fact that the *Hua-yen Sutra* was transmitted to China largely from Central Asia, not India.[60]

ON BEING CRITICAL OF CRITICAL BUDDHISM

Critical Buddhism has challenged a plethora of long-held, pervasive assumptions along with the people and institutions who adhere to them,

and has done so in a style that is uncharacteristic of Japanese discourse (viz., directly and explicitly rather than indirectly and muted), so it is not surprising that it has stirred up forceful opposition from a variety of fronts. There are many who wish that Critical Buddhism would just go away, and in order to hasten its demise these opponents search for every and any weakness in its presentation they can find (including ad hominem characterizations of its principle advocates). In their eagerness to refute Critical Buddhism and thereby dismiss it, they sometimes act as if refuting a single issue or aspect is sufficient for dismissing all of the claims and arguments of the Critical Buddhists. Critical Buddhism must, of course, accept criticism as a legitimate and even necessary activity. However, criticism should be reasonable. As a caution against making overly hasty dismissals, opponents should differentiate three distinct areas: target, argument, and positive proposals.

Hakamaya and Matsumoto have attacked an extremely wide range of *targets*, including historical, sociological, institutional, textual, nationalistic, cultural, ideological, and political issues. The appropriateness of each of these targets needs to be evaluated individually. The choice of some targets may be patently legitimate, while others less so. If, for example, one concludes that *wa* ("harmony")[61] is an inappropriate target—and one can substantiate that conclusion with sound reasoning—that does not permit one to dismiss the critique of *dhātu-vāda*, *tathāgata-garbha* ideology, or any of the other countless targets. Conversely, if one concludes that attacking social discrimination in Japan is legitimate, that does not automatically vindicate every other target or claim advanced by Critical Buddhists. Each must be judged on its own merits. One may ask metaquestions, such as "Has Critical Buddhism taken on too many targets?" (a strategic or tactical question), or "Do the variety of targets offer a proper focus, or does their diversity and disparity diffuse the basic points?" (tactical and rhetorical questions), and so forth. Microquestions on the appropriateness of targeting particular texts, or the interpretations of particular passages or terms, or particular individuals and institutions, might also be raised. Is, for instance, *dhātu-vāda* a useful, or a counterproductive, neologism?[62] Further, one may think that a target that in general is appropriate (such as *dhātu-vāda* or *ātma-vāda*) is being inappropriately attributed to a certain text or thinker;[63] even if the specific attribution can be refuted, that does not delegitimize the general target in other contexts.

The question as to whether a certain target is or is not appropriate is separate from the question of the quality of the argument(s) advanced to critique that target.[64] One may accept, for instance, that *wa* is a legitimate target for critique, and yet decide that some of the *arguments* advanced in the critique are nonetheless flawed. The failure of an argument does not invalidate the appropriateness of its target (though the argument will need to be improved). This caveat is especially important for Western scholars, who will find that, even though Matsumoto and Hakamaya argue in a more direct manner than is typical for Japanese scholars, their style of argumentation is still heavily Japanese, aimed as it is at a Japanese audience. By Western standards the style of Japanese argument seems circular, verbose, evasive, at times too emotional. If Critical Buddhism is to become part of the discourse of Buddhist scholarship in the West—rather than merely an object for academic reporting—its arguments will have to be recast in forms more suitable to Western tastes and methodologies.

One can also ask whether a particular *argument* is methodologically sound, whether it is coherent and cohesive, whether it is logical, whether it contradicts or concords with other aspects of the claims made by Critical Buddhists, and so on. All that rests and falls on such questions, though, is the validity of the particular argument, not the appropriateness of a particular target, much less the thrust of Critical Buddhism as a whole (unless it can be demonstrated that some particular argument is foundational for everything else advanced by Critical Buddhism). One may, of course, find their arguments well constructed and still remain unconvinced about the appropriateness of their targets or the feasibility of their proposals (well constructed arguments are "valid" but not necessarily "true").

Finally, both Hakamaya and Matsumoto offer numerous *positive proposals.* For instance, Hakamaya declares that genuine Buddhism must involve critical thinking and causal analysis (in fact, critical thinking *about* causal analysis), and Matsumoto further insists that it entail a correct ethical orientation. These proposals are separable from specific targets and the quality of particular arguments. For instance, whether rational thinking rather than mindless empty-headedness is integral to Buddhism is a separate issue from whether *dhātu-vāda* is a valid target or not. Similarly, while the quality of their arguments may go to the question of how persuasively they are presenting their proposals, one may find value in their proposals even while being dissatisfied with certain arguments. For instance, one may find appealing Matsumoto's proposal to accept as

foundational for all Buddhist thinking the classical form of *pratītya-samutpāda* as expressed in the *Mahāvagga*[65] and yet still decide that the reasons he proffers for this are inadequate.[66] Similarly, even if one resists accepting all of their targets as valid, their proposals may prove inspiring regardless. Conversely, even if one ultimately rejects their proposals, one may still find their arguments and targets valid.

In short, each of these three spheres needs to be evaluated separately. Weaknesses either perceived or imagined in any one sphere do not provide grounds for dismissing the other spheres. Even after two spheres on a particular issue have been refuted, the third will not have been refuted thereby. Let me offer an example.

In Part III of his *Critical Studies on Zen Thought* (1994), Matsumoto attempts to locate the atman theory in the famous passage from the *Lin-chi lü* (Record of Lin-chi): "On your lump of red flesh, there is a true man of no rank always going in and out of the face of every one of you."[67] Focusing on the term "face" (literally, "face gate"), Matsumoto argues that it derives from one of three Indian models:

1. The *Atharva Veda*'s notion of a pure atman situated in the body that goes out to encounter sense objects through the nine "gates"[68] of the body reflecting those encounters back *inward*, as a king would *exit* and *reenter* his quarters;
2. The Jain notion of sensory "gates" through which *āsava* (karmic material particles) *enter*, obstructing and restricting the otherwise omniscient self (atman[69]);
3. An early Buddhist notion, devoid of atman, in which the mind generates *āsava* (fundamental emotional and cognitive proclivities) so that they are considered "*outflows*" rather than *in-flows*.[70]

Which of these three theories, he asks, is behind Lin-chi's notion of "face-gate"?

More by implication than explicit argument he concludes it is the atman theory of the *Atharva Veda* that Lin-chi is invoking, since the "true man of no rank" is going in *and* out of the face just as the atman goes in and out, like the king leaving and returning to his quarters. The Jain and early Buddhist models, on the other hand, only describe an inward flow (Jain) or an outward flow (Buddhist), but not both. His "arguments" are philological in style. He interprets the phrase "lump of red flesh" to signify the heart (*hṛdaya*).[71] He argues that the conjunction

of "gate" with "face" is unattested in Pali or Sanskrit Buddhist literature (*mukha-dvāra*, "face gate"), while the five senses may on occasion be described as "gates." He substitutes terms and concepts from *The Platform Sutra* to explicate terms in the *Lin-chi lü*, in particular relating the "true man of no rank" to *The Platform Sutra*'s notions of "self-nature" (*svabhāva*) and "mind-ground" (*hsin-ti*), terms he associates with an atmanic *dhātu-vāda* ideology.[72] How did such a Hindu model reach the author(s) of *Lin-chi lü*? Matsumoto speculates that it was brought to China with tantra, since tantric literature, in key texts like the *Mahāvairocana Sutra*, clearly displays atmanic thinking with notions such as the "great self."

My purpose in summarizing this argument is neither to confirm nor to refute it, but instead to use it as an example of how the three areas—target, argument, proposals—should be dealt with separately. The target here is a key phrase in the *Lin-chi lü*. There are several arguments, primarily philological in style. In this case, no specific positive proposal—such as critical thinking, causal thinking, or ethical orientation—appears explicitly, though one may claim it contains certain implicit general proposals, such as: Consider this phrase, since it is atmanic, to be non-Buddhistic; Buddhism will only correct itself from its dangerous deviations once it has ferreted out and freed itself from such non-Buddhistic rhetoric and ideologies.

Whether one considers *Lin-chi lü* fair game as a target will depend to some extent on one's prior feelings about the importance and veracity of the text.[73] Such feelings may or may not be affected by any argument Matsumoto or someone else might offer. One who has seized on *Lin-chi lü* as one's own sacred scripture will, at least initially, resent any challenge to its sacred status. Conversely, one may find the particular phrase under investigation to be a legitimate and even important target, but may nonetheless decide that the profferred arguments are insufficient.[74] Again, one may decide that the arguments are compelling while nevertheless one attempts to "save" Lin-chi from the attack by taking refuge in the notion that the *Lin-chi lü* was compiled after Lin-chi, that it was redacted and amended numerous times, and so this phrase—while universally recognized as one of Lin-chi's most famous—is dispensable without damage to the image of Lin-chi as an enlightened Ch'an master.[75] The point I wish to make is that one may reject the target and still find the arguments valid; one may reject the arguments and still find the target appropriate.

Even if one refutes the arguments and the target in *this specific instance*, one still lacks grounds for rejecting any other targets or arguments elsewhere.

It may be disingenuous of Matsumoto to reduce the language of *Lin-chi lü* to that of the *Platform Sutra*—the latter's language is indeed teeming with *dhātu-vāda* imagery and implications.[76] Despite the "traditional" linkage of Lin-chi to Hui-neng, in virtue of both being of the Ch'an lineage, there are tremendous differences between them in style, content, vocabulary, and method. Lin-chi's language *can* be read in different ways. For example, while the *Platform Sutra* frequently opposes "external" things and ideas to the "inner" original nature, Lin-chi explicitly rejects that dichotomy. He says:

> There is no Buddha, no Dharma, no training, and no realization. What are you so hotly chasing? Putting a head on top of your head, you blind fools? Your head is right where it should be.... But you do not believe it, and so turn to the outside to seek. Do not be deceived. If you turn to the outside, there is no Dharma; neither is there anything to be obtained from the inside.[77]

Does this suggest that the "inner/outer" distinction drawn upon by Matsumoto to delineate the three "door" models may be off target? Is it Matsumoto himself who presupposes the Jain model in the very manner that he frames the question of "Buddhism" becoming "defiled" by external impurities (*dhātu-vāda*)? Has the purity of Buddhism been defiled from outside (by Hindus, Taoists, animists, nationalists, etc.)? If *The Platform Sutra*'s teachings are indeed "tainted" with *ātma-vāda* and *dhātu-vāda* non-Buddhist defilements, is Matsumoto perhaps defiling Lin-chi by imposing on it *The Platform Sutra* and *Arthava Veda* from without? Matsumoto claims that the third model, the early Buddhist model—which he says is anti-atman—has the *āsava* flowing *out* of the mind. A common description in early Buddhism for awakening, equivalent to "understanding *pratītya-samutpāda*," is "eliminating the *āsava*."[78]

Matsumoto repeatedly evokes certain sections of the Pali literature and Nāgārjuna as his touchstones for authentic Buddhism. How is the early Buddhist elimination of *āsava* (fundamental mental problems) any different from Nāgārjuna's aim to put *prapañca* (misguided cognitive-linguistic proliferation) to rest (*prapañcopaśama*)? And how is that different from Lin-chi's "place where your thought-instant of mind comes to rest"?[79] Lin-chi's analysis of language is not only "critical," but also a

faithful echo of Nāgārjuna's analysis of *prapañca*.[80] These sorts of questions raise the issue of whether *Lin-chi lü* is a legitimate target. Does the fact that the true man of no rank is *on* the lump of red flesh, rather than residing *in* it, disturb Matsumoto's inner/outer analysis? That sort of question addresses the quality of his arguments. In the end, it may be that Lin-chi agrees with many of Matsumoto's positive proposals: ethical advancement, critical thinking, and critiquing substantialism and essentialism.

We have seen that Critical Buddhism marks the conjunction of certain inevitabilities. We have also seen that the emergence and institutionalization of *dhātu-vāda* Buddhism required sustained misreadings of ambivalent passages and models.[81] A Yogacarin might note that, hermeneutically speaking, such misreadings indicate an inability to cognize "things in the manner they become" (*yathābhūtam*). But such blatant misreadings (or the naive Nichiren view that the *Lotus Sutra* actually records the words of the historical Buddha) are not nearly as problematic and difficult to identify as the more subtle substantialistic readings. Buddhism began by noting that the underlying belief in an eternal self—expressed in a variety of forms—was the deepest, most pernicious, most intractable thing to which humans cling. *Ātma-dṛṣṭi* is the prime barrier to enlightenment. Later Buddhists gave the name *jñeyāvaraṇa* to this intractable *dṛṣṭi*, and they too saw it as the main obstacle to enlightenment. Thus we should not be surprised that East Asian Buddhists, not being enlightened despite the belief that all possess "original enlightenment," should tenaciously cling to this *dṛṣṭi*. Critical Buddhists are reminding us that the debate is not over; it has only been on hold for twelve hundred years.

Critical Philosophy Versus Topical Philosophy

Hakamaya Noriaki

I am often asked about the term used as the title of my book, *Critical Buddhism*, which seems to be rather unclear and leaves people wondering about the content. Perhaps this is simply because the term has never been used before, although it is a notion that I have worked with for some time.[1] In any case, I would like to explain my use of the term and clarify the meaning I attach to it.

By "Critical Buddhism" I mean to indicate that "Buddhism is criticism" or that "only that which is critical is Buddhism." Of course, this is not actually the case, since obviously not all Buddhism is critical. In fact, it would not be far off the mark to say that most of what falls under the rubric of "Buddhism" in Japan is *not* critical. I have advanced the proposition "Buddhism is criticism" in order to bring this question out into the open as far as possible, though I fear it might be dismissed out of hand by those who feel that I am overlooking the simple historical or cultural facts of the matter. Be that as it may, I shall tentatively speak of the kind of uncritical pseudo-Buddhism found in Japan as "Topical Buddhism" and proceed to explore it in the pages that follow.

The terms of the polarity, "critical philosophy" (*kritische Philosophie*) and "topical philosophy" (*topische Philosophie*), are borrowed from Western philosophy.[2] The first to draw attention to the distinction was Giambattista Vico (1668–1744). As Ernesto Grassi points out, Vico stresses the way in which the critical method obscures the importance of imagery and fantasy, which are so important to human thinking. He cites a passage from Vico:

> Our modern advocates of advanced criticism rank the unadulterated essence of "pure" primary truth before, outside, above the gross semblances of physical bodies. But this study of primal philosophical truths takes place at the time when young minds are too immature, too unsure,

> to derive benefit from it. Just as old age is powerful in reason, so is adolescence in imagination. Since imagination has always been esteemed a most favorable omen of future development, it should in no way be dulled. Furthermore, the teacher should give the greatest care to the cultivation of the pupil's memory, which, though not exactly the same as imagination, is almost identical with it. In adolescence, memory outstrips in vigor all other faculties, and should be intensely trained. Youth's natural inclination to the arts in which imagination or memory (or a combination of both) is prevalent (such as painting, poetry, oratory, jurisprudence) should by no means be blunted. Nor should advanced philosophical criticism, the common instrument today of all arts and sciences, be an impediment to any of them.

Grassi comments on the passage:

> At this point it can be asked, What is the relation between the problem that we have raised and the Vichian rejection of "critical" philosophizing? It arises precisely in this context with the appearance of the term "topical philosophy," which Vico sets against "critical philosophy." "For just as the invention of arguments is by nature prior to the judgement of their validity, so topical philosophy (Lat. *doctrina*) should be given precedence over critical." Thus *inventio* precedes *demonstratio*, discovery precedes proof.
>
> What is the relation between *invention* and *topics*? We have noted that, once a first truth is discovered, the scientific process necessarily consists of the rigorous application of deduction. But for Vico the idea that the essence of philosophy might be found exclusively in the rational deductive process was unacceptable, above all because he presupposed the necessity of another activity, that of invention, which preceded deduction. In fact, Vico identifies *the doctrine of invention with topical philosophy.*[3]

As Grassi notes, Vico has presented a forceful argument for topical philosophy, a philosophy of "invention." Vico's work had little impact on Western philosophy, which—unlike its counterpart in Japan—is deeply rooted in the critical tradition. Vico was deliberately reacting against Descartes, who had laid the foundations for the tradition of "philosophy as criticism." But since he disparaged the very notion of criticism and logical proof, all he could do was to make the defiant claim that philosophy was not solely the domain of the critical, but included the topical as well. Vico's argument, based as it is on rhetorical method, was no match for Descartes.

Nonetheless, the rhetorical tradition has proved strong and enduring. In seeking to nurture the natural inclination of youth to the arts, it pro-

claims the priority of *topica* over *critica*, particularly in a West dominated by the logic of a critical philosophy.[4] Thus even in the West one finds periods of reactionary irrationalism, when a movement will surface to conspire with topical philosophy and raise the banner of revolt against critical philosophy. The present is just such a time, in which awareness of the impasse presented by modernity seeks expression in postmodernism or poststructuralism.

The comments of Grassi quoted above were delivered at an international symposium on Vico's thought and published in 1969. While Japan is usually quick to reflect Western trends, it was only in 1987 that a special issue of the journal *Shisō*, entitled *Reading Vico*, was published, under the supervision of Nakamura Yūjirō.[5] In the same year a Japanese translation of Vico's *De nostri temporis studiorum ratione* appeared.[6] In the context of the belated arrival of Vico's "topical philosophy" (which serves as a reactionary counterfoil here in Japan even more than it does in the West), the attempt to counterposition "Critical Buddhism" and "Topical Buddhism" might end up giving further impetus to these reactionary trends. Even though I am personally convinced that Buddhism is simply criticism, there may be those who follow Vico's revolt against Descartes to make the counterclaim that the central philosophy of Buddhism is topical. Even at the risk of instigating such a reaction, I feel it is important to expose Japan's intelligentsia to the core of what is involved in the opposition of standpoints. The heart of the intellectual question, I believe, lies not in the different ways of thought of East and West, but rather in the confrontation between *topica* and *critica*. It also strikes me that clarifying this polarity might be a good way to slam the door in the face of the tedious parroting of the latest Western fashions by Japanese intellectuals who are anxious to fuse our ancient, indigenous "topical" worldview with this latest foreign import.

The first time I specifically took up the opposition between "critical philosophy" and "topical philosophy" was in an essay called "Scholarship as Criticism," the second essay of *Critical Buddhism*. Although this was the first time that I had laid out the *critica/topica* contrast as such, ever since I had begun working on my "Critique of the Kyoto School" (the opening essay in *Critical Buddhism*), I had had the feeling that a closer look at this fundamental clash of viewpoints would go a long way towards stemming the tide of uncritical philosophical imports. In my critique of the Kyoto philosophers, I characterized their work as an attempt to erect

a philosophical superstructure for the self-affirming adulation of Japanese culture, a task they accomplished by merging the idea of original enlightenment, the self-affirming and pompously declared "glory of the Eastern spirit" masquerading as Buddhism, and a brand of idealism more German than Western.

At the time I felt that there were more similarities than differences in the indigenous modes of thinking East and West, and considered the critique of "topical philosophy" a good way to highlight those similarities. In the course of composing the essay, however, I came to realize the extent to which topical philosophy had become a pervasive force in Japan—so much so that even though I was living in Japan and breathing its philosophical air, I was unaware of what was going on. At the same time, I was not comfortable with setting up the Kyoto school as a convenient "other" on which to lay the brunt of my criticisms. This led me to reflect on these questions in the work of one of my favorite authors, Kobayashi Hideo, resulting in "A Critique of Kobayashi Hideo's *My View of Life*," the third essay in *Critical Buddhism*. These three articles were originally published in the "Commentary" section of the *Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyōgakubu ronshū* (nos. 17, 18, and 19), on the assumption that the purpose of "commentary" is "criticism."

The papers that comprise Part II of *Critical Buddhism* were written concurrently with the above three articles, and are in one way or another related to the same issues. Chapter 4, "A Glance at the State of Buddhism in the United States," describes an experience I had at the U.S.–Japan Conference on Japanese Buddhism in August of 1985, which confirmed my distrust of East-West dialogue. The reason for this distrust was illustrated best in the reaction to a paper by my friend and colleague Paul Griffiths of the University of Chicago Divinity School,[7] which advocated demonstration and logical proof as the proper mode of interreligious dialogue. The Japanese participants, advocating an "Oriental philosophy" that transcended logic, banded together with the majority of the Western participants who fancied themselves well-versed in Oriental thought and tried to persuade him that he needed a deeper understanding of the "Orient," an Orient that is not bound by logic or fixed standpoints. As I will argue later, this is nothing other than the rhetoric of topical philosophy, which is why it is not surprising that the reaction was so similar to that accorded Matsumoto Shirō's presentation of "The Doctrine of *Tathāgatagarbha* Is Not Buddhist," which I discuss in "Scholarship as

Criticism." Indeed, it was in good part the negative reception given these two papers, together with my growing recognition of the need to oppose a critical philosophy to this sort of topical philosophy, that led me to claim at a meeting of the Special Section of the Sōtō Doctrinal Consultation that "I intend to renounce the safe confines of academic pronouncements."

Chapter 5 of *Critical Buddhism*, "*Tathatā*, *Dharmadhātu*, and *Dharmatā*," discusses how some ideas traditionally thought to be at the core of Mahayana Buddhism in fact eviscerate Buddhism. Chapter 6, "The Anti-Buddhist Character of *Wa* and the Antiviolent Character of Buddhism," identifies the Japanese notion of "harmony" (taken to be the defining value of Japanese culture from the time of Prince Shōtoku) as anti-Buddhist and nothing more than political ideology pure and simple. In writing these articles I came to realize that the "topical philosophy" that so dominates China and Japan is basically the same as the doctrine of original enlightenment.[8] Taking aim at intellectuals in control of the media in Japan, Chapter 7, "Rejection of False Buddhism," therefore took up a more general discussion of the notion of original enlightenment as a pseudo-Buddhism that needs to be eradicated. Chapter 8, "Problems in Watsuji Tetsurō's Understanding of 'Dharma' and 'Emptiness'," takes up the questions raised in two of Matsumoto Shirō's articles, "On *Pratītyasamutpāda*" and "On Emptiness,"[9] to show how, in the end, even the influential Buddhologist Watsuji was not able to get beyond the limitations of the theory of original enlightenment in his understanding of dharma and sunyata. This essay also presents my arguments against Yamaori Tetsuo's reactionary attempt to revive the work of Kimura Taiken, the doyen of original enlightenment theory.

A CONFLICT OF EXTREMES

As I have explained, my aim was to expose what I saw as a malady ravaging Japanese intellectuals—the disease of "topical philosophy"—as little more than indigenous Western thought in Japanese attire, mingle-mangled with indigenous ideas and presented as the newest theoretical trend. Since the essays were composed at a time when I was only just becoming more and more aware of the opposition between topical philosophy and critical philosophy, with the result that this aspect does not come out as clear in some of the pieces as it does in others, I would like

here to concentrate more directly on the question, though I realize the outcome may seem to some of my readers overly generalized.

As I mentioned, topical philosophy, or *topica*, is closely related to rhetorics and oratory, as Nakamura Yūjirō has pointed out:

> Given that *topica* is almost the same as rhetoric, for Vico *topica* is clearly opposed to *critica*. And when we further recognize that this tradition is already present in Cicero, it becomes apparent that *topica* as rhetoric falls completely outside of the tradition of philosophy understood as logic or dialectic, and thus has a positively antiphilosophical character.
>
> In other words, in contrast to the pretensions to universalism of "philosophy" and the absolutism of deductive entailment, *topica* or rhetoric is a different sort of knowledge altogether, a knowledge that includes multiple approaches to concrete problems, a plurality of probable truths, the art of discovery, and the like. In a 1930 essay on "The Spirit of Rhetoric," Miki Kiyoshi wrote that logic is the field of thinking and the study of its rules. Logic deals with objective thinking in generalizations and is therefore abstract thinking. Miki contrasts this with rhetoric: "Rhetoric is not, in essence, merely eloquence and elocution. It is not mere linguistic ornamentation or the art of beautification. Modern philosophy largely ignores or has forgotten the problem of rhetoric, a telltale sign of its abstraction and poverty. In order to retain its essence philosophy must return to its origins, that is, to Greek philosophy."[10]

As Nakamura has so admirably demonstrated, *topica* is nothing other than "antiphilosophy." After Descartes had gone to all the trouble of extracting the method of "philosophy" out of the antiphilosophical traditions of Europe, why must we once again return to this antiphilosophy? Apparently, as Nakamura has argued in quoting Miki, the answer is that philosophy must never forget that rhetoric is the essence of philosophy, that which alone protects it against abstraction and impoverishment.

Nakamura concludes his most recent work, *Topos*, with these words:

> Just as the self (or individual) emerges from the corporate body and the hero from the chorus, the theme emerges from the topic and the subject from the predicate; the function of the subject/theme is found in the *self-conscious union* with the predicate/basis. In other words, we must drop a plumb line deep into *the ground of our existence, that ground from which we spring, so that by self-consciously merging with that ground, we can then stand apart from it.* When the self, the hero (protagonist), the theme, and the subject forget the existence of the corporate body, the chorus, the topic and the predicate, when they lose the tension of that

> relationship and become self-sufficient, then they immediately lose their power as well.[11]

In order to save philosophy Miki would have us return to "antiphilosophical" rhetoric. So, too, lest philosophy forfeit its power, Nakamura aims for a "self-conscious union" that will bring critical philosophy back to an antiphilosophical topos that is yet its generative ground.

It is worth nothing that in the above citation Nakamura does not refer to the "antiphilosophical" quality that he had previously used as the defining characteristic of rhetoric. The opposition between "philosophy" and "antiphilosophy" is apparent, but the opposition between "philosophy" or "criticism" on the one hand and *topica* on the other is ambiguous. All we are told is that just as the predicate includes the subject, so is philosophy or criticism included within *topica,* and the felicitous tension between the two spoken of as a "self-conscious union." To say that "philosophy is criticism, and criticism alone is philosophy" renders everything outside of criticism nonphilosophical, but the "virtue" of affirming *topica* rather than "antiphilosophy" is that *topica* absorbs everything into itself, even criticism. As a result, if philosophy does not reject *topica* and grants the latter existence at all, *topica* will, as "topical philosophy," suddenly find a place within philosophy. Hence, though I designate the opposition as "critical philosophy" versus "topical philosophy," the real antagonism is between *critica* and *topica*, and it is *topica* that true philosophy must always reject. In this sense, those who assert that "criticism alone is philosophy" may be called "criticalists" (if I may coin the phrase), while those who, like Nakamura, wish to include *topica* within philosophy as its very ground or origin and aim for the "self-conscious unity" of both, we may call "topicalists" or "advocates of the topical." Obviously Descartes falls into the camp of the "criticalists" and Vico into that of the "topicalists."

Scrutinizing the uselessness of a traditional logic whose purpose lies "in speaking without judgment of things of which we are ignorant,"[12] Descartes put forward four principles (*précepte*) of logic, which begin:

> The First was never to accept anything for true (*vraie*) which I did not clearly (*évidemment*) know to be such; that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitancy (*précipitation*) and prejudice (*prévention*), and to comprise nothing more in my judgment than what was presented to my mind (*mon esprit*) so clearly (*clairement*) and distinctly (*distinctement*) as to exclude all ground of doubt.[13]

For Descartes a clear, disinterested, and cautious discernment of truth and falsity was paramount:

> Superior men have no reason for any great anxiety to know these principles of critical philosophy, for if what they desire is to be able to speak of all things, and to acquire a reputation for learning (*docte*), they will gain their end more easily by remaining satisfied with the appearance of truth (*vraisemblance*), which can be found without much difficulty in all sorts of matters, than by seeking the truth itself (*vérité*) which unfolds itself but slowly and that only in some departments, while it obliges us, when we have to speak of others, freely to confess our ignorance.[14]

Vico, on the other hand, as if in direct and malicious response to Descartes, writes:

> Such an approach [of beginning one's education with critical philosophy] is distinctly harmful, since training in common sense (*sensus communis, senso comune*) is essential to the education of adolescents, so that that faculty should be developed as early as possible; else they break into odd or arrogant behavior when adulthood is reached. It is a positive fact that, just as knowledge (*scienza*) originates in truth (*vero*) and error (*errore*) in falsity (*falso*), so common sense arises from perceptions based on verisimilitude (*verisimilis, verosimile*). Probabilities stand, so to speak, midway between truth and falsity, since things which most of the time are true, are only very seldom false.
>
> Consequently, since young people are to be educated in common sense, we should be careful to avoid that the growth of common sense be stifled in them by a habit of advanced speculative criticism.[15]

Vico reads Descartes backwards, almost as if he really were advising the seeker of fame to "remain satisfied with the appearance of truth (*la vraisemblance, verosimile, verisimilis*), rather than seeking the truth itself (*la vérité, vero, veritas*)"! Not surprisingly, Vico fails to give any logical explanation as to why following the critical method of Descartes will lead to "odd or arrogant behavior when adulthood is reached." In the end, he sounds like nothing so much as a preacher trying to persuade us that we should assign value to things based on the simple fact of their relative priority or subsequence. Truly, verisimilitude precedes truth, and, as Grassi presents Vico's argument, *topica* precedes *critica*.[16] Granting *topica* superiority simply on the basis of precedence, however, leaves little recourse other than the realist affirmation of the topical as the self-evident original ground. For this breed of "topicalist," the essential point can be

only to "discover" the truly existent topos. Needless to say, such thinkers will never attempt a reasoned critique of the position of the "criticalist," but will rather avoid the issue by claiming that *topica* precedes *critica* and thus magnanimously absorbing *critica* into *topica*. But this is only the strategy of the topicalist. The criticalist will refuse the compromise and insist on clarifying the opposition between *critica* and *topica*.

I identify Śākyamuni Buddha as the first such criticalist in India, and, if I am correct, it also follows that "Buddhism is criticism, criticism alone is Buddhism." If the tendency to revert to topical philosophy regularly surfaces with some strength even in the West with its supposedly deep-rooted commitment to critical philosophy, it is important to realize how much easier it was for the critical to be swallowed up and eliminated by the topical in India. With this in mind, we can apply the arguments advanced in the Western clash between *critica* and *topica* to the Buddhist case as well, counterposing "critical Buddhism" to "topical Buddhism."

Like Descartes, Śākyamuni was a criticalist. He opposed the topicalists of his own time and their predecessors. But even more quickly than Vico followed on the heels of Descartes, advocates of a topical philosophy reappeared throughout Indian Buddhism and eviscerated Śākyamuni's true criticism. It is therefore important to consider the point of critical Buddhism—the Buddhism of *paṭiccasamuppāda*, the Buddhism that "goes against the convention" (*paṭisotagāmin*), the Buddhism that Śākyamuni established—as criticism of the convention of "ground" (*ālaya*, from the verb *ā-lī*, to lay beneath), of the topos to which his world was accustomed, and as the means of eliminating the indigenous ways of thought that those advocates of a topical philosophy grafted on to Śākyamuni's criticism and that have been passed down to us as "topical Buddhism." This is the struggle in which Matsumoto Shirō and I have been engaged.[17]

WESTERN INDIGENOUS THOUGHT

Topical philosophy magnanimously not only makes room for critical philosophy, in an act of blatant but thoroughly uncritical self-affirmation it also inflates itself with all sorts of indigenous ideas. If critical philosophy is to combat this assault on thought, it must take a position that sets up every sort of indigenous thought as the focus of its negations and apply the rigor of logical critique to each and every instance of it. Except for a

brief interlude during the Kamakura period, the topical philosophy of original enlightenment has afflicted Japan for more than a millennium. While the trend may be difficult to reverse, if we are going to pursue Critical Buddhism we have first to realize just what the object of our critique is, and therefore I shall come right out and name it: the indigenous thought of both Japan and the West. A critique of these two forms of indigenous thought will help us clarify the nature of topical Buddhism, their all-too-willing bedfellow.

Though I am not a scholar of Western philosophy and will likely end up only exposing my own ignorance, in order to sketch the critique from the standpoint of Critical Buddhism I would like to begin with the case of the West. Returning for a moment to Grassi, I cite the conclusion of his essay, "Critical Philosophy or Topical Philosophy?":

> Critical philosophy or topical philosophy? This was the question with which we began. Above all, it should be observed that the distinction between the two kinds of philosophizing made by Vico can no longer be considered a closed issue, solely of historical interest, but must be seen as a problem with much current relevance. Today we glory in science and in cybernetic instruments, entrusting our future to them, forgetting that we still have the problem of finding "data," of "inventing them," since the cybernetic process can only elaborate them and draw consequences from them. The problem of the essence of the human genius and of its creativity cannot be reduced to that of rational deduction, which modern technology is developing to improbable depths.
>
> The second conclusion we may be permitted is the realization that the Vichian theories of topical philosophy are rooted in the Latin humanistic tradition, for which rhetoric had a function and an importance that have been totally forgotten. Humanistic thought was constantly concerned with the unity of *res* and *verba*, content and form, which once disjoined could never be reunited. If the rational element be admitted as the sole possible content of our speech, it will no longer be possible to give to it a "form" capable of moving souls; and, increasingly, philosophy will be consigned to the forgotten regions of history.
>
> The reevaluation of Vico begun by Italian idealism—which was based on the identity of the *verum* with the *factum* (the true with the created) propounded by Vico—saw in Vico above all the defender of the thesis of the creativity of human thought, and thus, in spite of everything, of the "*cogito ergo sum.*" This was a misrepresentation of Vico's central idea and impeded understanding of his humanistic problematic position, which had nothing in common with the idealistic tradition or with Hegelianism in particular.

> The humanistic distinction between the true and the probable rendered possible all the reflection on the essence of political action and the growth of the juridical tradition. Finally, the distinction between "first truth" (*primo vero*) and "secondary verities" (*verità seconde*)[18] has prevented the philosophical, aprioristic deduction of the natural sciences which is proper to idealism. But the true history of the humanistic tradition in its anti-Cartesian role has yet to be written.[19]

Grassi's conclusion is typical of those who look to Vico as a humanist. Indeed, Vico's "humanistic distinction between the true and the probable" does not attempt to *exclude*, as did Descartes, but rather to *include* the true within the probable, making the probable the very foundation or topos of truth. Humanistically speaking, this appears to be a most accommodating, generous, and enriching position to take. This "humanism" is the indigenous thought or cultural tradition of the West. Rejecting the interpretation of Vico offered by Italian idealism, Grassi prefers to locate him in the tradition of Latin humanism, the very movement that would give rise to the Italian Renaissance. Moreover, it was the return to the indigenous Western tradition—more specifically, to the Latin culture of the ancient Roman empire—and the turn against the way in which that tradition had been expropriated by Christianity since the Middle Ages, that drove the Renaissance to its revival of Latin humanism. From that point on, Western culture—centered in Italy—began its shift from a theocentric to an anthropocentric view of the world.

If it is accurate to call this humanism the indigenous ethos of the West, then Christianity, arising as it did among the Semitic peoples of Judea, represents a foreign tradition that continuously challenged the ancient Roman empire until in the end it succeeded in establishing itself as a state religion. Japan, which has never known such a thoroughgoing takeover by a foreign mode of thought, finds it hard to imagine the extent to which Christianity became so entrenched in the West as to be virtually synonymous with Western tradition. Nonetheless, even in the West (where the level of trite propaganda with which Japan has honored its indigenous modes of thought would never succeed) there always existed an undercurrent to embrace ideas like Vico's. But such undercurrents notwithstanding, critique and proof gained too firm a hold on the West for the advocates of a topical philosophy ever to win over the criticalists and establish indigenous modes of thought. The problem today is not that the question has been debated, with the topical position scoring a

logical, reasoned victory, but that with no debate whatsoever the topical way of thinking simply washed across Japan like the latest wave of fashions from Paris. One can only point to the shallowness of the critical tradition in Japan as compared to the West.

The changing trends of popularity enjoyed by existentialism, phenomenology, hermeneutics, Bergson, Heidegger, and Jung all display the same phenomenon, as do more current fads of structuralism, deconstruction, and postmodernism. Still worse, the purveyors of topical thinking are no longer simply scholars, but self-styled "new academics" who have sold their souls to the mass media and celebrate the indigenous ethos of Japaneseness as an axiomatic and self-evident truth. And, of course, these dyed-in-the-wool topicalists are instinctively anti-Cartesian and anti-modernist.

A look at the writings of Nakamura Yūjirō, for example, reveals him to be an obvious topicalist. In his book *Topos*, Nakamura cites Descartes to the effect that "if one can know the causes, from these causes alone it is easy to bring back to mind images that had completely disappeared" and thus "there is no need to rely on memory." On this point he offers the following comments:

> Descartes's "methodology" met the demands of his time. At the beginning of the modern period humanity needed to escape from the oppression of tradition and history, to break its ties to the past in order for the individual to become independent of the community— in other words, it experienced a need to erase its common memory. A "methodology" such as Descartes's was required in order to facilitate the erasure of memory and an absolutely fresh beginning. Thus, more than anything, the modern age is an age of "methodology." However, as the "method" was made into a fundamental principle and its control advanced and then diffused, people came to keenly feel the loss of the ground of their life, their existence.[20]

Although Nakamura does not go so far as to claim that by simply ridding oneself of "method" and replacing it with "*topica*" one will be saved from the "loss of the ground of existence," the fact that he characterizes Descartes as he does at the very least obliges him to offer some reasons for why "method" should constitute a "loss of the ground of existence." Not only does he fail to do so, he also changes the "no need to rely on memory" found in Descartes to "a need to erase memory." But (as Nakamura himself acknowledges in the passage immediately preceding the above

quotation) Descartes also wrote, "I have often wished that I were equal to some others…in fullness and readiness of memory."[21] Regarding his "Method," Descartes wrote that it "gives me the means, as I think, of gradually augmenting my knowledge, and of raising it by little and little to the highest point which the mediocrity of my talents and the brief duration of my life will permit me to reach."[22] It is hard to imagine him as wanting to "erase memory." For Descartes memory was the very thing that helped us, within the brief span of our lives, to expand our knowledge to its highest level. For him there was simply no need to make his mind into a topos and fill it up with assorted bits of information. To erase all memories would do away with time and language, effectively bringing human civilization to a close. This was hardly Descartes's intention.

Descartes expresses his views on time and memory lucidly in the *Discourse de la méthode*, though I doubt that the advocates of a topical philosophy would ever bother to cudgel their brains over the question of time.[23] In his *Essay on Common Sense*, Nakamura Yūjirō offers three reflections on the "time thieves" in Michael Ende's *Momo*, of which the third is expressed as follows:

> The third very interesting aspect of *Momo* is the mysterious old man who appears to help Momo out of her quandary over her battle with the time thieves. The old man, the "King of the Land of Time (professor of Nowhere House)," says that people have hearts (*kokoro* 心) for the appreciation of time.… As we see light with our eyes and hear sound with our ears, we experience time within our hearts, and thus we can also take this to mean that the heart is totally human and totally physical. Hence, as the confluence of all perceptions, the heart expresses our common sense.[24]

Not having access to the German original of *Momo*, I checked the English translation of this part of the book, which uses "heart," so I imagine that the corresponding German is *Herz*.[25] Regardless of whether or not it is the "heart" that is said to experience time, I fail to see how that allows Nakamura to conclude that "as the confluence of all perceptions the heart expresses…common sense." If we are going to be lax about defining the term "heart," then I offer another alternative: granting, for the moment, that it is the heart that experiences time, it is clearly memory, as the heart accompanied by words and language, that causes it to experience time. If, by any chance, we were to lose language, we would thereby lose all time as well. The only way in which we can talk about the

"time" of living beings is perhaps in comparison to somebody living in a coma, a tragedy devoid of both language and time.

I do not wish to attack Nakamura's interpretation of the novel without offering a reading of my own. Frankly, for all its pretensions to dealing with time, it is rather as if time has stopped in *Momo*. The novel begins in the ruins of an amphitheater on the outskirts of a city, to which it returns and where it ends. Time has a common origin and a common end, a place called the "Nowhere House,"[26] the dwelling place of the mysterious old man mentioned by Nakamura, the King of the Land of Time. This brings to mind the Greek *οὐ τόπος*, "a place which is nowhere," a "utopia." What good is time in such a never-ending utopia? Nor is language very highly valued in *Momo*. The only important word in the entire novel is "NEVER!" which flashes like lightning on the shell of the tortoise Cassiopeia.[27] I conclude that *Momo* has nothing at all to do with time, and it does not surprise me that the ruins of the amphitheater are used to symbolize the revival of the German or Latin indigenous spirit.

THE INDIGENOUS JAPANESE WORLDVIEW

It was Henri Bergson who endeavored to bring a discussion of time back into Western philosophy, understanding time as "the things that are given immediately to consciousness" (*les données immédiates de la conscience*). Because he considered consciousness to be memory accompanied by language, he also studied the loss of language (*aphasia*). But an overemphasis on the continuity of time and a view of language as the primary agent by which time is located and juxtaposed in space led him to a philosophy of direct perception that transcends language.[28] This is not unrelated to the development of his philosophy from the *élan vital* seen in his *L'évolution créatrice* to the culminating mysticism of *Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion*. Despite the way his thought developed, many in the West, particularly in France, caught on to the implications of his thought and submitted it to a pointed critique. When his philosophy of direct perception without language was imported to Japan, where words and language have never been considered primary, advocates of the topical position who had long been devoted to the preservation of indigenous modes of thought were delirious with joy. Brandishing the authority of the West in their own defense, they bandied his ideas about with complete abandon. Disregard for language, emphasis on immediate percep-

tion, happily importing ideas from works like *Momo* that evoke a mood of antimodernism and anti-intellectualism—now as then, little has changed.

Predating the importation of Western ideas, it was the Chinese notion of *tao* that fixed the Japanese culture in its antilanguage ethos. I have made this argument previously, in my "Critique of the Kyoto School," where I cite the final line of Akutagawa Ryūnosuke's *The Westerner* in support. But as it appears I did not make myself clear enough on that occasion, I will try to do so again here. First, the passage from Akutagawa:

> Nietzsche called religion a form of hygiene… Easterners have generally tried to ground hygienics in enlightenment. Lao-tzu exchanged greetings with the Buddha in the Village of Not-Even-Anything… There Lao-tzu questioned the younger Confucius—China's Christ.[29]

Historically speaking, it may seem strange to make Lao-tzu the elder of Confucius, since Lao-tzu's birth is usually placed some 200 years after Confucius's death. Akutagawa, of course, knew this. Given his classical education, one may suppose that the passage is based on the legend in the *Book of History*. In it we find Confucius asking Lao-tzu about propriety, to which the latter replies:

> If you rely only on language, your perception has no value. This reliance on language alone is easily shown to be ridiculous. Hidden in the superior person is surpassing virtue, while on the outside they appear the fool. Get rid of your conceit and overweening ambition—that's the important thing![30]

This explains why Akutagawa refers to Confucius as "China's Christ." Confucius, the one who values language, poses a sharp, incisive, and urgent question. The respondent, Lao-tzu, derides language and makes personality the issue, manipulating his words to evade the question at hand.

Following my scheme, then, this scene depicts a contrast between Confucius the criticalist and Lao-tzu the topicalist. The basic intent is to portray Lao-tzu, the topicalist and representative of the ancient Chinese indigenous thought, as preceding Confucius the criticalist. Like Śākyamuni in India, Confucius in China was a critical philosopher who took language from the indigenous Chinese topos, and then critiqued that topos with the concept of propriety distilled into the language of human ethics. Much later Lao-tzu appeared and sold this critical spirit out to the indigenous Chinese topical philosophy in an effort to eclipse Confucius's

critical philosophy. Still, because Confucius came on the stage some two centuries prior to Lao-tzu, his critical philosophy was able to establish a much stronger critical tradition than Śākyamuni had been able to establish in India. This is also why Akutagawa saw Confucius as "China's Christ," and why Śākyamuni Buddha, who left no such legacy, is not taken as "India's Christ," but is rather lumped together with Lao-tzu exchanging greetings in the Village of Not-Even-Anything.

Nothing could better represent the ancient Chinese conception of topos than this Village of Not-Even-Anything. As the name itself gives away, it resembles the Greek *οὐ τόπος* and the Nowhere House of Michael Ende. The following passages from Chuang-tzu further illustrate the point:

> Now you have a big tree and you are distressed because it is useless. Why don't you plant it in Not-Even-Anything Village (*wu ho yu chih hsiang* 無可有之郷), or the field of Broad-and-Boundless, relax and do nothing by its side, or lie down for a free and easy sleep under it?
>
> (The Nameless Man said:) "I'm just about to set off with the Creator. And if I get bored with that, then I'll ride on the Light-and-Lissome Bird out beyond the six directions, wandering in the village of Not-Even-Anything and living in the Broad-and-Borderless field."
>
> He who is a Perfect Man lets his spirit return to the Beginningless, to lie down in pleasant slumber in the Village of Not-Anything-At-All; like water he flows through the Formless, or trickles forth from the Great Purity. How pitiful—you whose understanding can be encompassed in a hair-tip, who know nothing of the Great Tranquility![31]

In his Japanese translation, Fukunaga Kōji glosses the "Village of Not-Even-Anything" in these three passages respectively as "the world with nothing at all," "a world of nothingness in which nothing is constrained," and "the primal world of nothingness in which nothing exists." More than anything, however, its essence is the ultimate "place" of all things that itself has no "place," and thus is neither a "nothingness" nor a "non-existence."[32] The superior person can sport in it, leisurely sleep in it, or plant a huge tree in it. Obviously, the fundamental requirement of sporting in that utopia is the abandoning of both language and knowledge. For, as Chuang-tzu says to Hsiao-fu (小夫, an allusion to "ordinary people"), who is particular about language and knowledge, "you whose understanding can be encompassed in a hair-tip, who know nothing of the Great Tranquility."

Topos is thus philosophized into the *tao*. Consider the description of the *tao* that appears in the famous first chapter of the *Lao-tzu*, followed by a verse from *Chuang-tzu* that describes the *tao*.

> The ways that can be walked are not the eternal Way;
> The names that can be named are not the eternal name.
> The nameless is the origin of the myriad creatures;
> The named is the mother of the myriad creatures.[33]

> The Way has its reality and its signs but is without action or form.... It is its own source, its own root. Before Heaven and earth existed it was there, firm from ancient times...it exists beyond the highest point yet you cannot call it lofty; it exists beneath the limit of the six directions and yet you cannot call it deep.[34]

We can see from the *Lao-tzu* just how the *tao* precludes conventional naming and denies language, and from *Chuang-tzu* how the *tao*, having "its own source, its own root," is identical with the Village of Not-Even-Anything, the ultimate topos that itself has no topos. We can also see how directly opposed this is to the *tao* of the *Analects*:

> If one inquires of the *tao* in the morning, in the evening he can die. (4.8)

> It is humankind that can broaden the *tao*, not the *tao* that broadens humankind. (15.28).

Taoism in China thus plays a role roughly analogous to that of Vico in Western philosophy. That is, in the same way that Vico distinguishes Descartes's truth from his own notion of "probability" and yet includes the former within the latter, the pure topos of Lao-tzu or Chuang-tzu's *tao* includes Confucius's more temporally sequential *tao*. At that point there can no longer be any words to express a notion that might be the *tao*. Borrowing the line of Nakamura Yūjirō's argument, we would say that by incorporating Confucius's critical concept of the *tao*, the Taoists were able to achieve a "self-conscious unity" of the critical and the topical.

Despite their best efforts, the *tao* of the Taoists did not succeed in burying Confucius's critical philosophy. Unlike the enigmatic, opaque, and obscure thought of the *Tao-te-ching* and *Chuang-tzu*, the conciseness and clarity of the *Analects* gives an accurate reflection of Confucius's position. Those who read him this way are not numerous, but I would cite Itō Jinsai as an example of a criticalist who discerned in Confucius this critical spirit, intent on discriminating truth and falsity:

> In general, books that speak directly and whose argument is clear, that are easy to understand and well written, are correct in their reasoning. The explanations of those whose words are difficult and whose reasoning is remote, which are hard to understand and difficult to read, are always false. If you hold to this and seek after this you will miss nothing in this peerless book (i.e., the *Analects*).[35]

> As for obscure explications and arcane principles, even though you look at them you cannot see them, even though you listen to them you cannot hear them, and when you find them in the people's customs they are all devious. You should realize that between heaven and earth there has never been any truth there. You must clearly distinguish the truth and falsity therein.[36]

Even in China few were able to see the meaning of the *Analects* as Itō Jinsai had done. Most intellectuals were more familiar with the indigenous ethos of Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu—so much so that even Buddhism, which properly should have been encountered as a foreign tradition, was absorbed by Taoism and debilitated in the process. The manner in which Buddhism, from Seng-chao to Chi-tsang, was adapted to this indigenous thought has only just begun to be critically studied by Itō Takatoshi. Though I await his work with great expectations, I will not presume to anticipate its outcome here.[37]

What is obvious in any case is that the Ch'an school that gained sway among the intellectuals of the Sung dynasty emerged from this sort of Buddhism thoroughly permeated with Taoism. When it was imported into Japan from the Kamakura period onwards as Zen Buddhism, the earlier Taoist-influenced Buddhism of Chi-tsang's tradition was reinforced, until we have the situation today where the indigenous thought of Japan is trumpeted as the Buddhist theory of "original enlightenment." Needless to say, indigenous thought—in any country—is constituted by an indigenous notion of topos that refuses language its literal meaning. Ironically, this also means that indigenous thought can take advantage of any language at all, as a sort of code, so long as it serves the purpose of attracting people's attention. The term "original enlightenment"—among the most obvious of such "codes"—is, at the level of meaning, fundamentally linked with the philosophy of the Taoist "Way." It is for that reason that I have focused on Taoism in a section labeled "The Indigenous Japanese Worldview." Everything imported into Japan and absorbed into this indigenous Japanese worldview—including Buddhism—boils down in the end to Taoism.

The ease with which differing worldviews can be dissolved into a homogeneous topical brew is an interesting phenomena in itself, but the fact remains that nothing has made the growth of critical philosophy in Japan as difficult as this flexible, natural, and withal ineffable Taoist brand of "satori." Indeed, perhaps no idea is thought of as so uniquely Buddhist, even in contemporary Japan, as this "satori." But because the dominant Buddhism in Japan really amounts to little more than Taoist "topical Buddhism," nothing could be *less* Buddhist.

Originally, "satori" was not a Buddhist term at all, and, according to the oldest Chinese dictionaries, *wu* (悟, pronounced in Japanese *satori*) was used interchangeably with *chüeh* (覚, *kaku*), both meaning simply to awaken from sleep or to be conscious of things.[38] A dull mind simply becoming conscious of things has nothing at all to do with the discriminating intellect of the Buddha, *paññā* or *prajñā*, which does not simply denote awareness but rather *dharma-pravicaya*, the clear discrimination of phenomena. Still, given the pervasiveness of this sort of Taoist-influenced "topical Buddhism," a nondiscriminating "satori" is taken to be the experience of Buddhas, and "discrimination" and "discernment" are decried as the greatest of evils. This all stems from the influence of this Taoistic "topical Buddhism," a point that cannot be emphasized enough.

CONCLUSION

I have argued that the indigenous Japanese worldview is little more than warmed-over Taoism. But is that all there is to the indigenous Japanese tradition? Motoori Norinaga, who devoted himself to the study of the ancient indigenous traditions, wrote the following in his *Kuzubana*:

> Buddhism is a disorderly and composite tradition, and of course differs from the Way. Its harm is obvious and easily seen, and has already been argued by the Confucian scholars in China and in contemporary times by the Shintoists of our own country. There is thus no need to burden ourselves with repeating these arguments all over again. Confucian thought, in contrast, is not as obviously harmful or as obviously loathsome. Lacking this sort of reputation, and with explanations and doctrines that, on the surface, seemed entirely in keeping with the Principle (*dōri* 道理), these teachings have long been commonly believed. Even among the learned, there were none who did not base themselves in this thought. In

> modern times one occasionally finds Shintoists who criticize this way of thinking, but by failing to plumb the depths of what they are criticizing, they eventually slip back into the selfsame Confucian beliefs. Of old few have truly understood this mistake, and hence, because the Way seems at first glance to be without harm, the depth and measure of its harm surpasses that of Buddhism.[39]

I have criticized "original enlightenment" as a kind of Buddhism that, in similar manner, presents a clear source of harm, something which I identify as a Taoist "topical Buddhism." Norinaga contrasts this with the Confucian Way, which, though it is not as obviously harmful, "has surpassed Buddhism in the depth and measure of its harm." Norinaga was clearly exasperated by this "Confucian Way," and after attacking the views of the Confucian critic Ichikawa Tamon on benevolence, rectitude, consideration, and piety, he arrived at the conclusion that the teachings of the Chinese sages were useless and harmful, adding: "beguiled by superficial benefits, how can the people of the world possibly see the great harm that lurks underneath?"[40] What then did Norinaga think of the Taoist tradition? I turn once again to the *Kuzubana*:

> The Way of Nature of which the critics speak is the nature esteemed by Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu. Truly this Way of Nature is nothingness. But there is a Way that is not made by humankind, a self-constituting Way that goes back to the age of the Gods. Because it originated with the Gods it is not really Nature, although compared to things of human origin, it resembles Nature. In contrast, Chinese teachings like yin-yang and the five elements did not originate with the Gods, but were devised by sages dependent on their own knowledge and conception of things. Because their knowledge had limits and there were many areas to which it did not extend, we must know that [the Way of Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu has] many things that do not conform to the "way" established by the Gods.[41]

In his later years Norinaga stressed the "Genuine Way" or the "Self-constituted Way" that had existed from the time of the Gods as the indigenous Japanese ethos. When confronted with the argument that this was very similar to the Taoist "Way of Nature," he was hard put to respond, as reflected in the passage just quoted. Norinaga's reply, in the end, claims that because the Taoist "Way of Nature" is a human creation it cannot compare to the Japanese Way of the Kami. Still, it seems that he may have recognized the point as quibbling, since he invariably includes a

remark to the effect that, "Even though it is not really Nature, although compared to things of human origin, it resembles Nature."

The same can be said with regard to his treatment of how "the teachings of Lao-tzu of China resembles the Genuine Way" in *Tamakatsuma*. No doubt, if one's attitude to all human affairs is derogatory, then all "paths" based on an ancient and indigenous topos will look the same. Thus Norinaga states in *Tamakatsuma:*

> The Genuine Way is a Way that was determined by the Gods and has nothing of human rationality added to it. In explaining its import, it is to be expected that there are many similarities and agreements with his [Lao-tzu] antirational teachings.... In general, the things of this world have a natural resemblance to each other and will of themselves intermingle, and just as this Way thus intermingles with that which is similar to the import of Confucius and the Buddhist Way, that which is similar in Lao-tzu will also naturally be intermingled.[42]

The result of banishing human effort is exactly this sort of nondiscriminated, mixed-up "Way" described in *Kuzubana*: "Because the Way seems at first glance to be without harm, the depth and measure of its harm surpasses that of Buddhism." As Jinsai argues, Confucianism based directly on the *Analects* should be expressed in "books that speak directly and whose argument is clear, that are easy to understand and well written." Because this approach reveals the true nature of Confucianism, "the depth and measure of its harm" does not come into question. The "Way of Confucius" described in *Kuzubana* is rather what Jinsai meant when he wrote of "obscure explications and arcane principles, even though you look at them you cannot see them, even though you listen to them you cannot hear them, and when you find them in the people's customs they are all devious." It resembles the "Way of Nature" that has banished all human effort. Once one asserts a "Genuine Way" of Nature, it is but a short step to the conclusion that "in general, the things of this world have a natural resemblance to each other and will intermingle of themselves."

Considering that Norinaga once valued language higher than anything—pointing out for example that "the style is hard to imitate though the intention is easy to imitate," and also praising Dazai Shundai's insistence on the truth of his own understanding of Confucius—it is hard to see how the Norinaga that advocates this sort of a "Way" could be one and the same person.[43]

Of course, the main reason that this sort of indigenous worldview allows so many different ideas to be mixed up together is that it is essentially topical in nature. In addition, as I indicated earlier, this allows advocates of indigenous worldviews from around the world to find easy agreement on the grounds that, at least theoretically speaking, this variety of worldviews stems from a common, primordial, universal topos. Just as the Village of Not-Even-Anything, the *οὐ τόπος*, or Nowhere House must be, ideally, the final topos of all things without having a topos of their own, the ultimate topos must, in principle, be one. Further, just as the constant topos is often described negatively, such a topos must fundamentally transcend the reach of language. In Taoist terms we might call this a "Way" (*tao*), which, as Chuang-tzu put it, "exists beyond the highest point yet you cannot call it lofty; it exists beneath the limit of the six directions and yet you cannot call it deep."[44] This is in fact an ideal expression of the nature of topos, as the rest of the passage continues, "born before heaven and earth, yet you cannot say it has been there for long; it is earlier than the earliest time, and yet you cannot call it old."[45]

The obvious persistence of this kind of indigenous ethos is everywhere promoted through the power of rhetoric so as to give it as impressive a description as possible and thus, in a gesture of patent self-affirmation, to allow it to be deployed in order to promote the topical worldview. In contemporary Japan this strategy has masqueraded under the guise of Western "topical philosophy." The result is that topical philosophy has earned itself a position of dominance in Japan, without effecting any change in the ancient and "unique" way of thinking of the Japanese people. It is precisely this situation that allows so many different philosophies and religions to be simultaneously popular in Japan, and also explains why critical philosophy has never taken root in Japan.

In *My View of Life*, Kobayashi Hideo writes that "the word *kan* [観, perception or vision] has a unique nuance for the Japanese," and, in fact, he repeats *ad nauseam* the empirical conviction "what we think must be the same as what we see." Yet nowhere does he give any indication that he intends to explain—logically and in his own words—why "vision" should have a unique nuance for the Japanese. Quite the contrary, he appeals to artistic awareness and the aesthetics of vision, and then, to top everything off, explains the evolution of that perception with quotes from the philosophy of Bergson.[46] In the end, the structure and authority of the uniqueness of the Japanese "vision" is based on a French philosopher.

This is not so ludicrous as it might at first seem, though the use of Western ideas as "authority" for anything claimed to be uniquely Japanese—actually a well-established tradition in Japan, which previously put Chinese ideas to the same service—is at best disingenuous.

The "Kyoto school," which touts an indigenous East Asian ethos of original enlightenment tinged with German idealism, is little more than another attempt to peddle a vision of Japanese uniqueness to the people of Japan. Nishitani Keiji, who sailed through the last great world war without a hint of self-reflection, became the dean of the Kyoto school and continued to extol a Buddhist "satori" of direct experience. Christians have stood in constant awe of Nishitani and sought dialogue with him, usually resulting in the sort of East-West "dialogue of accommodation" I referred to earlier.

A recently published volume of dialogues between Nishitani Keiji and Yagi Seiichi, notable for their consummate lack of critical argument, is an example of this kind of smarmy interchange. In the introduction, Yagi indicates that he pursued his dialogue with Nishitani because "of the fact that Zen 'satori' is deeply related to direct experience, and because I wanted to share my thoughts with a scholar of Zen and to write about this direct experience." The following exchange ensued as Nishitani critiqued the logic of the legalistic approach to love of neighbor:

> Nishitani: How can we speak of God or neighbor apart from direct experience? I believe this is the heart of the matter.
>
> Yagi: Yes, yes, that's it.
>
> Nishitani: In Buddhism we call this [direct experience] "satori" or awakening, and though the question of just what awakening actually is can become rather complicated, awakening is just awakening, opening your eyes. When your eyes are opened the Buddha is there, sentient beings are there—everybody is there. When they are not present—well, that cannot be called direct experience. That's the problem.
>
> Yagi: For Jesus, it is in direct experience that one can find oneself, one's neighbor, and God.[47]

Nishitani's "awakening" or "direct experience" is totally unrelated to Buddhism. It is no more than an expression of a purely Taoist "topical philosophy." Jesus would be shocked to hear Christians using Taoist ideas to speak of him. Since Nishitani's Taoist-influenced topical philosophy is

complete and thoroughgoing, it follows as a matter of course that he must also express his disdain for language. "A Zen *mondō*," he boasts, "is like a riddle; it must look like a riddle. This is only natural. As I said earlier, prior to all words, before all theories and before all thought, the question is how to realize the Buddha-heart."[48] He then quotes Seng-chao's famous verse, "Heaven and earth have the same root as I, all things have the same essence as I." Seng-chao's verse is, of course, no more than warmed-over Chuang-tzu, but Nishitani and Yagi seem oblivious to the fact. To borrow Akutagawa's metaphor, it is as if Nishitani had exchanged greetings with Yagi in the Village of Not-Even-Anything.

Nishitani belongs to the same generation as Kobayashi Hideo, and I have no intention of failing in respect for my elders. But the topical philosophy that Nishitani advocates is ageless, perennial, unchanging. Just as the philosophy of Chuang-tzu is called a "philosophy of death," so is Nishitani's. Because the topos exists primordially and is separated from time, it rejects aging and the changes of life. The goal of topical philosophy is, literally, to die and become one with the topos. Death cannot "die," but life, in fear of death yet attracted to the topos of death, must strive through criticism to free itself of this topos. This, at any rate, is how I understand life, as amusing as my gravity might appear to those who do not share it.

The history and interaction between critical philosophy and topical philosophy are complex and varied. I have omitted all reference to things like the role of Socrates within Greek philosophy, the role of Jesus within Judaism, or the founders of the so-called New Buddhism of Kamakura in Japan. I have instead tried to distinguish the two standpoints through a comparison between Descartes and Vico in the West, and between Confucius and Chuang-tzu or Lao-tzu in China. I have all but passed over the discussion of Buddhism in India, where, with a few exceptions such as Nāgārjuna and Dharmakīrti, the nature of Śākyamuni's critical philosophy was altered and then veiled behind the topical philosophy that had originally been the object of his criticism. This is precisely why it is imperative to see Buddhism as criticism, and why we must cut a clear distinction between critical Buddhism and topical Buddhism, in order to reexamine the long history during which topos has been considered the deepest truth of Buddhism. This has been my aim in putting together the essays in *Critical Buddhism*. Perhaps it would have been better to title the book *Topical Buddhism: A Critique*, but I gave it the title I did in the

belief that we must take as our task a continuing construction of the critical. I can only hope that this belief will resonate among others in the field.

➢ ➢ ➢

During his twenties Ōe Kenzaburō wrote a series of essays that were gathered together in a book called *Grave across the Tightrope*. Reading this book for the first time, I find myself in sympathy with its title. I was in the ninth grade when Ōe made his spectacular debut in 1958 and was awarded the Akutagawa Prize for Literature, but I had never bothered to read him. Recently, however, Kanazawa Atsushi had recommended Ōe's stories to me as unique among contemporary writers, and this put me in a mind to have a look at them. By strange coincidence, I began this essay on the evening of 15 October 1989. Earlier in the day, as it was Sunday, I had gone bicycling to Ōfuna with my family. On the way we stopped for shopping and I took a peek in a secondhand book store. As my eyes scanned the shelves, they fell on Ōe's *Grave across the Tightrope*. The price had been marked down from ¥800 to ¥500, so I picked it up without a second thought. Opening the book at random, I came across the following:

> No matter what kind of essay it is, I cannot bear with an author who takes an authoritative tone. When I find lines in my own writing that put on such airs in order to hide my own weakness, it doesn't matter how tolerant my readers are—I am ashamed of myself.[49]

"Topical philosophy" adopts the voice of authority in order to sell its own rhetoric. I feel the need to criticize that topical philosophy, and that includes elements of it that I find within myself. That night, as I read Ōe's "Images of the Postwar Generation," it seemed as though I could hear echoing around the room the voice of the youthful Ōe who had vowed never to speak with the voice of authority, and my own critical essays seemed meaningless by comparison.

[*Translated by Jamie Hubbard*]

Topophobia

Jamie HUBBARD

HAKAMAYA BEGINS HIS collection of essays on critical Buddhism by stating that critical Buddhism means that "Buddhism is criticism" or that "only that which is critical is Buddhism." Hakamaya does not intend criticism or critique to mean historical or textual criticism, although it may use these methods.[1] Rather, it refers to the exacting judgment of truth and falsity, the rejection of the false, and the use of language to demonstrate such claims.[2] Similarly, for Hakamaya *prajñā* does not refer to a nonconceptual, ineffable, direct experience, a bare perception bereft of cognitive activity, an intuitive leap, a pure consciousness event or an unmediated truth. Buddhist wisdom is discriminating knowledge (*dharma pravicaya*): knowledge that discriminates the way the world truly exists (causally and without self) and the way it does not exist (uncaused or self-caused, i.e., absolutely). Buddh*ism*, then, is the expression of that discriminating knowledge in history. As he wrote in an entirely different context, "At its inception Buddhist doctrine passed from the realm of inner enlightenment to that of enunciated doctrine, while the subsequent history…passes from the realm of enunciated doctrine to that of inner enlightenment."[3] This claim also indicates Hakamaya's understanding of the relationship between the words or doctrines of Buddhism as a tradition and institution existing within history, and the goal of that tradition.

To put it in another idiom, scripture and doctrine may only be the finger pointing to the moon, but if the finger points to the ground instead of the moon there is little chance that our gaze will be lifted to the moon's illumination. When he claims, then, that "only that which is critical is Buddhism," Hakamaya is clearly making a prescriptive or normative claim about the accuracy of much of that pointing, and he is well aware that the first objection will be that of the historian or ethnographer for

whom "Buddhism is what Buddhists *do,* and in fact most Buddhists *don't* do philosophical criticism." To this his answer is that, indeed, "it would not be far off the mark to say that most of what falls under the rubric of 'Buddhism' in Japan is not critical," and this "pseudo-Buddhism" he terms "Topical Buddhism."[4] As Hakamaya notes, inasmuch as his book is more concerned with a critique of this "pseudo-Buddhism" than a laying out of critical Buddhism, it might better be titled "Topical Buddhism: A Critique."[5]

TOPICAL BUDDHISM?

Stressing the importance of critical thinking may not seem so unusual, though for many the idea that this is the foundation of Buddhism might seem shocking. The same cannot be said of "Topical Buddhism," a neologism coined to refer to a metaphysical ontology of a substantival, generative monism (*topos*, akin to the *dhātu-vāda* critiqued by Matsumoto), a related epistemological doctrine of ineffability and self-validating experience, and a coercive inclusivism. For Hakamaya, all of this is structurally analogous to the method of *topica* advocated by the seventeenth-century philosopher Giambattista Vico.

In the sense of a generative monism Topical Buddhism refers to the idea of a "ground" of all existence, that "place" (*topos*) from which all things arise or in which all things are rooted, typically expressed as the "pure mind" (*citta-viśuddhi, citta-prakṛti*) or through the allied notions of *tathāgata-garbha*, Buddha-nature, and original enlightenment. In epistemological terms Topical Buddhism refers to the idea that thought and language similarly arise from a prior unity of consciousness while yet concealing (*saṃvṛti*) the truth of that unity (i.e., truth transcends language or is ineffable), and the oft-related idea that direct, individual experience (*pratyakṣa*) of that ineffable unity is sufficient grounds for religious belief (i.e., that religious experience is self-validating).[6] For Hakamaya, then, *topica* refers to a method of "discovery" that precedes critical demonstration, and as such is also taken to indicate the primacy of that which is precritical and prelinguistic.

The ontological structure of a nondifferentiated topos and the method of *topica* are often conjoined, and as examples of their confluence in Asian thought Hakamaya includes the *tao* of the *Lao-tzu* and *Chuang-tzu* (the chaos that precedes all differentiation yet gives rise to the myriad phenomena)

and Nishida's "topos of absolute nothingness" (the field of consciousness that logically precludes all judgment yet gives rise to all judgments).

Hakamaya's aim is wider, as we see in his allusions to the Western philosophical tradition of Giambattista Vico. In the seventeenth century, Vico argued for the primacy of the topical over the critical faculty and hence the method of *topica* or topics over that of the Cartesian criticism that had come to dominate the intellectual and educational thought of his day. In this regard Hakamaya claims that it makes little difference whether the subject matter is Buddhism or philosophy, for "the heart of the intellectual question…lies not in the different ways of thought of East and West, but rather in the confrontation between *topica* and *critica*."[7] In thus moving the discussion away from the purely Buddhist question of whether or not *tathāgata-garbha*, *buddha-dhātu*, and other ideas are compatible with the meaning, structure, and morality of interdependent causation and no-self, Hakamaya extends his discussion to a much more general and comparative level: *tathāgata-garbha* is one example of Topical Buddhism and hence the target of an intra-Buddhist critique, but topical philosophy in all of its manifestations is the larger target of Hakamaya's critique. Indeed, the long introductory essay that opens his *Critical Buddhism* deals with Descartes (1596–1650), Vico (1668–1744), Taoism, and Confucianism, and hardly mentions Buddhism at all. He is particularly wary of the way that Vico's thought has recently "washed across Japan like the latest wave of fashions from Paris"[8] only to merge with indigenous ways of thinking so as to support a dangerous political turn to the right, as seen in the nativism of Umehara Takeshi and former prime minister Nakasone Yasuhiro. This "topicality" of his polemic must be kept in mind, for as much as the debate reflects ancient Buddhist controversies and recent intellectual and theoretical trends in the Western academy it also clearly reflects Japanese social and political issues of the moment.

There is need for caution here, since a monistic topos and the method of *topica* have different origins, and even though the notion of topos as presented in Hakamaya's examples includes both the generative monism as defined by Matsumoto's notion of *dhātu-vāda* and a related inclusivist epistemology of a precritical, nondiscriminating, direct and intuitive "pure experience" of that source of all things, this does not mean that monism is necessary to Vico's championing of *topica* as method. In fact there is much about his position that resonates well with critical Buddhism, just as there is much about Descartes's criticism that seems rather

odd in the Buddhist context. Thus, although *critica* and *topica* often overlap, here I will focus on Hakamaya's understanding of the clash between them as epistemological models.

CRITICA AND *TOPICA*, DESCARTES AND VICO

Hakamaya presents Descartes as the one who established the Western tradition of the critical method of radical doubt directed to the elimination of all error and all probability, as one for whom a "clear, disinterested, and cautious discernment of truth and falsity was paramount." He cites, for example, the first of the famous "Four Principles":

> The First [principle of method] was never to accept anything for true which I did not clearly know to be such; that is to say, carefully to avoid precipitancy and prejudice, and to comprise nothing more in my judgment than what was presented to my mind so clearly and distinctly as to exclude all ground of doubt.[9]

To understand the challenge this presented, we need to remember that European thought in Descartes's time was ripe for a rebellion against the humanistic education of the classics, rhetoric, and a stifling scholasticism dominated by the Church. As it turned out, Cartesian method did indeed provide a foundation for succeeding centuries of scientific development and social change.

Not all were convinced, however, and Giambattista Vico was one of them. He reacted strongly against Descartes and his newly dominant method, asserting instead the need to return *topica* to its proper place in the educational system. Vico was particularly concerned with refuting what he saw to be the pernicious effect of the Cartesian method in education, especially the notion of criticism as a method for reaching a universally true and objective, indeed indubitable, first principle. (Vico also reacted against consciousness as the source or context of that first principle.) Since it is the rediscovery and recent importation of his ideas to Japan that gave Hakamaya a framework to pit Critical Buddhism against Topical Buddhism, we first need to look briefly at the *topica* that Vico opposed to Cartesian criticism.

Vico held the chair in rhetoric at the University of Naples from 1698 to 1741, and during that time strived to set up topical philosophy in opposition to Cartesian criticism, with an eye to restoring the rhetorical

tradition of Aristotle's *Topica*. The *Topica* belongs to one of Aristotle's logical works known as the *Organon* ("tool" or "instrument") which deals with dialectic, namely that which "reasons from opinions that are generally accepted" and whose conclusions are thus probable (Lat., *verisimilis*) rather than certain.[10] Hence it treats of correct arguments, and discusses how to look at an argument and to discover (Grk., *heuresis*; Lat., *inventio*) the places (Grk., *topoi*, Lat., *loci*) on which an argument is founded. It is concerned with the practical matter of establishing or refuting a thesis, and likely served as a textbook for the sort of debates practiced at Plato's Academy.[11]

Although the method of topics requires the correct reasoning of the dialectic argument, it is not concerned with a discussion of "truth," that is the provenance of science and requires premises that are true and primary (the subject of the *Posterior Analytics,* written after the *Topica* and largely supplanting it as a formal logic of proof or demonstration). The method of topics is concerned more with consistency in argument, how to achieve it, and how to turn the discovery of inconsistency against one's opponent. Aristotle thus considered the study of topics to have a very practical nature, useful for training the mind and discussing the theories of others on the basis of commonly accepted premises, but in a sense inferior to reasoning in pursuit or demonstration of truth. It is this practical nature that also makes the study of topics very close to rhetoric. The method is not, however, without its ambiguity in that it

> has a further use in relation to the ultimate bases of the principles used in the several sciences. For it is impossible to discuss them at all from the principles proper to the particular science in hand, seeing that the principles are the *primus* of everything else: it is through the opinions generally held on the particular points that these have to be discussed, and this task belongs properly, or most appropriately, to dialectic: for dialectic is a process of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all inquiries.[12]

It seems, then, that dialectic is also of use for discussing first principles that cannot be approached via the principles specific to the particular science. For our purposes here it is enough to note that, whether dealing with mere opinions and probabilities or as a "process of criticism" of unprovable first principles, dialectic is concerned with the "tools" of argument. In this sense it shares with the *Rhetoric* a concern for matters of opinion and persuasion, as well as a distance from demonstrations that

proceed from true or certain first principles and from arguments for the truth and certainty of first principles. This, however, leaves open the question of the "ultimate bases of the principles used in the several sciences," which, although amenable to the dialectical method of topics, remain beyond demonstration.

Like Aristotle's *topica*, Vico's topical philosophy is not so much a denial of the importance of critical demonstration as an insistence on the priority of discovering the "places" that were then in turn to be subject to demonstration. Rejecting static and *a priori* "first principles" of certainty, Vico understood human history as contextual, and theories of history as necessarily dependent on context. Vico is perhaps best known for his claim of *verum factum*: that we can only know with certainty (*verum*) that which is made (*factum*), or that which we make; and that any pure science pretending to proceed from an undoubtable first principle is in error because such a first principle is always, as that which is not made, unprovable.[13] Rather than absolute first principles of the physical world, it was human society, legal systems, literature—in short, human culture—that was the proper object of certain knowledge, and hence it was the arena of human events that was the proper focus of investigation. Accordingly, Vico also rejected the social theories of thinkers who looked to a timeless "natural law" or "social contract" (Hobbes, for example) as artificially projecting their own intellectual context back into history. Vico turned instead towards literature, folktales, and stories of ancient times as the source for thinking about the peoples of those times, and he demanded "an imaginative capacity for recapturing modes of consciousness utterly different from those with which [the historian] is acquainted in his everyday experience."[14]

Vico was also very interested in language and the widely variant meanings language takes over time (like the Buddhologist, his interest tended towards the etymological and philological), and he paid special attention to the metaphorical imagination and its communication in poetry. Poetry was not simply a decorative art for Vico, but at one time a "natural and pervasive mode of human expression" that could not be reduced to Cartesian rationality.[15] We see this concern for the poetic expressed also in Vico's theory of historical cycles, in which a prerational poetic mentality is gradually cut off and replaced by an increasingly skeptical rationality. It is the prerational that must be recaptured, for, as one commentator put it, the "dissolution of society is not arrested until man recaptures the

spontaneous primitive mentality which brings with it a renewed contact with God, a renewal of religion."[16] In short, topical philosophy seems to be less concerned with questions of an ontological ground of things than with epistemic foundations, and it is this notion of a prior, precritical discovery or intuition of that which is not "made" that Hakamaya claims is contrary to the discriminating wisdom of the Buddha.

Vico's attempt to reassert the importance of topics had little impact in his own age, but times change and, as Hakamaya recognizes, the current intellectual climate is much more sympathetic to the idea of grounding knowledge on a rejection of logical and rational critique. In particular, for Hakamaya the notion of recapturing a prerational, poetic mode of knowledge, the postmodern rejection of certainty and the accompanying deconstruction of the ideological context of certitude, the call for a "reimagining of the world," new-age spirituality in the West and in Japan, the popularity of the occult in seeming direct proportion to scientific and technological advances—all of this points to a perceived impoverishment of the human spirit in a modernity framed by positivist and scientist ideologies. It is this currency, or more specifically the Japanese discovery and importation of Vico as the spokesman for this sort of humanism, that provides Hakamaya with his focal point:

> Thus even in the West one finds periods of reactionary irrationalism, when a movement will surface to conspire with topical philosophy and raise the banner of revolt against critical philosophy. The present is just such a time, in which awareness of the impasse presented by modernity seeks expression in postmodernism or poststructuralism.... While Japan is usually quick to reflect Western trends, it was only in 1987 that a special issue of the journal *Shisō,* entitled *Reading Vico,* was published, under the supervision of Nakamura Yūjirō. In the same year a Japanese translation of Vico's *De nostri temporis studiorum ratione* appeared.... There may be those who follow Vico's revolt against Descartes to make the counterclaim that the central philosophy of Buddhism is topical. Even at the risk of instigating such a reaction, I feel it is important to expose Japan's intelligentsia to the core of what is involved in the opposition of standpoints. The heart of the intellectual question, I believe, lies not in the different ways of thought of East and West, but rather in the confrontation between *topica* and *critica.*[17]

Hakamaya begins his attack on topical philosophy by citing Nakamura Yūjirō to the effect that the art of topics is very closely related to

rhetoric and lies outside the scientific tradition of philosophical logic in that, unlike the abstract and universal aims of the logical and critical and "the absolutism of deductive entailment," topical philosophy is amenable to "multiple approaches to concrete problems, a plurality of probable truths, the art of discovery, and the like." Thus, according to Nakamura, "in a positive sense, [topics] is antiphilosophical." At the same time, it is also the ground of philosophy, the prior experience or discovery of that which logic subsequently argues, and hence precedes critical philosophy and gives to it the "places" or concrete contexts of its arguments. Similarly, the individuality of our human existence is preceded by the ground of all existence, with which it is one and yet individual. Again Nakamura:

> Just as the self (or individual) emerges from the corporate body and the hero from the chorus, the theme emerges from the topic and the subject from the predicate; the function of the subject/theme is found in the *self-conscious union* with the predicate/basis. In other words, we must drop a plumb line deep into the *ground of our existence, that ground from which we spring, so that by self-consciously merging with that ground, we can then stand apart from it.*[18]

This is a crucial point, for here we have the move from the methodological priority of topics to topos as an ontological ground of existence. The structure remains the same, so that it has the same deleterious effect on any criticism that would "subsequently" emerge, or on any individual self trying to stand as a particular moral agent. That is to say, the ontological "ground" will smother the critic in the embrace of conformity, the individual will be lost to the whole, and criticism will be absorbed by the topical, for "just as the predicate includes the subject, so is philosophy or criticism included within *topica,* and the felicitous tension between the two is spoken of as a 'self-conscious union'."[19]

THE STRUCTURE OF THE TOPICAL

Hakamaya uses the difference between the topical and the critical to draw attention to two deep-seated ways of thinking about things, ways of thinking that are indeed often set in opposition to each other. Of course, Hakamaya's intent is not simply to point this out, but to critique the topical approach as a vicious form of privileging that refuses even to recognize the fact of the opposition, functioning instead to eliminate or neutralize it through absorbing or embracing it. He relishes the blatant

Chart of Structural Opposites

left-hemisphere mode	↔	right-hemisphere mode
critical philosophy	↔	topical philosophy
intellectualism	↔	experientialism
ars iudicandi	↔	*ars inveniendi*
demonstratio	↔	*inventio*
veritas	↔	*verisimilitudo*
orthotēs	↔	*alētheia*
essence	↔	existence
analysis	↔	intuition
anumāna	↔	*pratyakṣa*
pratītyasamutpāda	↔	*tathatā*
paṭisotagāmin	↔	*anusotagāmin*
prajñā	↔	*samādhi*
paññā-vimutti	↔	*ceto-vimutti*
adhiprajñā	↔	*adhicitta*
śraddhā	↔	*adhimukti*
Lotus Sutra	↔	Ch'an/Zen
belief in causality	↔	the doctrine of original enlightenment
knowledge	↔	practice
reaping the fruits of one's actions	↔	Buddhahood of the non-sentient
transmigrating in the six realms	↔	Buddhahood of the non-sentient
time	↔	space
values language	↔	denigrates language
**vāk-śrāddhika*	↔	**vastvādhimuktika*
date-vāda*	↔	**dhātu-vāda*
human beings	↔	animals

confrontation as both an intellectual and moral imperative, and has made the confrontation explicit in a chart of structural oppositions.[20]

As a typological or structural comparison, this list is obviously fraught with difficulties—most of us, for example, seem to function fairly well with both hemispheres of the brain—but the structural divide that it points to remains problematic. Indeed, this issue is well known throughout the history of the Buddhist tradition (most notably perhaps in the context of the bSam yas debates in eighth-century Tibet or the sudden/gradual polarity in East Asian thought), but it is not unknown in

other contexts as well. Further well-known instances of this tension include Karl Potter's distinction between "leap" and "progress" philosophies, the delineation of the difference between meditative traditions aimed at samadhi and contemplative practices aimed at wisdom, and the debates between the *gzhan stong* and *rang stong* positions in the Tibetan tradition.[21] D. Seyfort Ruegg's recent comparative study, *Buddha-Nature, Mind and the Problem of Gradualism in a Comparative Perspective* is unsurpassed in showing just how deeply rooted—and often confrontational—these paradigms are within the Indo-Tibetan Buddhist traditions. He frames his discussion in terms of what is perhaps the grandest structural divide of all, that between nature and nurture (corresponding to Hakamaya's topical philosophy and critical philosophy). Drawing on his deep knowledge of the philosophical literature yet interested in a structural and comparative view of "'nature' and 'nurture' in the twin realms of soteriology and gnoseology,"[22] Seyfort Ruegg clarifies many of the historical and doctrinal developments without losing sight of the larger issues.

Drawing in part on the work of these scholars, we might extend Hakamaya's list to include such oppositions or structural tensions as follows:

nurture	↔	nature
development	↔	discovery[23]
saṃvṛti as revealing	↔	*saṃvṛti* as concealing[24]
gradual	↔	sudden
cultivation with effort	↔	spontaneity
conversion	↔	return
created, made, or constructed	↔	innate or essential
mediated	↔	immediate
produced	↔	revealed
progress	↔	leap
production of fruits	↔	pre-existing fruit
doctrinal study	↔	practice
orthodoxy	↔	orthopraxy[25]
cultivation of insight (*vipassanā*)	↔	cultivation of tranquility (*śamatha)*
discursive knowledge	↔	cessation of sensation and conceptualization

And so on. Although the division seems clear, the question that Hakamaya demands we attend to is whether or not the poles of the divide are irredeemably opposed. Indeed, many in the Buddhist tradition (as with many in this volume) have taken great pains to show that the breach is

more apparent than real. The cultivation of tranquility, for example, has long been seen as the appropriate preparation for analytic and discursive contemplation rather than as an unrelated technique leading to an unrelated goal. Or again, explaining *tathāgata-garbha* as skillful means is a well attested strategy of avoiding its substantialist thrust. In this regard, D. Seyfort Ruegg remarks at the onset of his survey of the many manifestations of this divide that

> opposed and hence apparently irreconcilable strands of thought are indeed to be found in our sources. But it would seem that more consideration, and probably more weight, have to be given to the possibility that the strands in question are forms of thought (and techniques) existing as polarities in tension between which the Buddhist traditions have from early times felt the need to strike a balance, rather than necessarily contradictory doctrines (and incompatible techniques) which could be harmonized only artificially and superficially, by some stratagem such as "inclusivism."[26]

While it seems rather clear that argument, polemic, coercive inclusivism, and outright rejection have in fact been the typical intra-Buddhist approach to the problem of opposing doctrines, this in itself does not seem to be the target of Hakamaya's polemic.[27] He aims, rather, at the variant of this strategy that seeks to include all differences within (or reduce all differences to) a linguistically transcendent or epistemologically prior experience of "reality," an "antiphilosophical topos that is yet its generative ground."[28] It is *this* form of reconciliation that incenses Hakamaya, for whom harmony through assimilation in a nonconceptual experience of truth is not merely methodologically incoherent (its internalist epistemology of a nonconceptual, experiential "truth" should render it incommunicable and merely private) but also morally bankrupt (it is truly hegemonic in denying the possibility of critical confrontation in matters of ultimate truth while simultaneously claiming certitude of knowledge about that truth). It is difficult indeed to have a discussion with somebody who claims to have had an experience that cannot be talked about but the truth of which is self-validating, since any who have not had the same experience are by definition unfit to talk about it.

An approach to knowledge ultimately resting solely on the authority of personal experience brooks no discussion. In this sense it *is* hard to imagine a more private yet simultaneously authoritarian posture. Śākyamuni may have refused to answer questions that were not relevant to the

path, but he never refused to talk about truth, nor did he ever claim that his experience was beyond language. Hakamaya goes on to note that, in spite of Śākyamuni's emphasis on the critical discrimination of truth and falsity and the elucidation of the same in his teaching, the topical approach dominates the entirety of the Buddhist tradition, not simply Japanese or East Asian Buddhism:

> Like Descartes, Śākyamuni was a criticalist. He opposed the topicalists of his own time and their predecessors. But even more quickly than Vico followed on the heels of Descartes, advocates of a topical philosophy reappeared throughout Indian Buddhism and eviscerated Śākyamuni's true criticism.[29]

TAOISM

For Hakamaya, then, the primary criterion of topical philosophy is that it affirms a nondifferentiated source of knowledge based on individual experience, which leads in turn to the relegation of differentiating or discriminating knowledge and language to a function of concealing truth. In this connection it is not hard to see why Hakamaya proffers the *tao* as a prime example of a topical philosophy. As is well illustrated in the first chapter of the *Tao te ching*, the *tao*, the totality of movement and change in the cosmos, is infinite and by definition cannot have boundaries that delimit what is "on" or "off" of the path. Thus the *tao* is unknowable even as a path, "The *tao* that can be '*tao*-ed' is not the constant *tao*." Because naming has precisely the function of so delimiting or differentiating things ("*this* is a chair and *that* is a table"), the *tao* is also unnameable: "The name that can be named is not the constant name." The *tao* thus has no individual, differentiated, or named existence, yet this "non-being" is the source of all being, which in turn gives birth to all phenomena: "Non-being is called the origin of heaven and earth; being is called the mother of the myriad things." Therefore, to perceive the origin in its wholeness one must go beyond the fascination and entanglement with the delimited forms of bounded existence (especially language): "Some people constantly dwell in non-being because they seek to perceive its wonder, while some dwell constantly in being because they seek to perceive the boundaries." Because non-being underlies and gives rise to being, "these two are of the same origin, yet are named differently. This sameness is called mysterious." The sameness (non-duality) of non-being and being is

"mysterious" precisely because it is beyond conceptual and linguistic differentiation. And yet even to call it mysterious is to attempt to name it, and so, "mysterious, and yet again mysterious, this is the gate of the multitude of mysteries."[30]

With the ineffable *tao* as the source of all things, the pervasive model in the *Tao te ching* and the *Chuang-tzu* is one of return to that which is prior to the delimiting and boundary-setting functions of conceptual knowledge and language. Further, inasmuch as any attempt to create or develop sagehood would be to differentiate the sage from the whole, its aim is to discover the creative spontaneity of the natural or "self-so" (*tzu-jan* 自然) rather than to develop or train human morality. As Hakamaya notes, the Taoist return to this ideal state, subtracting all forms of acquired knowledge and yet subtracting again, is a return to the home-ground that Chuang-tzu called "the Village of Not-Anything-At-All" (無可有之郷), a village devoid of all knowledge, all discriminating language, all aspiration, all memory, and all time.[31] It is "the Village of Not-Anything-At-All" not because it is a nonexistent place but rather because, as the ultimate place, it is *all* places. That is to say, as all places or the universal place it is no specific place, no single place that can be differentiated from any other place—it is a utopia, literally an *οὐ τόπος*, a "no place." And, as Hakamaya notes, "the fundamental requirement of sporting in that utopia is the abandoning of both language and knowledge."[32]

In spite of this abandonment, as Hakamaya notes, the bounded or delimited forms of language and ethical behavior are nevertheless said to arise from or be enfolded within the priority and generative force of the *tao*, just as Cartesian criticism is lost within the nondiscriminating priority of a prerational topos. In effect this sets the *tao*, like Vico's "probable truths," not in a relationship of *antagonism* to critical philosophy but in one of *non-opposition*, an absence of all relationship, a true epistemic absolute.[33] Hakamaya is particularly infuriated at the smug strategy of inclusivism by which topical philosophy resorts to the rhetoric of a "logic of no-logic" and an "unbounded position of no-position" (a place that is no/all place(s), that is, a utopia) when confronted with a dialogue partner that seeks to find its position so as to engage in critical dialogue.[34] Where some people see tolerance, Hakamaya sees a particularly dangerous form of privileging, dangerous not so much because of the simple fact of privileging (which, after all, is a feature of all philosophies that make value judgments, i.e., all critical philosophies), but dangerous because the

privilege masquerades as harmony, consensus, and accommodation.[35] We should note, however, that this form of topical philosophy is rather different from the practical method of Aristotelian *topica*, whose purpose was precisely to *find* the "places" upon which an argument rested. As noted above, the method of *topica* is also not necessarily or even typically involved in trying to find or "experience" an ontologically prior reality or an epistemically prior truth.

Of course, the idea of a "chaos" of nonexistence that precedes creation is not limited to the Taoist tradition. Nor is the idea that a return to or dwelling within the chaos that exists before differentiation or opposition the goal of religious practice (although maintenance of the created order is more often the norm). Indeed, most cosmogonic tales depend on the notion of a unity that exists prior to differentiated existence.[36] I believe that it is this structure that Hakamaya has in mind when he says of topical philosophy that

> Taoism in China thus plays a role roughly analogous to that of Vico in Western philosophy. That is, in the same way that Vico distinguishes Descartes's truth from his own notion of "probability" and yet includes the former within the latter, the pure topos of Lao-tzu or Chuang-tzu's *tao* includes Confucius's more temporally sequential *tao*. At that point there can no longer be any words to express a notion that might be the *tao*.[37]

It is also this structure, and in particular the denial of language that seems to be the target of his constant critique of indigenous thought: "Needless to say, indigenous thought—in any country—is constituted by an indigenous notion of topos that refuses language its literal meaning."[38]

For Hakamaya the point of Buddhist practice is not to return to what we naturally are (a primordial silence?), but rather to strive mightily to achieve the discriminating awareness and compassion of a Buddha.[39] This is because he takes Buddh*ism* not to be the all-encompassing *tao* but rather a narrowly prescriptive path that "goes against the stream" (*paṭisotagāmin*), that is, a way of thinking and practice that is "foreign" to our "indigenous way." To do what comes naturally or "go with the flow" (*anusotagāmin*) as either individuals or as cultures is to give in to our natural state of ignorance, greed, and hatred, whereas the Buddhist path demands a wrenching shift away from this "natural" morality. In this sense it seems that Hakamaya intends "indigenous thinking" (*dochaku shisō*) to refer to a sort of primitivist essentialism, a yearning for something that is at the root of or prior to all constructed elaborations, a primordial

and natural reality understood as either individual self or unique racial, national, or cultural identity. Buddhism, then, as the doctrine of no-self, is to be encountered and engaged as foreign and antagonistic to such a yearning for the indigenous. When, however, that foreign, unnatural path that is Buddhist practice is absorbed within the nondiscriminating topos of an indigenous, "natural" path, well, at that point it is no longer Buddhism:

> In India the indigenous way of thinking was, as taught in the Upaniṣads, to posit a fundamental basis or substance such as brahman or atman. Buddhism arose in response to this way of thinking. It denied a spatial and unchanging single topos, and instead taught that the only truth is a temporal process of conditioned arising (*paṭiccasamuppāda*, *pratītya-samutpāda*).... When Buddhism was transmitted to China as a "foreign religion," its central teaching was overturned...[and] the result has not even a smidgen left of the distinctive features of Buddhism—the Buddhist concepts of conditioned arising and causality have been eliminated in favor of the indigenous Chinese concept of "nature" or "spontaneity" (Jpn. *shizen*).[40]

Many of the historical and philosophical nuances of this broad condemnation that are open to debate, but the strong influence of Taoist ideas on Chinese Buddhism, especially Ch'an, is widely accepted. From the perspective of one who rejects coercive or triumphalist inclusivism as false to true Buddhism, the only conclusion can be that "even Buddhism, which properly should have been encountered as a foreign tradition, was absorbed by Taoism and debilitated in the process."[41]

ORIGINAL ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE KYOTO SCHOOL

Hakamaya sees the Japanese antipathy towards critical discrimination as rooted in this notion of *tao*, combined with Japanese indigenous thought, and overlaid with a veneer of topical Buddhism.[42] Buddhism is said to consist of "a nondiscriminating 'satori'...and 'discrimination' and 'discernment' are decried as the greatest of evils. This all stems from the influence of this Taoistic 'topical Buddhism'."[43] He puts it thus:

> The Ch'an school that gained sway among the intellectuals of the Sung dynasty emerged from this sort of Buddhism thoroughly permeated with Taoism. When it was imported into Japan from the Kamakura period onwards as Zen Buddhism, the earlier Taoist-influenced Buddhism of

> Chi-tsang's tradition was reinforced, until we have the situation today where the indigenous thought of Japan is trumpeted as the Buddhist theory of "original enlightenment."[44]

The importance of the theory of original enlightenment for virtually all aspects of Japanese Buddhism is well known, as is its impact on the affirmation of the enlightenment of the non-sentient, often cited as parallel to (and later giving doctrinal legitimation for) the indigenous Japanese "sacred phenomenalism." The *Awakening of Mahayana Faith*, typically cited as the *locus classicus* for the doctrine of original enlightenment, defines it as prior or original, pure, spatial, and pervasive in contrast to what is temporal and sequential, nondifferentiated, and hence as beyond thought, all concepts that should be familiar to the reader as Hakamaya's very definition of topical philosophy. The text says:

> The meaning of "enlightenment" is that the origin of mind is separate from [individual] thoughts. The mark of being separate from thoughts is to be equivalent to the realm of empty space that pervades everything, to be of one [and the same] mark as reality (*dharma-dhātu*), the undifferentiated Dharma body of the Tathagatas. As it is based on the Dharma body, one explains it and names it "original enlightenment."[45]

And Hakamaya comments,

> It is a very skillful maneuver to say, rather than "the mind is separate from thoughts," that "the *origin* of mind is separate from thoughts." The mind cannot be separate from its thoughts, which constantly arise and perish, but if there is an "origin of the mind" behind the mind, then this can be identified as an eternal and unchanging "thusness" (Skt. *tathatā*, Jpn. *shinnyo*) that sustains all phenomena.[46]

Hakamaya reserves particular scorn for the idea that the doctrine of original enlightenment should be considered a Buddhist notion. For him it is rather the quintessential example of topical philosophy with all of the attendant philosophical and social problems. In this connection he frequently cites the Kyoto school philosophers as illustrations of just how the doctrine of original enlightenment functions uncritically to validate a yearning for the indigenous, in this case the affirmation of the cultural uniqueness and superiority of the Japanese (that nexus of ideas broadly known as *Nihonjinron*):

> [The Kyoto school is but] an attempt to erect a philosophical superstructure for the self-affirming adulation of Japanese culture, a task they accom-

plished by merging the idea of original enlightenment, the self-affirming and pompously declared "glory of the Eastern spirit" masquerading as Buddhism, and a brand of idealism more German than Western.[47]

The philosophers of the Kyoto school certainly do seem to espouse ideas that broadly fit Hakamaya's categories, as we can see from Tom Kasulis's comparison of the dialectics of Nishida's "logic of place" (*basho no ronri*) with Hegel's dialectic:

> In Western philosophies such as Hegel's, the dialectic is progressive: it takes us from the starting point through opposition to a higher level of integration.... Nishida's dialectic, on the other hand, is regressive: it goes back to a point before the opposition, to the position out of which the polarities initially developed...both dialectical forms seek a unity beyond conflict, but for the Hegelian, the unity is whither the opposition develops for its resolution, whereas in Nishida's dialectic the unity is previous to the point whence the opposition originally emerged.... Nishida's logic...looks into the whence of judgment. What is the situation (*basho*) out of which judgment emerges?[48]

Indeed, just what is this *basho,* this unity, out of which all judgment emerges yet is itself beyond conflict?

> It is a pure activity, a predicate without any abstracted subject such as "the chair" or "I" on which I can hang a judgment. Yet, it is the basis for all judgments. Since the experience within this *basho* cannot be judgmentally articulated, Nishida calls it the "*basho* of absolutely nothing" (*zettai mu no basho*).[49]

If we may accept Kasulis's analysis as accurate, then it does seem to be the case that Nishida's philosophy conforms to the structure of topical philosophy critiqued by Hakamaya.[50] Indeed, although there are many subtle (and some less subtle) differences among the philosophers of the so-called Kyoto school, recourse to a pure experience that is prerational and prejudgmental and yet is "the basis for all judgments," is the hallmark of thinkers from Nishida Kitarō to Abe Masao. Even Tanabe Hajime's revisioning of philosophy as metanoetics, while opposed to Nishida in many respects, proclaims the need to go beyond reason: "'Meta-noetics' means transcending the contemplative or speculative philosophy of intellectual intuition as it is usually found in the realms of thought based on reason." Not surprisingly, truth is based on a self-validating religious experience:

> So powerful is metanoetics that it sweeps aside all doubt about itself. This may, it seems to me, be taken as evidence of its truth.... It is precisely the self-awakening which comes to one on the way of *zange* (repentance) that constitutes metanoetics, or *zange*. Intrinsic to the way of *zange* is the self-awakening of those who follow it and the wisdom thus attained. It is for this very reason that metanoetics can be designated a philosophy.[51]

From Hakamaya's point of view this aptly sums up the warrant of the topicalist: rooted in a self-validating experience that is beyond any "thought based on reason" that could critique it, metanoetics nonetheless "for this very reason…can be designated a philosophy."[52]

In addition to the exasperation felt in trying to engage the topicalist in critical analysis, Hakamaya is firmly convinced that this sort of inclusivism is not only philosophically incoherent, a poor excuse for epistemology, and non-Buddhist, but that it is also morally impoverished, a vicious and hegemonic sort of inclusivism whose effects are not limited to the esoteric realm of philosophical discourse but are abundantly in evidence throughout Japanese history and society. The moral acquiescence that he exposes in topical philosophy seems to be threefold. First, by forsaking critical discrimination in favor of a precritical unity or harmony, it tends to downplay or even deny the reality of actual historical differences, thus allowing for an affirmation of the status quo and negating the need for social criticism. Second, in conjunction with a facile affirmation of the status quo and a noncritical attitude, the self-validation of ultimate knowledge in (private) religious experience provides a model for authoritarianism. Third, where the doctrine of no-self opens the door for altruistic activities, affirmation of the originally enlightened nature of sentient and non-sentient alike provides no such theoretical basis. All three of these problems he finds pervasive in Japan, especially in the longstanding valorization of harmony (*wa*), which he sees not as a Buddhist doctrine of equality but rather as a political ideology of conformity; and in the romantic allure of the indigenous, that is to say, the praise of *yamato-damashii* (the Japanese spirit) of the sort found in the Japanist discourse of contemporary figures such as Umehara Takeshi and the former prime minister Nakasone Yasuhiro.

The first point, that topical philosophy tends to the affirmation of the status quo, seems related to Hakamaya's understanding of Buddhism as going "against the flow," in contrast to the topicalist tendency to con-

form to what already exists, to the suchness in which all things are perfect as they are in and of themselves, that is to say, "naturally." Hakamaya understands this refusal to challenge the status quo as belonging to the backdrop of social discrimination in Japan inasmuch as it leads to advocating the acceptance of one's lot in the world as a matter of karmic destiny in which all elements play an equal role.[53] He cites Myōe's lines on "as it should be" (*arubekiyauwa*) as an example of this attitude:

> Persons must hold to the seven characters of *a-ru-be-ki-ya-u-wa*. Monks should be as monks, laity as laity. The emperor should be as the emperor, and the ministers as ministers. Acting contrary to this [principle of] "as it should be" is the source of all evil.[54]

He also criticizes Meiji era preachers of the Sōtō sect who employed a "tricky logic that, starting from the 'same and equal one reality' that is the original foundation of the cosmos, suddenly jumps to an acceptance of present disparities as but the result of the karma of past lives," allowing them to preach resignation in the face of social inequity on the premise that "discrimination is none other than equality and equality none other than discrimination."[55]

Hakamaya and Matsumoto lend their voices to the chorus of critics who accuse the Kegon-like inclusivist rhetoric of the *Kokutai no hongi* as a social ideology that effaces the individual in favor of the whole, a most egregious example of the way that "as it should be" can function as a totalitarian ideology of the aggregate. In this regard, Hakamaya quotes Umehara Takeshi's praise of Prince Shōtoku's espousal of the "unity and equality" of Ekayana Buddhism as "the most effective ideology for creating a nation based on a functional bureaucracy under the Emperor and independent of the clans," noting that "the ideology of harmony in the Seventeen-Article Constitution attributed to Prince Shōtoku is indeed just as Umehara has it. But if this is what was really intended, then let it not be confused with true Buddhism."[56] In this way Hakamaya argues that Prince Shōtoku's constitution and the almost millenium-and-a-half tradition of harmony (*wa*) that it fostered are in fact an ideology of conformity entirely in keeping with the topical strategy of absorbing difference rather than allowing it; as the Japanese saying has it, "the nail that sticks out gets hammered down."[57] In the realm of international politics this became the "Fantasy Orient" of the Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.[58] Similarly, the current discourse of *Nihonjinron* is both facilitated

and constituted by an inclusivist topos of ethnic superiority structurally identical to that deployed to mobilize the Japanese "spirit" for the war.[59]

Another pernicious effect of the "naturalism" of topical philosophy is that its affirmation that things "as they are" already are "as they should be" eliminates the need to think critically about either self or society.[60] For example, the idea that Buddhism is beyond ethics is lent support by the rhetoric of Zen spokesmen such as D. T. Suzuki and Nishida Kitarō, who focus on the immediacy of direct experience beyond the reach of historical contingency.[61] The problem, of course, is that Zen Buddhists and their institutions are very much mediated by historical contingencies, and many would say that the same is true of their immediate, pure experience.[62] As Robert Sharf notes, the transcendent experience of "reality as it is" also serves to excuse the less-than-transcendent historical reality: "This apologetic discourse," he writes, "effectively exonerates religion from crimes committed in its name; the 'spiritual essence' of a tradition remains forever untainted by the shortcomings of church or clergy."[63] According to Hakamaya the result is that the affirmation of "reality as it is" combines with the denial of historical contingency to "excuse just about any situation in any time or place without any need for critical reflection."[64] Thus, where some would claim that Zen is beyond history, others note the historical fact that Zen institutions have accommodated themselves to the military-political establishment from the time of its introduction to Japan through the militarism of the war years and on to the corporate training sessions that secure the financial well-being of many temples in contemporary Japan—and this not in spite of its ahistorical rhetoric but precisely because of it. As another Komazawa professor, Okabe Kazuo, has noted, "The Buddhism of World War II…is an appalling example of what happens by simply floating along with the current of the times, in this case succumbing to militarism and even singing its praises. This is a stain on the history of Buddhism that can never be obliterated."[65]

Related in an interesting way to his critique of going along with the status quo is Hakamaya's second point, the warrant or authority granted by self-validating religious experience: "Topical philosophy adopts the voice of authority in order to sell its own rhetoric."[66] That is, an inclusivism that stands on the self-validating ground of ineffable experience is totalitarian because of its rejection of any language or rational demonstration that might contest its authority. With all doubts swept aside and only experience as evidence of its own truth, it is but a short step to an

authoritarian ideology of knowledge. This in turn fosters the ideology of social conformity and control that Hakamaya and Matsumoto see so much in evidence in prewar Japanese ideology such as that found in the *Kokutai no hongi*.[67]

Hakamaya's focus on the question of authority is not surprising in that the issue of epistemic authority (*pramāna*) is central to Indian religious thinking in general and to Buddhist thought and practice in particular. Typically Buddhism is said to recognize two forms of *pramāna*, direct experience *(pratyakṣa)* and inference (*anumāna*). Hakamaya observes:

> These two aspects [of topics or discovery and critique or judgment] correspond almost exactly to the distinction between *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* in Indian philosophy…[and even] in India thinking is overwhelmingly based on the primacy of *pratyakṣa*, with the exception of the Buddhist logical tradition of Dharmakīrti (7th c.), later inherited by Tsong kha pa (1357–1419).[68]

One of the things I find most interesting about his critique of topical philosophy as an authoritarian epistemology is that he takes the positivist or objectivist approach to scholarship to be another form of the same authoritarian attitude, in this case privileging the possibility of the unengaged "discovery" and presentation of objective facts, the authoritative display of the self-evident that in fact camouflages vested interests. That is, the notion of a value-neutral presentation of objective facts reduces all religious phenomena to the same level and in so doing functions in exactly the same way as the smothering embrace of the inclusivist: it denies diversity and fosters authoritarian hegemony. He writes:

> It is not entirely without rhyme or reason that the reverence for topos should appeal to objective facts, while the commitment to criticism should hold language in high esteem. The former need only redefine facts as topos, while the latter must work with language to express critical thinking. Weber himself enjoined, "*die Tatsachen sprechen läßt*" (Let the facts speak for themselves), and yet clearly stated also that "whenever a person of science introduces personal value judgment, a full understanding of the facts *ceases*."[69]

Elsewhere he assails a talk given by Sakurai Tokutarō, the president of his own university and a well-known specialist in the study of folk religion, for smuggling personal beliefs in under the guise of objective scholarship:

> The scientific study of religion and folklore has developed along the lines of Weber's injunction, "Let the facts speak for themselves," seeking in this way to secure an objective autonomy within the academy. The problem is that Sakurai, though giving the impression of fidelity to the facts, has taken a giant stride beyond the limits of objectivity.... Let there be no mistake. I have no intention whatsoever of denying the importance and public relevance of personal beliefs. Quite the contrary, I insist that we must find words to express our beliefs if we are to assess their truth or falsity. But it seems to me a violation of the rules, a kind of cheating, to place oneself on the high ground of the objective scholar of religion and folklore, claiming to engage in the typological study of religion from a position outside the traditions themselves, to "let the facts speak for themselves," and then assert the superiority of Japanese folk religion.[70]

In his spirited assault on the notion of scholarly objectivity, Hakamaya admits that it was this smarmy and self-congratulatory stance of self-validating authority within academic scholarship that galvanized him to "renounce the safe confines of academic pronouncements" and take up the subject of critical versus topical philosophy.[71] Consistent with their commitment to bring criticism to bear on the intellectual's participation in ideological structures, both Hakamaya and Matsumoto note that not only would the abandonment of a critical, judgmental stance be of utmost benefit to the authority of the institutional establishment ("all too often [this] leads to compromising objectivity in order to remain in the good graces of the enforcing powers-that-be"[72]); it would also make the vocation of university professor truly idyllic.[73] As we shall see, however, there is more at stake in Hakamaya's distrust of the authority of the topical. Namely, he sees it as part and parcel of a social and political totalitarianism, as when he concludes that the attitude fostered by Myōe's *arubekiyauwa* mentioned above "supported social discrimination and fostered an ethic of blind obedience to one's superiors."[74] Inclusivist generosity, viewed from the vantage point of those so included, easily turns into the smothering embrace of totalitarianism.

The third point, the relationship of the Buddhist doctrine of no-self to Buddhist ethics, has been extensively examined and the various issues need not be rehashed here. Suffice it to say that it could be argued that inasmuch as it was a search for individual knowledge (*jñāna*) rather than maintenance of social norms (*dharma*) that drove Siddhārtha out of his palace, Buddhism can partly be understood as the setting of an ethic of

personal or individual responsibility against the authoritarianism of a cosmic ethic of social duty. Similarly, in place of the illusory suffering of *māya*, Buddhism describes the real suffering of real beings, and rejects the notion of an independent, unchanging, and eternally blissful self or personal identity in favor of interdependent and changing phenomena as the only ground upon which to base religious practice. Hence, although the question of suffering and morality is classically presented as a concern for the compassionate outreach of the enlightened, it is *really* of concern for those unenlightened beings that suffer and is thus taught as the prime motivator for religious practice (that is, the first noble truth of suffering). It is structurally difficult if not impossible to derive any motivational meaning from suffering and anguish if our true nature is pure and enlightened.[75]

A thorough analysis of this point is beyond the scope of this paper. I would only note here that many philosophies positing such a pure ground as the true nature of living beings or the universe end up much closer to dualism than to monism, as is the case in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, where defilements are seen as utterly unrelated to the purity of the *tathāgatagarbha*, merely accidental (*āgantuka*) and lacking any reality whatsoever. Yet it is precisely defilements that must be the concern of moral theory and religious practice. It is no doubt for this reason that this issue has regularly been brought to the foreground of intra-Buddhist debate, where affirmation of an unchanging self or basis of all things is typically seen as tantamount to a denial of morality and the need for religious practice. Indeed, questioning the need for religious practice in the face of the dominant rhetoric of original enlightenment drove Dōgen's religious search, in the sense that the denial of the suffering of social discrimination stems from the affirmation of an originally enlightened mind. The critical realist, however, admits of the reality of things (including suffering) while maintaining a critical awareness as to *how* things really exist, that is to say, causally and without self.

COMMENTS AND APPRAISAL

In an attempt to sort all of this out, we may point to three different issues intertwined in Hakamaya's writing. The first and perhaps most divisive issue concerns making judgments about "what is Buddhism" and declaring other things "not Buddhist." Second is the question of whether or not *topica* and *critica* are mutually exclusive. A third and final issue has to do

with the pernicious effects of topical Buddhism. In focussing on these three issues, I mean to bracket the question of the truth value of what Hakamaya calls "true Buddhism," though in the end this may be the only really important question. For it is certainly possible that one might agree with Hakamaya's pinpointing of the "true" Buddhist view of reality, its incompatibility with Taoism, and the negative social effects of this watered-down Buddhism, *and still reject* that Buddhist view of reality as false.

It is in the very act of judging some things Buddhist and others "not Buddhist" that things get the most complicated.[76] On the one hand, the procedure seems fairly straightforward: define Buddhism and then compare any given doctrine or practice reputed to be Buddhist to see whether or not it fits the terms of the definition. The claims of E. Claire Prophet, L. Ron Hubbard, or Asahara Shōkō to be teaching Buddhism, for example, might be assessed in this fashion. In evaluating these arguments about what is Buddhism and what is not, it is good to keep in mind that in fact we make these distinctions all the time, whether as scholars, Buddhists, or simply as observers exercising our common sense.[77] Few would have much difficulty in deciding that the Gospel of Luke, for example, is not to be considered a Buddhist scripture. On another level we can note that in substance Hakamaya *is in complete agreement* with Umehara Takeshi, Kuroda Toshio, Neil McMullin, Allan Grapard, and others who argue that Japanese Buddhism cannot be understood outside of its intimate entanglements in indigenous thought and practices; indeed, in the view of some (like Umehara) Japanese Buddhism might not even be considered Buddhism at all.[78] Similarly, few have ever denied the impact of Taoism on Chinese Buddhist thought and practice. The difference with Hakamaya and Matsumoto is their insistence that if this influence is critically evaluated *from the Buddhist point of view*, some, if not all, of these influences must be rejected as incompatible with true Buddhism. Many seem to have great problems with the idea that such judgments are possible; or if possible, that they are desirable. For my part, I find the enterprise entirely legitimate. Moreover, I think that such critical judgment is imperative for Buddhists and scholars alike.

As for Buddhists themselves, suffice it to say that debating the parameters of "true Buddhism" is what Buddhist thinkers have always done, even when they are engaged in arguing the universal or utopian forms of Buddhism that Hakamaya decries. If this were the only question at hand, we would do well to let Hakamaya, Matsumoto, and others go their

Buddhist way, reckoning that their option to speak as "committed" Buddhists represents a choice to stand outside of the academy. This, of course, is the dominant approach of academic Buddhist studies, which might study Dōgen but declines to make judgments about the truth or value of Dōgen's ideas. Implicit in this approach, however, is the privileging of the scholarly or objective mode of inquiry, which is precisely what Hakamaya and Matsumoto wish to challenge. In line with his claim that even so-called objective study cannot avoid introducing subjective valuations, Hakamaya denies that there is any "'intellectual integrity' in placing myself outside the Buddhist tradition in order to speak about that tradition, in effect yielding the field to the [topicalists], who place themselves on a ground prior to all differentiation of religion [and thus pretend that all are of equal worth]."[79]

I am in agreement with Hakamaya and the many others who have argued that scholars do in fact constantly make judgments about what Buddhism is and what it is not, as well as about what kind of Buddhism is true Buddhism;[80] I also agree that the idea of the objective scholar is an idea whose time has passed. Much ink has been spilled of late in the dispute over the scholar's neutrality, and, be it the theological underpinnings of Orientalist discourse, the arrogation and regurgitation of sectarian Japanese Buddhist views in the pages of Western scholarship, or the appropriation and mimetic performance of Tibetan sectarian views by the "foreigner at the lama's feet," in past years the critical act of locating the scholar's stake has become an industry in its own right. Once the improbability of truly neutral scholarship is recognized, the issue is no longer whether or not scholars make judgments but rather, as Hakamaya astutely points out, whether or not those judgments are wrapped in the authoritative guise of objectivity and neutrality or are openly available for inspection.

Few and far between are the scholars who admit a religious stake in their own work, in spite of the great numbers of us who ply our trade with Buddhist publishing houses or derive institutional support from Buddhist organizations.[81] Rarer still are works that look critically at the Buddhist tradition. As a result, what tacit assumptions are smuggled in tend to be piously apologetic rather than critically apologetic.[82] If the pretense of objectivity fosters a "curator's" approach to one's work, a tacit commitment to the objects tends to a kind of "excavation" approach, in which texts, rituals, hagiographies, and the like are ransacked for evidence of the superior Buddhist approach to various intellectual, social, and

cultural issues of the moment. (This might seem a mere caricature were it not for the mass of Western writing on so-called "engaged Buddhism" and its theoretical cousin, Buddhist ethics.)

Of course, if we accept Hakamaya's notion of the openly committed yet critical scholar, the coherence and validity of both the critical method employed and the ideas stipulated as "core" must be open to criticism and judgment. On this point, I agree with Griffiths that the "exigencies of [Hakamaya's] polemical situation no doubt require him to spend more intellectual energy on explaining and refuting the errors of his opponents than on elucidating his own epistemology."[83] At the same time, it seems to me that Hakamaya needs to clarify his notion of *critica* and how it relates to the "true Buddhism" of no-self and causal interdependence. Still, I cannot accept as a reasonable guideline or ideal goal of our scholarly work the proposition that criticism and judgment are undesirable or impossible.

I do not mean, however, that the discovery that we as scholars have a vested stake in our scholarship necessarily implies any nasty secret or embedded interest that needs to be exposed, denounced, or expunged, and this is all the more the case with scholars who also profess themselves Buddhist in one form or another. As researchers we need to remember our own position vis-à-vis that which attracts our scholarly attention (that is to say, a tradition that has always been interested in arguing truth) and, perhaps more importantly, vis-à-vis an audience that includes the Buddhists whom we study. As my colleague Bruce Dahlberg once pointed out, inasmuch as we make our living from the study of religious communities, their texts and practices, it is entirely reasonable to consider what we have to give back to them in return. It seems to me that responsibly critical scholarship should be as useful to the religious community as it aims to be to the academic world.

Regarding the question of whether or not topical and critical philosophy are irredeemably opposed or can, in Seyfort Ruegg's sense, best be seen as simply typical of the tensions "between which the Buddhist traditions have from early times felt the need to strike a balance," I cannot let Hakamaya's contrast between Descartes and Vico pass without comment. I have a hard time understanding how the Cartesian method fits Hakamaya's demand for critical demonstration. While Descartes rejected much of the rhetorical tradition, his own most basic proposition, *cogito ergo sum*, seems to be the epitome of an internalist epistemology that ultimately rests on the certainty of personal experience or intuition. There is

also a problem of the content of the Cartesian certainty "I think, therefore I am." As Roger Corless has said, the Buddhist reply would surely have to be "Think again."[84] Another problem one would expect Hakamaya to have with a Cartesian approach would be its mind-body dualism. This led Descartes to the idea of the detached observer, which is closely related to Weberian objectivism and directly contradicts Hakamaya's notion of committed scholarship.

Finally, we cannot fail to note that much in contemporary theories of indeterminacy that contribute to the postmodernist rejection of the rational in fact grow directly out of the scientific tradition of Cartesian physics. That is to say, the postmodern (dis)location of the rational and the accompanying demand for renewed attention to the "mytho-sphere" and a reimagined universe—in short, the renewed interest in Vico—are concerns descendent from Enlightenment rationalism, even if today they stand in stark opposition to it. Not simply Gödel and Heisenberg, quantum mechanics and chaos theory, but also the mathematics of topology and topos theory—even the fuzzy-logic sets that promise to one day give us back the *okoge* in our rice cookers—are all born of a rejection of the sort of objective certainty that is similar to Hakamaya's rejection of historical objectivity. Hakamaya's rejection of Vico's "probability" or "verisimilitude" does not indicate a naive or nostalgic return to some sort of positivist, rationalist ideal of objective, deductive truth. At the same time, he is not always as clear as he should be about the difference between the two. Similarly, his insistence on Cartesian certainty beyond all doubt, coupled with an antihistoricist demand for "true Buddhism," seems to leave him open to charges of positing an ahistorical essence of Buddhism, in much the same way as Suzuki or Nishida did, and hence open to the same charges of authoritarianism.[85]

Vico's theories of prerational experience or discovery of the divine are not out of place in seventeenth-century Italy, but neither are they central to *topica* as a method; obviously they were not part of Aristotle's *Topica*. If we agree with Hakamaya that from either a Buddhist, epistemological, or moral point of view the relevance—though not necessarily the reality—of "pure" or "precritical" experience must be rejected (but no less than Descartes's self-certitude), what is left is Vico's real concern: the thoroughly related or contextual world of humanity.[86] His notion of *verum factum* (the real is the made), for example, seems to have a close affinity with the Buddhist notion of invariable causality on the one hand, and the

continual coming-to-be and passing-away of causally "made" phenomena. Vico was interested in the particulars or specifics of history, juridical theory, and the like, rather than ahistorical universals. His emphasis on the "probable" in contrast to Cartesian "certainty" or "first truth" was not a rejection of truth but a rejection of unchanging universals. In line with the Greek idea that the true and universal is unaffected by change, Vico called that which changes, that which is made or produced, the "probable" rather than the "true." This does not mean that we can never know what is true, and that the pursuit of what is "perhaps true or perhaps false" is as valid as the pursuit of truth. Vico's point, on the contrary, is simply that in the ever-changing world of the "made" there is no absolute or universal essence. To me, this sounds like Buddhism, at least Buddhism in its non-*tathāgata-garbha* variety.

Similarly, Vico's interest in language never led him to dismiss the importance of judging an argument's validity or the truth or falsity of its premises. Indeed, his criticism of Descartes is, as his translator notes, "as sharp-edged as it is 'clear and distinct' (a Cartesian anti-Cartesianism, so to speak)."[87] Both *topica* and *critica* deal with argument, though the former is perhaps inductive whereas the latter is deductive; and, as noted above, even for Aristotle *topica* was linked to first principles. The *inventio* that Hakamaya assails does not refer to the wholesale invention of multiple truths but to *heuresis* or the discovery of the inductive process.[88] In the same way, Aristotelian *topica*, too, can best be understood propaedeutically. That is, it is simply methodologically prior in that the heuristic exercise precedes argument and demonstration of validity, and does not point to an ontologically or epistemologically prior (and hence superior) reality, though perhaps those whom Hakamaya attacks have in fact argued such a structure.

My own brief excursus into rhetorical theory and Vico's philosophy has convinced me of the need for a *better* understanding of the way that rhetoric functions in religious history. For example, although many have pointed out the rhetorical nature of the topical polemic, we have not moved very far beyond the "rhetoric versus reality" approach that shows how historical reality can give the lie to rhetorical claims. The fact is, rhetoric does function in the context of arguments, and hence involves propositions that can be affirmed or rejected.[89] It is generally admitted, for example, that the rhetoric of religious inclusivism is actually a polemic of exclusivism, as in the *Lotus Sutra*. Methodologically speaking, rhetoric

is therefore a part of argument and judgment (if not demonstration).

Thus, too, in spite of all his derision of rhetoric, Hakamaya's prose is full of rhetorical flourish. Whether the reader bursts into laughter at his outrageous expressions or cringes at his less-than-temperate outbursts, there is no question that Hakamaya wields the weapons of rhetoric deftly in the attempt to move his argument into a much more public arena than may have been possible otherwise. So, too, if we understood rhetorical forms better, we might be able to revise our view of the claims of the Kyoto school philosophers that they are transcending language and argument as genuine arguments open to critical assessment as such (no less than Vimalakīrti's silence). In short, I do not see why the methods of *topica* and *critica* as classically defined need to be irredeemably opposed to one another.

This brings us to the larger issue of the divide between experience and reason, pathos and logos, which so many in this debate fall back upon. For my part, I resist the demand to eliminate the experiential, intuitive, or aesthetic mode of human existence from the realm of what is properly considered "religious," though I admit it does often seem that such was the original thrust of Buddhism (at least Buddhism considered as a movement of sramanic renunciants). Because monasticism and renunciation are unpopular today among those who do not want their Buddhism to be unworldly (or, to put it more positively, who want it to be socially engaged) as well as those practitioners who want to retain all the comforts of their modern lifestyle, we hear a lot about Śākyamuni's "return to the world" after his experience of enlightenment. But let us not forget that he did *not* return to live with his wife and child; nor did he return to the social engagement of a prince's duties. It also bears recalling that, unlike the orthodox Indian religions, Buddhism did not, in fact, have a great deal to say about music, sex, art, and the like, and to my mind is the more impoverished for it.

Hence, to Matsumoto's pronouncement that he could no longer be Buddhist if in fact Buddhism condoned social discrimination, I might add that I cannot be Buddhist if there is no room in Buddhism for *rasa*. This is not because I think that appreciating the diverse tastes of beauty, emotion, or physical experience are diametrically opposed to reason and demonstration. Like the intuition of the scientist subsequently verified through experiment and applied technology, or the aesthetic appreciation of the connoisseur deepened through discriminating knowledge, it seems

to me that reason can and should stand in support of experience. Without wishing to parade my imperfect understanding of Buddhist epistemology and logic, I do feel that the proper relationship between *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* should be one in which experience is considered a valid means of knowledge only insofar as it is not contradicted by reason.[90] The incoherence of Tanabe's *philosophy*, for example, does not render his experience of metanoia invalid or meaningless; it simply indicates that he has to rethink what that experience means. In this regard I am in complete agreement with Hakamaya's and Matsumoto's views on the doctrines of original enlightenment, *tathāgata-garbha*, the *tao*, and the mysticism of Nishida and others of the Kyoto school. In fact I tend to see in these latter much more that fits the structure of "topical philosophy" as defined by Hakamaya than I see in the classical curriculum of topics. (Unlike Vico, Buddhists have no excuse for infatuation with the Absolute.) Insofar as these doctrines posit a ground or truth of all things that is absolute, unchanging, independent, or transcending language and reason, the Buddhist *and* the scholar should be able to see that they conflict with the doctrines of no-self and causal interdependence; and hence the Buddhist needs either to reject these ideas as non-Buddhist or to accommodate them as *upāya*, which logically—if not rhetorically—amounts to the same thing as rejecting them.

At the same time, as a historian I am hard put to lay the blame for all of Japan's social ills on "Topical Buddhism." There is no gainsaying the fact that both Buddhist doctrine and Buddhist institution were used in Japan as ideological props for various forms of cultural authoritarianism from the time of Buddhism's introduction to the present day, and that this also helped foster the same totalitarianism. Nor can we deny, as both Hakamaya and Umehara recognize, the Buddhism so used was dominated by the tradition of original enlightenment. The complexity of this issue, however, is well illustrated by Hakamaya's critique of *wa* as an ideology of harmony, and I cannot but agree that it can and often has functioned to stifle and suppress diversity. But Shōtoku's *wa* is not Taoist ideology, it is a Confucian notion, and Hakamaya often refers to Confucius as a criticalist. Although in the *Analects* harmony (*ho*) does not mean simple conformity with social norms, conformity with social etiquette (ritual propriety, *li*) was a means of refining the brutishness of the natural human condition, much as the purpose of the Buddhist vinaya is to "tame the untamed." That is, the purpose of *wa* is to *restrain* the "natural." What,

then, are we to make of his critique of *wa* as "first and foremost a political ideology [that] should not be confused with true Buddhism"? Are we to understand from this that for Hakamaya true Buddhism is apolitical?

It may not be current fashion to say so, but my own sense is that the socially radical aspect of the Buddhist tradition lies in its institutionalization of dropping out of society, not in its occasional efforts at reforming society. But if this is indeed what Hakamaya intends by his criticism of *wa*, what of his own social and political agenda? I can only suppose that for Hakamaya *wa* is simply the *wrong* political ideology and that this is why it should not be confused with true Buddhism, whereas the right political ideology would be synonymous with true Buddhism. This would bring him close to the traditional definition of *buddhavacanaṃ* as encompassing all that is true. In any case, the central issue seems to revolve about the arrogance of authority, a point on which I believe Hakamaya agrees, and arrogance can be found among criticalists and topicalists alike. (By all accounts René Descartes qualified as just such an arrogant fellow.) In this regard, too, I would note that, despite the occasional confession of his own authoritarian attitude, Hakamaya needs to demonstrate more clearly how his notion of "true Buddhism" escapes theoretical as well as practical authoritarianism, particularly when combined with his forceful and even disdainful rhetoric.

CONCLUSION

At its most basic level critical Buddhism is about the validity of making distinctions among things. Is it in any sense true, and if so in what sense, that a Lincoln Town Car is not the same thing as a leaky rowboat, or that the experience of riding in a Lincoln Town Car is entirely different from riding in a leaky rowboat and that each can take you to a different destination? Is it in any sense true that Buddhism is different from Taoism, or that their respective practices lead to different attainments? Hakamaya's criticalist would answer in the affirmative to both questions, with the further understanding that it is only and precisely in such proper discrimination that the Buddhist goal of eliminating suffering can be achieved. The topicalist, on the other hand, not only denies the validity of the distinction but would also claim that such conceptualizations and discriminations are precisely the source of suffering. If one rejects such a gross caricature of the topicalist position—after all, who wants to ride in a leaky

rowboat?—and affirms the validity of making distinctions in the first place, then one is already a criticalist and the task is simply one of defining and comparing. This is precisely what Hakamaya, Matsumoto, and critics like those represented in this volume have done. It is also to Hakamaya's credit that he points out forcefully how many others—Buddhist scholars, politicians, critics, and university presidents alike—engage in the same activity, albeit without acknowledging the values upon which their judgments are based. For the critical Buddhists, then, the basic goal of Buddhism is discriminating knowledge, knowledge of truth and falsity, the rejection of the false, and the expression of that knowledge in language. This entails a rejection of any forms of Buddhism that run counter to this goal, forms that Hakamaya summarily refers to as "Topical Buddhism": the affirmation of an original purity, the self-referentially incoherent denial of differentiation in phenomena, reason, and language, and the attendant politics of harmony and inclusivism. The task of defining, comparing, and even judging whether or not "Buddhism is nothing but criticism" belongs to Buddhists and scholars alike, but as to whether Hakamaya is justified in claiming that both should be concerned with such definitions and judgment—that I am fully ready to affirm.

Scholarship as Criticism

Hakamaya Noriaki

"Wovon man nicht sprechen kann, darüber muss man schweigen"
—L. Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logica-Philosophicus*

The title of this essay is intended as a takeoff on Max Weber's "Scholarship as a Profession." Had my only purpose been parody, I would have chosen something like "Scholarship as a Non-Profession," or "The Scholarship Trade." But I have other reasons for taking Weber on. I begin with comments from a column I wrote for the *Komazawa University Campus Newsletter* entitled "600 Words on Academic Rumors":

> I can't help thinking that universities, dominated by a pseudo-objectivity that takes satisfaction in peddling bits of knowledge, have been taken in by the kind of nonjudgmental ethos Max Weber writes about in "Scholarship as a Profession."
>
> As evidence of this, we only have to look at the way that syncretism—originally used as a pejorative term to describe a kind of spiritual opportunism—has suddenly attained the status in religious studies, cultural anthropology, and folklore studies of a civil right that allows for any religious mishmash to be viewed, value-free, as valid as any other.
>
> For me, the minimum requirement for a religion is that it expresses one's belief in words and seeks to ascertain the truth or falsity of those words. I therefore wish to set for myself, as a self-imposed minimum condition of my university employment, an ideal of "Scholarship as Criticism" that stands in direct contradiction to Weber's ideal.
>
> At this point in my life, I must own my failures are more obvious than my ideals. But with an outspokenness untempered by tact as my only virtue, and in the spirit of Nietzsche's sincerity (*Wahrhaftigkeit*) and Cartesian common sense (*bon sens*), I resolve to carry on with my critical research in the field of Buddhist Studies. To begin with, I propose to

expose the seamy side of the ethos of "harmony" (*wa)* we find enshrined in the *Kokutai no hongi* that the Ministry of Education issued in 1937.[1]

This was the first time that I used the phrase "scholarship as criticism" in an anti-Weberian sense. By pure coincidence, my column appeared on the second page of the *Campus Newsletter*, following the front-page coverage given to the signing of an inter-collegiate exchange program between Komazawa University and the University of British Columbia. The lead article included a summary of the commemorative lecture delivered by our president Sakurai Tokutarō at the University of British Columbia on "Japanese Folk Religion and the Traditional Concept of Kami." While it is not entirely fair to judge his talk from a reporter's resume, what I read seemed to put us at exact opposite ends of the spectrum:

> The things worshiped in Japan as kami are many and varied: things of nature like mountains, trees, rocks, and water; natural phenomena like rain, wind, thunder; the spirits of humans and animals; the spirits of those dead who are singled out for reverence as the ancestor of a family or clan. Local communities and professional associations also elevate a whole range of protective deities to guard their territory or workplace and insure prosperity. Scholars of religion in the West studying this pattern of behavior labeled it "polytheism" and relegated it to the most primitive stage of religious development in order to stress its distance from the monotheism of the most advanced world religions like Christianity, Islam, and Buddhism. Such a viewpoint is both premature and superficial. Obviously the Japanese kami do not suggest a monotheism, but this does not mean that they coexist in great numbers without order or organization. On the contrary, they are bound to each other in an incredibly systematic hierarchy that functions according to certain principles. Usually hidden away quietly in the other world, far from human habitation, the kami appear in this world when they have a necessary role to play. The kami of Japan have a kind of pantheistic character.[2]

The scientific study of religion and folklore has developed along the lines of Weber's injunction, "Let the facts speak for themselves,"[3] seeking in this way to secure an objective autonomy within the academy. The problem is that Sakurai, though giving the impression of fidelity to the facts, has taken a giant stride beyond the limits of objectivity.

First of all, religious typologies such as polytheism, monotheism, and pantheism are neither more nor less than a way to sort out and catalogue

the phenomena we call "religions," much the same as a window-dresser arranges a display for a department store. So, too, different scholars adopt different typologies for the same phenomena, which is all well and good. I am not even sure there are any Western scholars who would classify Buddhism as a form of monotheism the way Sakurai claims they do. But even that will not detain me here. My problem is with his appeal to religious typology to argue the superiority of Japanese folk religion because of its pantheistic character. And why is this a problem for me? Because it simply does not make sense. Sakurai begins by offering an objective typology and then steps right over the borderline of scholarly conscience to advance his personal opinions as if they partook of the same objectivity.

Let there be no mistake. I have no intention whatsoever of denying the importance and public relevance of personal beliefs. Quite the contrary, I insist that we must find words to express our beliefs if we are to assess their truth or falsity. But it seems to me a violation of the rules, a kind of cheating, to place oneself on the high ground of the objective scholar of religion and folklore, claiming to engage in the typological study of religion from a position outside the traditions themselves, to "let the facts speak for themselves," and then assert the superiority of Japanese folk religion. My wording may be a bit harsh, but I know of no other way to convey the conflict I felt between what was written on the first and second pages of that *Campus Newsletter*.

If it were no more than an in-house disagreement, I should prefer to let the matter rest there. But the very conflict of viewpoints has permeated our society so profoundly and so subtly that it has all but become transparent to us. In such a situation, even an apparently trivial instance deserves attention. The conflict is not a new one, of course. It has probably been around as long as language has been. It is in Descartes that it comes into clearest relief. Descartes did not trust in scholars but in the *raison naturelle* or hard common sense of people, and proposed his critical philosophy "in French, which is the language of my country, in preference to Latin, which is that of my preceptors."[4] After Descartes' death, Giambattista Vico hoisted the banner of a topical philosophy in opposition to Descartes,[5] thus setting up an opposition between *critica* and *topica*. The term *topica* derives from the Greek *τόπος* (Latin also uses its own transliterations, though the native equivalent is *locus*) and means the method of topos. It refers to the intuitive grasp of an empty space, void, or place (*topos*) prior to all action or judgement—a brute ability that has

no need of language. Lest I be accused of exaggerating, allow me to quote the more moderate comments of Iwasaki Minoru on Vico's *De nostri temporis studiorum ratione* (On the study methods of our time):

> *Topica* precedes *critica*, in terms of both existence and cognition, because criticism is the art of judgement, whereas *topica* is the art of discovery. The discovery of universal premises naturally precedes the judgement of their truth value.[6]

Although Vico emphasizes the superiority of this "art of discovery," it is the art of judgement that has dominated the development of European philosophy, though perhaps not in the way Descartes might have expected. Sasaki Chikara has the following to say of Vico's "theory of modern science":

> Humanistic logic (that is, the study of human thinking and articulation), such as that of Rodolphus Agricola or his successor Petrus Ramus, which appeared during the Renaissance in opposition to the scholastic logic of Aristotle, can be divided into two parts.... The first part deals with discovery or invention. The second part deals with judgement.... Generally speaking, the former corresponds to *topica* and the latter to *critica*.[7]

In the terms of this distinction, the mainstream of European philosophy survived only as the science of "judgement." These two aspects correspond almost exactly to the distinction between *pratyakṣa* and *anumāna* in Indian philosophy. The fundamental difference from their European counterparts, however, is that in India thinking is overwhelmingly based on the primacy of *pratyakṣa*, with the exception of the Buddhist logical tradition of Dharmakīrti (seventh century), later inherited by Tsong kha pa (1357–1419) and the Gelukpa sect of Tibetan Buddhism.[8] But it is not a comparison of the intellectual history of Europe and India that concerns me here. If the Descartes-Vico debate was merely a European issue, no one in Japan would bother with Vico, but the fact is that the conspiracy that seeks to revitalize the opposition against Descartes is *not* confined to Europe. The special issue of the journal *Shisō* published in February of 1987 on "Reading Vico" symbolizes the resurgence of topical philosophy here in Japan. The "idea-importers" might counter that they are simply reporting the European rediscovery of Vico to Japan, but the indigenous Japanese topical philosophy that has traditionally given priority to an intuitive grasp of the void, and the Asian tradition of direct experience (*pratyakṣa*), seem only too willing to join ranks with Vico's topical

philosophy and in so doing open their arms to postmodernism and the the new-age "science" of Fritjof Capra and his ilk. No, it is not merely a matter of reporting on trends abroad. It is a reconfirmation of a Japanese ethos that, uncritically affirming its own tradition and claiming to be the epitome of topical philosophy, will accept anything as long as it is not critical. It is a simple matter to take advantage of this national ethos if one wishes to make claims about the superiority of Japanese folk religion, armed with no more than a cookie-cutter typology of religions and unperturbed by the absence of critical argument. Too many in Japan today take this tack; nothing short of a solid tradition of critical philosophy, however small at first, can hope to combat it. The difference between Sakurai and me, then, comes down to the conflict between topical philosophy and critical philosophy.

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It is July as I am writing these lines, and summer break is approaching for the university. Over the past year I have noticed any number of examples of the conflict between topical philosophy and critical philosophy that I view as symptomatic of something wrong in society today. On December 8th (immediately after the issue of the *Campus Newsletter* just referred to had come out), the Komazawa University's Steering Committee for Buddhist Ceremonies hosted a "Symposium Commemorating the Buddha's Attainment of True Knowledge," at which the President of Kōyasan University, Matsunaga Yūkei, delivered an address entitled "The Cosmic View of Esoteric Buddhism." His main point was that esoteric Buddhism is an all-inclusive religion that makes room for folk beliefs and just about everything else within the *garbha-saṃbhava-maṇḍala*. This struck me as a highly inappropriate way to commemorate Śākyamuni's calm and clear insight into a new and different way of thinking.

I was hoping to have the chance to question the speaker at the reception after the address, but Okabe Kazuo, then chair of the Faculty of Buddhism, was able to raise most of the questions I had in mind. "If esoteric Buddhism is an all-inclusive religion, what makes it Buddhist? Could Kiriyama Seiyū's Agonshū be considered esoteric Buddhism, and if so, why?" Matsunaga's reply went something like this: "We may consider it esoteric Buddhism—but there is no need to go into the details." Later, at the end of the reception, Wakimoto Tsuneya, a professor in the Cultural

Studies Program, delivered a short speech in which he commented to the keynote speaker:

> Listening to your lecture on the all-embracing *garbha-saṃbhava-maṇḍala,* I had the strong impression that it is very close to what religious studies does. Certain people nowadays claim that only a certain kind of Buddhism is true Buddhism, but religious studies is an academic field like the *garbha-saṃbhava-maṇḍala*. It considers all religions, even those that make such exclusivist claims, to be religion.

The event ended on this note of inclusivist magnanimity, an altogether fitting symbol of what is happening in Japan today.

Personally I find it incredible that my university would solicit a lecture about esoteric Buddhism on the anniversary of the Buddha's attainment of true knowledge, but the matter was too convoluted for me to do anything about it. Besides, Mt. Kōya had become the center of attention as a result of the "Kūkai boom" going on in Japan at the time, which made it all the more difficult for my views to get a hearing. I should have known from the beginning the only forum for criticism would be to sit down and write an essay like this.

Another example. On 8 November 1986 a symposium was held at Mt. Kōya under the joint sponsorship of Kōyasan University and the Mainichi Shinbun. Its topic was "Kōyasan *Saṃgīti*: In Search of Human Potential." Three weeks later, on 29 November, the *Mainichi Newspaper* did a two-page spread on the event, including abstracts of the talks.[9] Presenters at the symposium included Colin Wilson, a writer from England; Fritjof Capra, the American physicist; Ryan Watson, an animal behavior scientist from England; and Matsunaga Yūkei, the president of Kōyasan University. One can excuse the foreign guests for their misconceptions about Buddhism, but Matsunaga, who should know better, gave a talk that sounded like some sort of Upaniṣadic mysticism in which "*Mikkyō* confirms the identity of the self and the world of the absolute not through academic arguments but through the cultivation of the Three Secrets, expressing the physical body and the cosmos and manifesting the nature of humanity." If this is what the president of a Buddhist university understands to be Buddhism, how can one even begin to question the views of the other participants?

The newspaper report also included a fawning review of the whole event by Kurita Isamu, shamelessly kowtowing to ideas about Buddhism that could not be further from what Buddhism really is! "Humanity," he

writes, "is by nature absolute, that is, Buddha.... Emptiness is not a negation, but rather an affirmation of the absolute." No one who is sincere about understanding Buddhism can fail to see this as a perversion of its teaching. Human beings are by nature empty of absolute existence (*anātman*, no-soul), and knowing this is what becoming a Buddha is all about. Emptiness does not affirm any absolute but is a non-affirming or absolute negation (*prasajya-pratiṣedha*, *med dgag*).[10] The fact that all of this is diametrically opposed to Kurita's view matters nothing to him because the mandala leaves plenty of room for the authenticity of both absolute affirmation and absolute negation. In fact, he did not give a second thought the following year to setting aside his enthusiasm for Kūkai and getting all excited about Saichō. How well-timed! There is to be a summit of the world's religious leaders on Mt. Hiei in August of this year. Kurita has wasted no time in jumping on the bandwagon with a hopelessly outdated article on "Saichō and Original Enlightenment." The time has long since passed when anyone at my university would dare to publish such naivete on original enlightenment, but intellectuals are an odd sort and do not seem to mind applauding this kind of mediocrity. Although Kurita subtitled his piece "Prolegomenon to an Introduction," the literary critic Akiyama Shun took this as rhetorical modesty and welcomed the piece as "Kurita's crowning thoughts on the source of the Japanese spirit." I find it laughable that someone whose ideas have jumped around from Ippen to Dōgen and Kūkai to Saichō could have "crowning thoughts" on anything. In any case, Kurita's ideas on the "source of the Japanese spirit" are not so novel as to deserve such gushing praise, as we see from his discussion of Saichō's twelve-year retreat:

> Living through this experience in the natural setting of the mountains, driven almost beyond human limits, Saichō realized the logic and sensitivity the Japanese have towards nature, a sensitivity nurtured from ancient times and flowing in his blood. In Buddhist terms he must have actually experienced the oneness (*sōsoku* 相即) of nature and self. We cannot forget how strongly Saichō was influenced by the unique Japanese view of nature. For the Japanese, nature is both creator and created, and more than anything else, it is movement. Thus true existence is experienced within the phenomenal by becoming one with nature. This was passed on in the unutterable words of the ritual initiations of *mikkyō* and later developed into the broader Japanese tradition of original enlightenment.[11]

This notion of original enlightenment is what Kurita calls the "source of the Japanese spirit," parroting yet again an idea that has been around ever since the time of Shimaji Daitō at the end of the Taishō era: "Japanese intellectual history found its culmination in the notion of original enlightenment, the center around which it has revolved from ancient times right down to our own age."[12] Kurita's description of the Japanese view of nature may sound new, but it really amounts to the same thing as Sakurai's appeal to the uniquely Japanese "concept of kami" noted above. As illogical as it is to say that Mt. Hiei and the Grand Shrine of Hie are one and the same just because they happen to exist on the same mountain, the idea has considerable influence today. It shames me to say so, but creativity and logic seem to be of little moment when popular essayists turn their sights on Buddhism. They study Buddhism in order to make sense of their own traditions, and then discover some indigenous uniqueness and suddenly have no further need of Buddhism. They refuse to let the details of what Buddhism actually teaches interfere with their own arrogance.

Umehara Takeshi is another example of this self-serving arrogance. In June of 1987 he published a book called *Saichō Meditations* based on a series of television talks for NHK and timed to coincide with the Mt. Hiei summit. His ideas are no different from Kurita's, particularly in their total lack of critical understanding of the role played in Japanese intellectual history by the structure of esoteric-exoteric Buddhism on Mt. Hiei.[13] First, a passage from Kurita:

> Without question Tendai is a doctrine of integration and unity; compared to Shingon esoteric Buddhism it is open and inclusive. This also means that its influence was widespread, as can readily be seen from the fact that Zen, Jōdo, and the Hokke movement all stem from Mt. Hiei.... This leads us to suppose that it is the Tendai notion of original enlightenment rather than the Tendai school as such that resonates [with the source of Japanese spirit].[14]

And now Umehara:

> Saichō's Tendai joined with Shingon and gave birth to the Tendai theory of original enlightenment, best encapsulated in the well-known phrase, "mountains, rivers, grasses, and trees all attain Buddhahood." Here is the point at which Buddhism, a religion of human self-awareness, became thoroughly centered on nature. It is this intellectual climate that gave birth to Hōnen, Shinran, Eisai, Dōgen, and Nichiren. Though each

has a different point of view, they were all influenced by the Tendai theory of original enlightenment and each developed it in their own way.[15]

As I have argued elsewhere, the second that Buddhism came to be understood as a "religion of self-awareness," it ceased to be Buddhist.[16] Needless to say, my thesis is not widely accepted. So let us say for the sake of argument that I am mistaken. We still have to admit that when Buddhism changed from being a "religion of self-awareness" to a "religion centered on nature," at that moment it ceased to be Buddhist. This is precisely the reason that the founders of the new movements of Kamakura Buddhism reacted against this shift. It is a total perversion of the facts to claim that Zen, Jōdo, and the Hokke movement all stem from Mt. Hiei or that original enlightenment theory created the intellectual climate that made Hōnen, Shinran, Eisai, Dōgen, and Nichiren possible. Kurita and Umehara's claims notwithstanding, the fact is that those founders, bravely challenging the political authority of the pseudo-Buddhism of their time, were rigorously suppressed. Even the cautious and astute Dōgen developed a very pointed critique of "religion centered on nature," the false Buddhism that asserts that "mountains, rivers, grasses, and trees all attain Buddhahood." In his later *Shōbōgenzō shizen bhikkhu*, Dōgen criticizes it with these words:

> Some people say that, because the enlightenment of the Buddhas and Tathagatas encompasses the whole world, even a speck of dust manifests that enlightenment. Because that enlightenment encompasses both subject and the object, mountains, rivers, earth, sun, moon, stars, the four illusions, and three poisons express it as well. To see mountains and rivers is to see the Tathagata, and the four illusions and three poisons are the Buddha-dharma. To see a speck of dust is to see the *dharma-dhātu* and each spontaneous act is a manifestation of supreme enlightenment. They say this is the great understanding and call it a Patriarchal transmission. In latter-day Sung China, those who subscribe to this view are as numerous as rice plants, hemp, bamboo, and reeds. Their [religious] lineage is unknown, but it is clear that they do not understand Buddhism.[17]

Dōgen's rejection of the "religion centered on nature" proclaimed by "some people" is very clear.[18] But in his book *How to Read Dōgen*, Kurita lumps Myōe and Dōgen into the same loaf. So we have Myōe thinking himself one with nature: "seeking nothing, becoming again playful, life is satisfied." In Myōe's famous verse, "as it should be" (*arubekiyauwa*), Kurita finds the quintessenial meaning of the idea that

"all sentient beings are the Buddha-nature":

> Persons must hold to the seven characters of *a-ru-be-ki-ya-u-wa* 阿留辺幾夜宇和. Monks should be as monks, laity as laity. The emperor should be as the emperor, and the ministers as ministers. Acting contrary to this [principle of] "as it should be" is the source of all evil.[19]

To Myōe, of course, the founders of the new Kamakura Buddhism were the "evil" ones who contravened the propriety of the status quo. In a sense, this does indeed capture the flavor of the notion of original enlightenment that Buddha-nature exists in all sentient beings. It is this way of thinking that also supported social discrimination and fostered an ethic of blind obedience to one's superiors. That Kurita nowhere makes mention of Dōgen's criticisms in this regard comes as no surprise, but we may leave this matter aside for now.[20] What I cannot overlook is his blindness to the difference between Dōgen and Myōe that has him stumble into the nonsense of claiming that "In general, all who draw near the essence of Buddhism, be it Myōe, Dōgen, Shinran, or Ippen, however widely their words may vary and their paths diverge, in the end approach the same destination."[21] Dōgen's words are telling in this connection:

> Careless people claim that Taoism, Confucianism, and Buddhism are ultimately one, only the entrances are different. Or they say those teachings are like a tripod. That kind of view is often heard among the monks of the Great Sung China.
>
> If they hold such opinions the Buddha Dharma has already disappeared into the earth for them. Even a speck of dust of the Buddha Dharma cannot be found among that type of stupid people.[22]

If Kurita wishes to disassociate himself from these "careless people," he needs to clarify his position—or perhaps it would be enough if he simply retitled his book *How to Misread Dōgen*. But Kurita is safe in the present intellectual climate, because it is rather sharp-tongued people like me who are dismissed as "careless." And then, too, just like Wakimoto and his notion of religious studies as the all-inclusive *garbha-saṃbhava-maṇḍala* that embraces religions in all its forms, Kurita will no doubt find a niche somewhere in his scheme for my complete rejection of his ideas as having nothing to do with Buddhism—perhaps by dragging it under the umbrella of his beneficent "doctrine of integration and unity." This is the very attitude that gives rise to the institutional ideology of avoiding conflict by accepting everything just as it is, in the same way that Mt. Hiei

opened its arms to all of the founders of the new Kamakura Buddhism (who had rebelled against everything the mountain stood for) and lined the inner sanctuary of the Great Lecture Hall with their statues. This also seems to be the spirit of the summit of world religions being held there this year. Umehara, incidentally, mentions the images from the Great Lecture Hall in a chapter of his *Saichō Meditations* devoted to Japanese culture, and then goes on to say:[23]

> Prince Shōtoku must have considered Ekayana Buddhism, with its principles of unity and equality, the best system of thought on which to forge in Japan a national polity based on legal codes. In other words, he must have seen the emphasis on unity and equality in Ekayana as the most effective ideology for creating a nation based on a functional bureaucracy under the Emperor and independent of the clans.[24]

The ideology of harmony (*wa*) in the Seventeen-Article Constitution attributed to Prince Shōtoku is indeed as Umehara has it. But if this is what was really intended, then let it not be confused with true Buddhism. Like Kurita's "integration and unity," and Umehara's "unity and equality" both reek of the same ideology of harmony that surrounds the arrangement of the founders' statues in the Great Lecture Hall. Nothing could be further from this obscuring of all essential opposition than the basic ideas of the *Lotus Sutra* that Saichō valued so highly. Matsumoto Shirō is perhaps the first to clearly and sharply point this out in his book *The Practice of Buddhism*.[25] (The relevant section in Matsumoto's book was juxtaposed with Umehara's stereotypical interpretation of the *Lotus Sutra* for an ethics exam in the Komazawa University's Faculty of Economics.[26])

To get an idea of how dangerous this insistence that an integrity, unity, and equality replace discrimination between truth and falsehood can be, consider the following from the *Kokutai no hongi*:

> Harmony as of our nation is not a mechanical concert of independent individuals of the same level that has its starting point in [cold] knowledge, but a great harmony that holds itself together by having the parts within the whole through actions that fit the parts. Hence therein is practiced mutual respectful love and obedience, endearment and fostering. This is not a mere compromise or concord of mechanical or homogeneous things; but is [a thing] with all things having their characteristics, mutually different and yet manifesting their characteristics, that is, manifesting the essential qualities through the parts—that thus harmonize with

> the world of the one truth. That is, harmony as in our nation is a great harmony of individuals who, by giving play to their characteristics, and through difficulties, toil, and labor, converge into one. Because of characteristics and difficulties, this harmony becomes all the greater and its substance rich. Again, in this way difficulties are developed, special characteristics become beautiful, and at the same time even enhance the development and well-being of the whole. Indeed, harmony in our nation is not a half-measure harmony, but a great, practical harmony that manifests itself with freshness in step with the development of [all] things.[27]

When I stop to think that it is this very ideology of harmony that will be celebrated at the summer's summit of world religions on Mt. Hiei (and the phrase "the parts within the whole" remind me of Myōe's "as it should be"), I cannot refrain from voicing my criticism—if only to clear my nausea. Okabe Kazuo writes of what happened in the past as a result of letting this kind of thinking pass by without comment:

> The fact the Buddhism of the Kamakura period was able to manifest so much power and change history was due in part to the rise of the warrior class, but it was also due to its sharp criticism of the Buddhism that had become a power-broker within the Heian power structure.
>
> Dōgen's words express his harsh rejection of the kind of Buddhism that seeks to accord itself with worldly power. "The path to extinction is to blindly follow the way of the mundane world. There is no wisdom attained by attempting to please the mundane world. Those who transform the mundane are sages. Those who accord with the mundane are great fools."
>
> The Buddhism of World War II, on the other hand, is an appalling example of what happens by simply floating along with the current of the times, in this case succumbing to militarism and even singing its praises. This is a stain on the history of Buddhism that can never be obliterated.[29]

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Few times in history seem to be as little concerned with distinguishing what is true from what is false as the present. How did we get to this point? Is it simply old-fashioned to profess one's beliefs as true? Even in the religious world it seems that the only ones who speak up about what they believe are the weak and afflicted who give witness to their hope for salvation. Perhaps it is all part of the general mood of tolerance and understanding that marks the times in which we live.

I say "perhaps." In July of 1987 the Faculty of Buddhism sponsored a public lecture by Fujiyoshi Jikai, professor emeritus of Hanazono University and abbot of the Pure Land Buddhist temple Kōmyō-ji in Kamakura, entitled "Zen and Pure Land." I couldn't believe my ears when, in the course of his talk, Fujiyoshi remarked that, "the Paradise of the Western Pure Land is an *upāya*." From the time he was a child gazing up at the sun sinking into the Ariake Sea to the West, he had been raised to believe that his deceased father had gone there, to the Paradise in the West. But after going to college and studying with Hisamatsu Shin'ichi, he completely changed his way of thinking and came to understand the "unscientific" image of Paradise of the Western Pure Land as merely an *upāya*.

After listening to Fujiyoshi speak, I read some of what he has written and came away feeling that he is devoted to Hisamatsu to the very marrow of his bones, referring to him even as "a contemporary Vimalakīrti" who had "experienced a similar self-awakening."[30] It struck me that maybe he should just convert from Pure Land Buddhism and take refuge in Hisamatsu, though no doubt he would find the suggestion irreverent. Most people would probably find such a decision agonizing, but I do not get the sense that this would be the case with Fujiyoshi.

It is not my intention to censure Fujiyoshi personally, not least because a follower of Dōgen has no right to point a finger at a follower of the Pure Land tradition. I mean only to observe that the overwhelming tendency in Japan is such as would deny any substantial difference between Pure Land Buddhism and Hisamatsu's brand of Rinzai Zen. Some might take pride in this as a sign of Buddhist tolerance, but does it really make any sense to speak of such "tolerant religious beliefs" or "tolerant religious convictions"? If I were a Pure Land believer, I would certainly be most upset at one of my abbots babbling such nonsense without giving it a second thought. As it happened, after the lecture, I ran into Kōchi Eigaku and asked him what he thought about the idea that the Pure Land was simply an *upāya*. His face at once contorted in an expression of distaste, but before he said anything he recovered his composure, smiled, and said, "I have discussed this in detail in my book." I mention this because Fujiyoshi's lecture made me realize that a truly critical attitude towards the Buddhist tradition is impossible from a standpoint outside of it. This was the first time I had listened to a lecture wondering what I might think if I were listening to it as a member of a different sect.[31]

In any case, I came to the realization that it was important to discuss my relationship to religious beliefs and convictions precisely because intellectuals who discuss matters of religion and culture today seem to be so completely oblivious of this problem. I recall stopping in a bookstore to pick up a copy of Umehara's *Saichō Meditations* and running across Etō Jun's book *A Glance at Our Times* in the new arrivals section. Leafing through the book, I immediately recognized it as full of his usual poppycock but decided to take it along anyway.

In it I found an essay on religious convictions entitled "The Glance of the Living and the Glance of the Dead," one of Etō's typical whining impressions of a committee meeting that he attended on the problem of government bureaucrats paying official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. Being the transcription of an interview, it is barely readable, but may be considered a fair expression of his true feelings on the matter. Etō says that from the start he was skeptical of the committee, "which had no intention of interfering with official visits to Yasukuni Shrine," and did not at all enjoy the repetitiveness of the discussions. I cannot understand why he did not just turn down the invitation or even make a public resignation and bring the issue out into the open, giving the names of those involved. Instead, on 9 August 1987, he added his name to fourteen others on the official committee report. How can he pretend, then, that unlike all the others, he distanced himself from the minor details, as if haunted by the ghosts of the military heroes staring at him "from the ceiling of the Prime Minister's main dining room"?

This is the kind of thing that make his writings so whimpering. On the one hand, he sets himself up as a man of letters who can lament the "atrocity" of postwar censorship inflicted on Japan by the Occupation, who insisted, for example, that Kawaji Ryūkō's poem "Returning Spirits" be amended to read simply "Returning," as leaving but the "skeletal remains of the poem." On the other, he does not seem to care a whit about the editorial "atrocity" of censorship and excision that Japan inflicted on itself during the war.

Or again, throughout the essay he quotes Yanagita Kunio, displaying the same hoary ideology of harmony that presents the Japanese national entity as something unchanging, and yet shakes off the least hint that his ideas might be of the same sort as those "minor details" discussed in the meeting. As always, Etō avoids using telltale terms like "the ideology of harmony," preferring to speak instead of "the makeup of the nation," in

deference to the etymology of the English word "constitution." After considering the question of official visits to the Yasukuni Shrine from the viewpoints of the constitution, politics, and culture, he takes up this idea of the "makeup of the nation" from the viewpoint of culture. Bearing in mind that his adoption of English terms like "constitution" and "makeup of the nation" does not mean that he is saying anything new, we may cite a few examples:

> My fundamental premise is that constitutional law is based on the "constitution" of Japan, rather than that constitutional law should be the primary determiner of the "constitution."[32]

In other words, the "constitution" is the "source" of Japan and the unchanging essence of the national polity. He goes on:

> The most important thing for Japanese, that which they naturally hold dear, is the Japanese national character—in other words, the "makeup of Japan." This is the continuity of the nation that has been preserved from the time of the the *Kojiki*, *Nihon shoki*, and the *Man'yōshū* up to today. It is on top of this that individual memories and national memories accumulate.[33]

But wait—is it really only the Japanese that have "national memories"?

> Things would be simple if, as was the case with Germany, Japan had been annihilated, recreated under the direction of the Allied forces, and thus molded to follow the dictates of a legislative bureaucracy. But was Japan annihilated? Even if it had been, the memories of the Japanese were not. All families remember the faces of relatives lost in battle. Our own fathers, like gallant young warriors, remain in all of our memories to this day. How can such memories be erased?[34]

So we are supposed to believe that the Germans have no memories of their loved ones that died in battle? Apparently so, as the following quotation shows that this is something, come what may, that can never happen to Japan:

> *O-bon* is the day on which we pay respects to our ancestors. Returning to one's home town, greeting the ancestral spirits, and refreshing one's energies so as to be able to work industriously for the rest of the year. Whether war breaks out, whether heaven and earth shift, absolutely nothing changes. *This* is the Japanese "constitution."[35]

Etō's unshakable faith in the absolute stability of the Japanese "constitution" has nothing whatsoever to do with religious faith, much less literary convictions. (Indeed, the whole style of the piece is a rather pitiful display for a man of letters who once professed some feeling for literature.) Let us consider yet another example in which Etō's seemingly reasonable claims disguise a presumption to speak for the religiosity of all Japanese and completely ignore the voices of its minorities:

> When there is an airplane crash, the Japanese feel obliged to gather up each and every fragment of the bones of the deceased. Even today the Japanese still send groups to the farthest reaches of the earth to collect the remains of those who died in the war. The Americans, in contrast, seem to care little for recovering the remains of the dead, as the recent explosion of the space shuttle shows. According to Christian teachings, after death one ascends to God; there is no belief approaching the Japanese idea of the spirit (*reikon* 霊魂). The relationship between the living and the dead is naturally different.[36]

Does Etō assume that there is no such thing as a Japanese Christian? Does he think that if you are Japanese Christian, you must be more Japanese than Christian? No doubt Japanese Christians do struggle with their identity as Japanese, but Etō's stereotyping completely ignores this. Or again, are there no Japanese Buddhists who break out of the stereotype to actually long for rebirth in Amida's Land of Bliss? Are there none who believe so deeply in the cycle of transmigration that they have little care for what happens to their body after they have died? But who knows, maybe not, since a Pure Land priest like Abbot Fujiyoshi of Kōmyō-ji can uphold the same stereotype by claiming that the idea of the Pure Land is no more than an *upāya*.

I have no particular desire to single out celebrities for criticism, but I find it unacceptable that the likes of Etō should be allowed to trample on the beliefs of minorities with his theories of an absolute and unchanging "constitution" of Japan. Such hegemonic theory is cut of the same cloth as the "ideology of *wa*" found in the prewar *Kokutai no hongi*. Etō himself argues that, under current law, there is no need to recognize as legal religious entities shrines founded on that ideology. But it is precisely because it has been shown that they *are* in fact based on political ideology that it becomes all the more important to restrict them as legal religious entities in order to protect the beliefs of minorities from being ravaged as they were by the prewar Yasukuni Shrine (administered by the Army and

Navy) or by other shrines administered by the Bureau of Shrines in the Ministry of Home Affairs.

I find it intriguing that Etō should insist on the importance of "objective facts" while at the same time confessing belief in a religion of Japaneseness (*nihonkyō*) that propagates the idea of an absolute and unchanging Japan. One is hard pressed to find a worse candidate for the status of a "concrete fact." In a discussion with Kobori Keiichirō of Tokyo University published as "The Greater East Asia War and the Pacific War," Etō returns to this stress on "objective facts." The implication here is that the "Pacific War" was not an objective fact, but that "The Greater East Asia War" was.[37] Note the following exchange triggered by Kobori's claim that "it is important for us to make known facts"—such as the Nanking massacre or the Northern territories lost to Russia at the end of the war—which have been "twisted" in high-school history textbooks through the efforts of the Japan Teachers Federation:

> Etō: You're absolutely right. When we lecture in the classroom, as teachers, that is all we can do. It might be different in countries that incorporate ideological training into the curriculum, but at least in Japanese universities we must present the facts to the students as objectively as we possibly can. We must not interfere with each individual student's judgment of the facts and what sort of ideas they draw from them. If we do, we will not be doing our job.
>
> Kobori: Though it is a slight exaggeration to say so, the only way to express history is through an accurate timetable of events.[38]

Etō agrees with Kobori, but what has happened to the literary critic's concern for the narrative of history when faced with the brazen idea that history is no more than an "accurate timetable of events?" Even Etō's teacher, Kobayashi Hideo, once wrote that, "It is a serious matter that people, who forget everything once graduation has liberated them from the shackles of rote memorization, have no history books to teach them history as ideas to be studied."[39]

In any case, the only "objective facts" for Etō are the "facts" of the *nihonkyō* faithful. This is why he can rail against the censorship imposed by the U.S. Occupation Army and yet completely pass over the censorship of the Japanese government. In the same way, the Nanking massacre and the issue of the Northern territories are not the only facts that high-school history textbooks do not accurately report. They also fail to present an

accurate description of Prince Shōtoku, the "facts" of which are that the authorship of the Seventeen-Article Constitution and the *Sangyōgisho* remain a matter of some controversy. Difficulties with "facts" are everywhere to be seen, in spite of the simplistic "objectivist" belief that everything can be resolved by merely waving around the banner of objectivity. Similarly, Etō's understanding of the literary critic Mikhail Bakhtin's term *chronotopos*[40] suggests that the only thing needed is for one to line up the temporal order (*chronos*) of things while lounging on top of the uniquely Japanese space (*topos*) of *nihonkyō*. Perhaps Etō also thinks that modern history cannot be accurately recorded until a generation after the events, when all the "data" has been collected.[41] If so, I do wish he would confine himself to drawing up timetables and give up trying to mitigate Japan's wartime behavior on the continent with such claims as, "Japan never declared war against China."[42]

It is also curious that, in spite of his emphasis on "objective facts," Etō remains thoroughly steeped in an idea of topos that somehow came to mean Japanese uniqueness. By some twist of logic, Etō enlists Weber's exaltation of objective facts into the service of a a doctrine of topical philosophy. As simplistic as all of this might seem, it is not entirely without rhyme or reason that the reverence for topos should appeal to objective facts, while the commitment to criticism should hold language in high esteem. The former need only redefine facts as topos, while the latter must work with language to express critical thinking. Weber himself enjoined, "*die Tatsachen sprechen läßt*" (Let the facts speak for themselves), and yet clearly stated also that "whenever a person of science introduces personal value judgement, a full understanding of the facts *ceases*."[43] In this vein:

> Now one cannot demonstrate scientifically what the duty of an academic teacher is. One can only demand of the teacher that he have the intellectual integrity to see that it is one thing to state facts, to determine mathematical or logical relations or the internal structure of cultural values, while it is another thing to answer questions of the *value* of culture and its individual contents and the question of how one should act in the cultural community and in political associations. These are quite heterogeneous problems. If he asks further why he should not deal with both types of problems in the lecture-room, the answer is: because the prophet and the demagogue do not belong on the academic platform.
>
> To the prophet and the demagogue, it is said: "Go your ways out into the streets and speak openly to the world," that is, speak where criticism is possible. In the lecture-room we stand opposite our audience,

> and it has to remain silent. I deem it irresponsible to exploit the circumstance that for the sake of their careers the students have to attend a teacher's course while there is nobody present to oppose him with criticism. The task of the teacher is to serve the students with his knowledge and scientific experience and not to imprint upon them his personal political views.[44]

This approach to the scholar's profession is everywhere in evidence in Etō, perhaps accounting for his claim that "we are not doing our job" when personal political views come into the picture. I can hardly believe that a teacher, lacking any "personal value judgement" and based solely on the distinction between "stating the facts" on the one hand, and raising questions of value and action on the other as "quite heterogeneous problems," can actually "serve students with his knowledge and scientific experience."

Of late I find myself more and more convinced that I must say what I believe, even if I am accused of behaving like a "prophet" or "demagogue." I see no "intellectual integrity" in placing myself outside the Buddhist tradition in order to speak about that tradition, in effect yielding the field to *nihonkyō* faithful like Etō and Fujiyoshi who place themselves on a ground prior to all differentiation of religion. I have no desire to speak unilaterally without attending to my students' criticisms, although the architecture and ethos of the classroom that encourages this does seem to impede the sort of questioning I would like. If, however, mutual criticism between teacher and students, or among teachers, is sacrificed to "academic freedom," one can hardly imagine a more comfortable vocation than that of the university professor.

The German *Beruf,* variously translated here as "profession" and "vocation," would more accurately be rendered as "calling," which also carries connotations of a divinely-inspired mission. Weber's idea of *Wissenschaft als Beruf* seems to me to be driven by nothing so much as by the frustration of a scholarship (*Wissenschaft*) that has lost its Godlike authority and wishes to recover its vocational *raison d'être*. In the midst of this literal frustration and bereft of its God, "theology" hitched itself to Weber's train in order to turn "scholarship as vocation" in the direction of religious studies, anthropology, and folklore studies. Weber himself had the following to say about "theology":

> Now you will be inclined to say: Which stand does one take towards the factual existence of "theology" and its claims to be a "science"? Let us

> not flinch and evade the answer. To be sure, "theology" and "dogmas" do not exist universally, but neither do they exist for Christianity alone. Rather (going backward in time), they exist in highly developed form also in Islam, in Manicheanism, in Gnosticism, in Orphism, in Parsism, in Buddhism, in the Hindu sects, in Taoism, and in the Upaniṣads, and, of course, in Judaism. To be sure, their systematic development varies greatly. It is no accident that Occidental Christianity—in contrast to the theological possessions of Jewry—has expanded and elaborated theology more systematically, or strives to do so. In the Occident the development of theology has had by far the greatest historical significance. This is the product of the Hellenic spirit, and all theology of the West goes back to it, as (obviously) all theology of the East goes back to Indian thought.[45]

What is interesting here is that Weber sees all Asian mythologies originating in Indian thought and all Western mythologies in the Greek spirit. Needless to say, it is a rather broad brush he paints with here and glosses rather crudely over the facts as we know them. But as long as we are in the mode, I beg the reader's indulgence to make a rough sketch of them. Both the Indian intellectual tradition and the Greek spirit belong to the indigenous ethos of their respective traditions. It does take no more than a moment's reflection to realize that "Indian thought" can no more swallow up true Buddhism than Hellenism can provide a solid ground for Christian theology. In any case, after Weber, religious studies and anthropology have tended to find a single topos on which everything can be located. Much the same as Etō, in apparent oblivion of what he is doing, ends up locating Christian and Pure Land followers on the same topos of *nihonkyō*.

How did it happen that the whole wide world should have succumbed so easily to the idea of scholarship promulgated by someone like Weber, whose works contain so many errors of "objective facts"?[46] According to the Japanese translator of "Scholarship as a Profession," Weber misquoted the proverb "I do not believe what is absurd, but I believe because it is absurd" (*credo non quod, sed quia absurdum est*, often abridged into "I believe because it is absurd") as Augustine's, and points to it as an example of "the sacrifice of intellect." The proverb, however, should not be attributed to Augustine, but to Tertullian. Augustine's proverb is "I believe in order to understand" (*credo ut intelligam*),[47] which is not a renunciation of intellect at all, but its *correct* exercise.

Some of my readers may be impatient with me for unfairly accusing religious studies with so little evidence given in support of my accusa-

tions. I feel it necessary, therefore, to give at least some idea of the sort of "topical" approach to religious studies that I am criticizing. A perfect example right at hand is Mase Hiromasa's "The Philosophy of Religious Pluralism," where we read:

> Both exclusivism and inclusivism self-righteously claim their own religion to be primary and other religions peripheral. Neither a religious theology nor a world theology can be constructed from such a stance. The idea that any one particular religion, such as Christianity, constitutes a core of revelation around which other religions revolve at some distance is completely mistaken when seen in the light of the broad and manifold variety of the religious experience of humanity. There is sincere devotion to the sacred, profound spirituality, and a rich religious life to be found in other religions as well. It is therefore important for Christianity in the future to shift from a "Christocentric" to a "theocentric" standpoint and thus, alongside of other great world religions, to take its place in relation to the "one and only ultimate divine Reality." John Hick refers to such a recognition as a "Copernican revolution," suggesting that it will require nothing less than a paradigm shift from a Christ-centered or Jesus-centered model to a model centered on divine Reality or on that which is sacred in the constellation of all religious faiths.[48]

Words fail me in the face of such triumphalist declarations coming from the "world's most tolerant religion" trying to ground religious pluralism on the topos of an "ultimate divine Reality." The only words that come to mind are maledictions. I have already touched on the subject of how "tolerance" can actually stifle the voice of religious minorities and will not repeat it here. I do wonder about the purpose of trying to fabricate such a theology, though perhaps this is what one ought to expect of the kind of people who go to world religions summits and talk about inciting "Copernican revolutions" in religious belief. As far as I am concerned, the "tolerance" that Mase brandishes about can only have an anaesthetic effect on critical conscience. By taking a stand outside any religious tradition, he has in fact become an academic *poseur* looking down on religious faith.

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I am fortunate to have received a wide range of responses to my "Critique of the Kyoto School," which has further stimulated my thinking. I am particularly encouraged by my exchange with Takeuchi Yoshirō, all of

which began when I ran across the following lines at the end of Iyanaga Nobumi's *The Fantasy Orient*:

> Every time positivist-scientific rationalism did something to objectify "Oriental" reality, antimodern thought was quick on its heels to brandish the results in the battlecry for a new dream of unity and fusion (or of exclusion and obliteration) in an absolute wisdom. This "fantasy Orient" that was created by the West was then reimported back to its supposed origins together with Western modernity. It proclaimed a "fusion of cultures East and West" as the "new mission of the Japanese people," and attempted to build an "earthly paradise" of the universal Greater Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere with the emperor as the sole divinity. Today this "fantasy Orient *in* the Orient" masquerades as a new mysticism of the occult, as the "fusion of the new physics with perennial Oriental wisdom," seeking to awaken the ancient and yet constantly new spirits in our hearts as we find ourselves on the brink of nihilism.[49]

I immediately sent Iyanaga a note to thank him for having sent the book, along with an offprint of my essays criticizing the Kyoto school for being a mishmash of "original enlightenment" and German idealism. I received a long letter in reply on 1 January of this year in which he informed me of certain works by Western authors and two recent articles by Nakamura Yūjirō related to the problem of "overcoming modernity."[50] At the end of the winter break I read them and was even more appalled than Iyanaga's warnings had prepared me for.[51]

At the end of Nakamura's essay in *Shisō* there was a postscript that gave a brief critique of Takeuchi Yoshirō's "The Postmodern Trap of Intelligence." I did not know Takeuchi, but the fact that he was being attacked by Nakamura, whose article I had found annoying, piqued my interest. I located the original essay and was struck by the fact that it seemed to have been composed under much the same circumstances as my "Critique of the Kyoto School," namely, the period following the landslide victory of the Liberal Democrats in the 1986 elections. Our motivations for writing were also similar, though his criticism of Japanese politics and culture is sharper and more far-ranging than I could ever achieve. The following criticism of Nakamura's shameless flattery of "Nishida philosophy" drew my attention:

> The unwillingness to confront reality within the current of postmodern thought continues. One such example is the rehabilitation of Nishida philosophy that has become so apparent of late. According to Nakamura

> Yūjirō, one of the representatives of that movement, all of the characteristics of postmodern philosophy—ideas like the unconscious self (the Oriental "no-self") as opposed to the conscious self, the philosophy of *topos* in place of the philosophy of the subject, the physical versus the spiritual, the feminine principle versus the masculine, the knowledge of pathos versus logocentrism, predicate logic versus subject logic, the decentralization of knowledge versus systematic thought—all of these can already be found in Nishida philosophy. This is said to be the great philosophical heritage common to all humanity, not only the Japanese....
>
> Of course I do not mean to refute all of these claims as mistaken. But the fact is, Nishida philosophy was incapable during the war of offering a critique of the Japanese war of imperial aggression, which was itself clearly an accomplishment of "modern principles." Not only was there no criticism, but, as is well known, Nishida philosophy sanctioned the war effort and incited numbers of eager youth to join in the ugly struggle. It is altogether beyond me how people can fail to see the self-evident fact that the "overcoming modernity," *at least in this philosophical form*—that is, as a postmodern philosophy—is both ineffective and harmful.[52]

I hardly need note that the characteristics of postmodern philosophy summarized here are the same as those of the "topical philosophy" that I am against, whereas the counterposition corresponds to the "critical philosophy" I am trying to advance. There is no point in detailing the differences again here. Suffice it to say that the point of Takeuchi's critique of the ambiguity of a topical philosophy in postmodernist dress is its unwillingness to confront reality. In reply to the criticisms of Nakamura,[53] Takeuchi discusses Nishida philosophy, the "topical philosophy" popularized in postmodernism, as "Mahayana Buddhism *cum* German idealism." If we change the first term to read "original enlightenment" and reject the claim of original enlightenment to be Buddhist doctrine, then I am in complete agreement. The mistaken identification of original enlightenment with Mahayana Buddhism is, of course, the fault of Buddhist scholars, not of Takeuchi, and this only compels me more than ever to persist in arguing against the theory from within the Buddhist tradition while leaving the sharp and wide-ranging criticism of Japanese politics and culture to people like Takeuchi.

Matsumoto Shirō initiated the critique of "topical philosophy" within the Buddhist tradition as the criticism of *dhātu-vāda*. He argues that *dhātu* (stratum) *is* the topos (he uses the Latin word *locus*) within the

Buddhist tradition, feeding like a parasite off a mighty lion. In China and Japan the parasite fattened and grew strong by taking the form of the philosophy of original enlightenment, debilitating the lion almost to the point of killing it. But the parasite could not transform itself into the lion. It is hard for many to see this simple truth. Some even quibble that a parasite that has lived so long in the lion has become part of it. This is in fact the dominant view and it might actually be true in the sense that the lion has yielded to the authority and expectations of the crowd. But there cannot be any question but that what makes Buddhism Buddhism is its championing of "critical philosophy" against all forms of indigenous "topical philosophy."

As Okabe has written:

> It is a matter of a historical fact that Buddhism is at its most vigorous when it has raised its banner high to declare "*this* is true Buddhism," even when this means going against the currents of the time or incurring oppression from the authorities of the time.[54]

Those who boast of Buddhism as a religion of tolerance only place themselves foursquare outside the Buddhist tradition and yield to the force of the herd. Like Mase, who declared "religious pluralism" distinct from any particular religion yet based on the topos of an "ultimate Divine reality," they commend a topical philosophy of all religions as one, thus relieving themselves of the obligation to distinguish what is Buddhism from what is not. It is only from within the Buddhist tradition that one can speak of true Buddhism, but in the case of Buddhist studies it appears as if the more brilliant the scholar, the more difficult it is to recognize this obvious point. The adoption of the idea of "true Buddhism" in order to level a critique against the Buddhism that has yielded to the authority of the crowd from inside the tradition itself is what I call "scholarship as criticism." But Buddhists, one would assume, already know this.

In a final lecture commemorating his retirement from Tokyo University this past January, Takasaki Jikidō spoke on "The Ultimate in Mahayana Buddhism," at the end of which he remarked, "As long as we stand at the university lectern, we must follow Max Weber." I took the remark as an indirect swipe at the short piece I referred to at the start of this essay, but I was too wrapped up in my anticipation of his refutation of Matsumoto Shirō's scholarly critiques to give it a second thought. In fact, he completely passed over the basic points of their dispute in order to

censure Matsumoto for his emphasis on the question of what constitutes true Buddhism.

Not unrelated to this, I presented a paper at the 1987 annual meeting of the Japanese Association for Indian and Buddhist Studies entitled "A Critique of the *Vimalakīrti Sutra*" in which I argued that this sutra, which may be considered the foundational scripture for the Kyoto school of philosophy,[55] argues for a reality underlying the Three Jewels of Buddhism and in that sense does not deserve to be included in the Buddhist canon. A number of questions were raised, but it surprised me, given that the conference took place in Kyoto, that none of them tried to take the position that the *Vimalakīrti* represents the pinnacle of the Mahayana scriptures. In any case, of all the questions only Takasaki's went to the heart of the matter: "Do you really expect to be allowed to come to an academic conference and stand there, as a Buddhist, giving us your one-sided declarations of what is true and what is not?"

I was tempted at that point to thank Takasaki for his question and leave the podium. It is not that I did not anticipate such a question, but only that I did not expect it to come directly from Takasaki. His forthrightness caught me off guard and, truth to tell, still leaves me stuttering for an answer. At the time I think I replied that, since my talk was premised on my Buddhist belief, and since he had in his final lecture at Tokyo disagreed about the propriety of such assumptions in scholarly work, it is not surprising that we should disagree, but that I wished to be a Buddhist and a scholar at the same time and place, and so forth and so on, and that one day I would try to address the question head-on without hedging. Or something to that effect.

On leaving the podium I felt as if I had given myself a stiff homework assignment, and ever since I have the sense that I still have not finished it. I am not sure just how persuasive one can be in a world that takes the objective, purely academic approach to be the only legitimate avenue for a scholar to take. What I do know is that I must continue to write about what I believe, come what may.

It may be out of line for me to turn the tables on Takasaki, but I have some unresolved questions of my own. Now, I do not necessarily think that becoming a monk or shaving one's head is the most important thing about being a Buddhist—not as important as pursuing the question of what true Buddhism is. It seems superfluous for someone like me to add here that I believe Takasaki, abbot of the Sōtō Zen temple Seishō-ji, to be

an eminent Buddhist. Setting aside his purely scholarly work, I want to know whether, when he writes books in a more popular vein such as *An Introduction to Buddhism*[56] or *What is Buddha-nature?*, is he writing as as a scholar or as a Buddhist? Perhaps he feels that as long as one doesn't come right out and say "This alone is true Buddhism," it doesn't really matter. If that is the case, then I would ask him to refrain from repeating clichés in public like "As Buddhist studies flourish, Buddhism perishes."[57] If the two are the same, then what benefits one will benefit the other; whereas if they are different, then it is indeed obvious that Buddhism will perish at the hands of irresponsible Buddhist scholars who choose to take their stand outside of the tradition. By the same token, if truth and falsity are unrelated and something becomes "Buddhist" merely by being proclaimed as such, then I suppose shouting, "*Dhātu-vāda* IS Buddhism!" (as Tsuda Shin'ichi did to me over the telephone) should by that very act make *dhātu-vāda* Buddhist.

My problem is that if anything and everything can be considered Buddhism, how are we to understand Takasaki's claim to "take pride in Japanese Buddhism as the ultimate of Mahayana Buddhism"?[58] Perhaps he would counter that words like "ultimate" and "pride" do not imply that "this alone is true," which is entirely right. I am reminded of Weber's comment:

> Science further presupposes that what is yielded by scientific work is important in the sense that it is "worth being known." In this, obviously, are contained all our problems. For this presupposition cannot be proved by scientific means. It can only be *interpreted* with reference to its ultimate meaning, which we must reject or accept according to our ultimate position towards life.[59]

On 29 June, as I was about to sit down to work on this essay, I received the first volume of Yamaguchi Zuihō's *Tibet*. Two days later I received a letter from Takeuchi asking for my opinion of Nakazawa Shin'ichi's gushing praise of Nakamura Hajime's new work, *Baudda*, which had appeared a few weeks earlier in the *Asahi Shinbun*. Because both of these works had a profound influence on the writing of this essay, I should like to cite some representative passages.

My first idea was to center this essay on the premise that the object of scholarship is not "mere information." I was therefore thunderstruck when I opened the foreword to Yamaguchi's book and read:

> I would ask those who consider Japanese Buddhism to represent the true tradition of Indian Buddhism, please to read this book as it stands, without any predisposition to "advocate" any particular faith; please understand this as *mere information* about what I have considered to be another true tradition of Indian Buddhism.[60]

As I read on, I quickly realized that Yamaguchi's book was not, in fact, simply a tour guide filled with "mere information," but that it clearly reflected his own convictions about Tibetan culture and customs. (I think, for example, of his description of "sky burial.") I understood that the purpose of his prefatory remarks was to parry possible attacks on his scholarly commitment. The professor will probably scold me for my one-sided interpretation, but I wish to compare the following comment to the remark cited above from Takasaki's *What is Buddhism?*:

> There is no question that differences that exist within particular religions that worship under the same name are useful in helping us to reflect dispassionately on the Japanese national character. I wanted to add this comment, as once again the illusion that *Japan is in every way superior* seems to be coming to the fore again as the memory of our past mistakes begins to fade.[61]

It is not for me to decide whether I have succeeded or not, but my aim in this essay was to enliven Yamaguchi's warning.

And now a brief reply to Takeuchi's question. In reading Nakazawa's review of Nakamura and Saegusa's *Baudda,* I was surprised how diametrically opposite my own estimation of the book was from his eloquent and convincing praise of it. The review is not important enough to fuss over. *Baudda*, on the other hand, will no doubt have an immense impact. What struck me at first glance was the symbol of the Three Jewels that appears throughout—on the jacket, the cover, the inside cover, everywhere. The symbol, probably chosen by scholars, consists of three circles above supported by a larger circle underneath. The image left me with the impression that the lower circle was given a foundational value that seemed to slight the three upper circles. This is precisely the idea I had rejected in my "Critique of the *Vimalakīrti Sutra*." It also happened to correspond perfectly with the approach and content of the book. The following passage is a shining example of how the "dharma jewel," if made to expand and sink to the ground, can be transfigured into a "universal law" that permits all things:

> The one path that we must preserve as human beings is the path of reason. This is what "maintains humanity as humanity." If humanity does not preserve it as its own path, we become "non-humans" in human form. We become animals.
>
> Moreover, human beings live out their lives in a number of different capacities. The same person at home, for example, can be husband and parent, and yet remain a child to his own parents, a younger or older brother to his siblings; a woman can be wife, parent, child, older sister, or younger sister. Each of these relationships represents one of the capacities in terms of which they live, and each relationship determines a path that one must walk. *A husband has a path he must maintain as husband, and a wife a path that she must maintain as wife. The child as child, the parent as parent—each has a duty to fulfill. To each person there is a path or principle that must be realized in each of the many various relationships or capacities of life.* This is their unique dharma or duty.
>
> If we widen the scope still further, there is a further principle that each must realize as a member of a group, a local community, a profit-seeking society, a nation, and a race.
>
> The form and nature of that practice will differ according to the country and the times, but the dharma itself is an eternal principle. It must be realized universally.
>
> The principle is universal and eternally applicable, not something fixed or static. This universality must be actualized in the present reality. For even if the fundamental principle is the same, its actual manifestations will differ from one time and place to another. The principle for humanity develops along with actually living beings because, philosophically speaking, it is possessed of an unlimited potential for growth.[62]

This sounds to me like a direct plagiarizing of Myōe's "just as it should be." If not rejected right then and there, this "universal principle" will prevent Buddhism from ever becoming true Buddhism.

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My essay draws to a close and all I can think about is how many things I have not had the chance to say. Still, it does not seem quite right for me to criticize everyone else and exempt myself. I conclude, therefore, with a brief attempt at self-criticism.

To begin with, my call for "scholarship as criticism" is an attempt to reject "topical philosophy" in favor of "critical philosophy," the former being a denial of language, the latter its reaffirmation. Next, I think this

needs to be considered in the context of a Japanese tradition that exalts silence, in order the better to contrast the two philosophies. I realize I have not been able to accomplish all of this. The first thing that needs to be done is to demonstrate the benefit of the nomenclature itself. There is much that could be said here, but difficulties still remain.

For one thing, until "language" itself is precisely defined, it is rather pointless to argue about whether it is being valued or devalued. Judging from his published writing, we would probably not consider Bergson as devaluing language, although his theory of language as *symbole* does have that effect. By the same token, there is no question that Norinaga valued words as the "leaves of words" (*koto no ha* 言の葉), but that is not quite the same as *logos*, and in fact he is usually regarded as having valued *pathos* over *logos*. Perhaps it is better to leave so ambiguous a notion as "language" out of the picture altogether.

At this stage I cannot deny my own contribution to the ambiguity. When I think back now to my review of Kobayashi Hideo's *Motoori Norinaga*[63] in which I cited Bergson and compared his view of language with Norinaga's (even though Kobayashi never actually referred to Bergson in his book), I recognize a first step away from my starting point in the "tradition that devalues language" and towards the "tradition that values language." No doubt the effort at clarity of expression does force one to think more clearly, but all along I had been exerting myself precisely *not* to speak clearly. Would not breaking away from this style of expression mean disqualifying myself from the current definition of what it means to be "academic" and thereby succumbing to the "authority" of the crowd, in this case the conventional wisdom of the scholarly world? Perhaps so.

I remember the first paper I ever wrote in college, a fairly self-complacent and straightforward piece (although I refrained from mentioning how odd I found some of my professors' ideas).[64] From that time up until the review of Kobayashi's book, I wrote with no clear awareness of actually writing in the Japanese language. I did not take conference presentations very seriously. It took very little time to prepare handouts that gave the requisite appearance of weighty and important data, thus relieving me, I reasoned, of any obligation to prepare a written text. Thinking about it now, I recoil in shame at my lack of self-respect and the overwhelming disdain for my audience. A talk that I gave at the Osaka Buraku Liberation Center in 1985 brought this home to me and changed

my thinking. For the first time I realized that, for all my stress on the importance of language in general, I had cultivated a supreme indifference to my own use of it. Since that time I have resolved on all occasions, be it an academic conference or a panel discussion, to try to prepare a manuscript in addition to whatever data I bring with me.

Last June 20th, during an unusual downpour in the midst of an otherwise dry rainy season, I paid a visit for the first time to the home of Takeuchi Yoshirō, whose wife was kind enough to pick me up at the station and drive me back again. I have many memories of our conversations that day, in particular his comments about "lies," which I find coming back to me again and again. Of late he has been writing about fundamental human religiosity from the time of the earlier Stone Age up to the age of universal religions. In the course of discussing these matters, he noted how humans have been lying as long as they have had language, and noted the presence of proscriptions against lying common to civilizations everywhere. At the time I did not pay much attention to the remarks, but later I began to reflect, in slightly different terms, on the fact that "only human beings lie." I remembered thinking about this many years before, but now the idea came back to me with renewed force, together with another fact that had been pestering me and that was also closely tied up with the question of language: "Only human beings have the capacity for social discrimination." Given the quasi-linguistic faculties of animals that enable communication and distinction, the fact that it is only we humans who can lie and create social structures that discriminate is not unimportant for our understanding of human language. Might it not be that the reason "lies" and "social discrimination" are so painful for sensitive people is that they are such an unavoidable part of our human makeup? Or conversely, that what makes politicians, shielded behind the armor of political facts, so oblivious to "lies" and "social discrimination" is the fact that they are so insensitive by comparison?

I, too, share in this insensitivity to lies and social discrimination. On the one hand I feel disdain for textual studies; on the other, I follow a traditional academic path, appearing to value objectivity, historical facticity, and textual data—all the while closing my eyes to what is going on in my language. It is a strange thing, but for all the years that I stood up there waving my facts around and reveling in the competition of the academic game, people thought me a properly modest scholar. But once I began to say honestly what I was thinking, all of a sudden I was castigated

as arrogant and self-willed. I feel myself rebuffed by the words of Max Weber: "The prophet and the demagogue do not belong on the academic platform. To the prophet and the demagogue, it is said: 'Go your ways out into the streets and speak.'" But I stand up to the rebuff. I will not allow myself to be vanquished by the "facts" and will live trusting in language. Henceforth I renounce the quest for any "hidden text" read into the works of others in accord with my private and arbitrary intuitions, however fashionable this may be in current hermeneutics.

As part of the dubious methodology of the hermeneutics in fashion today, Ludwig Wittgenstein is casually invoked in the field of Buddhist studies. I know little about Wittgenstein, but I do know that it is mistaken to assume that the silence he had in mind when he wrote "Of that which we cannot speak, of that should we remain silent" is the same as the silence of the Zen masters.[65] In fact, I can hardly imagine anybody *less* like the Zen masters than Wittgenstein, a man whose views of language ran the gamut from that of Bergson to Norinaga in the course of a single lifetime. Wittgenstein never succumbed to any easy "path" as Norinaga did. His belief in and struggles with language were difficult and tormented to the end. Perhaps only one so committed to language could change his ideas as dramatically as did Wittgenstein.

Meanwhile, we try to make our way with textbooks that do little more than line up the facts as if carved in stone, independent of what anybody thinks about them. I, too, am responsible for the genre, having helped to write a textbook still in use called *Religious Studies I*.[66] As the preface states, the book represents a major revision of an earlier text called *General Buddhism*, though much of the earlier text was simply taken over as is. Even the topics I was assigned to cover in my chapter on "Indian Buddhism" had been predetermined, and my job was simply to give an objective description of each item on the list. I was given little editorial discretion, and as I look back today at what I wrote, I feel that nothing short of a complete rewrite is called for in the case of my chapter. I discuss these issues in the classroom where I continue to use the textbook, but I am continually embarrassed by my casual and facile use of language. Is it not amazing how everything we find wrong with a textbook when we study it as a student is conveniently forgotten when we reach an age when we have to compose one of our own?

At the outset of this essay I set up a contrast between "topical philosophy" as a "tradition that devalues language" and "critical philosophy" as

a "tradition that values language." But just as the human brain has a right and a left hemisphere, both of which are necessary for its functioning, so, too, *critica* will never stand on its own without the counterfoil of *topica*. Having evolved from the animal state to the level of human beings, we now have no way back to the brute simplicity of prehuman life, no matter how nostalgically we might yearn for it. Although there are cases reported in which right-hemispheric brain damage has left human linguistic activity unaffected, once the left hemisphere is damaged human linguistic activity remains permanently and irretrievably impaired. There is no need to argue the importance of right-hemispheric functions, but we must not let ourselves get carried away by our fascination with either these functions or their systematic presentation in one or another form of "topical philosophy."

No doubt there are times when all of us wish we could stretch out in oblivion on a field of flowers or coil ourselves up in a fetal position and return to the safe sanctuary of the womb. I, too, know such feelings, perhaps even more so than others, and must guard against letting it overtake me. But do those who glibly celebrate the right hemisphere have any idea of what it would be like to suffer the loss of language? The knowledge of suffering and joy that comes with language is not served by escaping into a "topical philosophy" that attempts to renounce language, but only in the commitment to discerning truth and falsehood that is the concern of a "critical philosophy."

[*Translated by Jamie Hubbard*]

The Limits of Criticism

Paul J. Griffiths

The debate over Critical Buddhism has been going on in Japan for the last decade or so, and has begun to be widely known and discussed in Europe and the United States for the last four or five years. It has provoked some strikingly rhetorical and impassioned argument, and it has shed light upon some dark but important issues in Buddhism and the study of Buddhism. Much of it, though, suffers from an oddly uncritical—given the emphasis upon criticism of the advocates of Critical Buddhism—blending of two issues that ought, on the conceptual level, to be distinguished in order properly to be related. In this brief paper I shall do what I can to separate these issues, and to show what intellectual benefits might be reaped from such a separation.

Before I begin that enterprise I should declare my own place in the debate and the limits of my knowledge of it. Unlike the other Western contributors to this volume, I am not a Japanologist, nor a specialist in East Asian Buddhism. What I know about Buddhism comes mainly from reading its classical Indian texts, and my Japanese is sufficiently bad that I have been able to read no more than a few of the large number of contributions to the debate available only in that language.

My direct exposure to the currents that have swirled around Hakamaya Noriaki and Matsumoto Shirō at Komazawa University during the last decade comes principally from the fact that the former was my teacher during his lengthy visit to the University of Wisconsin–Madison in the early 1980s. I read Sanskrit and Tibetan materials under his direction for almost two years, came to know him well, and to admire and respect his intellectual acuity and the depth and range of his knowledge of the Buddhist traditions. He has taught me more about Buddhism than anyone else, and I continue to revere him and his work. So I write in some sense as Professor Hakamaya's student. This does not mean that I do not

feel free to criticize his ideas; indeed, given the nature of those ideas I should criticize them, since they encourage criticism. But it does mean that any criticism I might offer should be understood as an offering to a man who knows vastly more about almost everything than I, and who has shaped my thinking not only about Buddhism, which is his religion, but also about Christianity, which is mine. My own work in Christian theology and philosophy of religion mirrors and is to some extent mirrored by his in Buddhist theory; and when I argued, in a book published in 1991,[1] that engaging in apologetics, either inter- or intrareligiously, is likely to have significant heuristic benefits, I had in mind, among other things, the already evident results of his work. All of us, even—perhaps especially—those who think him wrong-headed, know more about Buddhism and about the kinds of argument that can be offered for certain theses than we did before he began to make the arguments he makes, and we know it precisely because of the sharpness of his arguments and rhetoric.

What, then, are the two issues that have become inappropriately mixed in this debate? As the materials collected elsewhere in this volume show, the first is the question of what Buddhism is, of what criteria to use to distinguish properly Buddhist phenomena from phenomena that ought not merit the label "Buddhist." This is a question in the end about the essence, the *hṛdaya* or the *sāra*, to put it Sanskritically, of Buddhism. The debate about this matter, so far as I can tell, has focussed mainly upon beliefs—epistemological, ontological, axiological, and sometimes explicitly metaphysical—and patterns of action and attitude that have ethical significance at both the individual and social level. First-order questions under this head include: Is it Buddhist to believe that all sentient beings share the common property *is certain to become awakened*? Or: Is it Buddhist to engage in aggressive warfare? Or to have racist attitudes and to defend racist policies? Such questions also imply second-order problems, of which the most inclusive in this context is: What criteria should be applied in order to determine whether some phenomenon is Buddhist?

The second issue is one of truth and rightness. Here too the debate has been about beliefs, as well as about attitudes and actions that bear ethical weight; but the question has not been "Is this Buddhist?" but rather "Is this true?" (in the case of a belief) or "Is this right?" (in the case of an attitude or an action). So, in the case of the beliefs mentioned in the preceding paragraph, you might ask whether the belief that all living beings are certain to become awakened is true; and in the case of

engagement in warfare or the possession of racist attitudes, you might ask "Is this right?" Questions about the truth or rightness of specific beliefs and patterns of action also imply broader second-order questions, such as: How should you determine what is a true belief in some sphere? Or: How should you determine what is a right action in some sphere?

It remains unclear in most of the contributions to this debate known to me just what the relationship between questions of the first kind—questions, that is, about Buddhism—and questions of the second kind—about truth and rightness—is supposed to be. There are a number of possibilities. First, it might be thought that answers to questions of the second kind are also answers to questions of the first kind. In this view, all true beliefs and all right actions and attitudes are Buddhist just in virtue of being true and right. There are certainly elements in the Buddhist traditions that seem to suggest such a view, some of them very ancient.[2] But this view is almost certainly stronger than any stated or implied by contributors to the Critical Buddhism debate, in part because it has entailments that are difficult to accept. Among these are that since all true beliefs are ipso facto Buddhist, true beliefs about the win/loss record of the Chicago White Sox (among many other things) are also Buddhist.

A weaker position is that it is necessary for a belief to be true in order for it to be Buddhist—or for actions and attitudes to be right in order for them to be Buddhist—but that it is not sufficient. I strongly suspect that at least this weaker view is implicit in much of the Critical Buddhism debate. If Buddhism is the true religion, or at least one among the true religions, then it will seem natural to assume that only true beliefs can be part of it, and that only right actions and attitudes can be recommended by it.[3] Put differently: if there is good reason to believe that some belief is false or that some action or attitude is wrong, this will also be good reason to believe that the belief or the attitude/action is not Buddhist. Such a view has been influential, perhaps statistically dominant, in all long-lived traditions of thought and practice. Such traditions are not likely, after all, to acknowledge that a false belief could be among their teachings or that a wrong action could be advocated by them. If this position is assumed by most or all of the contributors to the debate, this goes a good way toward explaining why the two kinds of questions have been merged, for in this position, showing that some belief is false is the same as showing it not to be Buddhist; and showing some belief to be Buddhist is the same as showing it not to be false—i.e., to be true.

There are other positions on the relationship between questions about Buddhism and questions about truth and rightness that could be taken. For instance, you might argue that there are no interesting connections of a logical kind between the two sets of questions: that, for instance, answers to questions such as "Is this Buddhist?" can be given by appealing only to contingent historical information surrounding the phenomenon in question (such, perhaps, as that some action is said by those who engage in it to be Buddhist; or that some claim made in a text is labeled in that text as a Buddhist claim). If this move is made then of course it will immediately follow that some true beliefs are Buddhist and some Buddhist beliefs are true; but equally that some false beliefs are Buddhist and that some Buddhist beliefs are false; and, what is the same as the previous two claims, that there is no interesting connection between the truth-value of a claim and its credentials as a Buddhist claim. But it seems reasonable to assume that none of the contributors to the Critical Buddhism debate are taking this line. It is a line that appeals only to the more weak-minded among contemporary Western theorists of religion.[4]

Suppose, then, that contributors to the debate are likely to be assuming—even if they are not explicit about it—the view that truth (of beliefs) and rightness (of attitudes and actions) are necessary but not sufficient conditions for those beliefs and attitudes/actions to be Buddhist. Still, there are some important questions that need to be answered, questions that can only be handled by making distinctions that flow from separating—again, in order later to show the proper relations between—the question of truth/rightness from that of authenticity in the way that I have done. Principal among them is: Are the criteria for determining whether some belief is false, or some attitude/action wrong, drawn only from materials that on some other ground are taken to be Buddhist? Or may they be drawn from elsewhere? This is a question about how knowledge about what is true or right is to be had. It is a question, in the end, of epistemology: how are you to arrive at and justify your opinions as to what is true and right? It is here that the distinction between critical and topical philosophy, made much of by Hakamaya and to a lesser extent Matsumoto, has its importance.

What, then, is this distinction? How are critical and topical philosophy to be understood?[5] One important aspect of the distinction is epistemological: criticalists and topicalists have different views about how beliefs—claims to knowledge—ought to be acquired or fixed, and about

how they ought to be justified. There is much more to the distinction between criticalism and topicalism than this, but it is this element upon which I shall focus in what follows. I shall say nothing about the interesting question of whether Hakamaya's interpretation of Vico as a topicalist, or his reading of Descartes as a criticalist, are exegetically correct; I'll treat the critical-topical distinction as one between ideal types—in the Weberian sense, and in spite of Hakamaya's dislike of Weber, to which I shall return.[6]

For the topicalist, truths are uncovered, discovered, or revealed. They are always already present, prior to and independent of the knowing subject, inscribed eternally and changelessly in the fabric of the cosmos. Our task as knowing subjects, then, is to conform our opinions and beliefs to the way things are, to see that our noetic structure coincides with and corresponds to the ontological structure it is supposed to image. Metaphors of finding or uncovering are important for topicalists in describing the processes by which knowledge is arrived at; and metaphors of reflection or imaging are important in describing the noetic structure that results from the uncovering of truth. Our cognitive faculties are, in this view, like a mirror, and they fulfil their proper goal when they are in a condition perfectly to reflect the nature of things.[7] The goal of topicalism, as Hakamaya puts it, is verisimilitude; and its method is one of removing obstructions to what is already necessarily and changelessly present.

Two other closely associated themes are important to topicalists on the question of how true beliefs ought to be arrived at. The first is that of authority; and the second is that of error. Hakamaya is consistent, lyrically and forcefully so, in his rejection of appeals to authority as a proper basis for the formation and justification of true beliefs, even when he recognizes within himself a tendency to make such appeals.[8] Such appeals are typical of topicalism. The conforming or homologizing of the individual's noetic structure to reality typically occurs as a result of a self-validating and authoritative revelation—not necessarily in the sense of a direct communication from God, but possibly also including that—of the way things are. The *topica* or *loci*, the essential elements in the structure of reality, emerge from the depths of consciousness or are set forth by some authoritative source in such a way that they are luminously and self-validatingly obvious. No questioning of them is possible or needed: error is not, as Indian logicians would have it, located at the level of *pratyakṣa*, or perception; the very occurrence of a perceptual act carries with it irrefragable

guarantees that it accurately represents what is perceived.[9] The mirror of consciousness does not distort.

And yet, obviously, topicalists must account for cognitive error, for it is clear that not everyone's consciousness is properly conformed to reality—from a topicalist viewpoint, for instance, Hakamaya's consciousness is presumably not so conformed. So it seems that the mirror does sometimes distort, to a greater or lesser extent. How can this be? A typical topicalist explanation locates error at the accidental or adventitious level, making it the result of defilements or distortions or obstructions that are not intrinsic to you as a knowing subject, not part of what you essentially are, but that have instead accrued to you by some series of accidents, much as you might break your leg or your neck.[10] In this view, a properly ordered noetic structure, a collection of beliefs that perfectly mirrors the way things are, is intrinsic to—an essential property of—you as knowing subject; error is a removable accident, removable ideally by finding the properly self-validating revelation of what you really are, which is also the way things really are.

Hakamaya and Matsumoto identify topicalism construed in this way with those strands of Buddhist thought usually called *tathāgata-garbha* or *hongaku shisō* (these two expressions do not embrace ideas in every respect identical, but the differences between them need not be of concern here). They see, rightly, that such a view about how true beliefs are come by and what they are like also carries with it a set of views about justification: about how it is that you are warranted in having the beliefs you have, what makes it reasonable for you to have those beliefs and not some others, and how you ought, if challenged, show that your beliefs are the right ones, preferable to their competitors. Topicalist views about all these matters are easy to derive from what has been said so far: topicalists justify their beliefs by displaying them, assuming that since they were arrived at on the basis of the luminous self-evidence of what has been revealed in the depths of consciousness, properly ornamented display will suffice for justification. Hence the emphasis typically placed by topicalists on rhetoric as an instrument of proper ornamentation.[11] Topicalists will, as Hakamaya emphasizes again and again, reject the view that demonstrative argument based upon conceptual distinctions is either necessary or sufficient for the justification of belief: the *ars inveniendi* is itself seen as a mode of justification, and the *ars iudicandi* is rejected. Or, to put the same matter Sanskritically, *anumāna* is unnecessary for

justification because *pratyakṣa* suffices.

So much for topicalism on the fixation and justification of belief. Criticalism is treated less extensively than topicalism by Hakamaya. The exigencies of his polemical situation no doubt require him to spend more intellectual energy on explaining and refuting the errors of his opponents than on elucidating his own epistemology. This is unfortunate, for it leaves a number of pressing questions unanswered. It can at least be said that, for Hakamaya, criticalism is everything that topicalism is not: beliefs, for the criticalist, are neither fixed nor justified by appeal to self-validating sources of authority, whether experiential or external; demonstrative argument based upon careful conceptual distinctions is essential for justification; and the goal of the criticalist is not verisimilitude—the homologization of the noetic and the ontological order—so much as truth, the possession of beliefs that accurately, but correctably, express the way things are. Criticalism so understood is, for Hakamaya, true philosophy, true scholarship, and also true religion, for each of these enterprises consists in large part in expressing beliefs in words based upon conceptual distinctions, and then in doing your best to assess the truth or falsity of those beliefs by the use of argument.[12]

It is very important to see that Hakamaya's goal is not to provide one more apology for the rationalism of the Enlightenment, much less to defend a naive optimism about the capacities of unfettered critical reason to arrive at truth. Descartes may be preferable to Vico for the adherents of Critical Buddhism, it is true; but this is principally because of the former's rejection of self-validating culture- or religion-specific sources of truth, and his concomitant avoidance of the dangers of nativism, racism, sexism, and the unbridled aggression against those of the wrong culture, sex, race, or religion made possible by these errors.[13] Hakamaya is not interested in affirming Descartes as the father of the *déracinée* positivist intellectual who has learned nothing and forgotten nothing in the century since Max Weber offered the most eloquent and familiar apology for the sense of vocation and self-congratulatory superiority so evident in the works of Weber himself, as well as in those of his legions of disciples in Western—and Japanese, it seems—academic institutions at present.[14] Hakamaya's critique of this essay makes the grounds of his disagreement with it perfectly clear. He takes it to be one more representation of an authoritative stance in epistemology; for Hakamaya, the Weberian view of scholarship as a vocation implies the possibility of presenting or displaying

facts without adopting a normative, or critical, stance toward them. It is, that is to say, an ersatz and academic version of *hongaku shisō*, whose fundamental commitment is to the view that there is a standpoint from which claims can be made whose truth is self-evident, a standpoint from which the only possibility of critical engagement is with those who already accept the axiomatic commitments informing the standpoint—in this case, the procedural and substantive commitments of nineteenth-century German *Hochwissenschaftlichkeit.*[15]

Hakamaya is therefore not defending criticalism as a form of positivism, whether in academia or out of it. To do that would be to offer, from his viewpoint, and from mine, a peculiarly tasteless and ersatz form of religion. *Hongaku shisō* at least has more flavor than Weberian rationalism, even if its practitioners are likely to be roughly equally dangerous, ethically and epistemologically speaking. Just how, then, is Hakamaya's epistemological endorsement of Descartes over Vico to be taken, if not in the now-traditional (in Europe and the United States) positivist sense? I confess that I am not sure of the answer, largely because Hakamaya is himself less clear than I would wish about it. So I shall now sketch what Hakamaya's criticalism ought to mean, epistemologically speaking, in the hope that he will agree with me; and will conclude by looking at his polemical engagement with the German Buddhologist, Lambert Schmithausen, to see whether the epistemological reading of criticalism I offer finds any support therein. This will also make possible a reconnection of the twin themes I disentangled at the beginning of this essay: the question of what is properly Buddhist, on the one hand, and that of what is true or right, on the other.

Suppose we begin by using a distinction now standard in Anglophone epistemology: I mean that between internalist and externalist epistemologies, made clear in the recent work of Alvin Plantinga and William Alston, but with much deeper roots in the epistemological traditions of the West.[16] Epistemological theories are typically interested in distinguishing between instances of belief that are not well-grounded, and that as a result have no claim to be called knowledge, and instances of belief that are well-grounded and that therefore do have some such claim. For instance, I may believe that I can generate reliable beliefs about the future performance of the stock market by consulting the entrails of properly sacrificed goats. Most Western academics—certainly most Anglophone epistemologists—would tend to say that beliefs about the course of future

events generated in this way lack the property or properties that might give them claim to be called knowledge. In contrast, I may believe that I can generate reliable beliefs about what Boris Yeltsin said to Bill Clinton last night, even though he speaks no English and I no Russian, by consulting a report of the conversation given in *The New York Times*. Many, perhaps most, Anglophone epistemologists would be likely to think that beliefs generated in this way are of a kind such that they should be considered knowledge. The debate centers upon what account to give of the property or properties that distinguish beliefs of the first kind from beliefs of the second kind.

Internalist epistemologies typically claim that the property in question—it might be called "warrant" or "justification" or something similar—is internal to those who have the beliefs in question, something to which they have special access: they have had the proper experience, say, or have constructed or understood the proper argument, and to both of these facts, and others like them, the subject is a better witness than anyone else. Internalism in epistemology goes nicely with deontology: I may be justified (warranted) in believing that *p* (where *p* stands for some proposition or claim), if, and perhaps only if, I have fulfilled my epistemic duties or obligations. As Plantinga puts it:

> …justification, internalism, and epistemic deontology are properly seen as a closely related triumvirate: internalism flows from deontology and is unmotivated without it, and justification at bottom and originally a deontological notion.[17]

For the internalist, then, what counts is whether you have fulfilled your epistemic duties or not; and you can tell whether you have by, paradigmatically, undertaking an act of introspection; an act that will, if done with proper attention, tell you whether, as Locke puts it, you are like someone who "believes or disbelieves according as Reason directs him," or whether you are like someone who "transgresses against his own Light, and misuses those Faculties which were given him to no other end, but to search and follow the clearer Evidence."[18] Internalism in epistemology is, then, evidentialist, deontological, and (usually) radically individualist: you can tell whether you have fulfilled your epistemic duties or not simply by virtue of possessing and using generically human intellectual equipment.

Externalist views are quite different. They claim that what makes a particular instance of believing justified or warranted is something exter-

nal to believers, typically some process or method of arriving at the belief in question that is not internal to them, and may not be known, understood, or controlled by them. Perhaps the most common kind of externalist epistemology is reliabilism: the view that you are warranted (justified) in believing that *p* if and only if a particular instance of so believing possesses the property of having been produced by a reliable belief-forming practice or mechanism. Externalist views allow, indeed they require, a distinction between a belief's having been produced by a reliable belief-forming mechanism, sometimes called a doxastic practice in the trade, and this fact being known to the believer. You may very well have beliefs that have been so produced, and yet not know this fact; or if you do know it, you may not—and need not—be able to give an account of just what it is about the doxastic practice in question that makes it reliable. It may be (though it is not) the case that consulting the entrails of properly-sacrificed goats is a reliable way of arriving at beliefs about the course of future events; an externalist need not require of those who perform such a practice that they know it to be reliable, much less that they know and be able to show why it is reliable (were, counterfactually, it to be so) in order for it to produce (largely) true beliefs for them. Externalist epistemologies, then, are typically nonevidentialist, antideontological (if being deontological requires not just that you have fulfilled your epistemic duties but also that part of fulfilling them is that you know and are able to show that you have done so, as in the case of Locke), and nonindividualist, since individuals need not be, and usually will not be, the final court of appeal on the question of whether and why particular beliefs are justified.

Externalist epistemologies are generally to be preferred to internalist ones, even though the latter have been dominant in Anglophone philosophy since the seventeenth century. There are many reasons for rejecting internalist epistemologies; going into all of them would require a full-dress and very lengthy essay in epistemology, which I cannot give here. However, I can note the central reasons. First, internalists are almost inevitably committed to some version of foundationalism, according to which a properly ordered noetic structure is founded upon beliefs of whose truth the believer can be convinced by introspection: they are perhaps, as Locke would have it, clear and distinct ideas; or they present themselves with a luminous force that cannot be denied; or, in a common version, traceable in various forms to Descartes, Spinoza, and, again,

Locke, they are self-evident or evident to the senses. Beliefs of this foundationally obvious kind, once arrived at, support all other beliefs in a properly ordered noetic structure. Beliefs that are not themselves in the foundations will be derived from those that are by proper deployment of evidence, or by patterns of deductive argument, or the like. But the principal and obvious difficulty with this kind of epistemological foundationalism is that its axioms do not meet the criteria they set forth, which leads to the odd position that if you are an avowed internalist you cannot be justified or warranted in being such precisely because of your internalism. Your epistemological theory sets up criteria for justification that it cannot itself meet. This is because the axioms of internalist epistemologies are not themselves foundational to anyone's noetic structure. (Are they self-evident or evident to the senses? Hardly. Do they force themselves upon us with the luminous power of the structure of the cosmos revealing itself? No.) Neither can they be derived from those foundations by evidence or reasoning in any way that is beyond dispute by reasonable people. Epistemological internalism, then, in so far as it is a form of foundationalism, sets up epistemic duties that it cannot itself meet (recall Plantinga's words, quoted above, about the intrinsically deontological nature of internalism).

Internalism has another and closely connected problem. This is the unbearable burden of epistemic duty that it places upon the individual. If it is up to me to know in virtue of what I am justified in having the beliefs I have in order for me to be justified in having them, and if, moreover, that to which I must appeal in coming to have such knowledge must be facts about the foundations of my own noetic structure as construed by internalists, then it immediately follows that I will be justified in having very few of the beliefs I have. For example, I have several beliefs about Newton's Laws of Motion and Fermat's Last Theorem. But since all of the beliefs I have about these matters are based upon authoritative testimony—I read them in books or was taught them in class—and are neither self-evident, nor evident to the senses, nor derived by me by patterns of more-or-less deductive or evidentialist reasoning from beliefs that are self-evident or evident to the senses (Is the truth of Newton's Laws self-evident or evident to the senses? No. Have I proved them for myself? No.), it follows from an internalist viewpoint that I am not justified in having them. The same will follow for an enormous number of the beliefs I have: the vast majority of the interesting ones, I would say.

Externalism in epistemology avoids these difficulties, and for that reason is to be preferred as an epistemological theory—or, better, family of theories. Since it separates the fact of my being justified or warranted in believing that *p* from my knowing that I am justified and from my being able to show that I am justified, it makes it possible for me to be justified in many of the beliefs I have, beliefs that epistemic internalism would not judge to be part of a properly ordered noetic structure. Also, externalist epistemologies do not suffer from the same kinds of self-referential difficulties with foundationalism that so bedevil internalisms. We ought all, then, reject epistemic internalism in all its kinds and embrace some externalist epistemology. Hume and Locke were wrong, and Augustine, Reid, and Newman were right.[19]

The point of this long (but not long enough to do the matter justice) excursion into epistemological theory has been to lay the groundwork for asking whether Hakamaya's distinction between criticalism and topicalism maps neatly, or at all, onto the distinction between externalism and internalism. The answer is not quite clear to me. The topicalist emphasis upon experientalism, self-evidence, intuition, and so forth, places topicalism very close to internalism. But the criticalist emphasis upon analytical argument as necessary for the attainment of right judgment does the same: for if the production of demonstrative arguments for the truth of my beliefs—the *ars iudicandi* as Hakamaya understands it—is a necessary condition for my being justified in having them, then this too is a characteristic of internalism in epistemology. It is, for example, close to Descartes's view, and Hakamaya very often quotes Descartes as the *uttarapakṣa* to Vico's *pūrvapakṣa*. But there are indications that point in the other direction as well, suggestions that Hakamaya does not want a strong internalism. He claims, for example, that in order to establish a truly critical attitude toward Buddhism he cannot stand outside it;[20] that to attack wrong ideas as to what Buddhism is, he must do so from within the tradition. This is not something a hard-line internalist would say, for it suggests that certain beliefs can be justified—beliefs in this case about what Buddhism is—only by adopting a certain cognitive stance toward Buddhism to begin with: one of *śraddhā,* trust or confidence that Buddhism is a good thing,[21] or that its deliverances, rightly construed, are such that you ought to give, or are warranted in giving, them epistemic weight; or that you ought to try to live by them. If Hakamaya thinks this, and moreover thinks that criticalists can be warranted in think-

ing this without having to show, critically, that they are so warranted before thinking it, then criticalism moves closer to externalism. Insofar as it is an epistemological thesis, criticalism, in this case, does not assert that *all* believers can be justified in their beliefs *only* by having and being able to produce demonstrative arguments for their truth—that would be a classically internalist, a properly Cartesian, claim. It asserts the more limited thesis that a systematic and complete rejection of criticism (reasoned argument) as a method for both belief-fixation and belief-justification—a rejection typical of topicalism as Hakamaya presents it—is improper and indefensible. But, as I have said, I am not sure that this is what Hakamaya means, though I think it is what he ought to mean and what I hope he means. I shall press the question a little by looking now at an instance of his reasoning on a particular topic, to see whether this can help in elucidating with more precision just how criticalism is to be understood.

In 1985 Lambert Schmithausen published a paper called "Buddhismus und Natur."[22] The argument in this paper was later developed and presented in lecture form at various venues in Asia during 1990. Late in 1990, Hakamaya published a rejoinder to Schmithausen's thoughts on this matter, based in part on the 1985 article, in part on the 1990 lecture, and in part on personal discussions he had with Schmithausen in late 1990 in Tokyo.[23] Schmithausen then published (in 1991) a further revised and expanded version of his 1990 lecture, part of which contains a response to Hakamaya's 1990 article.[24] This is a most interesting and revealing debate, though one that operates in something of a conceptual fog, due in part to the number of languages in which it has gone on (German, Japanese, English), and to the difference in assumptions and approaches of its protagonists. To begin with, Schmithausen and Hakamaya begin from quite different ideas as to what is meant by the term "nature" (*shizen*, *Natur*). For Schmithausen, it means both ecosystems understood independently of human beings ("wild nature") and, more generally, living beings—sentient and otherwise—who are not human. For Hakamaya, it means what things really are, their *natura* or *physis*, that from which they come, their *prakṛti* or ontological ground.

This difference in starting point naturally influences the argument. Schmithausen wants to show that there are conceptual resources in Buddhism that can be used to ground decent treatment of both wild nature and nonhuman living beings. Hakamaya wants to show that Buddhists do, or should, reject the idea that there is an ontological

ground or source of being for nature, just as they do or should reject the idea that humans have an atman, an enduring source of identity. He then takes this denial to extend to a denial of any and all claims as to the intrinsic value of the natural order in both of Schmithausen's senses. Schmithausen takes umbrage at what he sees as a possible implication of Hakamaya's view, which is that living beings can be treated as if they had no intrinsic value— i.e., merely instrumentally.

Underlying this debate is a deep disagreement between Schmithausen and Hakamaya as to the significance and reference of the term "Buddhism." Schmithausen wants an inclusive sense:

> I have good reason to regard as "Buddhism" the whole of the Buddhist tradition, i.e. all movements and groups claiming to be Buddhist, and all ideas and attitudes occurring or documented to have occurred among them.[25]

But postulating a sense as inclusive as this gives him some uneasy moments. He is aware that such an open definition provides no room for critical judgment, and that equating the meaning of the term "Buddhism" with the aggregate of its uses will yield a concept so internally differentiated and contradictory that it can be of no use for any critical or constructive purposes—not even for those that Schmithausen himself is so concerned about.[26]

By contrast, Hakamaya's view of what Buddhism is, as Schmithausen clearly sees, is both restrictive and normative: Buddhism is criticism, based upon the doctrines of *pratītyasamutpāda* and *anātma-vāda*.[27] Buddhism is what goes against the stream (*pratiśrotra*), what is not found in other streams of thought, whether Jainism or Brahmanism in India, Taoism in China, or Shinto in Japan. Schmithausen construes Hakamaya's restrictive/normative reading of Buddhism as being, at least in part, a set of historical claims: claims about what Gautama Śākyamuni taught, for example. As such, he finds them implausible, even "utterly arbitrary."[28] I am not sure, however, that this is how Hakamaya intends them. It is true that he sometimes sounds as if this is what he means,[29] and if he does he is on shaky ground.[30] But the charitable and more likely reading is to take Hakamaya's restrictive understanding of the meaning of the term "Buddhism" as being not principally a historical thesis, but rather a critically normative philosophical thesis. Hakamaya's thought moves from a critical engagement with Buddhist sources to a set of decisions as to what

is true and right, and then back to the tradition to determine what in it best accords with these decisions as to what is true and right. Hakamaya is a Buddhist philosopher first—were he a Christian I would call him a theologian—a philologist and an interpreter of texts second, and a Weberian-positivist historian only a very distant third. This is entirely evident in the essay on nature that Schmithausen criticizes; Hakamaya has decided, on the basis of a critical engagement with Buddhist texts coupled with some philosophical decisions of his own, that it is proper to reject any set of ideas that reifies the natural order and gives it intrinsic weight and significance. He then reads the Buddhist tradition in light of these decisions: any elements that accord with it may be properly Buddhist; any that do not cannot be.

Schmithausen, by contrast, attempts a version of what Hakamaya, and I, would see as the Weberian fallacy: he wants to deploy a broadly internalist epistemology in the service of a broadly positivist historiography in order to show his readers *wie es eigentlich gewesen ist* in regard to Buddhist thought about nature. But this will not work because it cannot—and as I have noted, Schmithausen is himself uneasily aware that it cannot. Historiography is always driven by ideology, by a set of critically—or, in a bad case, uncritically—normative decisions about what it is for and how it should be done, decisions that are not themselves given or justified historically. The advantage and virtue of Hakamaya's position and method is that it makes its broadly ideological commitments explicit; the disadvantage of Schmithausen's is that, for the most part, its commitments are hidden, tacit, even denied.[31]

None of this is to say that Hakamaya is right about the relations between the human and the nonhuman order, sentient and otherwise, nor that Schmithausen is wrong. It is only to say that the way in which Hakamaya constructs his views on this matter—and his views as to what Buddhists think about it—is vastly preferable to the way in which Schmithausen constructs his. Schmithausen accuses Hakamaya's views of being "Cartesianism in Buddhist garb";[32] but this is not a correct reading. Hakamaya thinks and writes, as I have shown, and as Schmithausen himself also admits, as a Buddhist, which suggests not so much the strong internalism of a strict Cartesian as the moderate externalism of a man of faith (if I may be allowed a Christian interpretation of *śraddhā*) in Buddhism, critically construed, of course. There is a close link between Cartesian internalism in epistemology and Weberian positivism in historiography; and

this suggests that, in the end, Schmithausen is more the Cartesian than Hakamaya.

It is easy to see, in spite of all this, how the apologists for Critical Buddhism can be seen as Cartesian internalists. Hakamaya's often intemperate rhetoric allows the impression that he gives an independent and free-standing significance to the unaided force of the human intellect. But I do not think, finally, that this is the best way to read him. Criticism is, for him, a tool in the service of Buddhism; a tool to be used by Buddhists for the clarification, elucidation, and defense of the deliverances of Buddhism; it is not a tool that independently provides those deliverances, nor is it a tool that, alone and unaided, can make a Buddhist of anyone or justify anyone's being such. It is, however, an indispensable tool for showing the errors and incoherences of those who hold an indefensible epistemology, an incoherent ontology, and a dubious ethic—the *dhātu-vādinaḥ*, as Matsumoto and Hakamaya call them, whose secular equivalents are the internalists and positivists of the academy. There is a fideism of the academy just as there is a religious fideism; and it is one of Hakamaya's great strengths to have pointed this out so trenchantly. If I read Hakamaya aright, he is a Buddhist, a man for whom the clarity brought by a properly externalist use of critical reason is an indispensable tool in the struggle to construe Buddhism properly and to defend it, so construed, against its internalist and positivist despisers. I am no Buddhist, and can have nothing to say of a constructive kind about the proper construal of Buddhism; but as a Christian I can only agree with and applaud Hakamaya's arguments and his mode of procedure.

Comments on Critical Buddhism

Matsumoto Shirō

I would like to make some brief comments on "Critical Buddhism."[1] First, Critical Buddhism must always maintain a critical attitude toward Critical Buddhism itself, or else it will be just another kind of traditional Buddhism. It is imperative, therefore, that we be critical towards the teachings of Dōgen, of Indian and Tibetan Madhyamika philosophers,[2] and even of the Buddha himself.[3] It is quite likely that their thinking was, on some points, influenced by *dhātu-vāda*. We should not approach them with an attitude of unquestioning adoration, but must try to understand their teachings accurately and critically.

For example, I think that it is inaccurate to say that Dōgen criticized original enlightenment thought or *tathāgata-garbha* thought in his "Bendōwa." Dōgen himself uses the term *shinjin-ichinyo* (identity of body and mind), which is one type—in fact an extreme type—of *tathāgata-garbha* thought. Moreover, Dōgen was not entirely free from *tathāgata-garbha*-type ways of thinking even in writing the 12-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō*.[4]

Second, with regard to Madhyamika philosophy, the word *tattva* (thatness) found in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* xviii–9 has been considered by all Madhyamika philosophers since Bhāvaviveka to denote the highest reality as cognized by nonconceptual cognition (*nirvikalpa-jñāna*). This interpretation of *tattva* based on the notion of nonconceptual cognition is, I think, clearly influenced by the *dhātu-vāda* tradition, especially that of the Yogacarins.[5]

Third, there are many clear statements admitting the existence of atman even in the teachings of the Buddha himself. In the so-called earliest Buddhist texts preserved in Pali such as the *Suttanipāta*,[6] for example, there are many passages that admit the existence of an atman.[7] Moreover, it cannot be denied that the Buddha practiced dhyana even after he had attained enlightenment. However, the dhyana theory seems to have been

the main cause for producing the non-Buddhistic notion of nonconceptual cognition.[8] We must be very careful when we try to make clear the true import of the Buddha's teaching.

Finally, I think we must make a distinction between two types of *tathāgata-garbha* thought.[9] The first type could be considered the original type, that is, the idea of Buddha-nature as "immanent" 仏性内在論 or as "Buddha-nature in one's body." The second type is the more extreme type, and could be called the "theory of the manifestation of Buddha-nature" 仏性顕在論 and is expressed in sayings like "Buddha-nature manifested as phenomenal existence such as trees and stones."

The Doctrine of *Tathāgata-garbha* Is Not Buddhist

Matsumoto Shirō

As the title I have given this essay indicates,[1] I do not consider *tathāgata-garbha* thought to be Buddhist. To demonstrate this thesis I propose to begin with a discussion of what Buddhism is, then to turn to the doctrine of *tathāgata-garbha* and demonstrate why the two are incompatible. In doing so, I am fully aware that my presentations of Buddhism and *tathāgata-garbha* thought represent my own views on the matter.

WHAT IS BUDDHISM?

I begin, then, by laying out the broad outlines of what I understand Buddhism to be. To begin with my conclusion, I take Buddhism to be the doctrines of no-self and *pratītyasamutpāda*. The *pratītyasamutpāda* I have in mind here, however, does not include such later formulations as the "co-arising of the *dharmadhātu*" or the "mutually dependent, simultaneous and spatial (i.e., non-temporal) *pratītyasamutpāda*" that we find, for example, in Hua-yen thought. By *pratītyasamutpāda* I understand first and foremost the *pratītyasamutpāda* of the twelve-membered chain of dependent arising as taught in the *Mahāvagga*, which I believe to be the twelvefold chain of dependent arising that Śākyamuni pondered in its forward and reverse order, and to the truth of which he was awakened.

Such a claim is sure to provoke immediate objections from academics. "Śākyamuni's awakening is unrelated to *pratītyasamutpāda*," they will say; or "the twelvefold chain of dependent arising is a later development"; or perhaps more radically, "there is no essential difference between Śākyamuni's enlightenment and that taught in the Upaniṣads or early Jain philosophy."

The scope of the present study does not allow me to delve into the interpretative problems of early Buddhism needed to counter these claims.[2] I will only indicate my two principal motives in asserting that Śākyamuni was enlightened to the twelvefold chain of dependent arising.

First, I am opposed to the idea of objective scholarship, or rather to the idea that final judgements are to be ever postponed and finally suspended. As I have argued elsewhere, it is the task of those who are practicing Buddhists to determine the true Buddha-dharma, even if this involves submitting to criticism statements in the earliest Buddhist texts.

Second, I wish clearly to reject the idea that Śākyamuni's awakening (and hence Buddhism itself) can be understood in terms of self and existence rather than in terms of no-self and emptiness. For me, the teaching of no-self follows naturally from the notion of *pratītyasamutpāda* to which Śākyamuni was awakened.

Tsuda Shin'ichi is typical of those who approach Buddhism from the point of view of self or existence. As is well known, in the *Mahāvagga* story of the Buddha's awakening, immediately after contemplating the twelvefold chain of dependent arising in forward and reversed order Śākyamuni uttered a "paean of joy" (*udāna*), delighting in the true "appearance of phenomena" (*pātubhavanti dhamma*) as they become manifest to the meditator.[3] On the basis of Tamaki Kōshirō's interpretation of this "dhammā" as "primal source of phenomena" or "primal dhammā,"[4] Tsuda repeatedly glosses it as "existential foundation," "existence (*Sein*) as the foundational strata," "the single source of the world," "the *Sein* that is the existential foundation of phenomena," or "the feminine singular *dhamma*."[5] He writes, for example:

> The metaphysical scheme of humanity arising from the *single* source of the world and its return to that same foundation is already implied in even the simple phrases of the previously cited *Mahāhatthipadopama-sutta* [emphasis added].

The ideas that Tsuda puts forward in this article are neither as complex nor as novel as they might appear. They are typically expressions, pure and simple, of the *tathāgata-garbha* tradition—that is, of *dhātu-vāda*. It does not seem to have occurred to Tsuda that the various phrases he employs can all be subsumed under the single term *dhātu*. For in the end his claim amounts to little more than the idea that manifold phenomena (*dharmāḥ*) arise from a singular *dhātu*, the *dharmadhātu* (the

foundation of the various dharmas). I have reached the point that I can no longer concede the possibility of understanding Śākyamuni's awakening in terms of such a "singular truly existing source."[6]

THE *TATHĀGATA-GARBHA* TRADITION

If we may allow this brief sketch of my idea of *dhātu-vāda* to stand for the time being, we may turn next to the notion of *tathāgata-garbha*. Before I present my thesis that *tathāgata-garbha* thought is a form of *dhātu-vāda*, I would ask the reader to set aside preconceptions about the *tathāgata-garbha* doctrine. The idea, for instance, that "the *dharma-dhātu* is the world of truth" (真理の世界), or the mistaken notion that "dharma" means "truth" (真理) or "permanent law" (理法), or again the idea that "the mind is pure in its essential nature" (Skt. *prakṛtiś cittasya prabhāsvarā*, Chin. 自性清浄心) are basic Mahayana concepts said to appear in the *Prajñāpāramitā* sutras. In my view, however, none of these ideas has been demonstrated as true or even textually verified. As Hirakawa Akira has shown, for example, the *Tao hsing pan jo ching* (T No. 224, 8.425–78), the oldest extant Chinese translation of the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñā-pāramitā* (itself the earliest of the *Prajñā-pāramitā* sutras), does not, in fact, contain the phrase *prakṛtiś cittasya prabhāsvarā*.[7]

Along the same lines, far from being a teaching of equality, the doctrine of *tathāgata-garbha* seems to me to be an argument for social discrimination. I will clarify this below in explaining the structure of *dhātu-vāda*, but I recommend that those who hold the widely accepted idea that *tathāgata-garbha* thought teaches equality to consider the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* and the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sutra*. The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*'s theory of the reality of the three vehicles is of course well known as an exposition of Yogacara doctrine,[8] but what are we to make of its assertion that "All sentient beings are/have the *tathāgata-garbha*"? The extant text does indeed declare, "*tadgarbhāḥ sarva-dehinaḥ*" (*Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*, IX.37), which the commentary interprets to mean "*sarve sattvās tathāgatagarbhā ity ucyate* (*Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra-bhāṣya* ad IX.37). At the same time, it also clearly declares the existence of "those lacking the cause" (*hetuhīna*, *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra* III.11), which is interpreted as "forever lacking the lineage [*gotra*] for nirvana" (*atyantāparinirvāṇadharman*, *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra-bhāṣya*, ad III.11). What is therefore important to note is that the

Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra's declaration that "all beings are/have the *tathāgata-garbha*" is not the same as the *Lotus Sutra*'s declaration that "all sentient beings will attain Buddhahood" (*issai kaijō* 一切皆成).

The same idea can by found in the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sutra*, which sees no contradiction between the assertion that "all sentient beings possess Buddha-nature" and the existence of the *icchantika*, beings permanently incapable of attaining to Buddhahood.[9] I would illustrate this with two passages from the Tibetan translation of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sutra* (Peking edition No. 788):[10]

1. Within all sentient beings is the nature of a Buddha (Skt. *buddha-dhātu*, Tib. *saṅs rgyas kyi khams*); this nature (*dhātu*) is provided (*tshaṅ*) within each of their bodies. *After eliminating the mark (rnam pa) of defilement they will attain Buddhahood*, <u>excluding, however, the *icchantika*</u> (Tu 99a6–7).[11]

2. <u>Even the *icchantika* possess the *tathāgata-garbha*</u>, but it is within a very thick covering. Just as a silkworm makes its own cocoon but cannot leave it until it makes an opening, the *tathagata-garbha* cannot free itself from those karmic blunders and emerge from within the *icchantika*. Therefore [the *icchantika*] will not attain the cause of enlightenment (*bodhi-hetu*) even until the end of all transmigration (Tu 134b2–3).[12]

Takasaki Jikidō interprets references to the exclusion of the *icchantika* in the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sutra* to be a qualification of the general claim that "all sentient beings possess Buddha-nature."[13] I cannot agree. As the second passage above shows, the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sutra* clearly states that the *icchantika* also possess Buddha-nature ("*tathāgata-garbha*" in the Tibetan). Accordingly, "excluding the *icchantika*" is not meant as an exclusion from possession of the Buddha-nature but as an exclusion from the attainment of Buddhahood. This is referred to in the first quote by the phrase, "after eliminating the mark (*rnam pa*) of defilement they will attain Buddhahood." To repeat, then, the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sutra*'s declaration that "all sentient beings possess Buddha-nature" is not the same as the *Lotus Sutra*'s standpoint that "all sentient beings will attain Buddhahood."

In addition, Takasaki has himself shown that Vasubandhu's *Commentary on the Lotus Sutra*, although affirming the notion that "all sentient beings possess Buddha-nature," also establishes the thesis of three separate vehicles and therefore also negates the notion that "all sen-

tient beings will attain Buddhahood."[14] Hence the initial optimistic understanding that the doctrine of *tathāgata-garbha* or Buddha-nature entailed the possibility of the attainment of Buddhahood proves to be unfounded.[15] If we add to this evidence from the *Abhisamayālaṃkara* (discussed below), we may schematize our conclusion as follows:

Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra
all sentient beings are the *tathāgata-garbha*

Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra* and Vasubandhu's *Commentary on the Lotus Sutra
all sentient beings possess the Buddha-nature

Abhisamayālaṃkara
the undifferentiated *dharmadhātu*

→ ***Lotus Sutra***
All sentient beings attain Buddhahood

It has been known for some time now that *buddha-dhātu* is the original Sanskrit for the term "Buddha-nature" as it appears in the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sutra* phrase, "all sentient beings possess the Buddha-nature." In spite of this identification, Buddha-nature is still commonly taken to mean the "possibility of the attainment of Buddhahood," "the original nature of the Buddha," or "the essence of the Buddha." I find this incomprehensible. The etymology of *dhātu* makes it clear that its meaning is a "place to put something," a "foundation," "*locus.*" It has no sense of "original nature" or "essence." As a further elucidation of the meaning of *dhātu* within *tathāgata-garbha* thought, I would like to turn briefly to my notion of "*dhātu-vāda*," which discloses the fundamental structure of *tathāgata-garbha*. *Dhātu-vāda,* or the "theory of *locus*" is, of course, no more than a tentative name I have chosen for an overall structure that is depicted in the chart on the following page.



As the diagrams shows, all things are positioned in terms of a locus (L) below and a superlocus (S) above. The defining characteristics of *dhātu-vāda* may thus be given as follows:

1. "Locus" is the basis for "super-loci."
2. "Locus" gives rise to "super-loci."
3. "Locus" is one, "super-loci" are many.
4. "Locus" is real, "super-loci" are not real.
5. "Locus" is the essential nature (atman) of "super-loci."
6. "Super-loci" are not ultimately real, but have some reality in that they have arisen from the "locus" and share its nature.

Of this (1) is of course the most important point and determines the structure of *dhātu-vāda*. In (2) we see how the production of S from L stems from the very nature of L as locus. As for (3) and (4), once L is taken to be a singular reality S must necessarily be seen as different in nature, hence plural and merely provisional. If this were not so, it would be meaningless to say that S arises from L. The essence (atman) in (5) may thus be thought of as "A" in the relationship known in Indian logical systems as *avinābhāva*:

without A there will be no arising of B.

So, too, here, without L, S will not arise. Indeed, in two of the most important texts of the *tathāgata-garbha* tradition, the *Śrīmālādevī Sutra* and the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sutra*, L is actually declared to be atman.

Finally, (6) provides the basic ideology for the establishment and absolutization of social discrimination and separation. The doctrine of the five fixed *gotras*, including the *agotra* (or *icchantika* forever shut off from the attainment of Buddhahood), the caste system, social classes from

kingship to slavery, and the like are all based on this structure. In this sense, the structure of *dhātu-vāda* makes it possible to harmonize the seemingly contradictory notions of "all sentient beings possess Buddha-nature" and "the *icchantika* never attains Buddhahood." Furthermore, the plurality of S is essential to the structure of *dhātu-vāda* and cannot be eliminated. In other words, the singular (equal) nature of L does not serve to eradicate the plurality (differences) of S, but rather acts as the basic support to maintain that plurality. Clearly *dhātu-vāda* encompasses an ideology of social discrimination.

To sum up, the basic structure of *dhātu-vāda* is that of a singular, real locus (*dhātu*) that gives rise to a plurality of phenomena. We may also speak of it as a "generative monism" or a "foundational realism." Elsewhere I have discussed the prototypical structure of this *dhātu-vāda*, tracing its development from the "Chapter on Herbs" in the *Lotus Sutra*, through the "Chapter on the Arising of the Nature" in the *Avataṃsaka Sutra*, to its culmination in the *Śrīmālādevī Sutra*, and then on to the *Sutra of Neither Increase Nor Decrease*.[16] For a compact statement of the basic structure of *dhātu-vāda,* however, we may turn to the following verses from the *Mahāyāna-abhidharma Sutra* and the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* (I, 39), respectively:

> *anādikāliko dhātuḥ sarvadharmasamāśrayaḥ* |
> *tasmin sati gatiḥ sarvā nirvāṇādhigamo 'pi ca* ||

> The beginningless *dhātu* (locus) is the equal support (*aśraya*, locus) of all phenomena (dharma).
>
> Because of that, there exist all forms of life as well as the attainment of nirvana.

> *dharmadhātor asaṃbhedād gotrabhedo na yujyate* |
> *ādheyadharmabhedāt tu tadbhedaḥ parigīyate* ||

> Because the *dharmadhātu* (the *dhātu*/locus of all phenomena) is nondifferentiated, it is not reasonable that there are differences of *gotra*.
>
> Because, however, of the differences of the phenomena (dharma) located on [that locus], those differences [of *gotra*] are taught.

The locative absolute "because of that" (*tasmin sati*) in the passage from the *Mahāyana-abhidharma Sutra* indicates that *dhātu* includes the meaning of "cause" (*hetu*) as well as "locus." The verse from the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* manifests the social discrimination common to the *tathāgata-garbha* tradition in that it maintains the nondifferentiated nature of the *dharma-*

dhātu or locus while ultimately affirming the differences of actual phenomenon (dharma) and spiritual lineages (*gotras*) among people.

CONCLUSION

The structure of *dhātu-vāda*, whose affirmation of identity and nondiscrimination ironically ends up affirming and absolutizing actual differences, can also be seen in the Japanese notion of "original enlightenment," itself based on the *tathāgata-garbha* tradition. Hakamaya Noriaki has discussed this in an article entitled, "Thoughts on the Ideological Roots of Social Discrimination." He sees Dōgen's thought to entail a fundamental critique of the ideas of original enlightenment and *tathāgata-garbha*, and proceeds to dramatize how, in the later history of the Sōtō sect, this fundamental position of Dōgen was twisted and changed into teaching the very thing its originator had criticized.

The same phenomena took place in India. The structure of *dhātu-vāda* discussed in the previous pages had itself been the target of Śākyamuni's criticism—the *Brahman-ātman* philosophy of the Upaniṣads. (The similarities of the *tathāgata-garbha* tradition with the philosophy of the Upaniṣads have often been pointed out by Takasaki.[17])

It is not within the scope of this essay to lay out all the textual evidence in support of the claim that *dhātu-vāda* was the object of Śākyamuni's criticism. The important point here is that Śākyamuni's doctrine of causality, *pratītyasamutpāda*, can only be understood when viewed as antithetical to the theory of a singular ground or cause of the manifold world—that is, to the idea of *dhātu-vāda*. Hence my claim that Buddhism or the Buddhist theory of *pratītyasamutpāda* takes aim at the notion of *tathāgata-garbha*, in virtue of its critique of *dhātu-vāda*. This is also the grounds for my thesis that *tathāgata-garbha* thought is not Buddhist.

We may summarize this position in three points:

1. *Tathagata-garbha* thought is a form of *dhātu-vāda*.
2. *Dhātu-vāda* was the object of Śākyamuni's criticism. Buddhism (qua *pratītyasamutpāda*) must of necessity reject *dhātu-vāda*.
3. Contemporary Japanese Buddhism can only be truly Buddhist insofar as it is unceasing in its negation of *tathagata-garbha* thought.

For non-Buddhists, none of this is an issue (and indeed for Hindus, the reemergence of *dhātu-vāda* within the Buddhist tradition might be seen as a fortunate turn of events). But for me, as a Buddhist, there is rather more at stake. Should any of my readers have harbored the notion that the doctrine of *tathāgata-garbha* belongs to the essence of Buddhism, or even simply that it represents one of the many streams of the broad Buddhist tradition, I can only plead with them to recognize it as an example of the very thing that Śākyamuni was criticizing and to return to true Buddhist teaching.

[*Translated by Jamie Hubbard*]

The Doctrine of Buddha-Nature Is Impeccably Buddhist

Sallie B. King

One of the most important arguments made by the exponents of Critical Buddhism is, as Matsumoto Shirō asserts in the title of one of his papers, that "The Doctrine of *Tathāgata-garbha* Is Not Buddhist." In brief, the claim made by Matsumoto and Hakamaya Noriaki is that *tathāgata-garbha* or Buddha-nature thought is *dhātu-vāda*, an essentialist philosophy closely akin to the monism of the Upaniṣads. In Matsumoto and Hakamaya's view, only thought that strictly adheres to the anti-essentialist principle of *pratītyasamutpāda* taught by Śākyamuni should be recognized as Buddhist. Buddha-nature thought, being a *dhātu-vāda* or essentialist philosophy, is in fundamental violation of this requirement and consequently should not be regarded as Buddhist. On the basis of this reading of Buddha-nature thought, Matsumoto and Hakamaya proceed to make the several subsequent claims documented in this volume. Since the assertion that Buddha-nature thought is *dhātu-vāda* is such a foundational claim, I will focus my remarks upon this one point in their corpus, though at the end of this chapter I will have a few words to say regarding their charge that Buddha-nature thought is to blame for the weakness of Japanese Buddhist social ethics.

I propose in this paper to challenge Matsumoto and Hakamaya's reading of Buddha-nature thought. In my understanding, while Buddha-nature thought uses some of the terminology of essentialist and monistic philosophy, and thus may give the reader the impression that it is essentialist or monistic, a careful study of how those terms are used—how they actually function in the text—leads the reader to a very different conclusion. I will attempt to demonstrate that Buddha-nature thought is by no means *dhātu-vāda* as charged, but is instead an impeccably Buddhist

variety of thought, based firmly on the idea of emptiness, which in turn is a development of the principle of *pratītyasamutpāda*.

In making my remarks I draw upon the exposition of Buddha-nature thought given in the *Buddha-Nature Treatise* (*Fo hsing lun*), attributed to Vasubandhu and translated into Chinese by Paramārtha.[1] The *Buddha-Nature Treatise* is a particularly useful text to consult in this matter inasmuch as it constitutes a considered attempt, by an author of great philosophical sophistication, to articulate the Buddha-nature concept per se and to explain both its philosophical meaning and its soteriological function. Indeed, the author is savvy enough to have anticipated the criticisms that this concept would face, including the particular criticisms leveled in our time by Matsumoto and Hakamaya, and to have effectively countered them in the 6th century CE. In this chapter, then, I will consider some of these criticisms in turn and see how the author of the *Buddha-Nature Treatise* defends as Buddhist the concept of Buddha-nature and the language in which it is expressed.[2]

Before delving into the particular criticisms, however, we must consider the intention of the author of the *Buddha-Nature Treatise*. Why does he write this text? What is his motivation? What are the underlying concerns that move him to speak as he does? What does he hope to achieve with this text? Answers to these questions are not difficult to find in the *Buddha-Nature Treatise*, as the author frequently refers to his concerns and objectives.

Probably the single most important motivation for the author of the *Buddha-Nature Treatise* (and, I surmise, others in the Buddha-nature camp) is his concern over the negative language prevailing among exponents of *śūnyavāda*. The author states many times that an important part of his audience is neophyte bodhisattvas who misunderstand the language of emptiness as nihilistic. Mind you, the author himself does not make this mistake, and indeed incorporates the idea of emptiness in a fundamental way into his own work. He is aware, however, that there are some among his contemporaries who, by virtue of the doctrine of emptiness, regard the Buddha as having expounded a nihilistic view and are themselves engaged in spreading this interpretation. Others seem to have responded to emptiness language with fear and perhaps left the Buddhist fold altogether. Still others apparently found that the relentless negativity of *śūnya* dialectics simply sapped them of the positive motivation they needed to sustain Buddhist practice.

To all such persons, the author of the *Buddha-Nature Treatise* was very much concerned to demonstrate that Buddhism is not nihilistic but, much to the contrary, holds a promise of something of great value that can be discovered through Buddhist practice. Since emptiness language has these negative effects, and since, after all, *śūnyavāda* is not the Truth but simply an *upāya*, why not experiment with other ways to communicate the Dharma? And since *śūnyavāda* had pretty well exhausted the *via negativa*, and language, being dualistic, basically offers only negative and positive options, why not experiment with articulating the Dharma in positive language?

Our author wants to attract people to the Buddha-dharma; in particular, he wants very much to encourage them to practice so that they will realize in their own lives that to which the words of scripture point. In his view, negative language has had its day; it is time to give positive language a try. His dilemma, of course, is a classic one for a Buddhist: how to speak positively of that which the Buddha himself refused to elucidate; how to speak of what is found at the end of the Path without betraying fundamental Buddhist philosophical or soteriological principles. I am convinced that our author is consciously walking a tightrope between the unacceptable negativity of *śūnyavāda* on the one hand, and, on the other, language that violates Buddhist principles (in particular, essentialist or entitative language). What kind of language can he construct that will overcome the negativity of emptiness language without itself becoming entitative? Readers may judge for themselves whether our author succeeds in this very difficult undertaking, but I urge you to understand his effort in the context of this motivation and this objective. Now to the criticisms.

PRATĪTYASAMUTPĀDA

Matsumoto and Hakamaya have argued that only *pratītyasamutpāda* thought is acceptable as "Buddhist" thought. They maintain that Buddha-nature thought is incompatible with *pratītyasamutpāda* thought and therefore is not Buddhist. However, our author completely accepts *pratītyasamutpāda* teachings; he assumes their validity and builds upon them to construct Buddha-nature thought. Let us examine a passage where the author uses *pratītyasamutpāda* thought to examine the concept of an "own-nature," in order to distinguish the latter from Buddha-nature.

> For example, what formerly is a seed subsequently produces a grain plant. The "former" and "subsequent" stages of this grain are neither one [the same] nor two [different], neither exist nor do not exist. If they were one [the same], then there would be no "former" and "subsequent." If they were different, then what was originally grain could subsequently be a bean. Therefore, they are neither the same nor different....
>
> Therefore we say that there being no own-nature is like the former and subsequent [stages of a] plant. It is neither one [i.e., eternally the same] nor different [i.e., discontinuous between former and subsequent stages] and [therefore] is able to function broadly and variously.[3]

Note that the argument conveyed in this passage is composed of concepts from *pratītyasamutpāda* thought. This is a dynamic type of argument in which the emphasis is upon causation: this being the case, that follows. Note that it is precisely because the world is conceived as dynamic, as a series of processes, rather than constructed of entities, that life as we know it is possible: plants are processes, not entities, that grow in an orderly fashion from seed to fruit; this is classic *pratītyasamutpāda* thought. It is in this context that the author is able to clarify his concept of Buddha-nature. Note well that the latter is not a static entity: just like the plant, it is neither the same nor different over time—because, like the plant, it is not an entity, but a process. Note that its functioning is made possible precisely by the fact that it is not an entity but a process functioning in an orderly fashion within the world of cause and effect. Finally, note that Buddha-nature is being described solely in terms of its functions. Thus far, there is no conflict between *pratītyasamutpāda* and Buddha-nature thought.

ATMAN AND THE OTHER *GUṆAPĀRAMITĀ*

In his essay "The *Lotus Sutra* and Japanese Culture," Matsumoto argues that the *tathāgatagarbha*, or *dhātu*, is equivalent to an atman and serves as the essence or foundation that produces all things. He has constructed a chart that shows all particular dharmas being produced by the underlying *dhātu* (atman). He points out that the *Śrīmālādevī Sutra* and *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sutra* actually call the *tathāgatagarbha,* or Buddha-nature, atman. Thus, it is argued, Buddha-nature thought is *dhātu-vāda* that violates Buddhist strictures negating the existence of essences or substances.

The *Buddha-Nature Treatise*, like the above-mentioned sutras, also directly calls the Buddha-nature "atman." However, in doing so it in no way adheres to *dhātu-vāda* or crypto-Hindu philosophy. On the contrary, the author of the *Buddha-Nature Treatise* goes to considerable lengths to explain his use of the word "atman" in terms of mainstream Mahayana thought. We shall see below that our author does not accept the kind of monistic metaphysics that Matsumoto calls *dhātu-vāda*, but first let us examine his use of the term "atman" itself.

The discussion of atman in the *Buddha-Nature Treatise* may be examined most profitably in the context of the text's discussion of the four *guṇapāramitā*, the perfect or transcendent qualities, of the *dharmakāya*.

> All non-Buddhists, in their various ways, conceive of and grasp a self (*wo* 我) in those things that lack self; namely the five skandhas, e.g., form, etc. Yet these things, such as form, differ from what one grasps as the mark of self; therefore, they are eternally lacking in self. [However,] with the wisdom of thusness, all Buddhas and bodhisattvas realize the perfection of not-self (*anātmapāramitā*) of all things. Because this perfection of not-self and that which is seen as the mark of not-self are not different, the Tathagata says that this mark of the eternal not-self is the true, essential nature (*chen t'i hsing* 眞體性) of all things. It is because of this that the perfection of not-self is called "self"....
>
> All non-Buddhists perceive and grasp a self within the five skandhas. By overturning that attachment to self as vacuous and cultivating *prajñāpāramitā*, they may realize the supreme not-self that is identical to the perfection of self (*ātmapāramitā*). This is the fruit [of the practice of *prajñāpāramitā*]. This is the appropriate knowledge [for them].[4]

In other words, in this text, *ātmapāramitā* = *anātmapāramitā* = the true, essential nature of all things. Here we have language not only of atman but even a direct statement that this atman is the "true, essential nature of all things." On the face of it, this would seem to be a perfect illustration of the phenomenon that Matsumoto decries. However, upon closer examination, the fact that this atman cum essential nature of all things is identical to anatman and is realized through the practice of *prajñāpāramitā* absolutely precludes such a reading.

The author agrees with early Buddhism that the five skandhas lack self. He agrees with proponents of *śūnyavāda* that cultivation of *prajñāpāramitā* yields realization of the lack of self (the emptiness) of all things.

But he also agrees with those Yogacarins who felt that this was not a good place to stop! That is, ontologically, universal anatman is the final word; but linguistically and strategically, another word—a positive word—needs to be added. Thus, he goes on to point out that *anātmapāramitā* actually *is the case*—and this is a positive statement. Furthermore, it is not sad, unpleasant, regrettable, or otherwise a negative factor that universal anatman is the case. In fact—and here he takes a tangible step forward in committing to what is the case beyond mere linguistic packaging—it is an extremely wonderful thing that anatman is the case. Here we go a step beyond the level of assertion that *śūnya* theorists were willing to make. He wants there to be no question in the practitioner's mind: what is to be found at the end of the path is wonderful. He needs to create a new language to express this!

An examination of the other three *guṇapāramitā* will confirm that our author wishes to remain Buddhistically orthodox while creating a language that allows him to speak positively of what may be found at the end of the Buddhist path. Indeed, his effort to remain orthodox is so patent that there is little doubt in my mind that he is very conscious of what he is doing. The following is one of several passages discussing the *guṇapāramitā*, with the passage on *ātmapāramitā* (translated above) omitted.

> Next, [we will discuss] the Tathagata's four *guṇapāramitā*...purity (*vimala*, *ching* 淨), self (atman, *wo* 我), bliss (*sukha*, *le* 樂), and eternity (*nitya*, *ch'ang* 常).
>
> The *icchantika* vehemently reject the Mahayana. In order to overturn their pleasure in dwelling in the impurity of samsara they may cultivate the bodhisattva's faithful joy in the Mahayana and obtain the purity-paramita that is the fruit [of this practice]. This is the appropriate knowledge [for them].
>
> [*ātmapāramitā*]
>
> Because the sravaka deeply fear the pain (*duḥkha*) of samsara, they enjoy living serenely in samsara, extinguishing *duḥkha*. In order to overturn this [false] notion of pleasure, they may cultivate the samadhi that overcomes false emptiness vis-à-vis all mundane and supramundane dharmas [and obtain] the bliss-paramita that is the fruit [of this practice]. This is the appropriate knowledge [for them].
>
> The pratyekabuddha pay no attention to actions to benefit sentient beings but only dwell in peaceful isolation. In order to overturn this sentiment, they may cultivate the bodhisattva's *mahākaruṇā* in order to take

> action for the benefit of sentient beings until samsara itself is exhausted. Since there always will be those who need support and assistance, [they obtain] the eternity-paramita that is the fruit [of this practice]. This is the appropriate knowledge [for them].
>
> In this way, faithful joy in the Mahayana, prajna-paramita, the samadhi that overcomes false emptiness, and bodhisattva *mahākaruṇā* are the four causes that bring to completion the four *guṇapāramitā* of the Tathagata's *dharmakāya*.[5]

Here, then, are the notorious *guṇapāramitā*: the purity, self, joy, and eternity that are given as *guṇa*—qualities or descriptors—of the *dharma-kāya* in Buddha-nature literature. But what are the *guṇapāramitā*? A careful reading shows these to be functions, processes, or continuously evolving conditions of being. They are the completed or perfected form of the four practices or disciplines that are given as their causes. Consider purity: ultimately it reduces to faithful joy in the Mahayana. Who or what "has" this purity? A person (perhaps a former "*icchantika*"), bodhisattva, or Buddha. Who or what "has" this purity in its ultimate or paramita form? A Buddha or Tathagata (or in other words, the Tathagata's *dharmakāya*). What, then, is this faithful joy in the Mahayana? A little reflection will reveal that faith or joy in anything is something that changes moment by moment. It is certainly not a static thing, but a continuously evolving condition of being—a function, or process—of a person, bodhisattva, or Buddha.

Consider bliss: ultimately it reduces to the samadhi that overcomes false emptiness; it represents freedom from fear of *duḥkha*, freedom from negativity and nihilism. Again, who or what "has" this joy? A person, bodhisattva, or Buddha, the latter of whom "has" it in its ultimate form. Again, a short reflection on the kind of thing we are discussing—a blissful condition of freedom from fear—reveals that we are talking about something that changes moment by moment and thus is a process or function of person, bodhisattva, or Buddha.

Last, eternity. Here we might expect to find some "thing" that lasts forever. To the contrary, however, what we find is the Buddha's *mahākaruṇā* committed to work for the benefit of sentient beings again and again, over and over, until all sentient beings are free from samsara. This is a dynamic process: a commitment that is constantly renewed, moment by moment, as the Buddha continuously engages in an endless variety of acts for the sake of sentient beings. If this is *dhātu-vāda*, then all

of Mahayana Buddhism must be *dhātu-vāda*. Since we are not talking about a *dharmakāya* as an eternal "thing," however, but rather about a Buddha working endlessly in compassionate actions for sentient beings; nor of a *dharmakāya* as a pure, substantive (self-ful) or blissful "thing," but of a Buddha whose joy in the Mahayana is perfect, who has fully realized the selflessness of all things, and who is blissfully free of all fear and negativity, it is clear that we are not expressing any kind of ontological theory at all, much less a *dhātu-vāda* ontology. We are just talking about what a Buddha is like and extolling the virtues of such a being.

Thus, the issue of the use of the term atman (and the other *guṇapāramitā*) in Buddha-nature texts reduces to a matter of mere words. The author of the *Buddha-Nature Treatise*, for one, is following a particular strategy of language use as an *upāya,* based upon his judgment as to what kind of language will be most effective in bringing sentient beings to enlightenment.

However, we have by no means yet resolved the issue raised by Matsumoto and Hakamaya concerning whether Buddha-nature thought represents *dhātu-vāda* or monism. This issue needs to be addressed on a more fundamental level, the level of ontological views, to which we now turn.

ONTOLOGY

As mentioned above, Matsumoto and Hakamaya believe Buddha-nature thought to be a version of *dhātu-vāda* and thus to constitute a substantialist monism in which the Buddha-nature is the sole foundational reality out of which apparent reality is produced. It will be my task in this section to show that this is not the case, at least in the *Buddha-Nature Treatise* (though I suspect my argument has broader application).

The Affirmation of Buddha-Nature

The first priority of the author of this text is to affirm Buddha-nature. From the outset, however, he takes considerable pains to frame his affirmation of Buddha-nature in language that will leave him within the parameters of Buddhist orthodoxy. The text opens with the carefully constructed question, "Why did the Buddha speak of Buddha-nature?"[6] Note that the question is not, "What is Buddha-nature?" The latter question would immediately beg the ontological question by implying that

Buddha-nature "is" something. But our author is too sophisticated to make such a mistake. His immediate answer to the question asked is:

> The Tathagata said that all sentient beings universally possess Buddha-nature in order to [help people] overcome five errors and give rise to five virtues—that is, in order to cause sentient beings to overcome inferior mind, arrogance, delusion, denial of the true Dharma, and attachment to self.
>
> Regarding causing sentient beings to overcome inferior mind, those sentient beings who have not yet heard the Buddha say that there is Buddha-nature do not know that in themselves they certainly have Buddha-nature and can attain Buddhahood. Therefore in this lifetime, they develop an inferior state of mind and are unable to give rise to *bodhicitta*. Wishing to have them to put aside their inferior state of mind and give rise to *bodhicitta*, [the Buddha] says all sentient beings universally possess Buddha-nature.
>
> Regarding arrogance, there are people who have heard the Buddha say that sentient beings possess Buddha-nature and this caused them to give rise to an [arrogant] mind. Being [arrogant] they then say, 'I possess Buddha-nature and therefore I can give rise to the [Buddha] mind.' They become proud and say, 'Others cannot do it.' In order to break down this attitude, the Buddha said all sentient beings, every one, possesses Buddha-nature.
>
> Regarding overcoming delusion: If a person has this arrogant mind, then true wisdom with respect to the thusness-principle and thusness-realm does not become manifest and delusion arises....
>
> Overcoming denial of the true Dharma all comes down to sentient beings' errors regarding the dual emptiness [of person and thing]. By realizing emptiness, pure wisdom and virtue arise. This is what is called truth. As for "denial": if they do not speak of Buddha-nature, they have not fully understood (*liao* 了) emptiness. Even if they have grasped the truth, they speak ill of thusness. [In them] neither wisdom nor virtue is complete.
>
> Regarding overcoming attachment to self: If one does not see in sentient beings [both] falseness and error as well as truth and virtue, one will not give rise to *mahākaruṇā*. Because one hears the Buddha speak of Buddha-nature, one knows [there is both] falseness and error as well as truth and virtue in sentient beings and one gives rise to *mahākaruṇā*. There is no "this" and "that" [self and other] and therefore one overcomes attachment to self.
>
> With these five meanings as cause and condition, the Buddha spoke of Buddha-nature producing five virtues, viz., diligence, reverence,

> wisdom (prajna), knowledge (*jñāna*), and compassion (*mahākaruṇā*). These five virtues can overcome [the corresponding] five errors....
>
> To destroy five errors and produce five virtues—this is why the Buddha said all sentient beings possess the Buddha-nature.[7]

Why did the Buddha speak of Buddha-nature? The reasons fall into two categories: psychological/pedagogical and substantive. As the first reason shows, he wants to encourage people to practice; specifically, he wants them to aspire to Buddhahood and arouse *bodhicitta*. The second and fifth reasons show he is concerned that they detach ego from achievement. The third and fourth reasons show that there is, however, an issue of substance here; a matter of truth is at stake. We will examine this below. First, however, let us see how the above remarks relate to the issue of the "existence" of Buddha-nature. At the end of the treatise, the author gives the following question and answer:

> Question: 'The Mahayana sutras spoken by the Buddha formerly all declared that all dharmas are empty, like a cloud, a dream, or magic. Since *kleśa* can conceal, they are like clouds. Karmic action is not real, so it is like a dream. Everything is produced by the five skandhas, karmic retribution, the *kleśa*, and karmic action, so it is all compared to magic. This is the meaning that has been declared in the sutras. Why, then, do you say that all sentient beings possess (*yu* 有) the Buddha-nature?'
>
> Answer: 'As I said at the beginning [of this treatise], the five virtues overcoming the five errors manifest the existence (*yu*) of Buddha-nature. That is why I speak of it "being" (*yu*).'[8]

Here we have the verb for existence (the verb *yu* can be translated as either "have/possess" or "exist/be") attributed to Buddha-nature. Note, however, that as the author uses it, his affirmation that sentient beings "have" Buddha-nature or that "existence" can be attributed to Buddha-nature is only in the sense that speaking of Buddha-nature encourages practice, corrects certain errors in practice and gives a fuller representation of what is the case than does the language of emptiness.

Ordinarily in this text, however, the author does not attribute simple existence to Buddha-nature, but instead affirms that Buddha-nature "aboriginally exists" (*pen yu* 本有). Again, this sounds like the kind of language that concerns Matsumoto and Hakamaya. However, let us examine its use in the text.

> Question: According to you, why did the Buddha say that [some] sentient beings do not dwell in [Buddha-]nature and eternally fail to attain *parinirvāṇa*?
>
> Answer: The cause of being an "*icchantika*" is vehemently rejecting the Mahayana. When one [behaves] in this manner, samsara will not be exhausted for a very long time. It was in this sense that the sutras speak—i.e., in order to cause sentient beings to cast aside this behavior. [However,] it is in accordance with the principle of the Tao (*tao li* 道理) that all sentient beings aboriginally possess (*pen yu*) pure Buddha-nature. It is not the case that there should be one who eternally failed to attain *parinirvāṇa*. This is why Buddha-nature assuredly aboriginally exists. It has nothing to do with [Buddha-nature] either "being" (*yu*) or "not-being" (*wu*).[9]

Once again, Buddha-nature is affirmed. However, it is explicitly stated that this has nothing to do with Buddha-nature either existing or not existing. To say that Buddha-nature "aboriginally exists" is to affirm that there are really no *icchantika* per se, that if a person does not attain *parinirvana* it is because he or she rejects the path of liberation. The bottom line is that the author wants to get people to practice, to aspire to Buddhahood, to realize the Way. To say that "Buddha-nature aboriginally exists" is a way to attain this goal. Like speech affirming atman, speech affirming the "aboriginal existence" of Buddha-nature is an *upāya*, a method that the author hopes will encourage practice and thus contribute to the great end of liberating all sentient beings.

A Different View of Reality

Now we may proceed to the substantive issue. It seems that our author does, in fact, have a somewhat different vision of reality than that expressed in *śūnyavāda*. The question is, does this different vision remain within the confines of Buddhist orthodoxy? Let us examine the text.

Our author expresses his central point like this: "Buddha-nature is the thusness revealed by the dual emptiness of person and things."[10] Furthermore, he maintains as we saw above, "If one does not speak of Buddha-nature, one has not completely understood emptiness."[11] As I have emphasized, our author accepts completely the principle of what he calls "the dual emptiness of persons and things." To him, this is truth. However, he, along with many others in the Yogacara and *tathāgatagarbha* circles he seems to have frequented, felt that while emptiness

teachings were fully true, they were not the fullness of the truth. To negate error via the path of emptiness, to free oneself of delusion is, in his view, not all that there is to the religious path, specifically the Mahayana path of practice and realization. One frees oneself from delusion and, either right on the heels of this or simultaneously with it, one sees what is true. One can make affirmative statements on the basis of such experience—the problem, as always, is to find the appropriate language with which to do so. Our author uses the Yogacara language of thusness and reality as-it-is (using *ju* 如, *ju-ju* 如如, *chen-ju* 眞如, and *ju-shih* 如實 more or less interchangeably) to speak at this juncture.

It is my understanding that part of the impulse behind the development of the Yogacara movement was the desire to give expression to what was realized in yogic experience, or Buddhist meditative practice. Thusness language is only comprehensible from this perspective. If "thusness" represents an ontological view, it must be said that it is quite a minimalist one. In scope it falls very short of the kind of grandiose claims made for *dhātu-vāda*. Ontologically, after all, the word "thus" is really a tautology—reality is as it is: thus! It is a pointer at reality, and eschews making a substantive predication about reality. Where it does make a claim, it maintains, originally on the basis of an interpretation of meditative experience, that reality can be seen as it truly is in itself. Now this is a substantive claim, indeed, though primarily about human beings and only secondarily about reality as such. It is a claim that human beings are such that through an intensive and extensive transformative process (Buddhist practice) they can become capable of seeing reality as it is in itself. It is a claim, secondarily, that what is experienced on the part of one who has undergone this transformation is reality as it is in itself.

Here we are getting into territory extremely pertinent to the argument made by Matsumoto and Hakamaya. They claim that the Buddha-nature is the fundamental ontological reality and that the multiple dharmas, though fundamentally "inexistent," have "a degree of existence" since they are "produced from" the fundamental ontological reality and have that reality as their "essence."[12] Thus we have here a very particular theory of the relationship between the multiple dharmas and the fundamental reality of Buddha-nature.

What then, according to the *Buddha-Nature Treatise*, is the ontological relationship between Buddha-nature and dharmas, or reality in its plurality? The text, following Yogacara teaching, does not in fact speak of

a "relationship" between these two—not, indeed, because they are "all one" in a monistic totality, but because reality is nondualistic, as expressed in Yogacara thusness and *trisvabhāva* language.

Yogacara *trisvabhāva* language describes reality as experiential reality; that is, it expresses subject-object nonduality. In this perspective, reality is not conceived as if it were constituted, on the one hand, by minds, and on the other, by objectively existing things "out there." Instead, reality is constructed in three ways. In *parikalpita-svabhāva* (*fen-pieh hsing* 分別性), deluded minds and a distortion of reality cognized and experienced in terms of subject and object, names and concepts, arise in mutually constructive interdependence. In *paratantra-svabhāva* (*yi-t'a* 依他), reality presents itself and is experienced as *pratītyasamutpāda*. Here reality presents itself as it truly is and one perceives reality as such.

> *Parikalpita-svabhāva* is based on the language of provisional speech. Without such language, *parikalpita-svabhāva* would not come into being. Therefore you should know that this *svabhāva* is merely a matter of verbal expression; in reality it has no essence and no properties. This is what is called *parikalpita-svabhāva*.
>
> *Paratantra-svabhāva* is the principle manifest in the twelvefold chain of cause and condition [i.e., *pratītyasamutpāda*]. It serves as the basis for *parikalpita-svabhāva*; therefore, it is established as the *paratantra-svabhāva* (*i-t'a*, other-basis).
>
> *Parinispanna-svabhāva* is the thusness (*chen-ju*) of all dharmas. It is the nondiscriminating wisdom-realm (*chih ching* 智境) of the wise. Because it purifies the [first] two *svabhāva*, is the realization of the third, and draws out all virtues, it is established as the *parinispanna-svabhāva*.[13]

In this perspective, therefore, it is not a question of "things" as cognized by common sense being related to an underlying ontological substratum that constitutes true reality. "Things" as cognized by common sense are constructed by a deluded mind that imposes on reality its own grid, which transforms reality as it really is into something made up of discrete, individual entities that exist independently out there as "things." The fact that such a notion is, in fact, contrary to *pratītyasamutpāda* thought is demonstrated by *paratantra-svabhāva*, which sees reality as interdependently co-arising—i.e., it sees reality in terms of *pratītyasamutpāda* and maintains that is what reality is.

Parinispanna-svabhāva is the thusness of all dharmas, not their ontological foundation. This is enough in itself to invalidate Matsumoto and Hakamaya's thesis. What does it mean to speak of the "thusness of all dharmas"? Recall, "Buddha-nature is the thusness revealed by the dual emptiness of person and things.…If one does not speak of Buddha-nature, one has not completely understood emptiness." Thusness is revealed by emptiness; emptiness ultimately leads to thusness. Emptiness removes all errors, views, and attachments from the mind. However, according to the *Buddha-Nature Treatise*, one should not stop there. If one penetrates emptiness to the exhaustion of emptiness, then thusness stands revealed.

I take thusness to be a kind of ecstatic experiential apprehension of reality as-it-is. At that point, no thoughts, views, or concepts enter into the experience; they remain extinguished by emptiness. Here, however, an ecstatic experience—of reality, of "all dharmas"—opens up. This has nothing to do with reducing these dharmas to something more primary, more real. The dharmas, just as they are in that ecstatic moment, are intensely real, intensely vivid, and uniquely themselves, though without labels. This is not an ontological theory; this is experience. And if there is an ontological theory implicit in this experience, it is certainly not monism.

Note that *parinispanna* is given as the "wisdom-realm" of the wise. *Chih* ("wisdom") is the standard term for the subjective and *ching* ("realm") is the standard term for the objective. Thusness is often given in this text as *ju-ju*, a term which incorporates in a single abbreviation the *ju-chih* (如智) and the *ju-ching* (如境), i.e., both the "subjective" and the "objective" components of a single experiential reality. Here is how this works.

> The word "thus" of "Thus-come" (the *ju* of *ju-lai* 如來, Tathagata) has two meanings, thusness-wisdom (*ju-ju-chih*) and thusness-realm (*ju-ju-ching*). Since the two stand together, we use the name "thusness" (*ju-ju*).[14]

Thusness, then, is simultaneously reality as-it-is and the experience of reality as-it-is; it is the experiential reality that is immediately "given" and is prior to its bifurcation into subjective and objective components.

To reinforce this point, note that the author does embrace the view that, ontologically speaking, reality is accurately represented by *paratantra-svabhāva*, i.e., *pratītyasamutpāda*. He states:

> *Paratantra*[*-svabhāva*] is of two kinds: impure *paratantra* and pure *paratantra*. With the secondary cause of discrimination (*fen-pieh*), impure *paratantra* comes into being. With the secondary cause of thusness (*ju-ju*), pure *paratantra* comes into being.[15]

In other words, *paratantra* (i. e., *pratītyasamutpāda)* is, as it were, the ontological "given." One may perceive the ontological given in one of two ways: either through the discriminatory patterns of the deluded mind, or with a mind that sees reality as-it-is, without distortion. When discrimination is present, *paratantra* becomes *parikalpita-svabhāva*. When thusness is present, *paratantra* becomes *pariniṣpanna-svabhāva*. Therefore, in this sense, *paratantra* constitutes the ontological view, while both *parikalpita* and *pariniṣpanna* are soteriological conditions.

When Matsumoto and Hakamaya insist that in Buddha-nature thought there are discrete dharmas whose reality is derived from an underlying monistic *dhātu*/atman/Being-itself, they are not seeing reality at all as our author sees it. For the author of the *Buddha-Nature Treatise*, discrete entities are false because the very notion of discrete entities is a false notion based upon deluded consciousness. What does exist is a process of interdependent co-origination—*pratītyasamutpāda*—more deeply seen as sunyata, and even more penetratingly as thusness or reality as-it-is.

I must point out that not all Buddha-nature texts are Yogacara amalgams, as is the text used here (however, there are many texts that are Yogacara–Buddha-nature syntheses). There are, of course, also Buddha-nature texts that do not draw on Yogacara tenets and Yogacara texts that either make no reference to *tathāgata-garbha* or are opposed to *tathāgata-garbha* thought. I would like to suggest, therefore, that Buddha-nature thought does not constitute an ontological theory (monistic or otherwise). Buddha-nature thought is a soteriological device. It seems also to be something of a faith statement, i.e.: "I believe that all sentient beings can and ultimately will attain freedom from samsara." When an author wants to compose a text using Buddha-nature thought for soteriological purposes, he is free to draw on another body of thought (e.g., Yogacara) if he wishes to make ontological statements as well.

I have spoken throughout this chapter of the *Buddha-Nature Treatise*. To what extent does the case I have made for this text apply to other prominent Buddha-nature thought texts? I said above that Buddha-nature is a soteriological device and a faith statement, rather than an onto-

logical theory. It does seem to me, in fact, that one needs to consider each Buddha-nature text individually to determine both what point it is making about Buddha-nature and what ontological stance, if any, it is taking.

Let us consider just one other example, the *Tathagatagarbha Sutra*. This sutra may well be the oldest of the *tathāgata-garbha* texts. I take this sutra to be a clumsy and philosophically unsophisticated introduction of the concept of *tathāgata-garbha* through the use of concrete examples. In the sutra the pure *tathāgata-garbha* is said to exist uncorrupted within the *kleśa*-bound body and experience of ordinary sentient beings. The Buddha says, "With my Buddha-eye I behold all sentient beings and see that in their *kleśa* of desire, anger, and delusion, there is the Tathagata-wisdom, the Tathagata-eye, and the Tathagata-body.... All sentient beings, in all destinies, in their *kleśa*-bodies possess the *tathāgata-garbha* eternally free of corruption."[16]

We are then given a series of metaphors to illustrate this point. The pure *tathāgata-garbha* in the midst of *kleśa* is illustrated by comparison with such things as a kernel of rice still within the husk, gold fallen into a filthy place, a storehouse of precious jewels in a poor house, a Buddha statue wrapped in a rag.

Do these illustrations introduce an ontological theory according to which the *tathāgata-garbha* is an entity of some kind that exists in some literal sense within sentient beings? Certainly not! These passages do mean that no matter what condition one is in, one has within oneself something pure, precious, beautiful. But don't take this "something" as an entity! That "something" is the possibility of self-transformation, ultimately of enlightenment. The examples only mean that no matter what condition one is in, one always has within oneself the possibility of turning around one's condition by cultivating Buddhahood. In all these examples, it seems to me, the author is interested in asserting the universal possibility of enlightenment, despite all appearances to the contrary! The author is innocent of philosophical pretensions and does not even try to make ontological claims in this text. Thus the *tathāgata-garbha* here is a metaphor for the ability of all sentient beings to attain Buddhahood, no more and no less. Here again, then, the *tathāgata-garbha* teaching is introduced as a metaphor for soteriological purposes, but in this case this teaching is not conjoined with any ontological theory at all.

The point is simply that an ontological theory cannot be straightforwardly attributed to Buddha-nature thought, inasmuch as close examination reveals a variety of ontological theories, and an occasional absence of ontological theory, in texts that also espouse Buddha-nature soteriology. Indeed, even the soteriology is not monolithic. The *Śrīmālādevī Sutra* and the *Wu Shang I Ching*, for example, both contrast with the *Buddha-Nature Treatise* in strongly espousing faith as a response to the "inconceivability" of Buddha-nature, whereas the *Buddha-Nature Treatise*, while mentioning faith, emphasizes transformational experience.

My first conclusion, then, is that the assertion concerning Buddha-nature thought as a form of *dhātu-vāda* is false, for Buddha-nature is a soteriological device and is ontologically neutral.

SOCIAL ANALYSIS IN CRITICAL BUDDHISM

Let me turn very briefly now to a consideration of the social analysis that constitutes an important part of Critical Buddhism. If Buddha-nature is taken as a soteriological device and not as an ontological entity or principle, then it may usefully be compared to a similar (not identical) soteriological principle, namely the "Light Within" or "That of God Within" embraced by the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers). In both cases we have a soteriological principle that asserts the immanence, within every human being (all sentient beings, in the case of Buddha-nature), of supreme value and perfection. Religious practice, in both cases, is intended to bring the individual person to practical realization of this supreme value, which will yield a liberating or salvific noesis, and transform the person into a selfless and loving being.

The striking difference between the two, as embedded in their historical religious traditions, is that in Quakerism the Light Within is directly tied to ethical teachings and practice—of exactly the kind Matsumoto and Hakamaya seem to seek—while in Buddhism the ethical import of the Buddha-nature has, until modern times, been rather minimal. In Quakerism we see belief in the Light Within directly and explicitly tied to a belief in human equality and the inherent dignity and value of each human being. These, in turn, engender the belief that it is religiously and ethically right to challenge authority, to defy social practices that support social inequality and hierarchy, and to practice strict nonviolence.

Why should such similar soteriological views and practices be associated with such dissimilar ethical views and practices? I do not claim to have a complete answer to this question, but I would like to suggest the obvious—that the difference in ethical postures is due not to some aspect of the soteriological view (Buddha-nature and the Light Within) but to some other, contingent factor(s). It is highly likely, for example, that the ethical stance of Quakerism was strongly influenced by the socioeconomic status of its founder, George Fox (he was from a poor, lower-class stratum of society) and by the severe government persecution that early Quakers endured—for, after all, being from the lower-class might make one more likely to be critical of class structure, and being persecuted by authority might tend to make one critical of authority.

Consider some Buddhist cases. We know next to nothing about the social conditions of the authors of Buddha-nature thought, but it is highly unlikely that they were beaten, jailed, and hung for their religious views, as were some Quakers. Why should it then occur to our Buddha-nature authors that they need to emphasize in their writings the importance of being critical of authority? On the other hand, at least some of those who originated from the lower classes, such as Nichiren, and those who suffered official persecution, such as Nichiren and the founders of Sōka Gakkai, did develop antiauthoritarian ideas and were capable of engaging in social criticism.[17] While these remarks are obviously meant to be suggestive rather than exhaustive, I submit that it is factors such as these and many others (the influence of Confucianism, the nature of the state, forms of social control, native Japanese ethnocentrism) that will prove most fruitful in an effort to understand—and challenge—the rather somnolent ethical posture of East Asian Buddhist civilizations.

I do not mean to suggest that concepts have no influence upon social practice. *Pratītyasamutpada*, for example, is perhaps the Buddhist philosophical concept most frequently cited by contemporary Buddhist social activists to both explain and justify their activism. The Buddha-nature concept also appears in this company. In some strands of contemporary "Engaged Buddhism," Buddhist social activists specifically cite Buddha-nature as their justification. Thinkers and movements as diverse as Risshō Kōseikai, Sōka Gakkai, and Thich Nhat Hanh all assert that it is an important part of practice to manifest one's Buddha-nature through bodhisattva action in the form of concrete acts of compassion and social activism. Thich Nhat Hanh, for example, writes, "The capacity to wake

up, to understand, and to love is called Buddha-nature.... When you understand, you love. And when you love, you naturally act in a way that can relieve the suffering of people."[18] Here action "that can relieve the suffering of people" is understood to encompass everything from simple kindness to energetic antiwar activity and efforts to free political prisoners and to undo economic injustice.

These modern developments demonstrate that Buddha-nature thought does have resources upon which the Buddhist can draw to justify social engagement and action to transform society. That Buddhists in the modern period can and do put the term to this kind of use, while pre-modern Buddhists largely did not, simply demonstrates the importance of hermeneutics: a text will yield one set of answers to one set of questions, and quite another set of answers to another set of questions—it depends upon what assumptions, needs, and aspirations one brings to the text. A group or individual that wants to take up social engagement, and brings those concerns to texts of the Buddha-nature tradition, will find in those texts usable resources for their project.

My second and final conclusion, then, is that it is plainly invalid to blame the weakness of Japanese Buddhist social ethics on Buddha-nature thought, for clearly Buddha-nature thought can be and is used to inspire, justify, and direct Buddhist social activism. The culprit must be sought elsewhere.

The Idea of *Dhātu-vāda* in Yogacara and *Tathāgata-garbha* Texts

Yamabe Nobuyoshi

Hakamaya Noriaki and Matsumoto Shirō are convinced that *tathāgatagarbha* theory and the Yogacara school share a common framework that they call *dhātu-vāda* or "locus theory." The word *dhātu-vāda* itself is a neologism introduced by Matsumoto[1] and adopted by Hakamaya.[2] They argue that the *dhātu-vāda* idea stands in direct contradiction to the authentic Buddhist theory of *pratītya-samutpāda* or "dependent origination," which in turn leads them to consider *tathāgata-garbha* and Yogacara theories to be non-Buddhist. In their opinion, not only these Indian theories but also the whole of "original enlightenment thought" (*hongaku shisō*) in East Asia fell under the shadow of the *dhātu-vāda* idea,[3] with the result that most of its Buddhism is dismissed as not Buddhist at all.[4]

The idea of *dhātu-vāda* is thus an integral part of the Critical Buddhism critique and as such merits careful examination in any evaluation of the overall standpoint. Since Matsumoto first found the *dhātu-vāda* structure in Indian *tathāgata-garbha* and Yogacara literature, we need to begin with a look at the texts in question. My approach here will be purely philological and will limit itself to the theoretical treatises (sastras).

Basic structure of the *dhātu-vāda* theory

For Hakamaya and Matsumoto, the cardinal tenet of Buddhism is *pratītyasamutpāda*, which they understand as consisting of a temporal sequence of causally linked dharmas or "phenomena" that lack any solid basis in reality. Matsumoto illustrates this by means of the following chart.[5]

Chart 1



Chart 2, in contrast, illustrates the basic structure of *dhātu-vāda*.[6]

Chart 2



This second model, in contrast to the *pratītyasamutpāda* model, introduces a universal, solid basis under such names as *dharmadhātu* and *buddhadhātu*. In Matsumoto's terminology, this universal *dhātu* is a "locus" that supports phenomenal dharmas as "super-loci." He enumerates the characteristic features of this *dhātu-vāda* model as follows:[7]

1. "Locus" is the basis for "super-loci."
2. "Locus" gives rise to "super-loci."
3. "Locus" is one, "super-loci" are many.
4. "Locus" is real, "super-loci" are not real.
5. "Locus" is the essential nature of "super-loci."
6. "Super-loci" are not ultimately real, but have some reality in that they have arisen from the "locus" and share its nature.[8]

Thus, the *dhātu-vāda* model is essentially a monism (or, according to Matsumoto's own terminology, a "generative monism" 発生論的一元論).[9]

Hakamaya and Matsumoto take this to be an Upaniṣadic model and thus not authentically Buddhist. Particularly problematic for them is the fact that this *dhātu-vāda* framework is not as egalitarian as it appears. As they see it, one can classify any number of different elements—from the three vehicles to social castes—as "super-loci" resting on the universal "locus." Since the diversity of the "super-loci" is an essential element of the *dhātu-vāda* structure, the distinction among "super-loci" remains unaffected. On the other hand, the apparent equality that obtains on the absolute level serves at once to justify, obscure, and confirm the discrimination that appears on the phenomenal level.[10] In Matsumoto's opinion, this essentially discriminatory nature of the *dhātu-vāda* structure is clearly expressed in verse I.39 of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*:[11]

> Because the *dharmadhātu* has no distinction, any distinction among *gotra* is unreasonable. Nevertheless, because the dharmas <u>to be posited</u> [on the "locus" of *dharmadhātu*] are distinct, a distinction [among *gotra*] is proclaimed.[12]

In the same way, the ideas of universal "Buddha-nature" and *icchantika* in the Mahayana *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sutra* do not contradict each other but combine to form a harmonious whole. The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* asserts, on the one hand, that all sentient beings have *tathāgatagarbha* (verse IX.37)[13] and, on the other hand, admits that some people will never be able to attain nirvana (verse III.11). Hence the *dhātu-vāda* structure also represents a principle supporting the discriminatory *gotra* theory of the Yogacara school.[14]

MONISM OR PLURALISM?

Matsumoto's arguments are well prepared, and the coexistence of a universal "Buddha-nature"[15] and unequal attainments is indeed problematic. Still, it may well be possible to explain this coexistence in somewhat different terms.

A good place to begin is the famous definition of *gotra* in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* section of the *Yogācārabhūmi* :

> What is *gotra*? In brief, *gotra* is twofold: <u>the one existing by nature (*prakṛtistha*)</u> and <u>the attained one (*samudānīta*)</u>.
>
> The *gotra* existing by nature is the distinct state of the six-sense-basis (*ṣaḍāyatana-viśeṣa*) of bodhisattvas. That [distinct state] was naturally

acquired in the beginningless past and has been transmitted as such [to the present].

The attained *gotra* is what is acquired through the practice of merits in the past [lives].

In this case, both meanings are intended. Further, this *gotra* is also called seed (*bīja*), *dhātu*, and origin (*prakṛti*).[16]

Since Hakamaya himself quotes this last sentence as an example of the monistic *dhātu* model,[17] it is clear that he considers the *gotra* theory of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* to be a form of monism. His argument is based on the fact that all the terms given (*gotra*, *bīja*, *dhātu*, *prakṛti*) appear in singular forms.[18] But the argument is not without its weaknesses.

First, the paired terms *prakṛtistha-gotra* and *samudānīta-gotra* have a close analogue in the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* section of the *Yogācārabhūmi*:

> In sum, *dhātu*s are twofold: <u>the ones existing by nature</u> (*rang-bzhin gyis gnas pa,* 住自性界, *<u>*prakṛtistha*</u>[19]) and <u>the ones enhanced through habitual practice</u> (*goms-pas yongs-su-brtas-pa,* 習增長界, *<u>*abhyāsa-paripuṣṭa*</u>).
>
> The ones existing by nature are, for example, <u>the eighteen *dhātu*s</u> (*khams*), which are seeds (*sa-bon*, **bīja*) staying in their own respective continuities.
>
> The *dhātu*s enhanced through habitual practice are enhanced seeds resting in the body (*rten*, **āśraya*) so that the good or bad dharmas habitually practiced in other, former lives might arise [easily]....[20]

In these two passages, it is clear that the *prakṛtistha-gotra* of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* corresponds to the **prakṛtistha-dhātu* of the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī.* The correspondence between the *samudānīta-gotra*, "attained *gotra*," of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and the **abhyāsa-paripuṣṭa-dhātu,* "the *dhātu* enhanced through habitual practice," of the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* may not be immediately evident, but is confirmed by the *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra-bhāṣya,* which equates *samudānītam* [*gotram*], "attained *gotra*," and *paripuṣṭaṃ* [*gotraṃ*], "enhanced *gotra*."[21] Consequently, a correspondence between this portion of the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* and the aforementioned portion of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* seems beyond dispute.

The basic message of the passage of the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* is that there are innumerable good and bad elements (<u>*dhātu*</u>) in sentient beings that correspond to good and bad mental functions, and that one must accordingly cultivate the good elements in order to realize good mental states.[22] In other words, here the *dhātu* theory is clearly of a pluralistic sort. Furthermore, it is worth noting that the pluralistic structure of this

passage was recognized by Hakamaya himself in an earlier essay.[23] At the same time, we have established that the *gotra* theory of the *Bodhisattva-bhūmi* was closely related to the *dhātu* theory of the *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī*. This being the case, it is likely that the *gotra* theory of the *Bodhisattva-bhūmi* itself was pluralistic in structure.[24]

The pluralistic *dhātu* model and the *gotra* theory are intrinsically related to one another. In the same way that the *dhātu* of desire is incapable of generating hatred, the *gotra* of sravakas is unable to generate the supreme wisdom of the Buddha. Without such distinct *gotra*s, therefore, it would not be possible to establish a distinction among the three vehicles.[25] Accordingly, at least as far as these passages are concerned, the only chart we are able to draw is the one below (Chart 3). Obviously the pluralism it presents is not the same as the "generative monism" that Matsumoto offers.

Chart 3



SAṂSKṚTA OR *ASAṂSKṚTA*?

There is more involved in what has been discussed above than merely whether *dhātu* is singular or plural. It has to do with the foundation for supramundane attainment. If there is any possibility at all for us to acquire supramundane wisdom, on what does such a possibility rest? The *Bodhisattvabhūmi* responds by referring to inherent *gotra* and defines the foundation as *ṣaḍāyatana-viśeṣa*, or "the distinct state of the six-sense-basis." But just what does this *ṣaḍāyatana-viśeṣa* mean? We get a clue, I believe, from the following passage of the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*:

> The [distinction between noble ones and ordinary ones] is made in terms of the distinct states of bodies (*āśraya-viśeṣa*). [This distinction is possi-

> ble] because the body (*āśraya*) of noble ones is transformed (*parāvṛtta*) by the power of the paths of seeing and practice (*darśana-bhāvanā-mārga*), so that [the body] is no more capable of generating the defilements to be abandoned by the [paths of seeing and practice]. Therefore, when one's body has ceased to be the seed of defilements (*abījī-bhūte āśraye kleśānāṃ*), like a grain of rice consumed by the fire, one is called [a noble person] who has abandoned defilements.[26]

In the body of literature to which this text belongs, *āśraya* usually means, in the absence of further contextual specification, "body," or perhaps more precisely, our personal existence centered on the body. This makes it virtually synonymous with *ṣaḍāyatana*, which makes *ṣaḍāyatana-viśeṣa* and *āśraya-viśeṣa* equivalent.[27]

In the passage cited, the body of a noble person is distinguished from the body of an unenlightened person in that the former no longer produces defilements. In other words, the bodies of the unenlightened remain in a state that produces defilements and such bodies are conceived of as the *bīja* of defilements.[28]

In the passage from the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, the six-sense-basis (*ṣaḍ-āyatana*) of a bodhisattva is distinguished from that of a sravaka and a pratyekabuddha in that the *ṣaḍāyatana* of a bodhisattva is capable, eventually, of generating the supreme wisdom of the Buddha. The six-sense-basis of a bodhisattva who has the potentiality to give rise to the highest wisdom of the Buddha is considered to be the *bodhisattva-gotra*.

The important point here is that the *gotra* is taken to represent a particular state of concrete physical-mental existence. In other words, the basis for deliverance is posited on the phenomenal level—namely, *saṃskṛta*—and not on the absolute level of *asaṃskṛta*.[29]

We are reminded here of an important theoretical requirement of *abhidharma* Buddhism, namely that an *asaṃskṛta* or "unconditioned" dharma cannot be a generative cause of anything[30] and therefore cannot directly generate supramundane wisdom.[31] This same pattern is followed by the *Yogācārabhūmi*.[32]

Tathatā is synonymous with *dharmadhātu*, which, according to Hakamaya and Matsumoto, gives rise to all the mundane and supramundane elements. It should be noted, however, that the role of *tathatā* in soteriological contexts of the Yogacara system (especially in the *Yogācāra-bhūmi*) is rather limited. If it is sometimes called the cause of holy dharmas (namely supramundane wisdom), it is because *tathatā* assists the arising of

supramundane wisdom by becoming its cognitive object or *ālambana-pratyaya*. In other words, meditation on *tathatā* in the preliminary stages eventually induces supramundane wisdom.[33] But *tathatā,* in principle, does not become a generative cause,[34] which means that once again the suitability of the *dhātu-vāda* model as "generative monism" to the Yogacara literature is suspect.[35]

Classical Yogacara theory regarding *gotra* maintains that the divergent attainments of the three vehicles are each based on their own *dhātu* or *gotra*. Needless to say, this is a highly problematic position, and one needs to consider carefully why they were driven to take it. Merely in terms of the formal logic involved, however, the argument is rather straightforward: divergent effects must have divergent causes. This is much easier to understand than the idea of divergent effects based on a single cause, as the *dhātu-vāda* model suggests.[36] I do not believe that the universal *dharmadhātu* was the leading principle that supported the *gotra* theory of the Yogacara school.[37]

GOTRA AND *DHARMADHĀTU*

The theory does not, however, hold universally. If we consider a typical *tathāgata-garbha* text, the *Ratnagotravibhāga*, we find that such a clear distinction between *saṃskṛta* and *asaṃskṛta* is not strictly observed.[38] The text does not hesitate to assert that the actions of the Buddha arise from *asaṃskṛta*.[39] Even the *prakṛtistha-gotra* of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* is linked to the *tathāgata-garbha*, which is equivalent to *tathatā*.[40] But if *prakṛtistha-gotra* is equated with the omnipresent *tathatā*, no theoretical basis remains to support the absolute distinction among the three vehicles. Thus, the *Ratnagotravibhāga* states:

> Eventually the rays from the sun-disk of the Tathāgata fall even on the bodies of sentient beings fixed in state of evil (*mithyātva-niyata-saṃtāna*).... The statement that an *icchantika* never attains nirvana was made to remove the hatred against the teachings of Mahayana, because the hatred against the teachings of Mahayana is the cause of one's being *icchantika*. [In other words, this statement has] a hidden intention [that even *icchantika*s will attain nirvana] at another, [later] time [if they abandon their hatred of Mahayana]. Indeed, because the originally pure *gotra* exists (*prakṛti-viśuddha-gotra-saṃbhavād*), no one can be ultimately impure by nature.[41]

The *dhātu-vāda* model of ultimate discrimination based on universal *buddhadhātu* does not seem to work very well on this end either. Logic requires that divergent phenomena must have divergent bases. If the basis is universal, there is no logical reason to maintain an ultimate discrimination among the "super-loci." This structure is presented graphically in Chart 4. Note that the "super-loci" here are no longer discriminatory:

CHART 4



DHĀTU-VĀDA

On the basis of the above arguments, I am persuaded that the classical *gotra* theory of the Yogacara school was based on pluralistic *dhātu*s or *gotra*s. Once the *gotra* is reinterpreted as universal *dharmadhātu* or *tathatā*, it loses the theoretical basis that supports the absolute distinction among the three vehicles.[42]

There is yet another factor to be taken into account. India is a country in which tradition holds great authority. Old theories are not directly discarded when new ones come along, but are often retained and attempts are made to reconcile the old with the new. Something like this seems to have happened in the case of the *gotra* theory of the Yogacara school.

Actually, even within the *Yogācārabhūmi* the idea of *tathatā* was coming to play an ever greater role in the soteriological context. For example, a portion of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* section of the *Yogācārabhūmi* says that the cause of supramundane dharmas does not lie in ordinary seeds but in *tathatā* as a cognitive object.[43] The theoretical limitation of *tathatā* to the realm of a cognitive object, and hence its exclusion from the realm of generative causes, seems still to be in force. And yet at the same time one senses a dissatisfaction with the *gotra* theory of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, which grounds supramundane attainment on the phe-

nomenal *ṣaḍāyatana-viśeṣa*. This appears to indicate an expansion of the role of *tathatā* into the realm of the soteriological.

Now if the source of supramundane attainment is not individual seeds but universal *tathatā*, there seems no reason to sustain the idea of individuals being predestined to a particular level of attainment.[44] Nevertheless, the idea of distinct *gotra*s is not abandoned, and the attempt is made to defend distinct, predestined goals by claiming that some people are faced with an ultimate obstacle that blocks the way into *tathatā*, while others are not.

At this point the argument, it seems to me, has ceased to be rational and is simply concerned with preserving tradition. The *Yogācārabhūmi* is not a coherent text but a composite of heterogeneous elements, some more traditional, others more progressive. In general the material in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* is more developed than what we find in the basic seventeen sections of the *Yogācārabhūmi*. Still, the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* is part of the *Yogācārabhūmi* and presupposes what is contained in its basic sections. And since the basic sections clearly present the traditional *gotra* theory, the authors of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* were not at liberty directly to contradict or ignore that theory. This would appear to be the historical dynamic at work behind the inconsistency between the monistic *tathatā* and the pluralistic three vehicles.

True, certain passages do suggest a *dhātu-vāda*-type structure. A good example is the verse of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* that we referred to at the outset:

> Because the *dharmadhātu* has no distinction, any distinction among *gotra*s is unreasonable. Nevertheless, because the dharmas to be posited [on the "locus" of *dharmadhātu*] are distinct, a distinction [among *gotra*s] is proclaimed.

The earliest extant commentary on the work, the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra-vṛtti* of Ārya-Vimuktisena, explains the meaning of the latter half of the verse as follows:

> [*Gotra*s are differentiated, just as the vessels] made from the same clay and baked in the same fire [are differentiated] by the distinct names "honey pot," "candy pot," and so forth [according to what is put in them].[45]

In Matsumoto's phraseology, the *Vṛtti* would clearly hold that the manifold "super-loci" are posited on a single "locus," and that this

homogeneous "locus" is differentiated only in the sense that the heterogeneous "super-loci" are differentiated one from another. It is precisely this that he has chosen to name *dhātu-vāda*. But if the distinction among *gotra* amounts to no more than the superficial temporary distinction between a "honey pot" and a "candy pot," it has ceased to characterize anything essential. This is clearly different from the stringent *gotra* theory of the Yogacara school.[46] The great possibility for the conversion of *śrāvaka* allowed for in the *Vṛtti* seems to justify my suspicions.[47] It seems certain that the distinction among the three vehicles in the *Vṛtti* is not the absolute predestination of the Yogacara school.[48]

In addition, we might mention the following arguments:

> Therefore, [the *kārikā* I.5cd of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra*][49] teaches that <u>the *dharmadhātu* itself, [namely] the *gotra* existing by nature (*prakṛtistham gotram*), is the basis for practice, because [the *dharmadhātu* is] the cause of the holy dharmas</u>....
>
> Others hold that *gotra* is <u>the distinct state of the six-sense-basis</u> (*ṣaḍāyatana-viśeṣa*), which is twofold: one attained by conditions (*pratyaya-samudānīta*) and one existing by nature (*prakṛty-avasthita*).... [This opinion is rejected.][50]
>
> [Objection:] If *dharmadhātu* is *gotra*, does it not follow that all [the sentient beings] are [equally] established in the *gotra* (*gotra-stha*),[51] since the [*dharmadhātu*] is omnipresent?
>
> [Answer: The *dharmadhātu*] is called *gotra* [only] to the extent that it is recognized (*ālambyamāna*) and becomes the cause of holy dharmas....[52]

The context here is very similar to that of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* on a number of points. First, the entire argument is necessitated by the rejection of the classical Yogacara theory of *gotra* and the adoption of *tathatā* or *dharmadhātu* as the basis for supramundane attainment. Second, *tathatā* or *dharmadhātu* thus adopted aids the arising of supramundane wisdom by serving as its cognitive object. Third, in spite of the adoption of such a universal basis, the author does not discard the traditional distinction among the three vehicles outright, but strives somehow to retain it.

Most likely the crucial factor once again was the authority of the preceding tradition. The *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* had close ties with certain Yogacara texts,[53] which makes it easy to understand how the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* and its *Vṛtti* could not completely neglect the traditional *gotra*

distinction of the Yogacara school. At the same time, the Yogacara tradition seems not to have been so closely binding on the *Vṛtti* as the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*. The logic of the *Vṛtti* that supports the differentiation of *gotra*s is very weak. Hence, as we saw earlier, the distinction among *gotra*s in this text cannot be considered final.

CONCLUSION

In the compass of this essay I have only been able to cover a small portion of the large number of texts analyzed by Hakamaya and Matsumoto, and have had to exclude mention of any of the sutras. Obviously so limited an examination cannot claim to have taken into account all the aspects of *tathāgata-garbha* thought. However, we can say that at least as far as the sastra texts we have discussed are concerned, the applicability of the *dhātu-vāda* model of discrimination based on monism is questionable at best. The Yogacara theory of *gotra* is indeed discriminatory, but it is not based on monism. *Tathāgata-garbha* thought is clearly monistic, but the *gotra* distinction does not seem to signify anything essential. Some texts, such as the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra-vṛtti*, show an apparent *dhātu-vāda* structure, but that structure would appear to be an inconsistency brought about by a reinterpretation of the *gotra* theory. That is, replacing the pluralistic *gotra*s with monistic *dharmadhātu* did not entirely do away with the traditional distinction among the three vehicles.

I have tried to illustrate this in Chart 5, which presents my understanding of the *dhātu-vāda* structure. While it may look very similar to Matsumoto's scheme, it is really a clumsy patchwork of the super-structure of Chart 3 with the infra-structure of Chart 4, aimed at showing how the infrastructure and superstructure of Chart 5 contradict one another. I

CHART 5



remain rather skeptical of the position that the *dhātu-vāda* had anything like the solid structure that Hakamaya and Matsumoto seem to accord it. I wish respectfully to acknowledge their contribution to Buddhist studies in pointing out the problematics of the *tathāgata-garbha* thought so far overlooked. At the same time, I have tried to indicate the possibility of alternative interpretations based on the philological arguments presented in the foregoing.

A Critical Exchange on the Idea of *Dhātu-vāda*

Response

MATSUMOTO Shirō

I FIND YAMABE'S ESSAY on the idea of *dhātu-vāda* both important and full of valuable information and interpretations, and I am grateful for his studied critique of my hypothesis. While I am not prepared to accept his views and conclusions, I welcome the serious response and wish to respond to it briefly here.

Yamabe sums up his position succinctly near the end of his essay:

> The Yogacara theory of *gotra* is indeed discriminatory, but it is not based on monism. *Tathāgata-garbha* thought is clearly monistic, but the *gotra* distinction does not seem to signify anything essential. Some texts, such as the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra-vṛtti*, show an apparent *dhātu-vāda* structure, but that structure would appear to be an inconsistency brought about by a reinterpretation of the *gotra* theory.

I cannot, however, accept his conclusion, because I find the Yogacara theory of *gotra* to be based on monism, and because the *gotra* distinction seems to be of essential importance to *tathāgata-garbha* thought. Moreover, unlike Yamabe, I find the *dhātu-vāda* structure of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra-vṛtti* to be completely consistent. To clarify my position, let me take up the definition of *gotra* from the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* that Yamabe cited in his essay.

Before discussing the definition, I should like to express my surprise at the way he goes about criticizing my hypothesis. I should have thought he would have given attention to my essays "On the Ekayana Theory in Yogacara" and "The *Śrīmālādevī Sutra* and Ekayana Theory," on which my framing of the hypothesis of *dhātu-vāda* is mainly based. The former essay is especially pertinent to Yamabe's critique in that its arguments are focused on the important passage of the *Mahāyānasūtralaṃkāra-bhāṣya*

commenting on *Kārikā* XI. 53, which seems to clarify the meaning of the term *dharmadhātu* for the Yogacara thinkers. The passage in question reads "because the *dharmadhātu* of the *śrāvaka* etc. is undifferentiated" (*śrāvakādīnāṃ dharmadhātor abhinnatvāt*). Here we have a clear statement of the uniqueness of *dhātu* for the Yogacara thinkers. I would be interested in knowing how Yamabe would interpret this passage.

Now let us turn to the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* definition of *gotra*.[1] Yamabe's conclusion draws on the work of other scholars (among them, Hakamaya[2]) who take the terms *gotra*, *bīja*, *dhātu*, and *prakṛti* that appear in the definition as all synonymous. Yamabe cites the phrase, "tat punar gotraṃ bījam ity apy ucyate dhātuḥ prakṛtir ity api," which he renders, "Further, this *gotra* is also called seed (*bīja*), *dhātu*, and origin (*prakṛti*)."[3] I do not find the translation inaccurate,[4] but I believe it is also possible to render it, "But that *gotra* is also called *bīja*, and the *dhātu* is also called *prakṛti*." The Tibetan translation of the passage, it should be recalled, is "rigs de ni sa bon shes kyaṅ bya' khams de ni raṅ bshin shes kyan byaḥo" (Derge edition, Wi, 2b5). This is clearly consistent with my own reading.

Admittedly there are passages in which Sthiramati states that the words *gotra, bīja,* and *dhātu are* synonymous, as Yamabe points out,[5] and even where he takes *gotra* and *prakṛti* as synonyms. But that is Sthiramati's interpretation.[6] The Tibetan translation of the sentence cited above suggests to me the possibility of a slight difference between the two groups of words. In other words, one must admit the possibility that *dhātu* and *prakṛti* are taken to be different from *gotra*.

This interpretation of mine is supported by the appearance of the term *prakṛti-sthaṃ gotram* in the definition of *gotra* cited above. Yamabe follows other scholars in translating the term as [the *gotra*] "existing by nature," based on the Tibetan translation, "raṅ bshin gyis gnas pa" (Derge edition, Wi, 2b4). I find fault with the translation, however, and prefer instead to read it as "the *gotra* located on *prakṛti*" or "the *gotra* existing on *prakṛti*." I further consider this *prakṛti* to be the unique locus or *dhātu* of manifold *gotra*, giving this *gotra* theory the structure of a *dhātu-vāda*.

I admit the interpretation is altogether novel, but this does not make it wrong. The author of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* appears to equate *prakṛti* with *dharmatā* in the word *dharmatāpratilabdha*[7] ("acquired by *dharmatā*"). And this equation is reinforced by the passage of the *Abhisamayā*-

laṃkāra-vṛtti alluded to by Yamabe.[8]

I believe, then, that the *gotra* of *śrāvaka* and the like are positioned on a single locus, which is called *prakṛti* in the definition. Hence my conclusion that Yogacara system has a *dhātu-vāda* structure. In this connection I would also like to remark on the new interpretation of the word *ālambana-pratyaya* in the Yogacara texts to which Yamabe alludes. He translates the word to mean "cognitive object" and criticizes my interpretation of *dhātu-vāda* as "generative monism." But *ālambana-pratyaya* does not in this context refer to a "cognitive object" but to "cause as locus."[9] In other words, I take *ālambana* there to mean "locus" or "basis." This reading is further supported by the term *tadālambanaprabhava* that appears in a section of the *Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya* in which Vasubandhu says that the dharmas of aryas are produced from "that locus" (*tadālambana*)—that is, from the *dharmadhātu*.[10] It seems clear to me, therefore, that the Yogacara system has a *dhātu-vāda* structure.

I wish to acknowledge Yamabe's contribution to the elucidation of the *nānādhātu* or "different-*dhātu*s" theory of Yogacaras, but I fail to see how this is in any way inconsistent with the basic *dhātu-vāda* structure as I propose it. Rather, the manifoldness of *dhātu* referred to in the passages explaining the *nānādhātu* theory is to be taken as a plurality of *gotra*s posited on a single locus, which is what I call *dhātu*.

As for *tathāgata-garbha* thought, I prefer to leave my views of Yamabe's interpretations for another occasion. I would only ask him to have a second look at the passage of the *Ratnagotravibhāga* he cites. According to his translation, it is stated there as follows: "Eventually the rays from the sun-disk of the Tathāgata falls even on the bodies of sentient beings fixed in a state of evil (*mithyātva-niyata-saṃtāna*)."[11] Does this really deny the existence of sentient beings fixed in an evil state? I think not. Does the idea that we all, despite our caste, breathe the same air really provide a basis for equality rather than discrimination? Moveover, it should be noted that the *Ratnagotravibhāga* also admits the existence of *agotra* (*etad agotrāṇām na vidyate*)[I.41].

With this I conclude my remarks.

Riposte

Yamabe Nobuyoshi

To begin with, I would like to thank Matsumoto for his careful response to my criticisms. I acknowledge that my essay did not give due attention to certain points he made in two important essays,[1] but the fact that it was an oral presentation and the restrictions of time made it difficult to enter into the necessary technical detail. My remarks were no more than an attempt to outline my own understanding of *dhātu* and *gotra* in as simple a way as possible. The *Abhisamayālamkāra* verse I.39, which contains in a single verse the (apparent) *dhātu-vāda* structure seemed to offer an ideal pivot around which to set up my argument. Since Matsumoto himself has called on the same verse as a succinct demonstration of the "basic structure of *dhātu-vāda*,"[2] I assumed this would provide some common ground for discussion.

In any case, I take it as my responsibility to comment now on these two papers, particularly that dealing with "the Yogacara theory," and to address the points of his response—even if, once again, time and space make it difficult to meet Matsumoto's rigorous standards. Since our opinions seem to differ more radically in matters concerning Yogacara, I will focus in what follows on the Yogacara theory of *dhātu* and *gotra*.

Matsumoto's *dhātu-vāda* model is essentially static. He seems to believe that the same *dhātu-vāda* structure (discrimination based on monism) can be found throughout the Yogacara and *tathāgata-garbha* literature. In doing so, he bases his idea of *dhātu* mainly on passages having to do with the monistic *dhātu*—namely *dharmadhātu* and a (rather obscure) use of *dhātu* in the singular from the *Abhidharma Sutra*. He sees these singular *dhātu* functioning as the universal basis of all phenomena, as the ground from which all things arise. Even though *dhātu* is frequently defined as "cause," his argument runs, this is only a secondary, derivative meaning based on the image of a (universal) locus. He does not deny that *dhātu* frequently appears in the plural form in Yogacara texts,

but he claims that all such manifold *dhātu* are grounded in the singular *(dharma)dhātu*. Therefore, he concludes, the existence of plural *dhātu* does not contradict the *dhātu-vāda* model.

For my part, I have tried to delineate the development of the concept of *dhātu* (in most cases interchangeable with another concept, *gotra*) in more dynamic terms. I am persuaded that the structure of the *dhātu* theory in early Yogacara literature—by which I mean chiefly the *Yogācārabhūmi*—was essentially pluralistic.[3] *Dhātu*s were primarily manifold elements, each capable of producing corresponding elements. In other words, the primary meaning of the word in this tradition was "(pluralistic and individual) cause," and the spacial imagery was merely subordinate to this. I find it improbable that these manifold *dhātu* were always based on a single "locus" (Matsumoto's *dhātu* par excellence, as it were).

In particular, I do not believe that the *gotra* theory of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* was based on monism in any form. Later, these *dhātu* and *gotra* theories were restructured on a monistic model, and in the course of this reinterpretation, certain "hybrid" texts like the *Mahāyānasūtrālamkāra* and the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra* were created with both monistic and pluralistic elements. These texts seem to support Matsumoto's model of discrimination based on monism. But if one takes these texts in their historical context, the discriminatory elements show up as remnants of former pluralistic traditions. In contrast, purely *tathāgata-garbha* texts like the *Ratnagotravibhāga* and the *Śrīmālādevī Sutra* do not exhibit these discriminatory factors.

I do not wish my remarks to be taken to mean that I deny the existence of a *dhātu-vāda*-type structure entirely. I believe that such a hybrid structure did in fact exist at one point in doctrinal development. For that matter, our views on the *tathāgata-garbha* theory are not so radically different either. I, too, think that the *tathāgata-garbha* theory had an essentially monistic structure, although I do not see it as intrinsically discriminatory. It is regarding the structure of the *dhātu* and *gotra* theories of the early Yogacara tradition that our opinions diverge most widely. Accordingly, I should like to address this question more directly.

THE MEANING OF *DHĀTU*

Matsumoto claims that the original meaning of the word *dhātu* is "a place to put [something] on," a kind of "base" or "locus."[4] This is the crucial

point around which virtually all *dhātu-vāda* arguments revolve. But the importance of the idea is not matched by its clarity.[5]

If the claim is an etymological one—that the original meaning of *dhātu* is "a place to put [something] on"—the question is a complex one, since the verbal root *dhā-* and the suffix *-tu*, the two elements that make up the word *dhātu*, are both multivalent, and so the range of theoretically possible meanings for the compound is correspondingly great.[6] An examination of the usage of the term bears this out.[7]

According to Louis Renou's extensive study of the suffix *-tu*, the word *dhātu* was used in two broad sets of meanings in the *Ṛgveda*: "basis, foundation" and "element, layer."[8] In the *Ṛgveda*, he argues, the term *dhātu* is almost always compounded with a numeral (*saptadhātu*, *tridhātu*)[9] and "figures as the principle of division."[10] Hence the latter meanings (element, layer) are both prevalent and well attested. The former meanings (basis, foundation), however, are based on a single occurrence of *dhātu* as an independent (neuter) noun in the *Ṛgveda* (v.44.3):

> *atyaṃ haviḥ sacate sac ca dhātu ca*
> The oblation follows the steed [=Agni],
> it is the essence and the base [of sacrifice].[11]

This is an exceedingly "obscure" verse, concerning which Renou notes that the commentator, Sāyana, glosses this *dhātu* as *dhārakaṃ sarvasya* ("the support of everything").[12] The gloss would appear to be close to Matsumoto's interpretation, but it should be remembered that Sāyana is a very late figure (fourteenth century).

Buddhist texts do occasionally interpret *dhātu* as *dhāraṇa*, "support,"[13] which leads me to suppose that "support" (or, for Matsumoto, "locus") was in fact one of the meanings of *dhātu*.[14] But this is not the same as concluding that "support" or "locus" accounts for the word's etymological origins. Except for one obscure verse, the sense of "element" seems much more predominant in the *Ṛgveda*. If Matsumoto wishes to make the claim that "locus" was the original meaning of the word *dhātu* from which all the other meanings derived, he needs to provide more supporting evidence. His claim concerning the etymological meaning is, at best, not obvious.

THE USE OF *DHĀTU* IN YOGACARA LITERATURE

Matsumoto's interpretation of the term *dhātu* in Yogacara literature is based on his reading of a verse of the *Abhidharma Sutra* and a passage

from the *Madhyāntavibhāga*.[15] I will leave a discussion of the *Madhyānta-vibhāga* for later. The verse from the *Abhidharma Sutra* runs:

> The *dhātu* from the beginningless past is the common basis for all the dharmas. When it exists, all the destinies [in samsara] and the attainment of nirvana exist.[16]

Matsumoto asserts that "The expression *samāśraya* [the common basis] clearly shows that the word *dhātu* has the meaning of 'locus'."[17] He goes on:

> In relation to the [two] nominative-case nouns, *gatiḥ* and *nirvāṇādhi-gamo*, *dhātu* is the locus as is shown by the locative case *tasmin* [a pronoun that represents *dhātu*]. When it is put in the locative-absolute phrase *tasmin sati*, the meaning "if it exists" is added to the basic meaning "at that existing one," and here the meaning "cause" arises. Thus if the word *dhātu* has the meaning "cause," it should be regarded as a secondary meaning derived from the primary meaning of "locus."[18]

There are several questionable points in these claims. First, the argument is made that *dhātu* means "locus" because the pronoun referring to it (*tasmin*) is in the locative case. In this verse, as Matsumoto himself observes, *tasmin* constitutes a locative absolute phrase together with the following *sati*. But since the locative absolute is very common in Sanskrit, if anything that can be put into locative absolute has the meaning "locus," it would follow that virtually all the Sanskrit nouns have that meaning. I do not, therefore, see how the appearance of the locative absolute phrase proves anything about the meaning of the word.

Concerning the first point *samāśraya*, "the common basis," we should note that in the Yogacara school, the word *āśraya* is used in a very general sense, almost equivalent to *pratyaya* (condition).[19] Although the word *āśraya* itself would have a spacial connotation, I am not sure how much of that connotation is retained in this kind of technical context.

Furthermore, I cannot agree with Matsumoto's claim that "locus" is the primary meaning of the word *dhātu*, and that the meaning "cause" derives from it.[20] As far as I can see, in the early Yogacara literature, the meaning of "cause" is far more predominant than "locus," and only when this primary meaning cannot be applied does the alternative meaning of "support" (or "locus") come to the fore. Since the verbal root *dhā-* has the meaning "to generate or cause," and since *-tu* can signify an agent, it is theoretically possible to deduce the sense of "cause" directly from the

components of the word without having to make the deduction indirectly through another meaning.

I believe it can be shown that the basic image of *dhātu* in the very early Yogacara literature (the portions of the *Yogācārabhūmi* that do not presuppose the theory of *ālayavijñāna*) was that of multiple (typically eighteen) elements capable of reproducing themselves from one moment to the next. By way of demonstration, I would cite a few passages, beginning with one from the *Śrāvakabhūmi*:

> What are *dhātus*? What is the skillfulness in *dhātus*?
>
> Answer: *dhātus* are eighteen, namely the eye-*dhātu*, the color-*dhātu*, and the eye-consciousness-*dhātu*, ...[list of eighteen *dhātus*]. The ability to know, approve, and examine that these eighteen dharmas arise, issue, and become manifest from their respective *dhātus*, their respective seeds (*bīja*), and their respective origins (*gotra*) is called skillfulness in *dhātus*. To know the arising of the eighteen dharmas from their own *dhātus*, that is, the comprehension of causes and conditions, is at the same time the comprehension of *dhātus*.[21]

The meaning of this passage becomes clearer when we read it in conjunction with the following paragraph of the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*:

> The meaning of *dhātu* is "origin" (*gotra*). Just as the manifold origins of iron, copper, silver, and gold in a mountain are called *dhātus* (minerals), the eighteen origins in one body or [personal] continuum are called "eighteen *dhātus*." In this case, "origins" refer to mines (*ākara*). Then whose origins are the eye and so forth? [Each of the eighteen *dhātus* is the origin] of [the subsequent *dhātu* of] its own type (*jāti*), because [the former] is the homogeneous cause [of the latter].[22]
>
> [Objection:] In that case, an unconditioned [element] (*asaṃskṛta*) would not be a *dhātu*. [Answer:] In this case, [it is a cause] of mind and mental functions.[23]

The two passages seem to me to be saying essentially the same thing. Each of the eighteen *dhātus* arises from the same element in the preceding moment that is its generative cause (*dhātu*). In other words, the essential nature of *dhātu* seems to be the capacity to reproduce itself in successive moments.[24]

This point is confirmed in the following passage from the *Pañcavijñānakāya-saṃprayuktā-manobhūmi* of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*:

> What is eye but not eye-*dhātu* is the eye of an *arhat* in the final [moment]. This is the first item [of the tetralemma].[25]

When the *arhat* enters nirvana nothing is left to carry over to the next moment, which is why in this final moment the eye no longer reproduces the same element in the following moment. And since the eye does not function here as a generative cause, it is no longer to be called *dhātu*. The model here is clearly one of successive causality.[26]

This leads me to believe that in the early Yogacara literature *dhātu*s were primarily plural elements reproducing themselves from one moment to the next.[27] The primary meaning was thus "generative cause (in pluralistic contexts)" and did not derive from any image of universal "locus." I see no reason to argue that these plural *dhātu*s were supported by another universal *dhātu*.[28]

On the basis of the actual usage of the words *dhātu* and *āśraya,* then, it is not at all certain that the *dhātu* in the verse of the *Abhidharma Sutra* meant universal locus. It should rather be taken to mean, as indeed most commentaries take it to mean, "cause."[29] I conclude that this verse does not support Matsumoto's "locus" model.

Even though I find myself in disagreement with Matsumoto's reasoning here, it must be admitted that the verse does give a monistic impression.[30] The point is not entirely beyond dispute,[31] but even if one grants that this verse is indeed monistic, this still needs to be understood in the context of the transformation of the *dhātu* theory from a pluralistic model into a monistic one. It is incorrect to assume that the entire Yogacara theory of *dhātu* was based on monism. The verse is no doubt an important one, but it does not represent the whole of the Yogacara philosophy. As we have seen, there is strong reason to believe that the *dhātu* theory of the early Yogacara school was pluralistic, and, in particular, that such a pluralistic *dhātu* model was directly related to the classical *gotra* theory of this school.[32]

MAHĀYĀNASŪTRĀLAṂKĀRA-BHĀṢYA

As Matsumoto points out, the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra-bhāṣya* at *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XI.53 says:

> Because the dharma is similar, the one-vehicle theory [was propounded]. The *dharmadhātu* is undifferentiated for *śrāvaka*s and the like. [This

> explanation is based on the] interpretation that [the word] *yāna* means goal.[33]

Matsumoto states that this passage "clearly shows the uniqueness of '*dhātu*' for the Yogacara thinkers" and asks for my reading of the passage.[34]

Obviously, in this passage *dharmadhātu* refers to something universal. I concede the point. But I question, first, if the passage supports the model of "generative monism" as Matsumoto claims; and second, if the *gotra* distinction is indeed based on such a universal *dharmadhātu*.

The Model of Generative Monism

In order for this passage to fit into the *dhātu-vāda* model, it must fulfill two conditions: *dharmadhātu* must be the locus of the three vehicles, and it must be the generative cause of the three vehicles.

As to the first condition, as is clearly indicated in Sthiramati's gloss *shes par bya ba'i yul*, "the object to be known,"[35] *dharmadhātu* as *yātavya* is a cognitive object, not a "locus." Matsumoto is probably correct to associate the passage from the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra-bhāṣya* cited above with the following line of the *Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya*:[36]

> Dharmadhātu is called so because it is the cause of the noble dharmas. Here, [the word] *dhātu* is used in the sense of "cause."[37]

Matsumoto claims that *ālambana-pratyaya* means "cause as locus."[38] But in reading this passage with the aforementioned gloss by Sthiramati, it is very difficult to take *ālambana* in any sense other than *shes par bya ba'i yul*, "cognitive object." Since the reading of *ālambana* as "locus" is not the usual interpretation of the word, I should like Matsumoto to provide further supporting evidence in support of his claim.

As to the second condition, that *dharmadhātu* must be the generative cause of the three vehicles, I have already detailed in my paper my reasons for believing this is not the case. For his part, Matsumoto criticizes my argument by citing the *Jñānālaṃkārāloka Sutra* (*de-bzhin-ñid ni gzhi'o*, "Tathatā is the basis [**pada*]").[39] I wish to refute the criticism.

To begin with, the *Jñānālaṃkārāloka* is not a standard source of the Yogacara doctrine, even though it was one of the many sources of the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*.[40] If Matsumoto wishes to criticize my understanding of the Yogacara theory, he should reference his remarks with a mainstream Yogacara text.

It is true that there is a similar statement in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* that describes *āśraya-parivṛtti*, "transformation of [personal] basis," (in this context equivalent to *tathatā*) as **pratiṣṭhā-hetu*, "supportive cause," as opposed to **janma-hetu*, "generative cause."[41] This **pratiṣṭhā* would be more or less equivalent to the **pada* of the *Jñānālaṃkārāloka Sutra*, but *pratiṣṭhā* does not necessarily mean "locus" in the Yogacara literature. What is more, "supportive cause" and "generative cause" are clearly different.[42] In short, the passage in question does not in any way uphold Matsumoto's "generative monism" model.

As I have discussed earlier, *tathatā* in this kind of soteriological context has a rich doctrinal background.[43] Reading the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* in this light, I see no need to amend the interpretation presented in my essay. I rather reiterate the point that *tathatā* as a cognitive object does not directly generate supramundane wisdom, much less other worldly dharmas.

The Gotra Distinction Based on a Universal Dharmadhātu

As I discussed at some length,[44] the passage in question from the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* is not positive proof of the three-vehicle theory. It is rather an argument that presupposes an already established three-vehicle theory and attempts to explain away scriptural passages that contradict the doctrine. In a sense, this is a concession to the one-vehicle scriptures. The text is not referring to the universal *dharmadhātu* in order to positively establish the *gotra* discrimination. They are simply making a concession to the one-vehicle theory, acknowledging that the three vehicles could be considered one in the sense that all of them share the same *dharmadhātu*. Diversity among the three vehicles is already presupposed here.

We need to look elsewhere for a principle of diversity. As Matsumoto correctly observes,[45] such a principle is found in *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* III.11, where the existence of *hetu-hīna*, "one who lacks the cause," is affirmed. The *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra-bhāṣya* at III.11 is a famous section that divides those who cannot attain nirvana (*aparinirvāṇa-dharmaka*) into two classes: temporarily hopeless people (*tat-kālâparinirvāṇa-dharma*) and eternally hopeless people (*atyanta*). The explanation given by the verse and commentary, however, is quite simple and clearly presupposes an already well-established *gotra* theory.

Such detailed arguments are found in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. Judging from the broad affinities between the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* and the

Bodhisattvabhūmi, and judging from the terminological similarities between the relevant sections, it is evident that the *Gotrādhikāra* of the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* was very closely related to the *Gotrapaṭala* of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. In order to understand the structure of the Yogacara *gotra* theory, therefore, we need to understand the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* correctly, but it is precisely at this point that Matsumoto and I diverge most radically.

BODHISATTVABHŪMI

In his response, Matsumoto attempts to read *prakṛtistha-gotra* as "the *gotra* existing on *prakṛti* [i.e., monistic *dhātu*]."[46] This is clearly in line with his view that plural *gotra*, as the cause of enlightenment, are different from the universal *dhātu* or *garbha*.[47] Indeed, his reading makes sense only when we can differentiate *gotra* from *dhātu*. The problem is that such a differentiation is very difficult. *Gotra* and *dhātu* are frequently treated synonymously, as Matsumoto himself later admits.[48]

As for the compound *prakṛti-stha-*, it is true that when *stha-* is used as the second member of a compound, it usually means "existing in [some place]." Nevertheless, such general usage would not automatically guarantee that Yogacara writers used the term in the same sense. The sense of a Yogacara technical term must be determined primarily by its usage in the Yogacara literature itself. In this regard, we may note in the first place (and again, as Matsumoto himself admits)[49] that the Tibetan version translates the compound as *raṅ bzhin gyis gnas pa*, reading the instrumental sense (*prakṛtyā*, "by nature") into the first member of the compound. This interpretation is further supported by the following passage from the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*:

> What is the enhancement of *dhātu*? Because of the former practice of wholesome dharmas based on <u>the existence by nature of the seeds of wholesome dharmas</u> (<u>*prakṛtyā kuśala-dharma-bīja-sampada*</u>), the seeds of wholesome dharmas in each subsequent moment become more enhanced, [then] most enhanced; they arise and they abide. This is called <u>the enhancement of *dhātu*</u> (<u>*dhātu-puṣṭi*</u>).[50]

The scheme seems to fit neatly with the aforementioned *gotra* theory according to the following pattern:

prakṛtyā kuśala-dharma-bīja-saṃpada	——	*prakṛtistha-gotra*
dhātu-puṣṭi	——	*samudānīta-gotra*

Indeed, *prakṛtyā kuśala-dharma-bīja-sampada*, "the existence by nature of the seeds of wholesome dharmas," seems to supply the concrete meaning of the notion of *prakṛtistha-gotra*. The interpretation looks still more plausible when one takes into account the repeated use of the instrumental form *prakṛtyā* in the *Gotrapaṭala* of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*.[51] In the case of the *dharmatā-pratilabdha*, it is probably not even possible to read it in any way other than as an instrumental *tatpuruṣa*. (Matsumoto's own translation is "acquired by *dharmatā*."[52]) Thus I believe that here both *prakṛti* and *dharmatā* are used in an instrumental (adverbial) sense ("by nature") and do not refer to anything transcendental.[53]

It is of course true that the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra-vṛtti* records an opinion that interprets the term *prakṛtistha-gotra* as *dharmadhātu*.[54] Two points, however, should be noted in this regard.

First, Matsumoto's claim is that *prakṛti* is the universal locus, and that *gotra*s are plural super-loci, but what the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra-vṛtti* says is that *prakṛtistha-gotra* as a whole is identified with (singular) *dharmadhātu*, not just *prakṛti*. Such an idea does not fit into Matsumoto's *dhātu-vāda* model.

Second, this interpretation of the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra-vṛtti* relies on a rejection of the original definition of *ṣaḍāyatana-viśeṣa* given by the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. It is evident that the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra-vṛtti* is employing the idea of *prakṛtistha-gotra* for its own agenda; it does not convey the original meaning of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* at all. As for the *ṣaḍāyatana-viśeṣa* itself, I can only direct the reader to the argument spelled out in my essay.[55] This expression may have had something to do with the tradition that the Bodhisattva had six keen sense-faculties.[56] In any case, *ṣaḍāyatana* clearly refers to concrete psycho-physical elements; it cannot refer to *dharmadhātu*.

As already mentioned, the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* is the locus classicus of the *gotra* theory of the Yogacara school, but in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* there is nothing to suggest that the *gotra* system was based on monism. This is clear proof that the Yogacara *gotra* system does not theoretically require a monistic basis. On the contrary, it was actually based on pluralism at the time of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. The *Gotrādhikāra* of the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* is also very likely based on a pluralism.[57] I can only conclude that pluralism was the principle that accounts for the diversity of views among those in the Yogacara school. Monism cannot offer a positive explanation.

RATNAGOTRAVIBHĀGA

My riposte has already run on too long, and I must therefore refrain from delving into the details of the *tathāgata-garbha* texts. I would only like to react briefly to points raised in Matsumoto's response. In doing so, I must admit, in all honesty, that I cannot make much sense of his comments on the passage I quoted from the *Ratnagotravibhāga*.[58] The passage clearly denies the idea of eternally hopeless *icchantika*s.[59]

The situation is basically the same with regard to the *Śrīmālādevī Sutra*. It seems fair to say, with Matsumoto, that the doctrinal structure of this sutra is monistic.[60] Nevertheless, the sutra does say:

> O Blessed One, *śrāvaka-yāna* and *pratyekabuddha-yāna* are all gathered in Mahayana.... Thus, the three vehicles are counted as one. O Blessed One, realizing the one vehicle, one realizes the unsurpassed enlightenment.[61]

Although Matsumoto would object to this type of inclusive approach,[62] it is hard to read the above quotation as discriminatory. Matsumoto himself states that the *Śrīmālādevī Sutra* is based on the one-vehicle theory.[63] This being the case, there is no textual basis to claim that the *Śrīmālādevī Sutra*, "the most typical *dhātu-vāda* text,"[64] was discriminatory.

As I state in my essay,[65] I do not doubt that *tathāgata-garbha* thought has a monistic structure. But I do believe that the *dhātu-vāda* type of monism becomes discriminatory only when the differences among the "super-loci" are fixed and made unchangeable. Both the *Ratnagotravibhāga* and the *Śrīmālādevī Sutra* clearly reject such fixation. Given the teachings of these two representative texts of the *tathāgata-garbha* tradition, one is hard put to see how a monistic *tathāgata-garbha* theory can be intrinsically possessed of discriminatory elements. Quite the contrary, it seems to me that only when such *tathāgata-garbha* ideas were mixed into Yogacara doctrine, which had a discriminatory and pluralistic *gotra* theory as part of its tradition, does the problem of "monistic discrimination" (i.e., *dhātu-vāda*) come about. This is why I have claimed that *dhātu-vāda* was essentially a "patchwork" of these two different traditions.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Needless to say, the interaction between the Yogacara and *tathāgata-garbha* traditions is a complex issue. There is no doubt that certain parts of the Yogacara and the *tathāgata-garbha* traditions are closely inter-

twined, and that there are many aspects in which the two look alike. In this sense, I may have overstated the difference between these traditions.

Still, it does not seem to me that the whole of these two traditions can be said to have shared the kind of clear-cut structure that Matsumoto calls *dhātu-vāda*. If there was indeed any coherent structure to their commonality, one has to wonder why such vehement arguments were exchanged between the followers of *tathāgata-garbha* and Yogacara Buddhism in China and Japan. It rather seems to me that, in spite of many shared terms, the classical Yogacara *dhātu/ gotra* system as is found in the older parts of the *Yogācārabhūmi* had a radically different structure from its counterpart in full-fledged *tathāgata-garbha* texts such as the *Ratnagotravibhāga*.

In conclusion, I wish to thank Matsumoto once again for taking my critique seriously. I am aware that universal and discriminatory elements often coexist in a single text, and I do not necessarily doubt that there is a side to the *tathāgata-garbha* theory that could well function to obscure discrimination. Although I do not happen to think that discrimination is the inevitable conclusion of the *tathāgata-garbha* doctrine, I certainly acknowledge his contribution in pointing out the potentially dangerous aspects of this theory. If I have not properly understood him on certain points, I would like to ask him kindly to address misunderstandings on some future occasion.

The Core Elements of Indian Buddhism Introduced into Tibet

A Contrast with Japanese Buddhism

Yamaguchi Zuihō

The first contact the Tibetan people had with Buddhism took place in the early part of the seventh century. According to written records, the Ra mo che built in Lhasa in 646 CE was the first temple in Tibet to erect an image of the Buddha. The construction of the great bSam yas monastery began in 775, and the earliest recorded reference to a Tibetan monk dates from 779. The completion of the great hall of dBu rtse in that same year meant that six Tibetans were able to be ordained without waiting for the entire complex to be finished in 787. The ordaining minister was the celebrated Indian master Śāntarakṣita, author of two classic works, the *Tattvasaṃgraha* (an introduction to the various schools of Indian philosophy) and the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* (a treatise on the quintessence of Buddhist thought). He is reported to have passed away before the completion of the bSam yas monastery.

It was also during this time—around 786—that the Tibetan army occupied Sha zhou (including Tun-huang), thus consolidating Tibet's control over the territory of the Silk Road after a battle with the T'ang Chinese that had been going on since the middle of the seventh century. The central Asian country of bDe khams was set up as a Tibetan colony. Intent on introducing various aspects of Buddhism into his country, the ruler of Tibet, Khri srong lde btsan (742–797), invited the Ch'an master Mo-ho-yen 摩訶衍 (the same Chinese characters used to transliterate "Mahayana"), who had been propagating Buddhism in the Tun-huang area, to come and preach the Dharma at the bSam yas monastery. A small number of Chinese monks had already been at bSam yas from around 781, and Śāntarakṣita was struck by the difference between their Buddhist

teachings and what he had learned in India. It is said that he thus called for a debate on the issue, and predicted in a last will composed before his death that Kamalaśīla would be invited from India to represent Indian Buddhism.

Mo-ho-yen taught that one could attain liberation merely by sitting in meditation (*zazen*) until achieving a "nonconceptual and nonperceptive" (不思不観) state, and that no other practice could achieve such results. In 791 Queen 'Bro bza', beside herself with grief at the loss of her son, took the tonsure, with her consorts, under Mo-ho-yen. This prompted a rapid increase in the number of Mo-ho-yen's followers as people began to turn away from the stricter form of Indian Buddhism, which taught the elimination of human egoism and the practice of altruistic deeds.

When an exchange of letters between representatives of Indian Buddhism and the master Mo-ho-yen concerning these matters reached the attention of King Khri srong lde btsan, who had established Buddhism as the national religion of Tibet, he concluded that Mo-ho-yen's Ch'an was antisocial and in 793 ordered him to stop teaching. But Ch'an had already sunk its roots too deeply in Tibetan society to be so easily extracted. For some time intense opposition was leveled against the king's action, including protest by suicide. By the following year the king was obliged to retract his decree and invited Kamalaśīla to debate Mo-ho-yen at the bSam yas monastery. To make a long story short, Mo-ho-yen lost the debate and, under conditions agreed to in advance, had to leave the country. And so it was that "Indian Buddhism" came to be proclaimed the correct form of Buddhism for Tibet.[1]

My point in briefly recounting this story is to bring into question the widespread assumption, in Japan and elsewhere, that Buddhism is something more or less like what Mo-ho-yen taught. In fact, even within the Chinese Ch'an tradition itself one finds a strong current of thinking that is closer to Indian Buddhism than it is to the teachings of Mo-ho-yen. The Ch'an that Dōgen learned in China, for example, may be viewed this way. As Kamalaśīla reminds us in his detailed three-volume critique, the *Bhāvanākrama*, one must beware of painting the whole of Chinese Buddhism with the brush of Mo-ho-yen's Ch'an. Taking this work and Śāntarakṣita's *Madhyamakālaṃkāra* as my points of reference, I would like to take a look at the chief marks of what is taken to be "proper" or "correct" Buddhism in the Tibetan tradition, with particular attention to the distinction between "bodhi-wisdom" and "liberation."

The defining characteristics of Indian Buddhism as we find it expounded in these texts can be summarized in three points.

First, the purpose of Buddhism is not "liberation" (*mukta*, *vimokṣa*) but the realization of "wisdom" (*bodhi*) for the practice of "great compassion" (*mahākaruṇā*).

Second, unlike satori, bodhi-wisdom is not seen as an experience of sensory perception, but as an attainable existential realm and state of latent consciousness.

Third, to achieve bodhi-wisdom, one must begin by cultivating an awareness of the a priori actuality of the phenomenal world that can be expressed in words, and then pass beyond words to the habit of revisioning the world in terms of an a priori flow of causal relations and lack of a graspable substance.

In the concrete, this process entails eradicating attachment to self by the diligent perfection of prajna-wisdom (*prajñāpāramitā*) and by the cultivation of a latent consciousness that breaks with the idea of the self as something in search of itself. The desired result is that one begin to act spontaneously out of compassion to serve others, and that this action in turn provide the solid and continuing foundation for a new way of life.

Not only does the Buddhism of "sitting in meditation" that Mo-ho-yen advocated not contain these three elements, it points in the very opposite direction. We find his position laid out in the Tun-huang text of "The Ratification of True Mahayana Principles for an Abrupt Awakening to the Truth."[2]

BODHI IS NOT LIBERATION

To begin with, consider Mo-ho-yen's response to a question by a follower of Indian-style Buddhism on "whether or not the practice of the six perfections (*pāramitā*) and other Buddhist practices are necessary":

> In terms of mundane meaning (*saṃvṛti-satya*), it is not that [the practice of the six perfections] is not necessary; the practice of the six perfections and other practices are expedient means directed at clarifying supreme meaning (*paramārtha-satya*). In terms of supreme meaning, "necessary" or "not necessary" cannot even be verbalized with regard to the practice of the six perfections and other practices, since [supreme meaning] transcends verbal expression. This is widely taught in the sutras. [80a–b]

The expression "expedient means" (*upāya*) as used in this context does not reflect the original positive sense of the term. Like the meaning its Japanese equivalent *hōben* has come to take in modern usage, it carries rather the negative sense of a "convenient" solution, not ideal but unavoidable in the circumstances.[3] Furthermore, for Mo-ho-yen "mundane reality" does not refer to the whole realm of human experience in general, but only to the life and perspective of those who do not practice zazen. Conversely, "supreme reality" refers to the "nonconceptual and nonperceptive" insight gained through zazen. In this sense, it corresponds to the second of the three defining characteristics of Indian Buddhism enumerated above, in that it is not an experience of sensory perception. Even though this supreme reality is said to be a priori in transcending sensory perception, it can be inferred through verbal negation and therefore cannot simply be dismissed as "transcending verbal expression." Instead, one should accept insight into supreme reality as an aid on the road to bodhi-wisdom.

Mo-ho-yen goes on to claim not only that zazen is distinct from the prajna and dhyana of the six perfections, but also that the practice of the six perfections is no more than an expedient way for those of inferior capabilities. Those blessed with superior capabilities, in contrast, should practice "nonconceptual and nonperceptive" zazen and have no cause for recourse to the practice of the six perfections. In this context he distinguishes four types of "the six perfections," the highest of which he calls "the internal six perfections" (内六波羅蜜):

> For those who have achieved nonconceptuality and nonperceptivity, the six perfections will naturally be perfected [internally]. For those who have not, [the inferior forms of] the six perfections should still be practiced, even though they cannot expect to attain fruitful rewards [such as the highest attainment of Buddhahood] in this way. [80b]

Mo-ho-yen does not view the six perfections either as a means of advancing toward Buddhahood or as an irreplaceable practice for attaining bodhi, but as a kind of capacity that one either has or does not have.

At the same time, even though Mo-ho-yen claims that individuals vary in their native abilities, he still wants to insist that all human beings are originally endowed with an innate "wisdom of the all-knower" (一切知者の智) that will manifest itself spontaneously in anyone who has managed to get rid of delusions through the zealous discipline of non-

conceptual and nonperceptive zazen. Naturally, the "wisdom" thus manifest is understood as the ability to comprehend the ultimate truth, and the six perfections are seen as its attributes. In his words:

> The six perfections are practiced in order to achieve *prajñāpāramitā*. But if the perfection of wisdom (*jñāna-pāramitā*) is achieved [in the achievement of nonconceptual and nonperceptive zazen], then the other five perfections [as well as *prajñāpāramitā*] are achieved as well, even without practicing them as such. [81b]

Mo-ho-yen thus ignores the practice of various means for advancing on the path to Buddhahood, including the practice of the six perfections. Instead, he teaches that it is enough to seek one's own liberation through the practice of nonconceptual and nonperceptive zazen, without realizing that to do so is a form of self-attachment.

Mo-ho-yen's response to the question of how quickly one can realize liberation through the practice of zazen rings naive:

> According to the *Laṅkāvatāra Sutra* and the *Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitā Sutra*, those who are liberated from all conceptual thinking are called Buddhas. Different people have different capacities, some sharper, some duller, but if one cultivates this [nonconceptual and nonperceptive zazen], delusions and such tendencies will vanish and liberation will be attained. [80b–81a]

Actually the *Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitā Sutra* does not refer to "liberation" at all, but to bodhi, and this in the context of warning against the tendency to substantialize the referents of verbal expression because this leads to self-attachment in the minds of ordinary, ignorant people.[4] The sutra dismissed such an attitude as not belonging to the realm of the Buddha. This does not mean, of course, that as a living organism the Buddha did not have a working consciousness. Indeed, as Kamalaśīla observes in his explanation of "the confirmation of truth" (*pratyavekṣa*),[5] it is impossible for a living organism to realize a "nonconceptual and nonperceptive" mind, even within zazen.

In the third section of the *Bhāvanākrama*, Kamalaśīla criticizes this Zen-like attitude of ignoring the practice of the six perfections:

> Some, although they are no longer in the cycle of birth and death, are still detached from great compassion and do not practice perfections like giving to other sentient beings. Their only concern is with controlling and conquering themselves. Lacking [altruistic] means (*upāya*), they

lapse into the wisdom of the sravaka or pratyekabuddha. [sDe dge 3917, f. 60b; Peking 5312, f 66a]

The phrase "cycle of birth and death" refers here to the general phenomenal world of mundane human experience. In Mahayana Buddhism one is required to achieve both the perfection of wisdom (*prajñā-pāramitā*) as well as the other five perfections within this mundane world in order to fulfill the requirements for advancing toward Buddhahood. Without the endowment of altruistic virtue, supreme wisdom (*anuttara-samyaksaṃbodhi*) cannot be realized. One does not arrive at an attitude of living a selfless, compassionate life merely by recognizing the "nonsubstantiality of all phenomenon."

It is precisely this ideal that is all too often passed over in Japanese Buddhism. The goal of "perfect extinction of substantial attachment to donor, recipient, and alms through [the act of] giving" 三輪清浄の布施 is not a major element in the "ideal of practice" found in Japanese Buddhism.

The dismissal of self-conquest as the bodhi of a sravaka or pratyekabuddha is an example of the way Mahayana Buddhism criticized "Hinayana" Buddhism for reverting to the religious ideals of indigenous Indian religions that seek "liberation" rather than bodhi. Mo-ho-yen's fondness for the term "liberation" shows that he was unaware of the problems with his teachings.

Hinayana Buddhism taught that people tend to arouse an erroneous attachment to personal existence if they think of it as something unchanging and eternal. The reality of living individuals is rather "the absence of self" and attachment to such an unchanging personal substance is referred to technically as "the obstacle of passionate afflictions" (*kleśāvaraṇa*). The goal, therefore, was to overcome the obstacle of "passionate afflictions" and liberate oneself from attachment to the self. Unfortunately, this tended to promote the idea that the material elements that make up the physical human body do have substantial existence. From the Mahayana perspective this is, of course, an error, one that later Buddhists would dub "the obstacle of [mistaken] knowledge" (*jñeyāvaraṇa*).

We find an example of this erroneous way of thinking already in verses 756 and 757 of the *Suttanipāta,* where it is referred to as the deluded conceptualization of an eternal substance behind "name and form" (representing mental and physical existences) that causes an emotional and willful attachment to the self. This shows a decided lack of insight into what the Buddha taught. Reducing the meaning of "name and

form" to merely "individual [independent] existence" as the cause of "the obstacle of passionate afflictions" represents a major departure in the history of Buddhism.[7] As a result, early schools of Buddhism in India became attached to the idea of the existence of phenomenal dharmas even while touting the transiency of all things. Eventually this led to the Sautrāntika school's theory of "momentary extinction" (*kṣaṇa-bhaṅga*).[8] In contrast, the *Prajñāpāramitā* sutras (for example, the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā Sutra*) reject all attempts to substantialize phenomenal entities, even the idea of ever-changing surface traits (*lakṣaṇa*). Mention of a "lapse into the wisdom of the sravaka or pratyekabuddha" is intended as a criticism against the tendency to seek "liberation" for oneself.

As social beings, people rely on words, perceptions, and inferences. Phenomena are made into abstract concepts, that is, they are given names or simple forms in order to be remembered and to allow for intellectual classification and manipulation. In the course of this process of "understanding," the impermanent, ever-changing nature of the original phenomena gets lost. The temporal aspect is glossed over by words and forms, with the result that the reality behind them comes to be conceived of as unchanging and substantial. Once it has arrived at this way of thinking, the mind easily becomes attached to the supposed substantial referents, and develops an emotional and volitional relationship between them and its own supposed substantial reality. This, the Buddha taught, is the misconception that lies at the root of all suffering in the world. By classifying abstractions of "name and form" and then imagining them as substantial entities, consciousness can only lead to the wrong course of action, or what later Buddhists would call "the obstacle of [mistaken] knowledge."

As we will explain later when we come to the third characteristic of Indian Buddhism, the correct perception of the world and its phenomena is a matter of the greatest importance in Buddhism. There is nothing in its teachings to suggest detachment from others or indifference towards their lives. On the contrary, one cannot live independently and at the same time claim to understand Buddhism. The "obstacle of [mistaken] knowledge" is removed only by purifying one's conceptual understanding for the sake of serving others. It is only *within* the reality of human society that one can awaken to the idea of bodhi-wisdom and realize it concretely in compassion. Nirvana means release from attachment to oneself, and this means giving oneself over to the service of others in order to lead them to the same path. This "giving" is none other than the practice of the six perfections.

This is also the true meaning of "benefiting the world" (*genze riyaku*),[9] which Dōgen captures in the injunction to "First save others before you attempt to save yourself."[10] Clearly there is no question of forsaking human society in order to pursue peace of mind on some secluded mountain or deep in the recesses of a forest. To be sure, one should strive not to be controlled by others or absorbed into one's surroundings, but what is the point of struggling for self-control? Even if I achieve a kind of "liberation" or "freedom from the bonds of attachment," as long as I continue to live only for myself I have yet to overcome the "obstacle of [mistaken] knowledge."

Bhavya, one of the patriarchs of the Madhyamika school of Mahayana Buddhism, says in his *Tarkajvālā* that "this [Hinayana] way serves only to remove the obstacle of passionate afflictions, but does nothing for the obstacle of [mistaken] knowledge." It is not that the Buddha taught distinct paths for removing these two distinct obstacles. Both derive from a common misunderstanding rooted in the native tendencies of consciousness itself. The Buddha's conviction of the truth of emptiness was what allowed him to sever the tendency toward passionate afflictions and mistaken attitudes at the roots.[11] In other words, unshakable insight into an a priori, "empty" flow of causal relationships—that is, into the nonsubstantiality of phenomena—of itself disengages one from the "obstacle of passionate afflictions." In this connection Śāntarakṣita writes:

> Once one has seen through the nonsubstantiality of phenomena, one will become accustomed to thinking in terms of the lack of independent existence (*svabhāva*), and without even realizing it will abandon the delusions that arise from passionate afflictions. [v. 83; sDe dge 3885, f. 76b; Peking 5285, f. 75b]

Most Japanese dictionaries of Buddhism fall into the irresponsible habit of treating "liberation" and "bodhi" as synonymous. But attaining bodhi is not to be confused with the secluded refinement of egoism that goes by the name of "liberation." It involves overcoming the "obstacle of [mistaken] knowledge," the freedom from self-attachment, and the lived practice of giving oneself in service to others.

BODHI IS NOT SATORI

The second distinguishing mark of Indian Buddhism is the teaching that bodhi-wisdom is not an experience of sensory perception like satori, but

refers to the achievement of a distinctive existential realm and its accompanying state of latent consciousness.

On the basis of his understanding of the *Vajracchedikā-prajñā-pāramitā Sutra*, Mo-ho-yen taught that the "wisdom of the all-knower" latent in all of us comes to light in the practice of nonconceptual and nonperceptive meditation. He claims that the Dharma Body (*dharmakāya*) itself is revealed in this way. In short, the wisdom made manifest in zazen is none other than an insight into the nature of the supreme truth. As we saw earlier, since the claim is that nonconceptual and nonperceptive zazen is aimed finally at the supreme truth, it is beside the point to argue whether the six perfections and the other virtues are necessary or not for those who have the capacity to practice. Whatever one may think of such a claim, it is clear at least that for Mo-ho-yen zazen involved an existential grasp of or insight into supreme truth (勝義の把握).

Despite the obvious differences between the teaching of Mo-ho-yen and that of other Chinese Ch'an masters, this insistence on the experience of "satori" is shared in common. The recorded sayings of the Ch'an masters recount numerous incidents of a seemingly meaningless action leading to an insight or serving as a catalyst for satori that suddenly bursts into the experience of a "great awakening" (大悟). These experiences were also in fashion in Tibet from around the tenth century. The "supreme Yoga tantra" line of lay esoteric Buddhism—at first dismissed as "a demonic religion" (悪魔の宗教)—extrapolated from the experience of sexual ecstasy to develop a method for reaching a realm "beyond thoughts and conceptions" (無念無想). The completion of this process, said to give one access to the ultimate meaning of emptiness, was called "the ultimate stage" (*niṣpannākrama*). The idea was based on indigenous Indian religious practices masquerading as Buddhism and riding roughshod over the careful distinction between the two truths (*saṃvṛti-satya* and *paramārtha-satya*). That is, in dismissing worldly truth out of hand as incommensurate with supreme truth, it overlooked the inviolable aspects of worldly truth and mistook it for simple nothingness.

This idea of an "existential grasp of the supreme truth" is common also to the Yoga school, one of the six traditional philosophical schools of India, and was referred to variously as "the mystical intuition [or 'direct insight'] of the yogin." Although even Indian Buddhists such as the famous logician Dharmakīrti acknowledged such experience,[12] Śāntarakṣita rejected it outright. The opening verses to his *Madhyamakālaṃ-*

kāra deny independent substance in any worldly phenomenon; since everything appears as a perceived result from the undercurrent of causal relationships, there is nothing that abides eternally. This leads him to attack "the mystical intuition of the yogin" head-on in the third verse:

> Some Buddhists say things like, "The object of perception that arises through the cultivation [of yoga] does not correspond to the activity of the phenomenal world [of composed dharmas]. It is rather a perception of the abstract and transphenomenal [uncomposed dharmas], which has nothing to do with the activities of a consciousness that aims at objectifying the self. Insofar as this object constitutes knowledge of the truth, it exists a priori [as the supreme truth]."
>
> If this were indeed the case, [this object of perception] would not be contradicted by even a single, independent substance. But it is in fact contradicted, because: "What is known from perceptions arising through the cultivation [of yoga] cannot be identified as unconditioned dharmas, because the knowledge is closely bound up with [perceptions] that are only experienced gradually." [verse 3; sDe dge 3885, f. 57b; Peking 5285, f. 53a–b]

In arguing forcefully against this position, Śāntarakṣita realizes that the basic question is not about knowing supreme truth, but about how ideas as such arise through feelings and intentions. His reasoning and conclusions are simple and clear. Not even a yogin can directly experience an a priori state of the truth. For insofar as that a priori state is the single and eternal state of existence of an "uncomposed dharma," it cannot be an object of perception accessible to a human consciousness that is not and cannot itself be eternal.

In another passage, Śāntarakṣita argues similarly against the existential grasp of "the supreme truth":

> [The supreme truth] cannot be known. From the beginningless beginning [our latent consciousness] has been thoroughly dominated by the tendency to misperceive "existences" as lying within the continuity [of living organisms]. It is therefore impossible for living beings to actually know [supreme truth itself]. [verse 74; sDe dge 3885, f. 74b; Peking 5285, f. 73a]

Not only is it impossible to grasp experientially the reality of an a priori "supreme truth" on logical grounds, it is impossible to do so insofar as one is a living organism. The opening section of the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā Sutra* explains clearly that not even a bodhisattva who

has perfected the perfection of wisdom has access to a conscious experience of satori:

> World-Honored One: The bodhisattva practices the perfection of wisdom. But no matter what one gains from the cultivation of the perfection of wisdom, one must not take pride at having attained the mind of bodhi. And why must one train this way? Because this mind [of bodhi] is not that kind of mind [that is taken as substantial]. By nature it is pure as light. [sDe dge 12, f 3a; Peking 734, f. 3a; P. L. Vaidya, *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā* (Darbhanga, 1960), p. 3]

The passage focuses on the nature of consciousness that arises in the form of feelings and intentions. "Training" here refers to changing the habits of latent consciousness in order to complete the formation of convictions coincident with the facts. Attainment of the perfection of wisdom assumes that one has already perfected the other five perfections. At that point, one is in tune with a priori reality and as such does not cling to the self or to objects of perception. Nor, of course, is the "mind of bodhi-wisdom" a conscious object of attachment. The true Buddhist is one who has become "accustomed" to this kind of conviction. If one is conscious of having attained a mind of bodhi-wisdom, this is rather a sign that one has *not* perfected the latent consciousness of the perfection of wisdom or attained supreme wisdom. The reference to the bodhi-mind as "by nature pure as light" means, as the sutra itself explains, that the mind is not an object possessed of characteristics and changes that can be grasped a priori, nor does it contain in itself any substantial objects on which it performs mental differentiations.

In short, one attains supreme wisdom through the cultivation of the perfection of wisdom on the one hand, and through the exercise of virtue and altruistic practices on the other. Insofar as one's mind is permanently attuned to the undercurrent of causal relationships, then even in perceiving the appearances of the phenomenal world, one will not get bogged down in extraneous distinctions concerning those appearances or cudgel one's brain over ideas arising from feelings and intentions.

From such a standpoint, the things that the yogins claim to have perceived in "mystical intuition" are merely "things" perceived in the consciousness of the yogin without any relation at all to the supreme wisdom of the mind of bodhi.

THE IMPORTANCE OF GIVING AND COMPASSION

The third defining trait of Indian Buddhism is the praxis of the first two. This practice is grounded in the relation of the "two truths," namely the truth of "worldly" reality (the world as a perceived phenomenon) and the truth of "supreme" meaning (the world as it is prior to our experience of it, the causal basis of our perceptions).

In giving verbal expression to our perceptual impressions, the human tendency is to create abstractions that dispense with the temporal element. In the *Suttanipāta*, the world of experience is presented as a continuous flow of illusions that can neither be stopped nor grasped, a stream of spatial existences that the imagination "pauses" in order to apply verbal conceptions to it.[13] In its effort to decide how the mind *should* work, Buddhist epistemology rejects verbal conceptualizations that see real objects as spatial existences extracted from their temporal context. All such ideation is seen as a "provisional construct" erected in the service of verbal expression. Indeed "space" and "time" themselves are seen as no more than makeshift "scaffolding" for verbal expression, not the form of a priori existence itself.

To paraphrase this idea in modern scientific terminology, let us say that one person is speaking and another is listening to what is said. What is being relayed to the listener is not in fact the speaker's voice as such but only sound waves advancing in the air that fills the space between them. The flow of the sound waves represents the a priori form of the "voice" that the listener actually hears. These waves are associated with a certain lapse of time, reassembled in the physical organs of the ear, perceived and interpreted as the voice of the speaker, and recognized as forming a string of words. A series of similar experiences are "remembered" and crystallize to form a false pivot around which the illusion begins to turn that I, as the subject of those experiences and as an imaginary pivot, am an objective, unchanging reality. In fact, however, the subject of these experiences is no more than a reference point for provisionally constructing images of our own experience. Furthermore, the idea of a time lapse (the past immediately preceding "now") makes it possible for us to speak of "the present time." But in fact the phenomenal world does not actually "pause" at all or come to a halt in the moment we determine to be this "present time."[14]

In the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā Sutra* and in the second chapter of Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*,[15] the real "now" that domi-

nates the phenomenal world is explained as a constant flow from past to future without pause and without lapse. In such a "now" there is no place for concrete sound waves to form. Rather, the speaker forms a series of "nows" that provides momentum to a flow of causal relationships, enabling these causal relationships to form in the present time and in the mind of the listener a "voice."

In Buddhist terminology, the a priori condition of this flow of "nows" is called "supreme reality"; the momentum of the undercurrent of causal relationships is called "the flow of [latent] conditions" (*pratītya-samutpāda*); and the fact that there is nothing substantial in this process to be grasped is what is called "emptiness." In the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñā-pāramitā Sutra* emptiness is referred to as the "suchlike nature" (如是性) of reality; the fourteenth and fifteenth chapters speak of "this aspect" (*ayaṃ dharmo*).[16] These terms in turn recall the use of the term "that" (*tatos taṃ, taṃ tasya*) as used in verse 757 of the *Suttanipāta*.

The point is that whatever one experiences—that is, anything whatsoever that serves as a cause for perception—belongs to a never-ending flow of causal relationships that cannot be grasped in the suspended animation of a "now." Perceived experience is described in the *Suttanipāta* as ever-changing "illusion" (*mosadhammaṃ*). In the Madhyamika school it is occasionally depicted as a "mirage" or "apparition."

In the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā* and the works of Nāgārjuna such expressions are intended basically to reject the "momentary extinction" (*kṣaṇa-bhaṅga*) doctrine of the Sautrāntika school. The sutra explains:

> All the Buddhas, World-Honored Ones, did not pass on their power (**pariṇāma*) to use form (verbal expressions) directly as a medium (to lead to supreme wisdom), because in actuality things that are past have already been consumed, extinguished, cut off [from the present], and changed; and things that are to come [in the future] have not yet appeared. In order to appear "now" [with no stopping and with no lapse of time] things cannot be objectified as a spatial stillness [in perception], and things that cannot be objectified cannot have any form as external objects. [sDe dge 12, f. 84b; Peking 734, f 90b; Vaidya, *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, p. 76; T No. 228, 8.610a–b]

The "four pairs of negations" of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* are understood in Chinese Buddhism in terms of the "eight negations" of "neither perishing nor arising, neither annihilated nor eternal, neither self-identical nor variant, neither coming nor going."[17] I find this interpretation mis-

taken because it contradicts the authoritative explanation of *pratītya-samutpāda* in the *sGra-sbyor bam po gnyis pa.*[18]

The first pair of negations, "neither perishing nor arising," points to the subjective transiency of objects as marked by the end and beginning of two "momentary extinctions." Understanding the changing flow of things in these terms—namely, as a new "momentary extinction" arising after another "momentary extinction" has passed away—does not allow for any flow of a mediating "now," and the momentum of the undercurrent of causal relationships that lead a thing from one phase of transformation to another is lost. This pair of negations rather aims at denying substantive transformation by pointing to the changing flow of a transiency that does not entail extinction. In other words, a connection is made between "change that does not involve the extinction of a substantive form" to "change that does not involve the arising of a substantive form." Similarly, the next pair of negations concerning the transient flow of things ("neither annihilated nor eternal") also aims at negating before and after as two distinct stages in order to deny the reality of a single, two-phased substance ("neither self-identical nor variant") to be grasped.

The final pair of negations, "neither coming nor going," locates the state of objects that are perceived as belonging to the flow of "now." If a substantial form from the past were in fact manifest in our perception, and then passed away, this would entail the existence of substances that survive in the transition from the past through the present to the future in order to become the objects of our perception. As I noted earlier in introducing Śāntarakṣita's rejection of the yogin's mystical intuition, Buddhist teachings do not allow for an eternal substantive object that can become the object of perception. But if this interpretation is also to be rejected, what actually takes place in the flow of what we call "now"?

It is not possible for something that does not exist in the past to have a "form" or "characteristic" that appears out of the past and to be perceived "now." Nor is it possible for some "form" or "characteristic" to pass away "now" into a future that does not yet exist. The only option that remains is to posit a "now" of flowing perceptions that neither involves forms coming from the past nor forms passing away into the future. In other words, even if one grants an object the latent potential to appear, its appearance does not appear in the "now" as such. If there can be no break in the flow, neither can there be any perception of a distinction between the two states of existence that words like "before" and

"after" suggest. Nor is there any substantial reality that fuses the two states into a harmonious unity. In this way, the perceptual transiency that is denied to objects is also applied to the subject.

This reading of the four negations is consistent with the explanation in the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā* of how the mind works. There it is said that the present "now" does not involve pauses or temporal gaps; nor does it allow for the "momentary extinction" of substances. Such a position coincides with the denial of the reality of "marks" according to which "there is no 'change' [through the extinction of marks as objective realities], and no "perception" [through the distinction of marks as subjective functions]."[19] This is not to say, of course, that there exists some single unchanging, substantive reality that serves as the subject of perception. All of this is clearly spelled out in the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*.

Hardly any of the later Mādhyamikan scholars accepted explanations based on the idea of an a priori being. Bhavya, like those of the Sautrāntika school, taught that the causes of perception are reflected, just as they are, in the forms in which they are perceived. He could not make any sense of the idea of an a priori "supreme truth" that cannot be experienced "now," but instead developed his own explanation of "supreme truth" as that which is experienced by a noble sage. Failing to understand the idea of a flow between two "momentary extinctions" as an expression of transiency, Candrakīrti took it to refer to a rejection of the doctrine of the nonreversibility of the flow of time. Focusing his attention on rejecting verbal expressions about time as mutually exclusive (suggestive of the *apoha* theory), he became mired in idealistic, often fraudulent, interpretations of mutual relationships.[20]

Only Śāntarakṣita seems to come close to a correct understanding, though there are problems with his interpretations as well. Śāntarakṣita taught that the "illusion" of motion or pause that shows up in our perceptual experience can be accounted for in terms of our experience of the passing of the immediate past as "the present." He argues that the causes and effects of perception are not the same. He uses the analogy of a "ring of fire" to illustrate the illusion of mistaking what is moving for something standing still, and of "a needle piercing the stem of a rose" to illustrate the illusion of mistaking perceptual vagueness for movement. Furthermore, he denied that space is an a priori and uncomposed dharma. For him space is not a conceptual "nothingness" but an experiential state that occurs through "the present." The a priori causes of a phenomenon

cannot be traced to a conceptual "nothingness" simply because it is denied spatial objectivity. Since the idea of "being" was equally unsuited to provide a priori causality for phenomena, he focused his attention on the notion of "extreme minuteness" (極微) found in the *Viṃśatikāvijñapti-mātratāsiddhi* and developed his famous theory of "proof without recourse to unity [of infinitesimal reality] and plurality" (*ekāneka-svabhāvavyatireka*, 離一多性証明).[21]

Unfortunately, the idea of "extreme minuteness" amounted to a conceptual "nothingness," which meant that the denial of conceptual "being" in Śāntarakṣita's proof entailed a reversion to the very idea of "nothingness" he had himself rejected. In giving examples to illustrate "emptiness" Śāntarakṣita deliberately avoided analogies such as "a flower in space" and "the horns of a rabbit" traditionally employed to distinguish it from "nothingness." Instead he drew on examples like "the image in a mirror" or "the (coreless) trunk of a banana tree," even though they were not suited to his method of "proof without recourse to unity and plurality."

"Extreme minuteness" does not refer to spatial characteristics. It is a conceptualized limit-condition referring to the "zero time" at the border of the past and the future, an abstract halt in the flow of the current of causal relationships that makes up the temporal "now." By analyzing time and space as provisional constructs, extreme minuteness amounts to an unwitting denial of both time and space, with the result that the idea of "composed dharmas"—the only thing Śāntarakṣita himself saw as worthy of attention—becomes unsustainable.[22] In the end his explanation fails to account for the fact that the causal relations that enable perception must somehow involve a time and space that does not "stop," even if there is no way to grasp this condition perceptually.

As we have seen, the a priori state of the phenomenal world can be inferred, and on the basis of this inference treated as logical knowledge, by employing the negative function of verbal expression according to which words are understood as having provisional meaning. Accordingly, the Ch'an characterization of ultimate meaning as something "not founded on words and transmitted outside the scriptures" is totally erroneous.

The *Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā Sutra* cited above acknowledges that ultimate truth can be inferred as knowledge, but warns that this knowledge alone is incapable of prompting the human heart away from the self-centered emotions and willfulness that dominate human behavior,

and guiding it towards bodhi-wisdom. In this way, it does not deny the possibility of verbal expression as an intellectual means of transmitting knowledge, but at the same time it warns us that we must be aware of its limits. The passage cited earlier continues:

> Even if you only know it [a priori reality] through forms [or negative verbal expression], until you have pondered it in your heart, it cannot turn you around to the attainment of supreme wisdom. At the same time, there is no way to ponder what you do not know. If you do not remember it, or if it does not form part of your latent consciousness, then it is likewise impossible for you to be turned around to the attainment of supreme wisdom. If, however, you go beyond the mere [intellectual] knowledge of the forms [or verbal expressions] and ponder it in your heart, both you and the other bodhisattvas will profit from the good roots [of altruistic activity] and arrive at supreme wisdom. [sDe dge 12, f. 84b; Peking 734, f 90b; Vaidya, *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, p. 76; T No. 228, 8.610a–b]

This passage covers virtually everything contained in the third characteristic of Indian Buddhism. The first basic step is to have knowledge of the supreme truth. But it is not enough just to have knowledge; one must ponder it internally. In doing so, if one constantly avoids substantialist thinking, the "good roots" that are accumulated through one's own altruistic activity as well as that of all who seek the Buddhist way will advance the cause of attaining to the realm of bodhi-wisdom.

To cultivate firm intellectual convictions regarding the supreme truth, and thus to overcome ordinary human substantialist thinking, is what Kamalaśīla calls "the confirmation of the truth" (*bhūta-pratyavekṣa*).[23] It is the perfection of wisdom:

> Without a correct confirmation of [a priori] truth, how can those who practice dhyana replace mental habits of attachment to concrete existence that they have had since beginningless time with [a mental attitude of] nondiscrimination? They claim that it is possible to take a non-conceptual (*dran pa med pa*) and nonconscious (*yid la mi byed pa*) attitude toward all phenomena, but this does not stand to reason. Without confirming the *truth* correctly, one cannot take a nonconceptual or nonconscious attitude toward all the dharmas that one has already experienced [as something substantial] in one's mind. If one decides not to conceptualize or to become conscious of these dharmas, in the very act of choosing against conceptualization or consciousness one [becomes

mentally attached to these dharmas and] actually calls them up to mind and consciousness....

Thus there is no other way to rid oneself of [substantive] conceptualizations and [substantive] consciousness than to confirm the *truth*. Even should one reach a state free of all conceptualization and consciousness, as long as there has been no confirmation of the *truth*, how can one act in accordance with [the conviction concerning] the lack of self-being in dharmas? Even if one should fathom [intellectually] the emptiness or lack of self-being in dharmas, as long as there is no confirmation of the *truth*, the mind will not be fully convinced of this emptiness. Without a firm conviction regarding emptiness, one cannot remove all the obstacles that the passions put in the way....

On the supposition that one's ability to conceptualize dharmas is not impaired, or that one is not an outright imbecile, how can one hope to reach a state of nonconceptualization and nonconsciousness without a correct confirmation of the *truth*? And [even if we grant that such a state were possible,] it could not be said that one has [spiritually] achieved nonconceptualization and nonconsciousness if the one who has attained it is physiologically a conscious, conceptualizing, embodied individual....

It is through this [confirmation of the *truth*] that people can sever all attachments to substantial existence produced by illusory perceptual constructions, and then attain nondiscriminative wisdom. This attainment in turn involves the latent conviction of emptiness that breaks the bonds of evil misunderstandings. Through means (*upāya*) and the perfection of wisdom, one is able to act rightly, in accord with mundane truth and supreme truth. Inasmuch as this implies that one has attained wisdom beyond the obstacle of [mistaken] knowledge (*jñeyāvaraṇa*), it also means that one is able to act in accord with all the dharmas of a Buddha. Conversely, if one has not this confirmation of the *truth*, one cannot call upon the right and fundamental bodhi-wisdom, nor can one [even] displace the obstacles of passionate afflictions (*kleśāvaraṇa*). [sDe dge 3917, ff. 62a–63a; Peking 5312, ff. 67a–68b]

In verse 75 of the *Madhyamakālaṃkāra*, Śāntarakṣita explains this idea, though without actually using the term "confirmation of the *truth*":

[By deepening one's convictions concerning what can be correctly learned about the a priori flow of causal relationships,] if the consciousness that is awakened by this conviction is sustained sympathetically, the latent convictions can avoid the [error of] substantialistic verbal expression. Masters of yoga enter a state of concentration (*samādhi*) that arouses in them a sympathetic conviction of the substantial equality [or a priori

> state] of all phenomena, and this in turn promotes a state of wisdom unblemished by discriminating thought. Until such time as they achieve this state, they cannot sustain a latent awareness that the internal and external existences that form the basis of life are, like the trunk of a banana tree, without a [substantialist] core. But once this wisdom is perfected in them, there are no seeds [for consciousness] to grow in latent consciousness and produce the idea of phenomena as substantial essences (*thams cad—-thugs su chud de*). [sDe dge 3885, f. 74b; Peking 5285, f. 73a6–8][24]

This passage calls to mind what Dōgen has to say in citing the words of Yakusan Gudō that "in order to think about the nature of unthinkableness (不思量底), one must use nonthinking (非思量)."[25] If "thinking" (思量) here refers to conscious feelings and volitions that are to be distinguished from analysis (考究) based on knowledge, then "unthinkableness" obviously refers to the a priori flow of causal relationships (*pratītya-samutpāda*) and the lack of independent existence (*svabhāva*). Thinking thus comes to refer to forming convictions about the undercurrent of causal relationships and making these convictions habitual. Gudō's phrase "one must use nonthinking" corresponds to the doctrine of Śāntarakṣita just cited regarding the state of wisdom "unblemished by discriminating thought" and yet convinced of the substantial equality of all things, a state that inhibits the idea from taking root in latent consciousness that phenomena are substantial essences. This is certainly a far cry from the "unconditionedness" (無為) or "satori attainment" (待悟) of zazen.

If I am able to understand the nature of supreme truth correctly, and then cultivate a habitual latent awareness of this conviction, this puts me in a position to break free of the delusional attachments of my former latent consciousness, which saw the self and external objects as substantial entities. At the same time, accumulating the effects of good deeds and practices holds out as a reward the attainment of bodhi-wisdom, and with it a latent consciousness that no longer clings to any substantial entities. In short, it is through the practice of the perfections (the various means of good deeds, including the perfection of wisdom) that I am able to attain the bodhi-wisdom of which Kamalaśīla speaks.

The phenomenal world arises from the undercurrent of causal relationships. There is no denying the fact that nothing appears without a basis in some a priori cause and condition. But to leap from there to the conclusion that these illusory appearances are substantial entities and then

to develop an attachment to them is a form of self-delusion produced by the living and perceiving body. Even from the vantage point of the ultimate realm, the mundane world remains the locus of our lives and our every attempt to reach a stillpoint. The need to practice the Buddhist path in the mundane world remains the same. As Śāntarakṣita writes:

> Phenomena that arise through the [perceptible] process of cause-and-effect are not to be rejected as mundane [reality]. One must not deny the process of purifying the [defiled] roots of passionate afflictions because of a confused understanding [of the discrimination between the true and mundane aspects]. (verse 84)

Elsewhere he elaborates:

> This is why [Nāgārjuna] taught that inferior people who do not understand the true meaning of stillness but stop once they have heard [the Dharma] and do not go on to practice virtuous qualities, will perish. [sDe dge 3917, f. 77a; Peking 5285, f. 76a]

These remarks are actually an extension of the teaching we find in the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā-prajñāpāramitā Sutra*. Śāntarakṣita's criticism is aimed at those who think that it is enough to understand the Buddha's teaching at the level of verbal knowledge, and that there is no need to form convictions about these teachings that shape habits of belief, or to practice compassion in order to rectify the perceptions of latent consciousness. In the exercise of virtue, the attainment of the perfection of prajna-wisdom leads ahead to supreme bodhi-wisdom, that is, to the wisdom of the "all-knower" (the one who knows perfectly the flow of causal relationships). This practice is called "means to advance upward [toward Buddhahood]" (向上方便).

When one advances toward the perfection of wisdom by confirming the *truth* within oneself, the outer Buddhist practices of "advancing toward Buddhahood" (i.e., good deeds) stimulate the development of a correct latent consciousness, and one draws near to the realm of bodhi-wisdom. The main issue here, according to Śāntarakṣita, is the type of consciousness that controls one's Buddhist activities:

> Therefore the perfections that are attained through the momentum (of the attachments that consider perceptions, just as they are, to be external objects) are no different from [the erroneous convictions] formed as a result of deluded attachment to mistaken ideas of self and things that belong to the self. The power [of these perfections] is weak. (verse 89)

> [In contrast, the power] that accrues from the attainment [of the six perfections] in virtue of its awareness that things are *not* substantial entities is considerable and flows out of its source with ever-increasing strength, like a plant growing up out of a seed with great vigor. (verse 90) [sDe dge 3917, f. 77b–78a; Peking 5312, f. 77a–b]

This is the same point made in the *Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitā Sutra* regarding the injunction to "give with complete lack of attachment to donor, recipient, and alms."[26] Lest there be any misunderstanding, Kamaraśīla explains the idea of "giving" as follows:

> "Giving" (*dāna*) is explained in three forms [wealth, fearlessness, and Dharma] and with regard to all six perfections. It is more than mere giving [in the narrow sense]. [sDe dge 3817, f. 216a; Peking 5216, f. 224a]

Mention is also made of this "triple form" in a commentary to the *Vajracchedikā-prajñāpāramitā Sutra* attributed to Asaṅga:

> Giving represents all of the six perfections. It involves [giving of] wealth, fearlessness, and the Dharma. These three correspond respectively as follows: the first [to the perfection of giving], the second [to the perfections of keeping the precepts and patience], and the third [to the perfections of diligence, dhyana, and prajna]. These are called practices without attachments. [Peking 5864, f. 1b; T. No. 1514, 25.885a10–11]

All of us rely on verbal expression to live in this mundane world, to provide ourselves with food, clothing, and shelter. It is only through the perfection of our existence as living organisms within a stable order that we can see the phenomenal world for what it is. There is no other context within which to seize the joyous opportunity of following the Buddhist teachings as they should be followed. It is well known that the six perfections make up the ideal of Buddhist practice. The Buddhist scriptures explain these six perfections in terms of three types of selfless giving that break down self-centered attachments. First, one needs to give material things to those who lack basic food, clothing, and shelter, to help those suffering from poverty and the fear of war, and so forth. Second, one needs to have patience and live a moral life ("keep the precepts"). Finally, for those who wish to guide others to the Buddhist path one needs diligence, concentration, and *prajñā* conviction.

These latter are necessary for those with the courage to seek bodhi. Śāntarakṣita refers to this as the quest for the ultimate "gift of the Dharma":

> Those who seek after the heart of the Buddha's teachings need to awaken in themselves a sense of compassionate mercy with regard to all sentient beings who still cling to mistaken teachings. (verse 96) [sDe dge 3885, f. 82a; Peking 5285, f. 82b]

In order to pursue this disengagement from all self-centered attachments in the midst of the phenomenal world, the life of the recluse is out of the question. On this point Kamalaśīla says:

> Even if one has the conviction of the supreme truth, there is no way to take leave of the mundane world. And because this is so, one seeks a great compassion freed of all false attachments, and intent on benefiting other sentient beings. [sDe dge 3915, f. 38a; Peking 5310, f. 41a]

The exercise of great compassion by a Buddha who has fulfilled this path is called "means to apply downward [to help other beings]" (向下方便). There can be no doubt that the ideal way of life taught by Buddhism is "the practice of perfect giving" and that this consists in the practice of the six perfections.

[*Translated by Paul L. Swanson*]

The Meaning of "Zen"

Matsumoto Shirō

In this essay I would like to offer a brief explanation of my views concerning the meaning of "Zen." The expression "Zen thought" is not used very widely among Buddhist scholars in Japan, but for my purposes here I would like to adopt it with the broad meaning of "a way of thinking that emphasizes the importance or centrality of *zen* practice."[1] The development of "Ch'an" schools in China is the most obvious example of how much a part of the history of Buddhism this way of thinking has been.

But just what is this "zen" around which such a long tradition of thought has revolved? Etymologically, the Chinese character *ch'an* 禅 (Jpn., *zen*) is thought to be the transliteration of the Sanskrit *jhāna* or *jhān*, a colloquial form of the term *dhyāna*.[2] The Chinese characters 定 (fixed concentration) and 静慮 (quiet deliberation) were also used to translate this term. Buddhist scholars in Japan most often used the compound 禅定 (*zenjō*), a combination of transliteration and translation. Here I will stick with the simpler, more direct transliteration "zen" and the original Sanskrit term *dhyāna* itself.

Dhyāna and the synonymous *samādhi* (concentration), are terms that have been used in India since ancient times. It is well known that the terms *dhyāna* and *samāhita* (entering *samādhi*) appear already in Upaniṣadic texts that predate the origins of Buddhism.[3] The substantive *dhyāna* derives from the verbal root *dhyai,* and originally meant deliberation, mature reflection, deep thinking, or meditation. In the age just prior to the rise of Buddhism, when the trend toward asceticism had become prevalent, the meaning of *dhyāna* seems to have shifted away from mature reflection or deep thinking to take on a sense closer to a simple concentration or settling of the mind.

According to early Buddhist texts, Śākyamuni mainly cultivated dhyana and ascetic practices during the time leading up to his enlighten-

ment. After enlightenment he rejected ascetic practices but kept dhyana as an efficacious practice. Accordingly the precepts (*śīla*), the practice of concentration (*dhyāna*), and the attainment of wisdom came to be regarded as the three pillars of Buddhist learning and practice. It should be noted, however, that the place of dhyana in this scheme is only that of a means for attaining wisdom. It was never itself meant to be the purpose or goal of Buddhism. Dhyana served to settle and concentrate the mind so that one might attain a correct understanding of the Buddha's teaching. The attainment of wisdom remained the purpose and goal of Buddhism.[4]

One does not have to step very far into the history of Buddhism to see that dhyana has not always been limited to the role of a mere means. Quite the contrary, it seems more often to have been the case that dhyana itself, rather than wisdom, was elevated to the position of the final goal. The development of the Ch'an schools in China is a classic example of this kind of thinking. If that is indeed so, then we are clearly dealing with a deviation from the original standpoint of Buddhism.

I have said that dhyana or zen is a mere means to attain wisdom, but I hasten to add at once that it is also an extremely difficult way to arrive at wisdom. The very word "zen" or "dhyana" implies a fundamental orientation towards the negation or denial of wisdom. Simply put, I see zen as synonymous with the cessation of conceptual thinking, its aim being to induce the suspension of thought. If this is true, and if we grant the obvious point that wisdom is the fruit of conceptual thought, then the only conclusion we are left with is that Zen thought is the negation or rejection of wisdom.

No doubt some will object that the wisdom at which Buddhism aims is not a form of conceptual knowledge or a state of awareness reached through conceptual thinking, but rather a kind of "nondiscriminatory cognition" (*nirvikalpa-jñāna*) that transcends even the distinctions between subject and object. At least in terms of early Buddhism, such an interpretation can only, at best, be called a popular misrepresentation of Buddhist doctrine.

In early Buddhism, wisdom (*jñāna*, *prajñā*) always meant a conceptual cognition or awareness of certain clear assertions and propositions, such as the Four Noble Truths or the teaching of dependent arising (*pratītya-samutpāda*). Nothing was ever taught about a nondiscriminatory cognition "free" of concepts or the thinking subjects—again, at least not in early Buddhism. The term "nondiscriminatory cognition" and the way

of thinking it represents only found explicit expression at a later stage in the development of Buddhism, particularly in Mahayana Buddhism, and moreover was a development that took place under the influence of an anti-Buddhist, Indian monism.[5]

Although the expression "nondiscriminatory cognition" belongs to the history of Mahayana Buddhism, the way that led to it—which I am calling "Zen thought"—has appeared frequently throughout its long history. It might even be said that Śākyamuni himself, by including the practice of dhyana with its aim of suspending conceptual thinking, introduced an element into Buddhism that fundamentally denies the wisdom that is the very goal of Buddhism.

In short, the question of "Zen thought" comes down to this: if zen (dhyana) means the cessation of conceptual thought, then Zen is a denial of Buddhism itself. If zen does not involve the suspension of conceptual thought, then it has significance for Buddhism. In the following pages I will take this up in further detail, drawing attention in particular to the examples of Mo-ho-yen and Shen-hui, prominent representatives of the Zen tradition who typify the rejection of conceptual thinking.[6]

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The essence of Zen thought is the denial of conceptual thinking, or, perhaps better, the cessation of conceptual thinking. Restrictions of space prevent me from laying out the evidence for this position in early Buddhist texts.[7] I shall content myself with a statement of my basic position regarding Zen thought.

As I see it, the core of the problem revolves around two words that both mean "thinking": *saṃjñā* and *manasikāra*.There is no doubt that Mo-ho-yen denied the validity of *saṃjñā*, and taught that the goal or ideal was *a-saṃjñā*. The following passage is typical of his position:

> Question: What is wrong with conceptualizing [*saṃjñā*]?
>
> Answer: Conceptualizing is a defect because it obstructs the wisdom of omniscience (*sarvajñajñāna*) inherent in all sentient beings, with the result that they continue to transmigrate for eons in the three evil destinies. This is what is wrong with it. The *Diamond Sutra* says, "One who is free of all conceptions is called 'Buddha'."

Leaving aside the quote from the *Diamond Sutra*, I would like to focus on the point that "conceptualizing" (*saṃjñā*) is considered to be a

defect.[8] In a word, Mo-ho-yen considers the root of all evil to lie in "conceptions" or "conceptualizing." The sense of the above quote is that transmigration in samsara is the result of conceptualizing, and that to become a Buddha one must be liberated from this conceptualizing. Moho-yen is not alone in this view. It is the very essence of Zen thought.

Some of the early Buddhist texts contain references to various types of dhyana such as *naivasaṃjñānāsaṃjñāyatana* (concentration that is neither conceptual nor nonconceptual), *saṃjñā-vedita-nirodha* (the cessation of conceptions and sensations), and *animitto cetosamādhi* (concentration of the mind without marks, or complete cessation). Each of these types of dhyana involves a denial of conceptualizing (*a-saṃjñā*).[9] The dhyānic practices were eventually organized in early Buddhism into the nine progressive stages of the four dhyana trances, the four concentrations of non-form, and the final concentration of the mind without marks (complete cessation). But what is important for our purposes here is to recognize that the practice of dhyana, and Zen thought, are fundamentally opposed to conceptualizing or thinking (*saṃjñā*), and have as their goal its complete surcease.

In weighing the significance of Zen thought we need to recall, as mentioned above, that Śākyamuni practiced dhyana meditation before he attained enlightenment, which means that the practice predates Buddhism. Legend has it that prior to his enlightenment Śākyamuni practiced under the two masters of dhyanic practice, Āḷāra Kālāma and Uddaka Rāmaputta. The states of dhyana aimed at in these practices were called "the concentration of nonpossession" and "the concentration that is neither conceptual nor nonconceptual."[10] But there is some difference of opinion as to whether these two types of dhyana originated outside of Buddhism or not. Fujita Kōtatsu comments on this question:

> However one looks at it, it is clear that the so-called "system of four dhyana trances" contains at least some elements from outside of Buddhism. The same could be said, more specifically, of the four concentrations of no-form. A reference to "the concentration of nonpossession" and "the concentration that is neither conceptual nor nonconceptual" can be found in ancient verses contained in the early Buddhist texts; and each of the four "concentrations of no-form" were originally taught separately and, one can presume, brought together into a single system at a later time....

> There is no disputing the fact that these teachings contain elements from outside Buddhism. Jainism emphasizes the notion of "nonpossession."… It is said that Āḷāra Kālāma taught the concentration of nonpossession and Uddaka Rāmaputta taught the concentration that is neither conceptual nor nonconceptual. Whether or not one accepts the legends at face value, they indicate that already from ancient times it was acknowledged that the four concentrations of no-form contained elements from outside Buddhism.[11]

Aside from supporting the view that the practice of the "four concentrations of no-form" are non-Buddhist in origin, Fujita draws an important connection between the "concentration of nonpossession" and the Jain idea of "nonpossession." Jainism teaches an extremely simple body-mind dualism—that human beings have a pure spirit that is covered by an impure physical body. For the Jains, therefore, ascetic practices such as fasting and the like serve to liberate the spirit (atman) from the body by diminishing and finally extinguishing the functions of the body. Here we have a clear instance of dualistic thought inspiring a practice whose aim is to free spirit from body.

The Jain idea of nonpossession is also grounded in this dualism. It distinguishes between atman (the spirit) and that which is not atman, and teaches that one must let go of attachments to the latter. Home, fields, valuables, family, and even one's own body are not atman and need therefore to be renounced because they are the cause of suffering. One must abandon such things and cultivate a state of "nonpossession" and "independent existence."

There is no way to know for certain whether or not Āḷāra Kālāma actually taught the "concentration of nonpossession" as the Buddhist legends say. What we do know is that practices like the Jain idea of non-possession did exist prior to the time of Śākyamuni's enlightenment. Mahāvīra, the founder of Jainism, was a contemporary of Śākyamuni, which seems to suggest that Jainism is not older than Buddhism. In fact, however, Jainism developed as a reformation of the older Nigaṇṭha school, making it clear that ascetic discipline and ideas such as that of "nonpossession" are pre-Buddhist. The fact that Śākyamuni practiced asceticism before his enlightenment bears further witness to this. It should also be pointed out that "ascetic practice" and dhyana are not always separate, but are often merged into a single practice. Jainism is characteristically ascetic in its practice, but it also taught the practice of

dhyana. It is simply unthinkable that Śākyamuni would not have cultivated dhyana during his six years of ascetic practice prior to his enlightenment. We can even go so far as to say that in the years before his enlightenment, Śākyamuni was engaged in Jain-like practice.

In this broader perspective, it seems clear to me that the teaching of dhyana in the early Buddhist texts has a non-Buddhist origin. Nakamura Hajime, however, disagrees:

> The idea of "nonpossession" was attributed to Āḷāra Kālāma, and the idea of "neither conceptual nor nonconceptual" was attributed to Uddaka, the son of Rāma. But Buddhism developed a new way of thinking, not unlike the way Mahayana would later arise in opposition to Hinayana.
>
> This is why the explanation offered in the *Majjhimanikāya* sees the teachings of "nonpossession" and "neither conceptual nor nonconceptual" as teachings deriving from outside Buddhism, even though in reality they were originally Buddhist teachings. Eventually they were organized under the structure of the "four concentrations of no-form," as the third and fourth levels.[12]

Simply put, Nakamura's claim is that these teachings were originally Buddhist but came to be considered non-Buddhist because tradition attributed these teachings to Śākyamuni's teachers Āḷāra and Uddaka. Nakamura bases his argument on the fact that the teaching of "nonpossession" and "neither conceptual nor nonconceptual" are found in the *Suttanipāta*.[13] He elaborates on the teaching of "neither conceptual nor nonconceptual":

> The idea of "neither conceptual nor nonconceptual," which was said to have been taught by Uddaka, the son of Rāma, was also taught in the very earliest period of Buddhism. We can find this in one of the oldest sutras, the *Suttanipāta*, where it is presented as a teaching of Śākyamuni. The question is raised:
>
>> What practice leads a person to get rid of form? And how can suffering and pleasure be extinguished? This is what I want to know.
>
> Śākyamuni replies:
>
>> Without ordinary conception, without mistaken conception, not without conception, and not with the extinction of conception—one who practices in this way will extinguish form. A [mistaken] consciousness of the world arises from conceptions.[14]
>
> The idea of "neither conceptual nor nonconceptual" is clearly taught in this passage. Uddaka may have been awakened to a special state that was

> "neither conceptual nor nonconceptual" owing to his practice of *dhyāna*, but this passage also teaches that one can realize a state of mind that gets rid of "consciousness of the world" (*papañcasaṃkhā*) by getting rid of conceptions (*sañña*) through the practice of *dhyāna*. Thus a teaching of Buddhism in its very earliest period was in later texts attributed to Uddaka.
>
> Of course the opposite inference, that such ideas taught originally by Āḷārā and Uddaka were taken in by early Buddhism and reflected in sections of the *Suttanipāta*, is also possible. But I find it unthinkable that the thought of two teachers that Śākyamuni had rejected would be incorporated *as is* into his teachings after his enlightenment.[15]

Nakamura thus argues that because the ideas of "nonpossession" and "neither conceptual nor nonconceptual" appear in the *Suttanipāta*, these were originally Buddhist ideas. I prefer his "opposite inference"—that they were originally non-Buddhist.

But I repeat: Śākyamuni certainly practiced dhyana before Buddhism was established. Explanations of dhyanic meditation in the early Buddhist texts show that dhyana was seen as identical to yoga. In the *Yoga Sutra*, "yoga" is defined as "the cessation of the activity of the mind" (*citta-vṛtti-nirodha*). Hence there seems no way to avoid the conclusion that the dhyana practiced by Śākyamuni involved a "cessation of thinking." It is further likely that this "cessation of thinking" was concretely taught as a denial of *saṃjñā* (conceptualization).

Nakamura considers it "unthinkable" that the ideas of two of Śākyamuni's former teachers would find their way, as such, back into his teachings. Yet surely there is nothing unusual about ideas originating from outside of Buddhism being reassimilated and then reflected in Buddhist texts. What is more, the *Suttanipāta* that Nakamura uses in support of his position is a rather peculiar Buddhist text, containing ideas that are not to be found in the more orthodox documents of the *Four Āgama*s. In other words, Nakamura's method for studying "early Buddhism" is based on taking "verse texts" such as those in the *Suttanipāta* as representing the oldest stratum of Buddhist texts. I do not favor this approach.

Even if one grants that the *Suttanipāta* was transmitted within the Buddhist community, I consider the ideas expressed in this text to be non-Buddhist. I further consider the text itself to belong to a genre of "ascetic literature" that was popular in the India of the time. The reason I have come to this conclusion is that the text contains Jain-like teachings

such as asceticism, dhyanic meditation, and the idea of a substantial self (*ātmavāda*). For this reason, it is hardly to be wondered at that such a text would attribute the idea of "neither conceptual nor nonconceptual" to Śākyamuni himself.

To continue, Fujita has the following to say about *saṃjñā-vedita-nirodha* (the cessation of conceptions and sensations=*nirodha-samāpatti*):

> The four concentrations of no-form is an arrangement of theories on dhyanic meditation designed to make them correspond to the different levels of the realm of no-form. The "concentration of complete cessation" is a state in which all senses are "pure" and only life (*āyu*) and warmth (*usmā*) are left to distinguish it from death. In the perspective of early Buddhism, the attainment of this state cannot be said to have been considered important.[16]

Fujita's conclusions concerning the "concentration of complete cessation" is entirely coincident with Kamalaśīla's criticism of Mo-ho-yen. Kamalaśīla pointed out that "if one can become a Buddha just by 'not thinking' (*amanasikāra*), then even unconscious or comatose people are also Buddhas." If the cessation of thinking—the complete cessation of concepts—is the goal, then how is this different from the body just before it dies, when one's thought processes have already ceased?

The idea of "the cessation of thinking" is also basic to the theory of the four stages of dhyana trance, which endorses the cessation of "intellectual activity" (*vitarka*, *vicāra*).[17] I will spare the reader the details on this theory here, but I would like to point out that there is no teaching of dhyana meditation whose fundamental aim is not the cessation of conceptual thinking. My personal view is that "Buddhism is the teaching of dependent arising" (*pratītya-samutpāda),* and that therefore the enlightenment that Buddhism proffers is nothing other than thinking correctly about the teaching of dependent arising. I cite from the opening section of the *Vinaya Mahāvagga*:

> At that time the Buddha, the World-Honored One, dwelt in Uruvelā on the banks of the Nerañjarā river, at the foot of the Bodhi Tree, and for the first time realized supreme enlightenment (*abhisambuddha*). Then the World-Honored One stayed at the foot of the Bodhi Tree for seven days, sitting in a full lotus position, savoring the bliss of liberation (*vimuttisukha*). At that time, in the first watch of the night, the World-Honored One considered (*manasākāsi*) forwards and backwards (*anulomapaṭilomam*) that which is dependent arising (*paṭiccasamuppāda*),

> i.e., "From the cause (*paccayā*) of ignorance, volitional activity arises. From the causes of volitional activities, consciousness arises. From the cause of consciousness, name-and-form arises. From the cause of name-and-form, the six senses arise. From the cause of the six senses, contact arises. From the cause of contact, sensations arise. From the causes of sensations, passions arise. From the cause of passions, attachments arise. From the causes of attachments, existence arises. From the cause of existence, rebirth arises. From the cause of rebirth, decay-and-death, travail, sorrow, suffering, pain, and anguish arise together (*sambhavanti*). Thus there is the arising (*samudaya*) of this heap of pure suffering. However, if this ignorance is extinguished by becoming free of craving (*asesavirāganirodha*), then there is the extinction of volitional activities. From the extinction of volitional activities there is the extinction of consciousness.... From the extinction of existence, there is the extinction of rebirth. From the extinction of rebirth, there is the extinction (*nirujjhanti*) of decay-and-death, travail, sorrow, suffering, pain, and anguish. Thus there is the cessation (*nirodha*) of this heap of pure suffering."[18]

If we accept what is written in this Buddhist text, then we must say that "awakening" (*satori*) or enlightenment (*abhisaṃbodhi*) means "to consider dependent arising" (*pratītyasamutpāda-manasikāra*).

It is impossible to draw Śākyamuni's teachings directly from the pages of the Buddhist canon. This is the limitation of purely textual research. But from the perspective of "intellectual history," I conclude that the extraordinarily profound and almost unbelievable idea of "dependent arising" is not to be found in India prior to Śākyamuni's founding of what we call Buddhism. The idea of atman was pervasive before the time of Śākyamuni, but the idea of dependent arising is its diametrical opposite, its direct contradictory. The only possible explanation for how this completely new idea "dependent arising" appeared is, as Buddhists have traditionally believed, that a single individual named Śākyamuni "awakened" to it. "Dependent arising" is a way of thinking conceived by Śākyamuni.

I choose to believe what is written in the passage quoted above from the *Vinaya Mahāvagga*: that Buddhism is the teaching of dependent arising, and that there is no "awakening" or "enlightenment" other than reflecting on or considering (*manasikāra*) dependent arising. If this is true, then it is clear that any "Zen thought" that teaches the "cessation of thinking" (*amanasikāra*, *a-saṃjñā*) is anti-Buddhist.

[*Translated by Paul L. Swanson*]

Critical Buddhism and Dōgen's *Shōbōgenzō*

The Debate over the 75-Fascicle and 12-Fascicle Texts

Steven HEINE

ONE OF THE MAIN ISSUES in the recent movement known as "Critical Buddhism" is the question of which version of the *Shōbōgenzō* represents Dōgen's authentic philosophical message. Critical Buddhism has rejected the conventional emphasis on the priority of the 75-fascicle version, which contains the famous philosophical essays on "Buddha-nature" (Busshō) and "Being-Time" (Uji). Instead it emphasizes that the 12-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō*, which was written toward the end of Dōgen's life and contains mainly practical instructions for monks in training, is the real or authentic text because of its critique of original-enlightenment thought and consistent focus on karmic causality. This paper examines the Critical Buddhist view in the light of responses by traditional Dōgen scholars. The debate is framed and evaluated in the larger context of Buddhist scholasticism and hermeneutics in which scholars try to reinterpret medieval sources from a classical or foundational standpoint and in terms of distinctively modern concerns.

The manuscript of the 12-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō* was discovered in 1927 at Yōkō-ji in Nōtō Peninsula in Ishikawa Prefecture, a temple founded by the fourth Zen patriarch Keizan and an important center for the sect in the medieval period. However, the existence of the 12-fascicle text as an independent version of Dōgen's magnum opus, standing in addition to the most widely accepted version—the 75-fascicle text—was long known or at least strongly suspected because there is an apparent reference to it in an important though cryptic colophon (*okugaki*) to the "Hachidainingaku" (Eight precepts of the enlightened person) fascicle. "Hachidainingaku," the last of the *Shōbōgenzō* writings composed during Dōgen's

illness leading to his death in 1253, was transcribed and edited in 1255 by his foremost disciple, Ejō. The fascicle with its colophon was included in yet another version of the *Shōbōgenzō*, the 28-fascicle text that was compiled by Gien in the thirteenth century, and it also appears in slightly altered form in the primary traditional biography of Dōgen, the *Kenzei-ki*, which was composed in 1472.[1]

Ejō's "Hachidainingaku" colophon is significant because it contains the only actual statement by Dōgen concerning his well-known goal of creating a 100-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō*: "The fascicles of the *Kana Shōbōgenzō* [in Japanese] that I have composed previously will be revised," Dōgen is quoted as saying, "and by adding new fascicles to the [revised] older ones I intend to create a 100-fascicle text." Ejō then describes the composition of twelve new fascicles:

> The "Hachidainingaku" is the twelfth of the new fascicles. After composing this fascicle, our former master's condition gradually deteriorated, and the writing of new fascicles came to a halt. Therefore, this and several other recent fascicles represent the last teachings of our former master. Unfortunately, many of the revised manuscripts for the [projected] 100-fascicle text are not available, and this is deeply regrettable. Those who wish to honor the memory of our former master should uphold the twelfth fascicle [or twelve new fascicles]. This fascicle [or these fascicles], expressing the final teachings of Śākyamuni, contain the last instructions of our former master.[2]

The colophon makes some interesting suggestions about the importance of the 12-fascicle text, but its meaning and purpose are ambiguous. On the one hand, this passage makes a clear distinction between the old and new fascicles of the *Shōbōgenzō,* and it suggests Dōgen's sense of a need to revise the former, while indicating that the latter package of twelve fascicles is not only more recent and timely but also most consistent with Śākyamuni's original teachings. The colophon explicitly states Dōgen's intent to create a 100-fascicle text, and seems to associate the 12-fascicle text with this goal while negating the role of the early, unrevised fascicles. Of the twelve "new" fascicles referred to here, ten fascicles were written during the 1250s, and most of these were compiled by Ejō during the 1255 summer retreat two years after Dōgen's death. The other two were written in the 1240s as alternative versions of fascicles included in the 75-fascicle text, but were later apparently selected by Dōgen for inclusion in the 12-fascicle text. The "Hachidainingaku"

colophon is also supported by another recently discovered colophon for a version of "Shukke" (Home departure) included in the 28-fascicle text that states that the fascicle was to be revised and eventually replaced by a new version, and the result appears to be the 12-fascicle text's "Shukke Kudoku" (Merits of home departure). In addition, there are unconfirmed reports that the 12-fascicle text was kept alive and transmitted through the centuries in some of the sect's sublineages stemming from Keizan's branch, which prized this version over the other editions of the *Shōbōgenzō*.

However, the "Hachidainingaku" colophon also leaves some key issues ambiguous or unresolved. For example, it does not rule out altogether the value of the older fascicles. Since the colophon declares that some revisions are unavailable, it is not clear where things stood at the end of the revision process at the time of Dōgen's death, or how much Ejō may have interpolated, knowingly or not, into the revisions. It is also unclear whether the next to last sentence refers to upholding the "twelfth" fascicle alone, or the entire 12-fascicle text. According to Ishii Shūdō, the unresolvability of this issue is exacerbated in light of the colophon for the *Hōkyōki*, the posthumously discovered record of Dōgen's conversations in China with Ju-ching, in which Ejō suggests that there may even be more manuscripts by the master undiscovered or left unfinished.[3] In addition, the colophons for several of the fascicles in the 12-fascicle text subsequently found in various temple manuscripts state that they were still in the process of being revised and edited.

Because of the questions about the colophon, most scholars have continued to focus on the 75-fascicle text even after the discovery of the 12-fascicle text in the 1920s. They have assumed that Dōgen was involved in an ongoing process of revising the *Shōbōgenzō* fascicles, some of which were placed either by Dōgen or by Ejō in the 12-fascicle text in order to create a work appropriate for the audience at Eihei-ji, which was largely composed of laypersons and new initiates converting from rival esoteric sects. The conventional view is that in the final stages of his career, after returning from a rather unsuccessful mission of preaching before the Hōjō elite in Kamakura, Dōgen was trying to create a scaled-down edition of the *Shōbōgenzō* that was at once more detailed and precise, by including additional citations and references from Mahayana scriptures, as well as more introductory, in explaining the basic Buddhist doctrines of karma, causality, and impermanence, as well as the rules of

monastic discipline and ritual, which may have been relatively unfamiliar to his audience in rural Japan. Therefore, although its composition was chronologically later, from a conceptual standpoint the 12-fascicle text has been seen as a kind of preliminary work containing practical instructions paving the way for, and essentially compatible and consistent with, the more philosophically advanced writings in the 75-fascicle text that were studied by higher-level monks.

One of the linchpins of Critical Buddhism, and one that has created at least a minor revolution in Dōgen studies, is a radical rethinking and reprioritizing of the relation between the two versions of Dōgen's *Shōbōgenzō*, known respectively as the "old" or "early" (*kyūsō* 旧草) 75-fascicle and the "new" or "later" (*shinsō* 新草) 12-fascicle versions.[4] According to Critical Buddhism, the 12-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō*, which has traditionally been perceived as secondary to or an appendage of the better-known 75-fascicle text and which targets an audience of novices rather than advanced monks, is crucial to the entire enterprise of overcoming various sorts of *dhātu-vāda* positions. Critical Buddhism, especially the scholarship of Hakamaya Noriaki, maintains that the 12-fascicle text reflects a profound change in Dōgen's outlook and expresses a highly critical view of original-enlightenment thought as a misguided absolutization and affirmation of natural existence. In his later writings, according to Critical Buddhism, Dōgen refines his thinking on the meaning of impermanence—still rather vague and confused in the 75-fascicle text because it is haunted by *hongaku* ideology—in accord with the early Buddhist doctrine of karmic causality as the key to understanding nonsubstantiality. Critical Buddhism thereby reverses the traditional textual hierarchy by asserting that the 75-fascicle text is a preliminary, incomplete, and therefore secondary (even dubious) body of writing, and that the 12-fascicle text exemplifies Dōgen's essential teaching based on dependent origination, which Matsumoto Shirō insists was developed by the Buddha as "antithetical to *dhātu-vāda*."[5]

The aim of this paper is to examine and evaluate the views of Critical Buddhism on how the two *Shōbōgenzō* texts illuminate Dōgen's critical perspective on original-enlightenment thought in terms of his attitude to causality and karmic retribution. These issues are also explored in light of the way conventional Dōgen scholars have responded to the Critical Buddhist exponents. The paper will first explain how and why the 12-fascicle text has become so important in Critical Buddhism, and then

examine the current debate with traditionalist scholars who continue to assert the priority of the 75-fascicle text. In this paper I will use the term "traditional Buddhism" to refer collectively to the views of those scholars who have rebutted certain key aspects of the Critical Buddhist approach to Dōgen studies. This label is unfortunately not without qualifications, since it refers to a variety of positions, and I will distinguish two distinct traditionalist perspectives. One maintains that there is no significant change in Dōgen's approach from his early to later writings. The other seeks a compromise by acknowledging some degree of change, though with a different and more complex rationale than argued by Critical Buddhism.[6] In the concluding section, I will comment on three interrelated points in evaluating the contributions of Critical Buddhism. First, I will show some of the limitations in both the Critical and traditional positions on the *Shōbōgenzō,* which often fail to take into account the full religious and historical context of Kamakura Buddhism, and thereby overlook (for example) affinities between popular *setsuwa* literary conceptions of karma and Dōgen's 12-fascicle text. Then I will consider one of the most commonly voiced critiques of Critical Buddhism: that it represents a disguised resurfacing of "militant fundamentalism" since it sets out to judge right and wrong forms of Buddhism and disavows all types of syncretism. In that context I will frame the *Shōbōgenzō* debate by clarifying the relation between the evaluative hermeneutics of medieval Buddhist scholasticism and the objectivity of contemporary Buddhist studies. Finally, I will discuss the broader social concerns of Critical Buddhism in light of parallel developments in Western religious thought, including liberation and deconstructionist theologies. Here I will offer some suggestions about how Critical Buddhism needs to develop a more comprehensive methodology to deal with the relation between the 12-fascicle text and the problem of social discrimination.

CRITICAL BUDDHIST METHODOLOGY VS. TRADITIONAL APPROACHES

The importance of the *Shōbōgenzō* for Critical Buddhist methodology is evident from the inception of the movement, which began with a series of books in 1989 and 1990. These books, in turn, were largely based on essays delivered and published in the mid-1980s by scholars in the Buddhist Studies Department of Komazawa University in Tokyo, espe-

cially Hakamaya Noriaki and Matsumoto Shirō. These scholars were interested in Dōgen's view of karma as a key to evaluating the relevance of Buddhist thought for a variety of social discrimination issues affecting their own university, its affiliation with the Sōtō sect, and Japanese society as a whole. These issues include the granting of Buddhist initiation names (*kaimyō*) to the deceased on the basis of their social rank, a practice that resulted in the unjust treatment of the outcast *burakumin* (untouchable) community and other minority or dispossessed groups.[7] Buddhism in Japan had evolved over the course of history into religious institutions primarily concerned with funeral ceremonies. The Sōtō sect recently began to realize that it had been performing this social function for the lower classes in a rather reprehensible fashion. Hakamaya and Matsumoto are part of a widespread response to a sense of frustration and disappointment in Buddhism, which appeared to be an anachronistic, authoritarian, dogmatic, and socially rigid institution instead of a genuinely contemporary, progressive, and flexible advocate for justice and reform. In their attempt to find out what had gone wrong with Buddhism and how it could be corrected, the Critical Buddhists, especially Hakamaya, turned to Dōgen's Kamakura-era critique of Sino-Japanese Buddhism for guidance.

Hakamaya has reexamined East Asian Buddhism from the lens of Dōgen's later thought, which Hakamaya feels was subverted by subsequent developments in the Sōtō institution. Critical Buddhism holds that *hongaku* thought denies causality on the basis of a nondualistic doctrine whose real aim is to assimilate local animistic-naturalistic cults, and that it thus tends to foster a false sense of equality that mitigates the need for social responsibility. Original enlightenment and related doctrines such as *tathāgatagarbha* and Buddha-nature espouse an uncritical tolerance and syncretism that foster, in the name of universal, nondiscriminating compassion, such problematic viewpoints as the demand for societal harmony (*wa*) over individuality and a tacit compliance with militarism. These attitudes are in turn supported politically by totalitarian and nationalist ideologies as well as intellectually by *Nihonjinron* (theories of Japanese uniqueness) rhetoric that ends up abetting ethnic discrimination.[8] The basic weakness of *hongaku* thought, according to the Critical Buddhists, is that ontologically it does not allow for the existence of an Other, since all things are considered to arise from the single, undifferentiated primordial *dhātu* or locus, and that it is thus rendered epistemologically and ethically incapable of dealing with the complex manifestations of otherness

that force concrete ethical choices. As Sallie King points out in a discussion of Buddha-nature doctrine,

> the texts prized in East Asian Buddhist traditions have tended to emphasize such things as nondiscrimination [in the epistemological rather than social sense] and nonconceptual wisdom, which are difficult to reconcile with the complexities of resolving competing claims, for example, or balancing needs against resources, which require that one be very precise in distinguishing particulars, that one make informed judgments, and that one regard such activities as important and valuable.[9]

That is, the *hongaku* and Buddha-nature doctrines lack a basis for developing situationally specific, ethically evaluative judgments, and the result is an unreflective endorsement of the status quo. According to Hakamaya:

> Although some interpret the doctrine of original enlightenment as a theory of equality since it claims to recognize the fundamental universal enlightenment of all people, this is actually a gross misunderstanding. In fact, the doctrine of original enlightenment, which in a facile way requires seeking out the fundamental unified ground of enlightenment, must be considered the primary source of [social] discrimination.[10]

In Japan, this means accepting or even supporting the "myth of Japanese uniqueness" and related nationalist/nativist/Nihonist rhetoric that pervaded post-Tokugawa, especially prewar, intellectual life.[11] Zen, in particular, has often hidden its support for the status quo behind what is, in effect, an elitist aestheticism based on the notion that everything reflects the Buddha-dharma (*zen'itsu-buppō*).

Although Dōgen never explicitly mentions, let alone criticizes, *hongaku* in any of his writings, he first exposed its underlying limitations in his famous "doubt" about why every Buddha has had to practice if all beings are inherently enlightened.[12] Dōgen is traditionally considered to have answered this doubt, experienced at the outset of his career, in his critique of the substantialist tendency referred to in the *Shōbōgenzō* as the "Senika heresy," which maintains the existence of a permanent soul that transcends the life and death of the body. In addition, Dōgen's doctrines of the oneness of practice and realization (*shushō-ittō*) and the impermanence of Buddha-nature (*mujō-busshō*) stress the dynamic, here-and-now (*genjō*) dimension of *hongaku* thought, according, especially, to the early *Shōbōgenzō* commentaries by Senne and Kyōgō. Moreover, in the 75-fascicle text he occasionally uses other "*hon-*" compound terms favorably,

such as *honshō-myōshū*, or "original realization and marvelous practice." Yet he constructs a creative compromise throughout his career by indirectly refuting problematic aspects of original enlightenment while reorienting its basic implications in terms of the continuing process of realization. According to the traditional view, these doctrines are expressed in fascicles such as "Genjōkōan" (Spontaneous realization) and "Busshō" (Buddha-nature), which form the core of the 75-fascicle text (these are two of the first three fascicles in the standard editions). They were developed by Dōgen in the middle part of his career, especially from the mid-1230s to the early 1240s, when he lived outside Kyoto and later at Eihei-ji in the Echizen mountains. The 12-fascicle version of the *Shōbōgenzō*, compiled posthumously by Ejō in 1255 largely from texts written in the 1250s, was primarily directed toward monks at an entry level of training, and is traditionally regarded as an extension of the 75-fascicle text that does not change or add significantly to its message.

The Critical Buddhists seek to reverse the view that the 12-fascicle text is secondary to the 75-fascicle text. Hakamaya's claim is that in the writings of the 75-fascicle text, which embrace a holistic, naturalist perspective, Dōgen was still struggling with *hongaku* thought and unable to fully overcome its influence. Hakamaya contends that the 12-fascicle text is the product of a dramatic and decisive change of heart by Dōgen caused by his heightened awareness of karmic causality or "deep faith in causality" (*jinshin inga*), and comprises a sharpened, more devastating critique of *hongaku* thought. Like Indian and Tibetan Madhyamika Buddhism, which Critical Buddhism greatly admires as exponents of true (i.e., critical not topical) Buddhism, Dōgen was now thoroughly clear and penetratingly critical about what he negated. This fundamental, decisive change in Dōgen's attitude occurred, according to the Critical Buddhists, around 1248 when Dōgen returned from a disillusioning visit to the Rinzai Five Mountains center in Kamakura, where he had gone to preach at the invitation of Hōjō Tokiyori.[13] This change or radical reversal is different from, though by no means unrelated historically and spiritually to, an earlier change that occurred around 1243 when Dōgen was first leaving Kyoto.[14] The change of the Kyoto-to-Echizen period, according to a number of modern sources Carl Bielefeldt cites, was apparently marked by a sense of dissipation and decline in Dōgen's writing, accompanied by an aggressively sectarian, dogmatic, and argumentative outlook in which he all too eagerly abandoned liberal social views that he had previously

advocated (perhaps in pursuit of aristocratic patronage), such as support for women and laypersons in the quest for enlightenment. According to some traditional scholars (primarily of Rinzai orientation, such as Yanagida Seizan and Furuta Shōkin), the monastocentric, puritanical outlook of the 12-fascicle text can be seen as a product of Dōgen's extended decline, while other traditionalists (primarily of Sōtō orientation, such as Kagamishima Genryū and Kawamura Kōdō) view this text as part of a renewed effort at strengthening discipline in Zen training.

According to the Critical Buddhist view, however, even the latter position does not go nearly far enough in highlighting the significance of the change that generated the 12-fascicle text. Dōgen's state of mind following this change can be compared to his determination when, twenty years earlier, he came back from China "empty-handed" after attaining enlightenment (according to a key passage in the *Eihei kōroku*, vol. I). Hakamaya maintains that the change does not represent a puritanical stance, but an enrichment and fulfillment of Dōgen's spiritual quest based on a deeply moral view of cause and effect and inspired by his initial doubt about *hongaku* thought. Dōgen's change is based on his understanding of the need to instruct disciples on the inviolability of karmic retribution, a process often referred to as "the karma produced is the karma received" (*jigō-jitoku*, or "you get what you deserve"). This approach undermines the original enlightenment view of Buddha-nature as a primordial endowment transcendent of bondage to karma. Hakamaya points out that in some passages of the 12-fascicle text Dōgen stresses the role of repentance or confession (*sange*) in reversing negative karma and attaining transformation. However, Hakamaya also argues that Dōgen is very critical of the ritualization of *sange* in a variety of East Asian *hongaku*-based practices that promote the misconception that evil karma can be facilely absolved through purification ceremonies (*sange metsuzai*).[15] The problem with this view is that it regards all defilement and evil behavior as extraneous to the basic purity of an essentially undefilable Buddha-nature.[16] Therefore, Dōgen's final major change becomes the role model for the Critical Buddhists' attempt to recover the basic Buddhist concept of causality and refute *hongaku* thought as a major corruption of that doctrine.

The examination of the 12-fascicle text, so crucial for the Critical Buddhist project, marks what is probably the first time that Dōgen's thought has been analyzed by specialists in other schools of Buddhism, particularly Madhyamika and Yogacara in India and Tibet. This in turn

has elicited an enormously profuse and thoughtful response from traditional Dōgen scholars. Although *Critiques of the Doctrine of Original Enlightenment* (*Hongaku shisō hihan*), the title of Hakamaya's book that unveiled the new methodology, refers only to a critique of original enlightenment, the second half of the book deals almost exclusively with Dōgen's rejection of Zen notions such as *kyōge betsuden* (special transmission outside the scriptures) and *sankyō itchi* (unity of the three teachings of Buddhism, Taoism, and Confucianism), and it introduces an attempt to rethink the significance of the 12-fascicle text. While his second book (1990) does not deal with Dōgen, his third book (1992) specializes in issues concerning the composition and compilation of the 12-fascicle text. Matsumoto's book (1989) criticizing *tathāgata-garbha* thought, and Itō Takatoshi's book (1992) criticizing Chinese Buddhism, have also commented on the 12-fascicle text, at least indirectly by citing Hakamaya's views.

Two major collections have been published in response to Critical Buddhism, involving many of the leading Buddhist scholars at Komazawa University as well as other Sōtō authorities, who have engaged in a creative dialogue with the views expressed by Hakamaya and Matsumoto. These collections contain a two-pronged exchange of ideas.[17] One collection edited by Nara Yasuaki focuses, in an advocacy-response format, on the extensive or "meta" issues of resituating Dōgen, and Zen as a whole, in the context of the overall development of Buddhism, and includes a section on the 12-fascicle text with contributions by Hakamaya, Kawamura, and Itō Shūken. The other collection, edited by Kagamishima Genryū and Suzuki Kakuzen, is an intensive textual study that probes in great detail many diverse and highly specialized aspects of each of the fascicles in the 12-fascicle text in comparison with the 75-fascicle text.[18] For Critical Buddhism the extensive issues cannot be separated from the intensive issues concerning the *Shōbōgenzō*, though the former are perhaps better publicized.

THE DEBATE ON THE *SHŌBŌGENZŌ* TEXTS

As indicated above, Critical Buddhism has raised questions about which version of the *Shōbōgenzō* reflects Dōgen's intention to create a unified text and presents his authentic philosophical message. Prior to Hakamaya's approach, scholarship on the *Shōbōgenzō*[19] tended to focus on

two areas: first, studies of the relation between the 75-fascicle text edited by Ejō and commented on by Senne (*Shōbōgenzō Okikigaki*) and Kyōgō (*Shōbōgenzō shō*) and several other early post-Dōgen versions, including a 60-fascicle text edited by fifth patriarch Giun in 1329, an 84-fascicle text edited by Bonsei in 1419, and a 28-fascicle text (n.d.) favored in certain Sōtō temples and known as the *Himitsu* (secret or "concealed") *Shōbōgenzō*; second, studies of the Chinese (*Mana* or *Shinji*) *Shōbōgenzō* collection of three hundred koans compiled in 1235 and the Japanese (*Kana* or *Keji* 仮字) collection of Dōgen's sermons and philosophical essays, many of them dealing with the koan cases contained in the Chinese collection.[20]

Kawamura Kōdō surveys several views of the function of the 12-fascicle text prevalent before the "Hakamaya thesis."[21] One, as mentioned above, is that there is a continuity between the texts, with the 75-fascicle version serving as the base and the 12-fascicle one as its extension. Another view is that the 75-fascicle text expresses the standpoint of *satori* and the 12-fascicle text expresses the standpoint of faith (variations of this idea identify the respective standpoints as realization and resolve-practice, transmission and salvation, reason and practice, or philosophy and morality). According to this view, both texts contribute to the goal of a 100-fascicle text that Dōgen envisioned, but was unable to achieve, shortly before his premature death in 1253. But as Hakamaya points out in his response to Kawamura's essay, there are now two main approaches to the 12-fascicle text. One (encompassing all of the views described by Kawamura) is that the 75-fascicle and the 12-fascicle texts are essentially of equal validity though different in style and purpose, with the 75-fascicle text on a higher spiritual plane to be studied by those approaching or having already reached enlightenment, and the 12-fascicle text serving a more practical, introductory function for novice initiates; taken together they contribute eighty-seven fascicles to the envisioned one hundred, and constitute in themselves an 87-fascicle text. The Critical Buddhist view, as described above, is that the 12-fascicle text reflects a decisive change of heart and constitutes the authentic *Shōbōgenzō*, with the 75-fascicle text seen as a preliminary and unfinished version of somewhat questionable value.[22]

The debate generated on issues concerning the relation between the 12-, 28-, 60-, 75-, 84-, and 87-fascicle versions (as well as other early versions, including 83- and 89-fascicle texts, plus an 88-fascicle text that

Shōbōgenzō Fascicles and Texts



Fascicles:

A_6=Zazenshin, Shunjū, Baika, Senjō, Tashintsū, Ōsakusendaba

B_{19}=Shinfukatoku, Raihaitokuzui, Sansuikyō, Den'e, Bukkyō [teachings], Shisho, Sesshinsesshō, Shohōjissō, Butsudō, Mitsugo, Bukkyō [sutras], Menju, Busso, Sanjūshichihon bodaibunpō, Zanmai-ōzanmai, Tenbōrin, Daishugyō, Jishōzanmai, Shukke

$C_{50/51}$=remaining fascicles of 94 fascicles (51 fascicles when including Gyōji II, as in the 60-fascicle version): Genjōkōan, Makahannya-haramitsu, Busshō, Shinjingakudō, Sokushinzebutsu, Gyōbutsuigi, Ikkya myōju, Kobusshin, Daigo, Zazengi, Kaiinzanmai, Kūge, Kōmyō, Gyōji I, Immo, Kannon, Kokyō, Uji, Juki, Zenki, Tsuki, Gabyō, Keiseisanshoku, Butsukōjōji, Muchūsetsumu, Kankin, Shoakumakusa, Dōtoku, Jinzū, Arakan, Kattō, Hakujushi, Sangaiyuishin, Mujōseppō, Hosshō, Darani, Senmen, Jippō, Kenbutsu, Hensan, Ganzei, Kajō, Ryūgin, Soshiseiraii, Hotsumujōshin, Udonge, Nyoraizenshin, Kokū, Ho-u, Ango

D=Hokke-ten-hokke

E=Bodaisatta-shishōbō

F_7=Sanjigo, Shime, Hotsubodaishin, Kesa kudoku, Shukke kudoku, Kuyō shobutsu, Kie buppōsōbō

G_4=Jukai, Jinshin inga, Shizen biku, Hachidainingaku

H=Ippyakuhachihōmyōmon

I_5=(Beppon) Shinfukatoku, (Beppon) Butsukōjōji, (Beppon) Butsudō, Shōji, Yuibutsu yobutsu



Text considered to have been compiled by Dōgen himself

Editions compiled after Dōgen's death (75-fascicle text contains A_6-B_{19}-C_{50} and 60-fascicle text contains C_{51}-D-E-F_7)

Various fascicles prior to Dōgen's compilation of the text (A-B-C-D-E-F-I)

Fascicles considered [by Hakamaya] to have been "concealed"

* The 75-fascicle and 12-fascicle texts belong together to form an 87-fascicle text, and the 60-fascicle and 28-fascicle texts belong together to form an 88-fascicle text.

combines the 60- and 28-fascicle versions) reflects an effort to come to terms with and overcome two long-standing, mutually reinforcing misconceptions concerning the composition of the *Shōbōgenzō*. The first misconception is that the *Shōbōgenzō* consists of ninety-five fascicles, which is the number included in many modern editions, most notably the paperback version published by Iwanami Bunko.[23] The second misconception is that these ninety-five fascicles were the ones intended for the projected 100-fascicle text. The modern 95-fascicle edition is actually based on a Tokugawa-era invention that was supported by a so-called definitive Meiji-era edition. The aim of the first 95-fascicle edition published in 1690 by Kōzen was to collect,[24] after years of confusion about the exact nature of the founder's writings, all of the available *Shōbōgenzō* materials, which consisted primarily of Dōgen's informal (*jishū* 示衆-style) lectures in contrast to the more formal (*jōdō* 上堂-style) lectures collected in the *Eihei kōroku*. This text was reissued in 1811 by Gentō and again in 1906 as the official Sōtō sect edition, known as the Daihonzan Eihei-ji edition. The 95-fascicle edition, however, made no attempt to recreate the structure or intentionality of Dōgen's original manuscript and is thus of no help in reconstructing what Dōgen projected for the 100-fascicle version.

Influenced by the textual studies of Mizuno Yaoko, Hakamaya organizes the versions of the *Shōbōgenzō* into three categories: the concealed manuscript, or the 28-fascicle text; the posthumously edited manuscripts, primarily including the 60-fascicle and 75-fascicle texts; and the 12-fascicle text, which he argues is the collection compiled by Dōgen himself and which reflects the innermost thoughts of Dōgen in his final teachings.[25] Hakamaya also considers the 12-fascicle text to have been a "concealed" text. Thus, Critical Buddhism rejects the traditional emphasis on the priority of the 75-fascicle version, which contains most of the famous philosophical essays, including, in addition to those previously mentioned, "Uji" (Being-time) and "Zenki" (Total Dynamism). The 12-fascicle text lacks the creative rhetoric and metonymic wordplays for which Dōgen has often been praised by modern philosophers, and it has been seen as puritanical and socially conservative because of its contents, which center on practical instructions for monks emphasizing external symbols and ritual. But the important point for Critical Buddhists is that in fascicles such as "Jinshin Inga" (Deep Faith in Causality) and "Sanjigo" (Karmic Retribution through the Past, Present, and Future), this text, unlike other *Shōbōgenzō* versions, stresses the irrevocability of karma and causality in a

way consistent with early Buddhist thought. The 12-fascicle text argues repeatedly for the law of retribution (*gōhō* or *goppō*), by which good deeds will create beneficial karma leading to positive consequences; indeed, any good deed can reverse evil and result eventually in redemption. Conversely, evil deeds necessarily beget negative karma and lead to rebirth in one of the three evil realms (hell, hungry ghosts, or animals). According to the "Sanjigo" fascicle the effects of karmic retribution are felt in present and future lives, and for Hakamaya the literal view of karma offers a blueprint for social responsibility.

The 12-fascicle text, according to Critical Buddhism, is also consistent in its refutation of original-enlightenment thought, which tends to deny causality because of an uncritical tolerance and syncretism and which is therefore rendered invalid as a basis for evaluative, ethical decision-making. For example, the "Shizen biku" [Fourth-stage monk] fascicle specifically negates *hongaku* tendencies that have crept into Zen thought, such as Hui-neng's doctrine of *kenshō* 見性 (seeing into [one's own] nature), which may suggest a hypostatization of a primordial, substantive "nature." "Sanjigo" explicitly refutes the view of karma endorsed by T'ang Chinese Ch'an master Chang-sha, who suggests the possibility of transcending karmic consequences. In the 12-fascicle text, Dōgen also demonstrates a willingness to critically revise his earlier thinking with regard to causality and original enlightenment. In the "Bukkyō" [Buddhist teachings] fascicle of the 75-fascicle text, for instance, Dōgen associates the twelve links of dependent co-arising with the preliminary pratyekabuddha stage rather than the final bodhisattva stage of realization, thus implying that there is a level of insight beyond causality. In a similar vein, in the "Gyōji" fascicle of the 75-fascicle text Dōgen argues that the cosmological principle of *gyōji*, or the sustained exertion of all human and natural phenomena, is more fundamental than dependent origination. But throughout the 12-fascicle text, it is clear that only "deep faith in causality" (*jinshin inga*)—a phrase repeated over two dozen times—is correct and that any subtle denial of causality is in error. Indeed, in "Shizen biku" Dōgen specifically criticizes the *hongaku*-oriented identification of mountains and rivers with ultimate reality—a view that he frequently expresses in the 75-fascicle text—as an example of the substantialist Senika heresy.

Furthermore, the 12-fascicle text refutes a variety of non-Buddhist standpoints that have overly influenced Zen doctrine. For example, Dōgen argues that the philosophies of Confucius and Lao-tzu, which

have been mixed with Buddhism to form the syncretic *sankyō itchi* ideology, fail to understand causality. He also repudiates an assortment of local folk religions and supernatural beliefs all too frequently assimilated by East Asian Buddhist sects, including Zen. Dōgen's critique brings to mind the refutation of Vedic ritualism and magic from the standpoint of causal logic as expressed in the *Tevijja Sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya*. Hakamaya cites the following passage in the "Kie buppōsōbō" [Taking refuge in the three jewels] fascicle to suggest that the antiquated, goal-oriented animistic tendencies Dōgen refuted continue to infect modern Japan:

> We should not act like those who, awestruck, vainly take refuge in mountain deities and spirits or worship at non-Buddhist shrines, for it is impossible to gain release from suffering in this way.... The wise person does not engage in such practices, for they only increase suffering and obstruct beneficial rewards. One must not take refuge in erroneous ways but clearly repudiate them.[26]

This approach in the 12-fascicle text seems in marked contrast to the affirmation of animism in the 75-fascicle text's "Raihaitokuzui" fascicle: "We revere the Dharma, whether manifested in a round pillar, a garden lantern, a buddha, a fox, a demon or a deity, a man or a woman."[27] In addition to the thematic and stylistic unity revolving around practices based on karmic retribution, an important feature of the 12-fascicle text noted by both Critical Buddhist and traditional scholars is its sequential integrity, especially when contrasted with the 75-fascicle text, which was arranged by Ejō primarily to reflect the chronological order in which the fascicles were composed. Each fascicle in the 12-fascicle text deals systematically with a stage in the process of realization, beginning with departure from home (*shukke*) and receiving the precepts (*jukai*), and moving on to such topics as awakening the bodhi-seeking mind (*hotsubodaishin*), paying homage to the Buddhas (*kuyō shobutsu*), repentance and purification of karmic conditioning (*jinshin inga*), the fourth stage of a monk's meditation (*shizen biku*), and finally the equanimity and compassionate outflows of the bodhisattva's attainment (*hachidainingaku*, the eight features of the enlightened person). The entire text forms a complete and persuasive religious document explicating the path from the initial impulse and determination to practice to the culmination and aftereffects of realization, and it is to be studied by a disciple at the appropriate stage in the quest.

THE REWRITTEN FASCICLES

One of the main points of evidence the Critical Buddhists used to support the priority of the 12-fascicle text is Dōgen's apparent rewriting of several fascicles in the 75-fascicle or 60-fascicle texts to express a new, more authentic standpoint for the 12-fascicle text. This textual issue, which supposedly captures the essence of Dōgen's new intentionality, is crucial to the metatextual concerns of Critical Buddhism. There are five rewritten fascicles, listed below according to their order in the 12-fascicle text:

a. "Shukke" [Home departure] first written in 1246, no. 75 in the 75-fascicle text, rewritten as "Shukke kudoku" [Merits of home departure] and compiled by Ejō in 1255, no. 1 in the 12-fascicle text (also no. 58 in the 60-fascicle text);
b. "Den'e" [Transmission of the robe], 1240, no. 32, rewritten as "Kesa kudoku" [Merits of the robe] in 1240, no. 3 (no. 41);
c. "Hotsumujōshin" [Awakening the supreme mind], 1244, no. 63, rewritten as "Hotsubodaishin" [Awakening the bodhi-mind] in 1244, no. 4 (no. 34)—in some editions both versions are called "Hotsubodaishin";
d. "Daishugyō" [Great cultivation], 1244, no. 68, rewritten as "Jinshin inga" [Deep faith in causality], compiled by Ejō in 1255, no. 7 (not in 60-fascicle text but no. 26 in the 28-fascicle text, with "Daishugyō" no. 17);
e. "Sanjigo" [Karmic retribution through the past, present, and future], 1253, in the 60-fascicle but not in the 75-fascicle text, rewritten as "Sanjigo" in 1253, no. 8 (no. 8).[28]

Of these fascicles, two cases—(b) and (c)—stand out because they were rewritten around the time of their original composition in the 1240s. Case (b) exhibits the most overlapping and even unity between the two versions. Traditional scholars acknowledge that "Den'e" was probably composed as a draft for the version included in the 12-fascicle text, thereby lending credence to the arguments of the Critical Buddhists. In regard to case (c), however, in which the two versions were first delivered on the same winter evening at Yoshimine-dera in 1244 (prior to the Kamakura visit), the traditional view has been that the "Hotsumujōshin" is intended for advanced monks while "Hotsubodaishin" is for novices. Critical Buddhism reverses this by suggesting that the latter demonstrates a clearer and deeper refutation of *hongaku* thought. "Hotsumujōshin" uses *hon-*

gaku-style rhetoric to identify the one-mind or all-encompassing mind with each and every aspect of the concrete phenomenal world, including the human and natural realms, but "Hotsubodaishin" departs from *hongaku* thought in emphasizing that the process of life-death during each moment invariably bears karmic consequences. In cases (a) and (d), the new versions were written in the post-Kamakura period of the 1250s: (a) is the last fascicle in the 75-fascicle text and the first in the 12-fascicle text, and the two fascicles in (d) offer different interpretations of the famous "Pai-chang's wild fox" koan. Finally, case (e), composed in the last year of Dōgen's life, is the latest of all these writings and the only one of the rewritten fascicles for which the initial version is not included in any extant edition of the 75-fascicle text.

The interpretation of case (d) of the rewritten fascicles expresses as much as any other single argument in their repertoire the heart of the Critical Buddhists' view of Dōgen's concept of karma and its relevance for overcoming *dhātu-vāda* viewpoints in East Asian Buddhism as a whole. The two versions both begin by citing the famous "wild fox" koan included in Pai-chang's recorded sayings and also cited in a variety of koan collections, including the *Mumonkan* (no. 2) and the *Shōyōroku* (no. 8), transmission of the lamp histories such as the *Tenshō kōtōroku* and *Shūmon rentōeyō*, koan commentaries, and dozens of Sung-era recorded sayings texts. The importance of this koan for Dōgen is demonstrated by his use of it in his own koan collection, the *Shinji/Mana Shōbōgenzō*, and his commentary on it in the *Shōbōgenzō zuimonki* and in several passages in the *Eihei kōroku*, including a verse commentary in the ninth volume. According to the narrative of the source koan, a monk has been transfigured into a fox for five hundred lifetimes as a punishment for expressing a misunderstanding of causality: in response to a disciple's inquiry, he maintains that even a person of great cultivation (*daishugyō*) does "not fall into causality" (*furaku inga*). The monk is released from this fate, and the fox corpse is buried with Buddhist rites, through the "turning word" (*ittengo*) of Pai-chang, who maintains the virtue of "not obscuring causality" (*fumai inga*). The fundamental paradox of this koan is that by verbally denying causality the monk is victimized by karma, yet by Pai-chang's affirming its impact he gains release. Yet, as the commentary by Dōgen and other Zen masters indicates, there are several problematical points in interpreting the koan, including the final fates of the monk (does he continue to transmigrate or attain full nirvana?) and the

fox spirit. Dōgen also ponders the idea that the fox might have deceived Pai-chang into believing it was really a monk, in which case its corpse should not have received a Buddhist burial.

On the other hand, the basic message of the koan about the inviolability of karmic causality, as indicated by the phrase *fumai inga,* seems quite clear. Yet most commentaries on the koan case, including those in the two koan collections, highlight the provisionality and ultimately the indistinguishability of the *furaku inga* and *fumai inga* responses.[29] Dōgen, in the earlier "Daishugyō" fascicle, seems to echo that view:

> Because causality necessarily means full cause and complete effect, there is no reason for a discussion concerning "falling into" or "not falling into," "obscuring" or "not obscuring" [causality]. If "not falling into causality" is incorrect, then "not obscuring causality" is also incorrect. Nevertheless, because of a fundamental misunderstanding, [the old man] was first transfigured into a wild fox body and then released from being a wild fox. And although "not falling into causality" was incorrect in the age of Buddha Kāsyapa, it may not be incorrect in the age of Buddha Śākyamuni. Although "not obscuring causality" released the wild fox body in the current age of Buddha Śākyamuni, it may not have been effective in the age of Buddha Kāsyapa.[30]

Both fascicles dealing with this koan are critical of the Senika heresy, which advocates a "return" to an original nature or source and sees the release from the fox body as a symbol of the monk resuming his true nature. Yet, whereas "Daishugyō" refuses to criticize the old man's view of *furaku inga*, "Jinshin inga" repudiates Dōgen's position of a decade before in which he equated causality and the transcendence of causality. In the later work he asserts quite emphatically that only *fumai inga* is accurate and that *furaku inga*, which amounts to the denial of causality (*hotsumu inga*), is mistaken.

> The single greatest limitation of the monks of Sung China today is that they do not realize that "not falling into causality" is a false teaching. It is a pity that even though they encounter the true Dharma of the Tathagata correctly transmitted from patriarch to patriarch, they accept the views of those who would deny causality. They must awaken right away to the principle of causality. The expression "not obscuring causality" of the current head monk of Mt. Pai-chang demonstrates that he never denied causality. It is clear that practice, or cause, leads to realization, or result.[31]

SUMMARY OF THE CRITICAL BUDDHISTS' POSITION

Next I will sum up the main arguments of Critical Buddhism before considering the responses of the traditional scholars. The central point of Critical Buddhism, particularly the Hakamaya thesis, is that in the 12-fascicle text Dōgen abandons and refutes his previous association with original enlightenment rhetoric and stresses the role of causality. That is, his philosophy of Zen undergoes a transformation from a metaphysical view that draws unwittingly from animism or naturalism and seeks a single source of reality (*dhātu*) beyond causality to a literal, strict karmic determinism that emphasizes a moral imperative based on the fundamental condition that karmic retribution is active in each impermanent moment. Whereas the metaphysical view is based primarily on a transcendental contemplative awareness, the literal view requires a wisdom born of study and knowledge. One of the main features of the later writings, especially noticeable when comparing the rewritten fascicles to their earlier versions, is Dōgen's extensive use of Buddhist texts. Thus, the Critical Buddhists maintain that the philosophy of religion in the 12-fascicle text is characterized by intellectual life and scholarly learning through textual study rather than the intuitionism and suppression of discourse that is expressed, for example, in the "Bendōwa." In other words, the later text marks a transition from "zazen only" (*shikan-taza*) and "original realization and marvelous practice" (*honshō myōshu*) to "honor prajna" (*hannya sonchō*) and "faith in causality" (*jinshin inga*).[32]

The overall aim of Critical Buddhism involves more than a simple reinterpretation of the *Shōbōgenzō*. The aim is to use Dōgen's change of heart as a starting point from which to challenge the *hongaku* orthodoxy that has perpetuated social discrimination and tacitly supported the status quo on the basis of claims of epistemologial nondiscrimination and ontological dynamism. This challenge in turn involves rethinking the meaning of the nonduality of samsara (which is causal) and nirvana (which transcends causality). If we reflect back on the origins of the debate concerning the relation between these two dimensions, the Abhidharma analysis of the dharmic factors of phenomenal existence draws a strict dichotomy between conditioned (*saṃskṛta*) dharmas, which are bound by the cause-effect process, and unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) dharmas, which are not bound by cause-effect. While the aim of early Mahayana *śūnyavāda* philosophy (Madhyamika school and *Prajñāpāramitā* sutras), according to most East Asian interpretations, is to demonstrate the inseparability or

indistinguishability of the realms of the conditioned, or causal, and the unconditioned, or noncausal, this raises a delicate but crucial issue pursued by subsequent schools of thought: When causality and noncausality are equalized, which side of the nondualistic equation—the side of causality or the side of noncausality—is stressed in understanding spiritual freedom? In other words, does the equalization suggest the naturalist heretical position (*jinen-gedō*) that causality is considered from the standpoint of fundamental reality to be a part of noncausality, a position that might imply that one is inherently free from the effects of causality and thus does not have to attain purification by overcoming discrimination? Or does it suggest the equally problematic nihilistic position that noncausality is equalized on the side of causality, which implies that one can never attain freedom from causality no matter how much effort is exerted, and that there is thus no motivation to reverse the tendency toward social discrimination? In either case, the moral implications of the inevitability of karmic retribution and the need for repentance in the genuine sense are lost.

According to Critical Buddhism, the *hongaku* view reflected in Zen thought and expressed in the 75-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō* actually compounds the conceptual and moral dilemmas implicit in the naturalist position. The *hongaku* view, by identifying ultimate reality with concrete phenomena, asserts nonduality from the standpoint of causality swallowing up noncausality and at the same time being swallowed up by it (since it does not necessarily require spiritual purification). Thus there is no genuine freedom or nondiscrimination as claimed under the banner of universal freedom and equality. What occurs instead is an acceptance of things as they are without moral authentication or evaluative judgment. Thus the real problem is not simply a matter of identifying polarities or of shifting the conclusion from one side to the other, but of equalizing them in such a way that the moral component of karmic causality is highlighted rather than concealed. If the morality of cause-effect is obscured because it is overly influenced by an emphasis on noncausality, then genuine noncausality cannot be attained. For the Critical Buddhists, Dōgen resolves this dilemma by asserting in "Jinshin inga" that "the law of causality is clear and impersonal (or selfless)"[33] in the sense that it is universal and inviolable, and yet that it has an eminently subjective quality ("deep faith") in that the freedom of noncausality can be attained only in and through the continuing process of moral purification perfected within the realm of causality.[34] This recalls the Madhyamika (*Mūlamadhyamakārikā*

25: 9–10) view that nirvana is found in terms of causality—nirvana occurs in the midst of samsara and not as an escape from it, yet is attained only through a fundamental change of perspective rather than the mere acceptance of causal relations. However, Dōgen's approach is based not on a nonrelational freedom from karma, but on an eminently flexible and polymorphous process in which the stages of practice and realization, while often simultaneous and overlapping, occur in irreversible sequence.[35]

THE RESPONSES OF TRADITIONAL SCHOLARS

While nearly all traditional scholars acknowledge the basic merit and even "sensational" impact of the issues raised by Critical Buddhism, they express mixed reactions concerning the long-term significance of this new methodology. Kagamishima Genryū, one of the most senior and prominent scholars in Dōgen studies and the man who wrote the introduction to *Issues Related to the 12-Fascicle Shōbōgenzō*, admits that there can be no turning back from some of the liberating effects of Critical Buddhism. He points out, for example, how far scholarship has progressed since Tokugawa-era scholar Tenkei Denson—known for his early but idiosyncratic commentary on the *Shōbōgenzō*—argued rather dogmatically that the "Daishugyō" fascicle is the true version while the "Jinshin inga" must be false. Yet Kagamishima also sounds a cautionary note, appraising Critical Buddhism as an overemphatic and rather biased approach to be contrasted with what he considers the more reasonable, mainstream compromise position of Ishii, Sugio Gen'yū, Shimizu Hideo, and others. The compromise position (which Kagamishima also challenges, nevertheless, though to a lesser extent), sees the 12-fascicle text as expressing a multivalent "spiritual change" that marks a shift in emphasis rather than a revolution in Dōgen's direction. The compromise suggests, for instance, that the 12-fascicle text must be seen only in connection with other writings and activities from Dōgen's later period.

Kagamishima's approach thus indicates that it is necessary to distinguish between two traditionalist positions—referred to below as (a) and (b)—for a total of three positions. At one end of the spectrum Critical Buddhism argues that Dōgen underwent a radical and decisive change, and at the opposite end the more conservative traditionalist (a) view maintains that there was no real change and that Dōgen stayed essentially the same throughout his life following his return from China. Both of

these positions stress a single, simple standpoint, whereas the compromise traditionalist (b) view allows for change but not in the clear-cut and once-and-for-all way that the Critical Buddhists claim. The first position holds that the 12-fascicle text, which was written during one relatively confined time span, supersedes the earlier text and is sufficient for an understanding of Dōgen; the second position maintains the fundamental equality of the 75-fascicle and 12-fascicle texts, while asserting the ultimate priority of the former in terms of the more sophisticated audience it targets; and the third position explores complex areas of development in Dōgen's later writings and biography that affect an understanding of the relation between the 75-fascicle and 12-fascicle texts.

What links the two traditionalist positions is a basic skepticism regarding any attempt to prove Dōgen's intentionality concerning the priority of the 12-fascicle text. From that standpoint they both make a series of guerilla raids on Critical Buddhist strongholds, including interpretations of the rewritten fascicles and Dōgen's philosophy of causality. The traditional scholars have argued against Critical Buddhism and in support of the 75-fascicle text on several grounds, such as the difficulty of establishing that the "rewriting" was Dōgen's and not the editing of his disciples, and the existence of other apparently rewritten fascicles that do not appear in or express the standpoint of the 12-fascicle text. Furthermore, Dōgen's approach to the topic of causality is complex, and it is easy to mistake a shift in perspective for a fundamental change.

The leading figures of the traditionalist (a) position include Kagamishima and Kawamura Kōdō. The latter, a specialist in the textual formation of the *Shōbōgenzō* and its early medieval commentaries, is sympathetic to some of the main aims of Critical Buddhism, especially its dramatizing of Dōgen's critical stance with regard to forms of Buddhism he considered deficient. For example, Kawamura agrees that it is important to distinguish between Dōgen's approach to Zen and the problematic views of *kyōge betsuden* and *sankyō itchi*, and also that it is helpful to compel contemporary Sōtō scholars to rethink the issue of how substantive metaphysics has been smuggled into a variety of syncretistic Buddhist doctrines and practices. However, Kawamura believes that Dōgen maintained the same critical distance from heretical views throughout his career and that it is important not to misread and overstate Dōgen's criticisms. Instead, it is preferable to see Dōgen as straddling a middle-way position in regard to *hongaku* thought, accepting its positive features as an expression of the

soteriological goal of realizing the unified nonsubstantive basis of contextual relations while refuting its tendency to obviate the need for sustained practice.

Kagamishima and Kawamura both argue that there is no firm evidence that Dōgen limited his message to the 12-fascicle text at the end of his life, or that he had come to reject the 75-fascicle text. Kawamura emphasizes Ejō's role as an editor and interpreter of Dōgen. Ejō's editing of the twelve fascicles two years after Dōgen's death is the only tangible evidence for the priority of the new text. Yet, as Kawamura points out, all the other evidence indicates that Ejō asserted the priority of the 75-fascicle text. Ejō apparently gained Dōgen's approval to edit the 75-fascicle text the year before the master's final days. If Dōgen had emphasized the importance of the 12-fascicle text as he approached death, why did Ejō not show this in a more vigorous way than by composing a single, cryptic (and long-obscured) colophon to the "Hachidainingaku" fascicle? If the Critical Buddhists are correct, why did Ejō not stop altogether his editing of the earlier fascicles, which Dōgen himself had continued to revise until nearly the very end of his life? Also, why did the other main disciples who were privy to Dōgen's way of thinking, Senne and Kyōgō, comment only on the 75-fascicle text? Kagamishima wonders if there may be in the near future a discovery of another version of Ejō's colophon that will further clarify—or perhaps complicate—our understanding of Dōgen's final instructions or intentions.[36]

Furthermore, Kagamishima and Kawamura emphasize that it is simplistic to argue that the five rewritten fascicles were revised for a single reason alone. The specific methods and purposes of rewriting vary significantly from case to case, but the general impression of the rewritten fascicles indicates that the respective versions express distinct but complementary rather than conflicting viewpoints on a particular topic. During the course of his move from Kyoto to Echizen, Dōgen, they argue, recognized the necessity of addressing the concerns of several different types of disciples (students): those still needing persuasion to leave home, those already in monastic life but needing to refine and develop their training, and those approaching the final stages of realization. For example, in the two versions of the fascicle on leaving home, the first version ("Shukke") deals with home departure from the standpoint of *jukai*, or the stage of receiving the precepts, while the second ("Shukke kudoku") examines it from the standpoint of *kudoku*, or the following stage of attaining merit.

Similarly, the "Daishugyō" and "Jinshin inga" fascicles that reach drastically different conclusions concerning the phrase *furaku inga* (not falling into causality) may be approaching its meaning from different standpoints.[37] "Daishugyō" approves of the saying from the standpoint of ultimate reality, which transcends the distinction between causality and noncausality, while "Jinshin inga" criticizes it from a more restricted realm of discourse, conventional truth, in which the tendency to avoid or escape causality must be refuted. But in the final analysis the two levels of discourse, ultimate and conventional, enhance and enrich one another to demonstrate a conclusion that would likely, though ironically, be supported by Critical Buddhism: the transcendence of causality is within, yet not merely within, causality, like the process of disentangling vines (*kattō*) by means of entangled vines as in the 75-fascicle text's "Kattō." Therefore, the traditionalist (a) position is that the *Shōbōgenzō* expresses multiple perspectives, so that the 12-fascicle text is not complete and autonomous but complementary with the 75-fascicle text in that the two texts intertwine general and specific, introductory and advanced frames of reference without any sense of polarization between them.

Ishii Shūdō, one of the leading representatives of what Kagamishima has identified as the compromise view, is very sympathetic to the aims and methods of his friend and colleague, Hakamaya, and was one of the earliest to respond formally to Critical Buddhism.[38] Ishii agrees that Dōgen's approach to Buddhism is based primarily on wisdom (Skt. *prajñā*) and learning rather than contemplation, despite the fact that Sōtō is often characterized as a religion based on zazen-only or just-sitting (*shikantaza*), a sectarian misunderstanding traceable to fourth patriarch Keizan that has been projected back to Dōgen. Without being too harsh on Keizan, who since the Tokugawa era has been revered by the sect as a kind of cofounder, Ishii feels that the purity of Dōgen's thought was subverted by the un-Buddhistic syncretism and misleading simplification inspired by Keizan and his disciples. Like the Critical Buddhists, Ishii argues that Dōgen should be understood as standing in accord with the critical approach to philosophy practiced in the Madhyamika school in India and Tibet, which seeks to overcome all one-sided fixations and delusions. In that context, Ishii cites the studies of Yamaguchi Zuihō in the early 1980s that pointed out for the first time the significant affinities between Dōgen and South-Central Asian Buddhism. He also maintains that Dōgen Zen is different from Chinese Ch'an, which has been overly

influenced by Lao-tzu and Confucius (though Ishii's view of Dōgen's Japanification as a purification of the syncretistic elements he found in China may be considered naive). On the question of interpreting the *Shōbōgenzō*, Ishii endorses the Critical Buddhist focus on the 12-fascicle text as a means of generating a fundamental revision of the Sōtō sect in a way that links classical theories of dependent origination to the contemporary need for social responsibility, though like other traditionalists he does not comment directly on social issues.

On the other hand, Ishii shares with the traditionalist (a) position a skepticism concerning several of the main conclusions of Critical Buddhism. First, he feels that Dōgen's attitude toward *hongaku* thought stayed relatively constant after his return from China, with no clearly discernible revision of thinking following his Kamakura visit. He sees Dōgen's constancy as a position of constructive ambivalence, standing not strictly for or against *hongaku* thought, but he also seems to put more emphasis than traditionalism (a) on Dōgen's struggle throughout his career for an appropriate communicative style and substance. Ishii agrees with Yamauchi Shun'yū, a specialist in Dōgen's relation to Japanese Tendai, that it is necessary at this stage of scholarship to take attention away from Dōgen's "doubt," which after all stemmed from his youthful concerns and inexperience (his rather unsophisticated question is not entirely relevant to the complex historical and textual issues involved in interpreting Dōgen's understanding of *hongaku* thought). Like traditionalism (a), Ishii is cautious not to overvalue the 12-fascicle text at the expense of Dōgen's other works. He points out that Dōgen edited and added to the 75-fascicle text until his death, so that the dates of writing and rewriting (as well as the question of how much disciples contributed to the revised versions) cannot be pinned down, especially considering the variety of *Shōbōgenzō* texts. In particular, Ishii is skeptical of the role of the 12-fascicle text in relation to the so-called 100-fascicle project mentioned in Ejō's colophon, because it is not entirely clear why this project would be important. Perhaps Dōgen was trying to emulate the *juko hyakusoku* style (poetic commentaries on one hundred koan cases) and other Sung-era collections of recorded sayings, but if this is the case it does not support the Critical Buddhist arguments.

The main reason that Kagamishima considers Ishii's compromise position to be a reasonable one is that Ishii, somewhat like the Critical Buddhists, acknowledges a change during the last five years of Dōgen's

life, marking a new attitude toward the Eihei-ji environment and a period of spiritual growth. However, in sympathy with the traditionalist (a) position, Ishii tries not to exaggerate the role of the 12-fascicle text or downplay Dōgen's earlier and other later writings. Interpreting the multifaceted change in Dōgen's life requires an examination of all aspects of what Dōgen was saying and writing in this period—it is not enough to limit oneself to the 12-fascicle text, which in fact does not express a single, uniform, coherent view, but uses multiple voices to reflect different influences and convey diverse messages. Ishii emphasizes that an understanding of the post-Kamakura period depends on a point-by-point comparative analysis of Dōgen's thinking as expressed in both the 12-fascicle text and the other later works.

Ishii's approach to the *Shōbōgenzō* issues centers on the interrelatedness of the 12-fascicle text and two other Dōgen texts from this period, showing the "intra-textuality" of the later *Shōbōgenzō* writings, the *Eihei kōroku* collection of *jōdō* or formal-style sermons (the majority of which were composed from 1247–1253), and the *Hōkyōki* collection of conversations Dōgen had in China with Ju-ching.[39] He also shows the intertextuality involved in Dōgen's frequent references in his later works to the texts of Hung-chih, Ju-ching, and a variety of early Buddhist texts.[40] The intra- and intertextual dimensions reveal changes in the style and substance of Dōgen's thought, but not necessarily in a way that supports Critical Buddhism. For example, the *Eihei kōroku* provides an example of how Dōgen shifted in his later period from the informal or *jishu* style of the 75-fascicle text to the more formal *jōdō* style.[41] His citations and allusions to Hung-chih and Ju-ching in the *Eihei kōroku* also increase significantly in the post-Kamakura period, and it is clear that the rewritten fascicles of the 12-fascicle text use many more citations from early Zen and Buddhist writings, including Zen *goroku*, Mahayana sutras (especially the *Lotus Sutra*), and jataka tales.[42] However, these stylistic changes could indicate an emulation of the patterns of Sung Ch'an or the continuing influence of Japanese Tendai as much as a return to the fundamental doctrine of dependent origination. Examining changes in the substance of Dōgen's thought by comparing the 12-fascicle text with other texts on specific topics also gives a mixed message. There is some agreement in that the *Eihei kōroku* (no. 412), like "Shizen biku," criticizes *sankyō itchi,* and that the *Hōkyōki* (no. 20), like "Sanjigo," records Ju-ching's refutation of Chang-sha's view of karma. However, Ishii believes that an exam-

ination of all of the later texts shows that the key to the spiritual change in the later period was a renewed emphasis on the priority of "purposeless zazen." The lack of attention to this issue in the 12-fascicle text is an incongruity that undermines the standpoint of Critical Buddhism and highlights the traditionalist (a) view of complementary, audience-specific texts.

Ishii's compromise approach is supported by two other recent studies of the 12-fascicle text: a brief, intensive analysis of Dōgen's commentary on the "wild fox" koan in the *Eihei kōroku* by Ishii Seijun; and a comprehensive overview of the relation between textual and biographical issues in Dōgen's later, post-Kamakura period by Matsuoka Yukako.[43] First, Ishii Seijun points out that while many scholars have been analyzing the disparity in interpretations of the koan in the two *Shōbōgenzō* fascicles, it is also important to examine Dōgen's *Eihei kōroku* commentaries, which suggest that he did not drastically change his view of karma and causality. For example, in a sermon delivered in 1241 (*Eihei kōroku* 1.61), Dōgen says, "Look! Look! Causality is clear," which seems to anticipate the "Jinshin inga" passage written over a decade later. Furthermore, in a sermon from 1252 (*Eihei kōroku* 7.40), Dōgen begins by saying in several different ways that the *furaku inga* approach represents a denial of causality, which is a heretical view. Yet he concludes by arguing, "If we speak only of not falling into causality it invariably results in the denial of causality, but if we speak only of not obscuring causality it is like coveting a neighbor's precious possessions," thereby suggesting that an exclusive focus on *fumai inga* can also be seen as an extreme position.

Matsuoka, in articles on "Dōgen's rebirth" (1993) and "The contemporary meaning of the 12-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō*" (1996) surveys systematically each fascicle in the 12-fascicle text from the intertextual standpoint of assessing its connections to other writings from the period. She maintains that Dōgen's spiritual rebirth was a result of his disillusionment with the direction of warrior Zen during his visit to Kamakura and his consequent sense of needing to recast his approach so as to eliminate any possible antinomian implications in his earlier nondualistic philosophy and rejuvenate the discipline and morality of his disciples in the Echizen countryside. In the penultimate section on "From Buddha to Bodhisattva," Matsuoka argues that Dōgen changed from a dispassionate philosopher of enlightenment to a compassionate teacher and monastic community leader, a development already evidenced in the transition

	Critical Buddhism	*Traditional (a)*	*Traditional (b)*
Dōgen's Intention	12-fascicle text only	75- and 12-fascicle texts are complementary	no clear, single discernible plan
Rewriting	only rewritten fascicles are relevant	Dōgen continues editing 75-fascicle text to the end	inter- and intra-textual elements must be clarified
Main Emphasis	emphasis on karmic causality	encompassing of introductory and advanced perspectives	post-Kamakura "spiritual change"
On *Hongaku*	Dōgen sharpens critique in 12-fascicle text	maintains same consistent view throughout career	continues ambivalent view

from "Hotsumujōshin" to the rewritten "Hotsubodaishin" fascicle. Like Ishii Shūdō, Matsuoka supports the Critical Buddhist position to the extent that Dōgen changed and revised his outlook. Yet she suggests that this change is not due simply to the adoption of an anti-*hongaku* philosophy, but also is a reaction to wide-ranging social issues affecting Kamakura Zen, as well as his new Eihei-ji environment.

The above chart sums up the major differences between Critical Buddhism and the two forms of traditional Buddhism on four interpretive issues: 1) Dōgen's intention in revising the *Shōbōgenzō*; 2) the status of the rewritten fascicles; 3) the main emphasis of his later works; and 4) Dōgen's view of *hongaku* thought.

EVALUATION OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS OF CRITICAL BUDDHISM

While Sōtō scholars consider the Critical Buddhist movement overly sensational, other observers may view it as a "stirring of the waters" (or perhaps a "tempest in a teapot"). Those Buddhists and Buddhologists who have been subjected to its often scathing criticisms may take offense, and some scholars and thinkers have responded that Critical Buddhism is actually a veiled form of fundamentalism that deems itself alone worthy of determining authentic forms of religion based on a simple and perhaps arbitrary commitment to the doctrine of dependent origination and a sec-

tarian preference for a particular set of Dōgen's writings.[44] The accusation of fundamentalism must seem both ironic and disturbing to the Critical Buddhists, who probably see themselves as quite unfundamentalist for several reasons: they appeal to the critical intellect rather than simplistic theological affirmation and faith based on the inerrancy of scripture; they aim for progressive reform rather than the conservative or reactionary political agenda found in many Western fundamentalist movements; and they are not involved in elaborately organized evangelical or healing rituals. Some of the New Religions in Japan, such as Sōka Gakkai, appear to qualify much more readily as "fundamentalist," though such labels must be used with great caution.

Another commonly voiced criticism is that Critical Buddhism is a throwback to "nineteenth-century approaches" to Buddhist studies when the early, Victorian scholars rather naively sought out a true, uncompromised, intellectually satisfying form of Buddhism without paying attention to the complexity and diversity of the tradition over history and affected by cultural interactions. Hakamaya has already responded to some of his critics by stressing that Critical Buddhism, if it is to be genuine, must involve a continuing process of wholehearted self-criticism. In order to clarify the criticisms of the methodology thus far, as well as the contributions it has made, it is necessary to evaluate the Critical Buddhist and traditionalist approaches to the *Shōbōgenzō* in light of their broader impact on Buddhist studies and comparative religious thought as a whole. My suggestion is that it is more appropriate to view Critical Buddhism as an example of "foundationalism," that is, as a sector of the religion trying to reinterpret its medieval sources from a classical or foundational standpoint and in terms of distinctively modern social and philosophical concerns.

In its analysis of the meaning and relevance of the *Shōbōgenzō* texts, Critical Buddhism has, at the very least, contributed to a breaking down of some of the barriers between South and East Asian studies by commenting for the first time on *hongaku* and Zen thought from the perspective of Madhyamika dialectical negation. Although the traditional scholars dispute Critical Buddhism on textual and historical grounds, the new methodological movement has exposed levels of sedimentation surrounding interpretations of the intentionality and merit of Dōgen's philosophical and practical writings. The depth and detail of the discussions of texts and intertexts by the Critical and traditional Buddhists has contributed to a full-scale revision in our understanding of Dōgen that has

helped revitalize the Sōtō sect, currently facing an array of difficult and even bewildering social issues. This in turn has awakened Buddhism from its discriminatory slumber and prompted a self-reflection about what authentic Buddhism is, based on ideological continuity with the doctrine of causality. For many years, Buddhist thought, as opposed to Buddhist studies, was centered in Kyoto, and particularly in the Nishida-Tanabe-Nishitani Kyoto school. Now Critical Buddhism in Tokyo has stolen some of its thunder and criticized Nishida's philosophy of place (*basho*, based on the Greek *topos*) as a *dhātu-vāda*, topical philosophy linked to prewar nationalism.

The main aim of Critical Buddhism is to demonstrate that, amid an array of deficient alternatives, the 12-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō* text provides a legitimate historical precedent for modern reform, a role model that can be extracted from its original context and made relevant to the contemporary scene. Critical Buddhism is not the first methodology that has attempted to lay a theoretical ground for social reform. There is, for example, the Rinzai priest/scholar Akizuki Ryōmin, who writes on numerous topics including Dōgen and whose calls for a "new Mahayana" issue from a postmodern viewpoint that has a "painful awareness of the demands facing Buddhism today, both from within and from without." The late Hisamatsu Shin'ichi created the reform F.A.S. society to promote world peace, and Ichikawa Hakugen has called for Buddhist intellectuals to share responsibility for Japanese atrocities committed during the Asia-Pacific War, as these were based on a false sense of harmony that led to compliance with the totalitarian regime.[45] But the Critical Buddhist project, with its sometimes excessive hyperbole, risks creating an inflated sense of the purity and authenticity of Dōgen's thought and simultaneously denigrating most of the Sōtō sect's history after Dōgen. It also appears exclusivist, even combative, toward most of the already polarized and fragmented Chinese and Japanese Buddhist sects. Many feel that Critical Buddhism is simply trying to "save" Dōgen from a host of challenges (though Hakamaya claims a higher regard for Hōnen) and is all too ready to abandon Sōtō and other syncretistic forms of East Asian Buddhism—as if any thinker, Śākyamuni and Dōgen included, is immune from charges of syncretism. Although Critical Buddhism does not intend to foster exclusivism, it is perhaps inevitable that its tone of being *engagé* and even *enragé* creates such an impression.

There are two reasons for the misimpressions about Critical Buddhism, one based on shortcomings in what the Critical Buddhists have accomplished and the other based on complexities involved in determining and assessing its unique methodological orientation.

The first involves a set of limitations inherent in the arguments of both Critical and traditional Buddhism, which remain bound by Dōgen apologetics and rarely move much beyond the arena of Dōgen studies. Because of this, the Critical Buddhists have left several problematic areas in Dōgen's writings outside the boundaries of their discourse. The most significant area involves the role of magico-religious ritualism directly reflected in the 12-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō* as well as other works of Dōgen's post-Kamakura period, including the *Eihei kōroku* and other records of his sermons. Some passages in the 12-fascicle text support the Critical Buddhist view of karmic determinism devoid of supernaturalism. Among the rewritten fascicles, for example, two of the earlier versions, "Hotsumujōshin" and "Daishugyō," are primarily concerned with the ritual efficacy of building stupas and the burial of monks, respectively, while the new versions—"Hotsubodaishin" and "Jinshin inga"—focus exclusively on the issues of impermanence and causality. However, other passages in the 12-fascicle text tend to give an entirely different picture of Dōgen as a popularizer who uncritically affirms all aspects of Buddhist religiosity. To illustrate the meaning of karma, for instance, Dōgen refers to miracles and magical deeds, such as a eunuch whose sexual status is reversed, a prostitute whose life dramatically changes because she briefly wears a Buddhist robe, and the power of animal transformations involving a fox and deer. Most of these examples are drawn from jataka tales, as noted by the traditionalist (b) scholars, or perhaps more directly from the *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāsā*.[46]

One area the Critical Buddhists need to explore is how Dōgen's view of karma may have been influenced by related doctrines in other forms of Kamakura Buddhism, including the notions of *mujō* (impermanence), *innen* (karmic fate), *ōjō* (rebirth), and *mappō* (age of the degenerate law). Dōgen may also have been affected by the increasingly popular *setsuwa* tales, such as the *Konjaku monogatari*, which were the primary textual vehicle for jatakas and which convey a literal view of karmic determinism in the past, present, and future lives. This latter aspect may well have developed subsequent to the original Pāli sources.[47] Furthermore, the Critical Buddhists need to address a number of historical, philological,

and philosophical issues involved in interpreting Dōgen's literal view of karma. Aside from the larger question of whether dependent origination can be considered the single preeminent doctrine in early Buddhism (the *Nikāya*s, for example, contain several different versions of Śākyamuni's realization), there is another question central to *Shōbōgenzō* studies: What is the relation between the accumulation of karmic merit and the attainment of a transcendental awareness that remains bound by karma?[48] Does Dōgen's later standpoint re-create the problematic Abhidharma view of separating merit from transcendence, a view that Madhyamika refutes? Is there not a need to critically evaluate the 12-fascicle text itself?[49]

In addition, Critical Buddhism should explain more fully other possible influences on Dōgen's later writings, such as that of repentance meditation in T'ien-t'ai/Tendai practice. Critical Buddhism also needs to connect its interpretation of Dōgen's thought to a whole series of subsequent developments in Sōtō Zen and Japanese Buddhism leading up to the modern social crises. These include textual issues, such as the role of the early medieval *Shōbōgenzō* commentaries by Senne and Kyōgō, which set the stage for later interpretations of Dōgen especially with regard to *hongaku* thought. Also important are historical studies, such as the effect of the Tokugawa-era Buddhist parish (*danka*) system and the Meiji-era Shinto-Buddhist separation (*shinbutsu bunri*) on the role of Zen in contemporary society.

If Critical Buddhism is seriously interested in addressing and resolving the issue of social discrimination, it must also engage a variety of perspectives on this issue, which has been dealt with by other factions of Zen in addition to other Buddhist sects and non-Buddhist critics and social commentators. These perspectives include: historical studies of the origins, sociology, and rituals associated with the practice of bestowing *kaimyō* resulting in discriminatory tendencies;[50] the question of how the category of *sendara* (Skt. *caṇḍāla*), especially as it appears in Chapter 14 of the *Lotus Sutra*, has been used in Japanese Buddhist thought to discriminate against those defined as too impure to be able to attain enlightenment[51]—this issue is complementary but somewhat different from the issue of the moral implications of *hongaku*; the role of outcasts in the Jōdo Shinshū, to which the vast majority of *burakumin* were assigned during the Tokugawa era and which has made considerable progress in overcoming discrimination, although *eta-dera* (outcast temples) or *eta-za* (outcaste seats) remain unchanged in some areas; the analysis of the structure of

discrimination by recent critics such as Noma Hiroshi and Karatani Kōjin, who acknowledge that, in addition to the strictly Buddhist factors, Japan's mistreatment of outcasts has its roots in Hindu caste practices that infiltrated into East Asian society, as well as Shinto notions of ritual defilement and contamination (*kegare*) that supported the Buddhist notion of impure karma.

The second reason for misimpressions is that it is difficult to identify and categorize Critical Buddhist methodology in a modern context. Critical Buddhism is strictly neither historical scholarship nor speculative philosophy (although it tends to resemble both), and it may appear dogmatic and argumentative compared to the conventional standards of objectivity and rationality in these disciplines. As in modern studies of most religious traditions, there tends to be a methodological gap in Buddhist studies between, on the one hand, fieldwork studies following a social-scientific model and focusing on ritual praxis and living encounters with symbols and, on the other hand, textual studies following philological or hermeneutic models and focusing on an analysis of scripture and various genres of scriptural commentary. However, within the domain of textual studies there is often another, more subtle, but perhaps even more significant gap between the historical approach and the comparative philosophical approach. The historian asks when, where, and who wrote the text without succumbing to speculative inquiries, while the philosopher asks how and why the text was written and what its meaning is, without limiting the inquiry to a particular diachronic context. The textual historian may feel that the philosopher takes too much liberty with the source material, while the philosopher may feel confined by the seemingly artificial boundaries of discourse set up and enforced by the historian. Philosophers may see historians as overly skeptical about Buddhism's apparent contradictions and problematics, while historians may believe that philosophers present an idealized view of the tradition shorn of inconsistencies based on cultural conditioning.

However, Critical Buddhism as an example of "foundationalism" really does not try to duplicate the methods of either objective scholarship or rational philosophy in the contemporary sense. Instead, its main model is classical Buddhist scholasticism, which is deliberately evaluative rather than neutral or descriptive in its approach to interpreting various ideologies. Buddhist scholasticism, particularly the approach known as "hierarchical evaluation of the teachings" (*kyōhan*), seeks to provide an orthodox

theological (rather than objective buddhological) ground for a particular form of orthopraxis by contrasting its own approach with alternatives that are judged to be partial, misleading, or deficient. Therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between the hermeneutics of scholastic hierarchical classification, which is intended to be evaluative and polemical, and the hermeneutics of scholarship, which tries to maintain objectivity and neutrality. In this case, Critical Buddhist foundational scholasticism uses the 12-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō* philosophy of karmic retribution to support a broad-based reform movement underway not only within the Sōtō sect in Japan but throughout a number of other Buddhist movements, including "socially engaged Buddhism" in America. It transforms traditional concerns with monastic practice and discipline into contemporary concerns for social commitment and responsibility. Despite occasional rhetorical excess, it is a generally consistent and constructively critical method, though not without flaws and lacunae.

Therefore, Critical Buddhist foundationalism more closely resembles other recent forms of Western theology than it does either religious scholarship or fundamentalism. One example is deconstructive theology, often compared to Madhyamika Buddhism, which highlights and deconstructs the substantive ideological presuppositions underlying conventional theology in its attempt to unravel and decenter all logocentric standpoints.[52] Deconstructionism exposes the sociopolitical context underlying theological rhetoric, though it usually does not endorse a social agenda.

Another comparison can be made to liberation theology, which advocates a rethinking of the foundational sources (i.e., the Gospels) as the basis for contemporary social reform and justice. Like Critical Buddhism, liberation theology has been criticized both for too liberally diverging from and too conservatively remaining within the framework of traditional Christianity.[53] However, the comparison breaks down for two reasons. First, the Latin American sociopolitical situation interacts with one religion (Roman Catholicism), whereas Japanese Buddhism must operate in an increasingly secularized country with a long history of religious pluralism. Also, liberation theology is based on a distinction and conflict between oppressor and oppressed and is influenced by Marxism. Should Critical Buddhism wish to identify its methodology more fully with the cause of the oppressed, such as the minority groups serviced by Sōtō temples for funeral ceremonies, it could probably find a better basis than Dōgen's elitist monasticism. Among these might be medieval Sōtō popu-

larization or Pure Land millenial movements, which in different ways offered spiritual uplift and hope to the downtrodden and displaced.

The main contribution of Critical Buddhism to the debate between historical and philosophical textual studies lies in its effort to bridge the methodological gap by reexamining and reevaluating areas of shift, transition, and syncretism from the standpoint of philosophical consistency and continuity with the foundational doctrines of Buddhist thought. According to this movement, Buddhism can and must change, and the model for this must come from within the tradition. However, for Critical Buddhism to make the 12-fascicle text the basis for reform and have a concrete impact on contemporary society, the methodology must deal with one overriding issue: How exactly does Dōgen's view of karma, or the Critical Buddhist view of Dōgen's view, promote social change? Can, in other words, Dōgen's understanding of karmic causality in a medieval monastic context be translated into an agenda for the modern social reform of institutional Buddhism?

Is Critical Buddhism Really Critical?

Peter N. Gregory

Over the past decade, Matsumoto Shirō and Hakamaya Noriaki have raised the banner of "Critical Buddhism" in a continuing series of books and articles. Matsumoto has focused his criticism on the Indian Buddhist doctrine of the *tathāgata-garbha*, which he charges goes against the original antisubstantialist insight of the Buddha's enlightenment as embodied in the teachings of no-self (anatman) and the twelvefold chain of interdependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*)—hence he claims that the *tathāgata-garbha* is "not Buddhism." Hakamaya has extended Matsumoto's criticism to the theory of "original" or "intrinsic" enlightenment (*hongaku shisō*), an East Asian development of the *tathāgata-garbha* doctrine. Hakamaya has gone on to charge that *hongaku shisō* is to blame for many problems afflicting contemporary Japan.

While I have reservations about Matsumoto and Hakamaya's work from an academic point of view, I believe that the controversy they have instigated is valuable in highlighting some of the differences between the way scholarship is done in Japan and in the West. It is simply unimaginable, for example, that this debate could ever have arisen within an American academic setting. The different institutional and social context in which Buddhist studies is done in America and in Japan should give all of us on both sides of the Pacific pause to reflect on what is now called the sociology of knowledge: how the institutional structures and academic culture within which we pursue our careers of scholarship shape the ways in which we delimit our fields of inquiry, the types of questions we ask, how we pursue our research, and the kinds of conclusions we draw—how, that is, the setting within which we work constitutes the very "Buddhism" that we study. Awareness of such differences should help make both sides more aware of their limitations, what they stand to gain from

one another, and the nature of the premises on which their different perspectives are based. So, in the spirit of dialogue and open debate called for by Matsumoto and Hakamaya, I would like to put forth my own criticism of their criticism in the hope that it will further dialogue between Japanese and Western scholars of Buddhism.

Let me begin by saying that I certainly agree with Matsumoto and Hakamaya that the development of *hongaku shisō* marked a profound shift in the history of Buddhist thought. Wherever we stand on the issue of whether or not *hongaku shisō* should still be considered Buddhist, I think we have to agree that *hongaku* is problematic, and Matsumoto and Hakamaya have surely made an important contribution to Buddhist studies by reproblematizing *hongaku shisō*. It is in how we deal with the problematic character of *hongaku shisō* that I part company with Matsumoto and Hakamaya.

The issues and problems raised by Matsumoto and Hakamaya's criticism of the *tathāgata-garbha* and *hongaku shisō* bear directly on my own research, which has focused on the medieval Chinese Hua-yen and Ch'an figure Kuei-feng Tsung-mi (780–841). Indeed, Tsung-mi's thought is a good test case for assessing Matsumoto and Hakamaya's critique because it seems to fit Matsumoto's description of *dhātu-vāda* to a T. To a striking degree Tsung-mi's language even matches the terms with which Matsumoto characterizes *dhātu-vāda*. It fits it so well, in fact, that it would be easy to paint Tsung-mi as an arch villain in the revisionist view of the history of East Asian Buddhism profferred by Matsumoto and Hakamaya.

Tsung-mi's thought emphasizes the underlying ontological ground on which all phenomenal appearances (*hsiang* 相) are based, which he variously refers to as the nature (*hsing* 性), the one mind (*i-hsin* 一心) of the *Awakening of Mahayana Faith* (*Ta-sheng ch'i-hsin lun*), the marvelous mind of perfect enlightenment (*yüan-chüeh miao-hsin* 円覚妙心) of the *Scripture of Perfect Enlightenment* (*Yüan-chüeh ching*), the one *dharma-dhātu* (*i fa-chieh* 一法界) of the *Avataṃsaka*, the mind ground (*hsin-ti* 心地), or Shen-hui's single word awareness (*chih chih i-tzu* 知之一字)—all of which are synonyms for the *tathāgata-garbha*. All phenomena are manifestations of this ground; they thus have no reality of their own (this is what it means to say that they are "empty"). This underlying ontological ground is, moreover, unitary and whole, whereas phenomena are multiform and diverse. Tsung-mi's thought thus seems to be best charac-

terized as a kind of generative ontological monism. Indeed, his whole system can be seen as being based on a cosmogony that explains how phenomenal appearances arise from the nature (*hsing-ch'i* 性起).

The structure of Tsung-mi's thought, moreover, is based on a model that owes far more to indigenous Chinese thought than to Indian Buddhist theories—that of essence and function (*t'i-yung* 体用). The underlying ontological ground is the "essence" or "substance" (*t'i* 体), whereas the myriad phenomenal appearances are merely its "functioning" (*yung* 用). This model is expressed by a series of interchangeable polarities: principle (*li* 理) and phenomena (*shih* 事), nature (*hsing* 性) and phenomenal appearances (*hsiang* 相), and root (*pen* 本) and branches (*mo* 末). Whereas essence refers to what is primary, absolute, unchanging, unconditioned, eternal, and profound, function refers to what is derivative, relative, variable, conditioned, transient, and superficial. Tsung-mi's understanding of Buddhism thus seems to be hopelessly tainted by indigenous thought (*dochaku shisō*), one of the characteristics of *hongaku shisō* strongly criticized by Hakamaya. But if we are content to stop here, dismissing Tsung-mi as someone who contributed to the East Asian bastardization of Buddhism, we will miss what is truly interesting about Tsung-mi, and in the process we will lose an opportunity to understand how and why a religion like Buddhism changes in the course of its historical development and cultural diffusion.

As an intellectual historian of Chinese Buddhism, I am not concerned with the question of whether the development of *hongaku shisō* so radically diverged from the fundamental tenets of the Buddha's "original" teachings that the result should no longer be considered "Buddhism." Rather I am fascinated with trying to understand how and why such a change took place by trying to determine what cultural and historical factors were involved. In other words, I find the fact that such a teaching could be considered non-Buddhist very interesting, but the question of whether it is "really" Buddhist or not in some normative sense strikes me as somewhat misconceived. In the final analysis, the question of "true Buddhism" (so important to Matsumoto and Hakamaya's mission) is theological and cannot be settled by historical scholarship. To me the most interesting aspect of the current debate, and the one that I feel I understand the least as an outsider, is what it reveals about the current state of Sōtō Zen in particular and Japanese Buddhism in general.

THE CASE FOR DOCTRINAL DEVELOPMENT

In terms of my own research on medieval Chinese Buddhism and Tsung-mi, my basic objection to Matsumoto and Hakamaya's critique of *hongaku shisō* is that it oversimplifies complex doctrinal and historical developments, that *hongaku* had a different meaning in Chinese Buddhism than Matsumoto and Hakamaya claim that it had in Japan, and that this fact should give Matsumoto and Hakamaya pause to rethink the focus of their criticism. In support of this contention, I would like to make three main points, albeit in a highly condensed manner.

First, for Tsung-mi and the textual and doctrinal tradition from which he drew, *hongaku* was tied to a positive valuation of language and thus cannot simply be understood as entailing an authoritarian denial of the validity of words and concepts as Hakamaya charges. Simply put, I would contend that the *tathāgata-garbha* doctrine can best be understood as arising out of a need to affirm the positive role of language in the face of its radical critique found in the *Prajñāpāramitā* scriptures and the Madhyamika treatises.[1] Thus the development of the *tathāgata-garbha* doctrine cannot simply be understood as the intrusion of indigenous thought; it was also a response to a perceived inadequacy within Buddhist doctrine. In his classification of Buddhist teachings Tsung-mi emphasizes the point that the teaching of the *tathāgata-garbha* supersedes that of emptiness precisely because it reveals the true nature of ultimate reality.[2]

My second main point is that for Tsung-mi this positive valuation of language was connected with the importance of *hongaku* in laying an ontological foundation for ethical and religious endeavor in the face of the antinomian challenges posed by some radical Ch'an movements in the late T'ang—especially the Hung-chou and P'ao-t'ang lines of Ch'an current in Szechwan during the second half of the eighth century and the first half of the ninth. Tsung-mi's granting pride of place to the teaching of the *tathāgata-garbha* in his classification of the teachings represents a striking revision of the fivefold classification of Fa-tsang. Tsung-mi's classification of the teachings is based on a cosmogony he reads out of the *Awakening of Mahayana Faith*. Thus the order of the teachings reverses the various steps according to which the originally pure mind becomes covered over by defilements and enmeshed in karma. This cosmogony provides a map for Buddhist practice and so reaffirms the need for continual practice after an initial experience of enlightenment, thereby countering the antinomian tendency of the Hung-chou and P'ao-t'ang interpretations of Ch'an.[3]

My third main point is that Tsung-mi's appropriation of *hongaku* carried within it a tension between ontological monism and ethical dualism and that this tension kept it from being drained of ethical import in the way that Hakamaya claims that it was in Japan. Tsung-mi charges that the Hung-chou line reduces all activities (whether good or bad) to the functioning of the Buddha-nature and maintains that there is no essence apart from such functioning. It thereby effaces any criterion by which to distinguish between good or bad, enlightened or unenlightened. In his criticism, Tsung-mi not only acknowledges the inseparability of the essence and the functioning of the mind as but different aspects of the same reality, but he also stresses their difference. Their inseparability is what makes religious cultivation possible, and their difference is what makes religious cultivation necessary. Tsung-mi thus uses the essence/function paradigm to preserve an ethically critical duality within a larger ontological unity. Whereas Hakamaya condemns *hongaku shisō* for undermining the possibility of taking an independent moral stance, Tsung-mi championed *hongaku shisō* precisely because he saw it as providing a solid ontological foundation for Buddhist moral and religious practice.[4]

These three points thus lead to the following objection: if the presuppositions embodied in *hongaku shisō* can serve as the basis for diametrically different ethical positions, then Matsumoto and Hakamaya cannot simply make *hongaku shisō* the scapegoat for the various social problems with which they are concerned. Just because *hongaku* could be used to rationalize the status quo with all of its inherent inequality does not mean that the injustice of social discrimination was a necessary consequence of *hongaku*—a point that is highlighted by the fact that in a different historical and cultural context *hongaku* was used as a basis for affirming some of the very things that Matsumoto and Hakamaya claim that it undermined in Japan. It is not *hongaku shisō* alone that is the problem. The problem, rather, is how it was, and is, interpreted.

To put the point more generally, I would contend that doctrines never have a simple and straightforward singular meaning but are always multivalent and complexly nuanced formulations that are susceptible to a wide range of interpretive possibilities. Of course, the range within which any given doctrine can be plausibly interpreted is circumscribed, although even here we cannot draw hard lines. The parameters of plausible interpretation are set by the way the doctrine itself is formulated as well as by the entire field of doctrines within which that doctrine is located. As the

constellation of the doctrinal field changes, so do the parameters within which any doctrine in that field can be interpreted. Doctrines have no meaning outside of the interpretive contexts in which they are embedded just as ideas have no reality independent of the minds that think them. This is why it seems meaningless to me to try to understand doctrines outside of their context because outside of their context they have no meaning.

The blame for contemporary social problems cannot simply be laid at the feet of *hongaku shisō*. The way in which doctrines become appropriated as social ideologies is complex, and what needs to be examined is the entire process by which this occurs and the various historical, social, psychological, epistemic, cultural, and other factors that make the process work in the way that it does. Repudiating *hongaku shisō* will do nothing to resolve the problems that face contemporary Japan. Casting the blame on *hongaku shisō* is like blaming social disturbances on "outside agitators"—neither tactic gets at the roots of those problems, which are far more complex and insidious.

As I see it, the question that consequently needs to be addressed is: what factors were involved in the Japanese case that led to *hongaku* being interpreted in the way that its contemporary critics claim that it was. This question once again brings to the fore the importance of the historical and cultural context in which *hongaku shisō* was, and is, understood and the context in which we, as modern interpreters of Buddhism, understand that context. And this awareness of our own historical context is the starting point for what I think it means to be critical. While being critical involves a constant effort to step back from and to recognize the coordinates of our own perspective, we can never escape the fact that we can only see something from a certain viewpoint. The eye, as Zen texts frequently remind us, cannot see itself. Awareness of this epistemological predicament, however, can have the salutary effect of freeing us from the self-righteousness that comes from the belief that we are in the privileged possession of the "truth." Indeed, the spectre of "truth" as an absolute standard by which to discriminate right from wrong (and consequently the question of "true Buddhism") carries within itself an authoritarian ideological potential that is apt to send shivers down the spine of anyone familiar with the history of religion in the West.

THE CASE FOR ACCULTURATION

As an intellectual historian interested in trying to understand the process of the acculturation of Buddhism in China, I must also object to the oversimplified treatment of indigenous thought in Hakamaya's revisionist interpretation of East Asian Buddhism. Hakamaya sees a close connection between *hongaku shisō* and indigenous thought, and in places he even defines *hongaku shisō* in terms of indigenous thought. To begin with, he contends that the *tathāgata-garbha* doctrine represents an intrusion of the indigenous Upaniṣadic idea of a substantial and perduring atman into Buddhism, a development that went against the original critical spirit of Buddhism, which criticized all forms of substantialist and essentialist thinking. Hakamaya suggests that because this kind of critical thinking challenged accepted attitudes and could therefore be perceived as threatening, it became overlaid with indigenous substantialist notions to make it more palatable. Moreover, as Buddhism spread throughout East Asia, the original antisubstantialist emphasis of the Buddha became further obscured by the indigenous thought in the particular cultures it encountered, especially the "naturalism" of Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu in China. The history of Buddhism in East Asia is thus largely the story of how the Buddha's original critical and antisubstantialist insight became overlaid by successive layers of indigenous thought, the end product of which is the fully developed theory of intrinsic enlightenment found in Japanese Buddhism. Hakamaya singles out two major exceptions to this sorry tale, Chih-i (538–597) in China and Dōgen (1200–1253) in Japan. Both of these figures were critical of *hongaku shisō* and sought to rescue Buddhism from the clutches of indigenous thought, but their efforts were ultimately subverted by their disciples and subsequent generations of followers.

This picture of Buddhism is "theological" in the sense that it is concerned with wielding a normative conception of "true Buddhism" to pass critical judgment on the development of Buddhism in East Asia. It seeks to uncover what went wrong with Buddhism in the course of its acculturation in China and Japan. What I find most striking in Hakamaya's "critical" approach to the history of Buddhism in East Asia is that the language and metaphors in which it is couched are based on the imagery at the very core of the *tathāgata-garbha* doctrine. As exemplified in the nine analogies of the *Tathāgata-garbha Sutra*,[5] the core imagery of the *tathāgata-garbha* holds that there is an originally pure and immutable essence that is covered over and obscured from view by adventitious

defilements. Hakamaya's discussion of the Buddha's enlightenment, Chih-i, and Dōgen seems to presuppose the idea that there is a pure, unchanging essence (i.e., true Buddhism) that gets covered over by indigenous thought just as the *dharmakāya* is covered over by defilements. The terms in which Hakamaya conceives Buddhism thus seem to be imbued with the imagery of the very doctrine he wants most to reject as non-Buddhist. Is not the very idea of "true Buddhism" essentialistic? Matsumoto and Hakamaya therefore seem to slip into the very substantialist fallacy they are intent on refuting by hypostatizing a certain conception of "true Buddhism."

For the intellectual historian, Matsumoto and Hakamaya's approach rides roughshod over the most interesting and important issues that need to be studied in detail and appreciated in terms of their subtle shades of nuance. For the theologian intent on arriving at critical judgments on the nature of true Buddhism, however, such concerns are largely beside the point. Our differences in regard to the issue of indigenous thought are thus to a large extent a function of our different standpoints and agendae. But they also reflect fundamental disagreements over the nature of religion and a different reading of "Buddhism."

THE NATURE OF RELIGION

The difference in our approaches to the study of Buddhism reflects a different understanding of religion, and it is in terms of this issue that the gap between Japanese and Western scholarship seems to be greatest—and, I would hazard, it seems to be getting wider. Insofar as the debate over *hongaku shisō* is a measure of general currents within Japanese Buddhist scholarship, I would even say that Japanese and Western scholars seem to be moving in opposite directions. That is, in their quest for "true Buddhism" Matsumoto and Hakamaya seem to be embracing the very kind of model of religion that Western scholars have recently been struggling to leave behind. The irony of the situation is that the model presupposed by Matsumoto and Hakamaya seems to owe more to the Western (and ultimately Protestant) notion of religion that was imported during the Meiji period than it does to either Buddhist or traditional Japanese conceptions. The litmus test for "true Buddhism" is thus defined in terms of faithfulness to a doctrine instead of, say, a community, an institution, a lifestyle, the performance of specified ritual actions, moral

and religious practice, or psychological transformation.

In the last decade or so, however, Western scholars of Buddhism have been moving away from such a textually and doctrinally oriented approach to Buddhism. In the United States at least, they typically find themselves housed in religious studies departments, and in both their teaching and research they have not been able to avoid addressing some of the broader intellectual trends that have impacted on the field of religious studies as a whole. Prominent among these is the growing recognition of the important contributions that the social sciences, especially anthropology, have made in understanding religion. The wide-ranging impact that literary criticism and deconstruction have had on the humanities has also gradually come to be felt even in the remote corners of the academy occupied by Buddhist studies. In various ways, these trends have made the study of texts problematical, and I would suspect that most Western scholars today would agree that, as a religion, Buddhism cannot be understood solely or primarily as a body of dogma. Dogma or doctrine is only one aspect (and not necessarily one to be privileged) of the complex and many-faceted phenomenon that we refer to as "Buddhism." Doctrinal formulations, that is, must be understood within the broader context of Buddhism as a religion.

Western scholars would also be extremely reluctant to grant Matsumoto and Hakamaya the central article of faith on which they stake their understanding of "true Buddhism"—namely, that the *Mahāvagga*'s account of the Buddha's enlightenment in terms of his discovery of the twelvefold chain of conditioned origination can be taken at face value as a report of historical fact. Lambert Schmithausen, for instance, has argued persuasively that the earliest accounts of the Buddha's enlightenment in the Pali Canon describe it in terms of the four noble truths and not in terms of *pratītyasamutpāda*.[6] There are, of course, enormously complicated textual and historical difficulties involved in using the Pali Canon to reconstruct "early," "primitive," or "original" Buddhism—not to mention the problematical character of the very conception of the project itself. Although the Pali Canon may, as a whole, be closer to the Buddha's "words" than any other extant textual corpus, it is still mediated by the collective memory of the community that compiled, codified, redacted, and transmitted it orally for hundreds of years before ever committing it to writing, and, even when finally put into writing, it did not remain static but continued to be modified by the tradition over the ensuing centuries.

As we have it today it is thus far removed from the Buddha, and we have no way of gauging how close or how distant any given statement is to the words of the Buddha. It is thus impossible for us to reconstruct with any degree of certitude the content of the Buddha's enlightenment or what the Buddha "originally" taught. Nor does the Pali Canon present a complete picture of "early" Buddhism. From its inception in the collective memory of the early monastic community, the Pali Canon never represented a full account of the Buddha's teaching. Rather, it was and still is a selective version of the Buddha's teaching preserved by one segment of the sangha, and we can only presume that some of the Buddha's teachings addressed to other groups were never included. These are only some of the many issues that must be dealt with by any scholarship purporting to be critical.

Any reconstruction of "original" Buddhism is therefore problematic, if only from a text-historical point of view. The blunt fact is that the Buddha's enlightenment is inaccessible to us; all we have are competing traditions about it. There are also larger conceptual problems in the very phrasing of the issue of "true Buddhism." Behind Matsumoto and Hakamaya's discussion of true Buddhism I sense an obsession with origins and purity—an obsession that seems to pervade Japanese scholarship on Zen as a whole.[7] But why is what is "original" better or somehow more "pure"? Doesn't the assumption that "what is original is best" mask a whole mythology of history as a fall away from and corruption of what was originally pure? Don't we see here, again, another and more subtle instance of *tathāgata-garbha*-type thinking and, in a different guise, another form of essentialism? I, for one, would reject the assumption that Buddhism ever was originally simple or pure. In any case, such assumptions must be examined critically and spelled out rationally if Buddhist scholarship is to move beyond the realm of mythology and to live up to its billing as "critical."

I would also contend that the issue of "true Buddhism," and the privileging of doctrine on which it is based, is problematic from the point of view of Buddhism. The early texts, of course, are not univocal, and they are susceptible to different readings. But there is much in the early tradition that would call such a dogmatic construction of Buddhism into question. The parable of the raft or the simile of the dharma as medicine, for example, imply a pragmatic approach to truth according to which doctrines have only a provisional status. Certainly the designation of a certain

doctrine (such as *pratītyasamutpāda*) as true, and using that as a criterion to judge all others, not only is dubious methodologically but also is problematic from the point of view of the early texts themselves. Luis Gómez, for instance, has shown that the *Aṭṭhakavagga*, which belongs to the earliest strata of the *Suttanipāta*, itself one of the oldest Pali texts, criticizes all views as the basis of attachment and rejects the notion that there is a right view at all.[8] The *Aṭṭhakavagga*'s critique of all views also denies that "truth" can ever be formulated in propositional form. Hakamaya's contention that early Buddhism affirms language is simply not true as stated. The early textual tradition already contains a variety of discourses and speaks with several voices, and we must be wary of taking any one of those voices to speak for all. I would thus make a plea for a more liberal and open reading of Buddhism, one that regarded all doctrines as *upāya* (including the very idea of ultimate truth itself). As a religion Buddhism cannot be reduced to a mere body of doctrine or a series of propositions making truth claims about reality; rather, it must be understood on its own terms as a practice (*bhāvana*), a path (*mārga*), or a way of life, in which doctrine plays its part. Doctrine, that is, must be understood within the broader soteriological vision of Buddhism.

Yet, such objections aside, I have great sympathy for Matsumoto and Hakamaya's emphasis on the importance of the critical spirit in Buddhism. Although this may not be the only voice with which the tradition speaks, it is certainly an important one and one that I think is particularly relevant for Buddhists today. My main criticism of "Critical Buddhism," then, is that it is not yet fully critical. As Matsumoto and Hakamaya point out, this critical spirit is embodied in such teachings as no-self, conditioned origination, and emptiness, which undermine the belief in an unchanging essence or substance. But this critique is not only directed against the "self"; it is also aimed at the identifications in terms of which the "self" is defined as a self. Insofar as we identify with something called "Buddhism," "Buddhism" (or "true Buddhism") is also a construction of the ideology of the self, and in that sense it too must be "emptied." Hence, in some sense at least, we cannot escape the paradox of being Buddhists. Can we then conclude, in the spirit of the *Prajñāpāramitā*, that someone can only be called a Buddhist if he or she realizes that there is nothing that can be grasped as Buddhism?

What I take to be the critical element in Buddhism is its critique of the inherent psychological tendency of human beings to give substance to

ideas—this tendency is the basis of clinging and, as such, the root of conflict and suffering. This critical spirit is above all else an injunction for us to look within at the source of our attachments. It is also a caution that one of the most dangerous of all attachments is the attachment to the idea of truth, which blinds us toward our own grasping and leads to self-righteousness and intolerance. Thus the call to critical Buddhism, as I understand it, demands that we be self-critical, both as scholars and as Buddhists. Among other things, being critical means becoming aware of the assumptions on which our discussion of critical Buddhism is based. Critical Buddhism must therefore come to terms with history—especially its own history, its own historical context, and its own historical position within the history of Buddhism. Such awareness is part and parcel of what it means to be critical.

Only when we acknowledge that Buddhism lacks any defining, unalterable essence (an atman, so to speak) and is itself the product of a complex set of interdependent and ever-changing conditions (*pratītya-samutpāda*), will we have a proper framework for understanding the process of its historical and cultural transformation and recognizing our own location within that stream we could call the "tradition." To say that there is nothing else is, for me, the very meaning of *pratītyasamutpāda*.

Metaphysics, Suffering, and Liberation

The Debate between Two Buddhisms

LIN Chen-kuo

THE CORE OF Buddhist practice consists in meditating on the cause of suffering in order to overcome it. The need for such practice is only intensified as Buddhism attempts to face modernity. For suffering and modernity, as apparently disconnected as they may seem at first sight, present an ineluctable challenge to philosophical meditation. Is modernity merely a new form of human suffering? Or is there a sense in which modernity really constitutes the "unfinished project" of the Enlightenment? These are questions the Buddhist thinkers share with Western intellectual history today.

In this essay I propose, in the first place, to locate the question of suffering in the context of modern discourse and examine postmodern positions associated with figures like Nietzsche, Heidegger, Adorno, and Derrida. In a word, these "postmodernists" attribute the suffering and illusion of modernity to the fact that the metaphysics of identity or subjectivity in which modernity is embedded is intrinsically oppressive. Having considered this view, I will then attempt to lay out the reasons why I consider the legacy of the Enlightenment as worth preserving today.

In the second place, I wish to consider how modern Buddhist thinkers and scholars of Buddhist philosophy respond to the call of modernity, focussing on the confrontation between Critical Buddhism and Topical Buddhism. The Critical Buddhists, in particular O-yang Ching-wu (1871–1943) and Lü Ch'eng (1896–1989) of the Chinese Institute of Buddhist Studies, and Hakamaya Noriaki and Matsumoto Shirō of Komazawa University in Japan, argue that the Sinicized forms of Buddhism are corrupt and incompatible with the project of modernity. In contrast, Topical Buddhist thinkers such as Nishitani Keiji of the Kyoto

school and Malcolm David Eckel contend that the Critical Buddhists fail to see the limits of logocentrism or to give "difference" its due. While both sides agree in criticizing the metaphysics of identity for its lack of social conscience, the Topical Buddhists insist that religious or sociopolitical liberation must be achieved through the critique of self-centered rationality.

In a third and concluding section I will argue that the unfinished project of modernity can be carried on through negative dialectics in the Buddhist sense. In line with the Mahayana cliché that "there is no nirvana without samsara," we need to see that modernity cannot be achieved without suffering. If samsara and suffering are ontologically part of modernity, as Adorno points out in his *Dialectics of Enlightenment*, then metaphysics will not be eliminated or overcome completely. The problem is rather how to engage in more joyful and deconstructive forms of metaphysics.

THE KARMA OF MODERNITY

Even though we now recognize Hegel's announcement of "the coming of world history" as a Eurocentric myth, the fact is, the encounter between European modernity and other traditions continues to take place on all sides. Historically, the Buddhist encounter with modernity began with European colonial expansion to Asia prior to the eighteenth century. The Western discovery of Buddhism not only brought about the so-called Oriental Renaissance in the West, but also changed the self-understanding of Buddhist traditions.[1] Under the shadow of colonialism, Buddhists were led to view themselves through the lens of another culture, or even to rewrite their own traditions with alien categories, thus effecting a kind of reverse Orientalism from within. The irony and ambivalence of the situation is only further complicated when Buddhists now turn around and try to confront the complexity of modernity in its present-day forms. From the very outset, we seem to be trapped in a hermeneutic circle of (mis)understanding.

Accordingly, it seems apropos to begin with a brief digression on recent philosophical reflections on modernity since the 1980s. The debate between Habermas and the "young conservatives" like Lyotard, Derrida, and Rorty offers one way into the question. We could also look back to Heidegger and his reading of Nietzsche in the early 1940s or, as both

Habermas and David Kolb suggest, back to Hegel.[2] For the sake of brevity, I will restrict my remarks here to Habermas in the attempt to track "the shifting horizon of modernity" in terms of attitudes toward metaphysics. For it is here, in the critiques of metaphysics, that the pathology of modernity witnessed in all radical critics is most visible.[3]

Some may question whether the assumption of such a relationship between modernity and metaphysics is legitimate. To the social scientist, Western modernity is manifest in the structures of industrial society, in capitalism, technology, and liberal democracy.[4] Weber, as is known, attributed the dynamism behind these structures to rationalization, but just how this works out in the concrete for modern civilizations is far from self-evident. Philosophically and historically, we need to look to a deeper understanding of being—that is, of the world and human beings—in the thought of figures like Descartes and Kant. In order for society to be "rationalized" in the form of modernity, there must be some sort of underlying metaphysical mind-set at work.

In the "modern" age, the processes of rationalization are carried on within an epistemological framework of the subject-object duality. This framework measures and certifies our knowledge of the external world. The foundation of epistemic certainty is therefore located on the side of the subject: for Descartes, in the ego of the *cogito*; for Kant, in the autonomous self as law-giver and world-viewer. The subject, in particular the thinking subject, becomes the center of being, while the object is reduced to something external to and represented by the subject. This mind-set functions not only in the epistemic realm, but extends to the ethico-political realm as well, where things and persons are objectified and represented by the thinking subject. They become items of reason, objects for rationalizaton. This mode of thought lies behind the great achievements of the Enlightenment. As Heidegger has observed:

> Western history has now begun to enter into the completion of that period we call modern, and which is defined by the fact that man becomes the measure and the center of beings. Man is what lies at the bottom of all beings; that is, in modern terms, at the bottom of all objectification and representability.[5]

Modernity is therefore the triumph of a human-centered or subject-centered world view in which everything is reduced to the status of "representation."[6]

Heidegger's critique of modernity and Western metaphysics calls to mind Hegel's articulation of the oppressive character of a reason "universally grounded in the structure of self-relationship, that is, in the relationship of a subject that makes itself an object."[7] In this regard, Hegel may be regarded as the first thinker to discern this negative dialectic in the Enlightenment. The solution he proposed to this impasse of modernity was to restore the primordial innocence and harmony of nature and history by revitalizing the unitary, reconciling power of reason. In the face of the one-dimensional mind-set of modernity, Hegel never lost his optimistic confidence in the mediating, unifying power of reason in history.

But the dialectical hopes for the realization of universal history we find running through the pages of the *Phenomenology of Mind* were not matched by events in the real world. Quite the opposite. In the twentieth century we find thinkers like Heidegger and Adorno typifying the strong sense of the suffering and helplessness of reason in the tide of events. In a flourish of despair over the possibility of a logocentric philosophy, Heidegger asserted that "only a god can save us."[8] And for Adorno, the practice of metaphysics becomes a mockery in an age stained by the memory of Auschwitz.[9] Instead of philosophizing, Heidegger says, what human beings need to do is open themselves to the presence (or the absence) of a god who promises them liberation from their "fallibility in the midst of beings." The fallibility of modern persons is evidenced in the age of technology as "enframing" (*Gestell*). "The essence of man is framed, claimed and challenged by a power which manifests itself in the essence of technology, a power which man himself does not control."[10] For Heidegger this is the discloser of modernity itself.[11] The Being of individuals is enframed by their very attempt to frame the world in which they live, and this "oblivion of Being" is their saddest fate.

For Adorno, the melancholy and suffering of modernity is not merely a matter of ontological pathology. It is a mourning reduced to silence in the ashes of the spirit. "All post-Auschwitz culture, including its urgent critique, is garbage."[12] Even after half a century, the agony and despair are still discernible. Suffering can never be kept in silence: "The need to let suffering speak is the premise of all truth."[13] The objectivity of suffering, in contrast, belongs to the systematic coercion of a metaphysics of identity for which "nonidentity is experienced as negativity." In Idealist thinking, the power of suffering has been relegated to the transcendental subject, with the result that nonidentity is, in the final stage of the dialec-

tic, totally assimilated and wiped away. Adorno saw it as his vocation to rescue the element of nonidentity from the control of this Idealist way of thinking.[14]

In the face of "negative metaphysicians" like Heidegger, Adorno, and Derrida, Habermas defends the need for a "unity of reason" to remain "perceptible in the plurality of its voices" in our times.[15] Granted reason can no longer be perceived in terms of transcendental subjectivity, and granted, too, the coercive nature of reason that Adorno and Heidegger warn of, Habermas yet believes that reason-in-communication is still required for our ongoing project of modernity. He insists that we should recognize the significance of the Enlightenment project out of which objective science, universal morality and law, and the liberation of art from the esoteric have emerged. It has enabled modern human beings like us to live a rational everyday life.[16] Habermas warns that the "negative metaphysicians" are in fact secret accomplices of the metaphysical Idealism they seek to overcome:

> Negation, which opposed the many to the one as Parmenides opposed nonbeing to being, is also negation in the sense of a defense against deep-seated fears of death and frailty, of isolation and separation, of opposition and contradiction, of surprise and novelty. This same defensiveness still betrays itself in the idealist devaluation of the many to mere appearances.[17]

Habermas rejects negative metaphysicians and metaphysical Idealism as extremes. In the latter, empirical individuals are conceived of merely as duplications of an Idea; in the former, reason is degraded for its oppression and refuge is found in a *totaliter aliter*.[18]

THE UNFINISHED PROJECT OF THE ENLIGHTENMENT

Whether they take a positive or a negative attitude toward modernity, Western thinkers are clearly aware of the intrinsic relationship, theoretical and practical, between the modern world and metaphysics. Heidegger makes the eschatological claim that only through "the destruction of metaphysics" is Being capable of disclosure, while Adorno diagnoses metaphysics of identity as the cause of historical catastrophe. For his part, Habermas, too, recognizes the necessary transition towards "post-metaphysical thinking," although as a defender of modernity he must

eventually part camp with such “irrational philosophers.” As diametrically opposed as the positions are, both sides agree that difference and plurality must be liberated from the tyranny of sameness.

When we look to the East, we find in the tradition of Buddhist thought a similar philosophical reflection and debate over the challenge of modernity. For modern Buddhist thinkers, the question is fraught with ambivalence. On the one hand, they are fascinated by the legacy of the Enlightenment to be found in science, technology, democracy, and human rights. On the other hand, some of them are skeptical of the wholesale acceptance of modernization and its nihilistic consequences. For both sides, there arises the following questions: Is “authentic” Buddhism compatible with the project of modernity? Or should it take a basically critical stance? There seems to be no way out of the ambivalence, at least not until the idea of “authenticity” has been clarified. This is nowhere more apparent than in the faceoff between Critical Buddhism and Topical Buddhism.

The very terms “Critical Buddhism” and “Topical Buddhism” are neologisms borrowed from Hakamaya Noriaki to designate two Buddhist positions. According to Hakamaya, Critical Buddhism sees methodical, rational critique as belonging to the very foundations of Buddhism itself, while “Topical Buddhism” emphasizes the priority of rhetoric over logical thinking, of ontology over epistemology.

In the West, critical philosophy is represented by the tradition that begins with Descartes, while topical philosophy is best typified by Vico’s attempts to reform Cartesianism. In the Buddhist tradition, the former refers to Buddha’s teaching critically understood, while the latter refers particularly (though not exclusively) to Sino-Japanese forms of Buddhism like *tathāgata-garbha* thought, the doctrine of original enlightenment, and the philosophy of the Kyoto school.[19] Hakamaya and others attack Topical Buddhism on the grounds that it is doctrinally and practically corrupt—in other words, that it is a “false” Buddhism. I adopt his labels without intending to imply any sectarian preference. Thus, unlike Hakamaya, I use the term “Topical Buddhism” as a neutral, descriptive term only.

It would be simplistic to dismiss Critical Buddhism as no more than a modern brand of Buddhist fundamentalism or essentialism whose only aim is to return to a certain purer form of Buddhism.[20] Indeed, rather than a return to the origins, the key concern for Critical Buddhists is

bringing Buddhism back to the modern world as the only place where the problems of theory and sociopolitical praxis can be properly tested. In their view, insensitivity to the theoretical roots of monistic metaphysics on the part of Sino-Japanese Buddhism lies at the root of an unconsciousness of, or even complicity with, sociopolitical injustices like military imperialism, ethnic discrimination against aboriginal Japanese or foreigners, Japanese ethnocentrism, and so on. In other words, they contend that monistic metaphysics or *dhātu-vāda* (a neo-Sanskritism coined by Matsumoto) are to be blamed for individual and social sufferings of this sort.

The monistic metaphysics in Sino-Japanese Buddhism, exemplified in the doctrine of original enlightenment, appears for the first time in *The Awakening of Mahayana Faith*. According to Hakamaya this doctrine has three characteristics:

1. All existents are grounded in a singular, changeless topos—that is, in an original enlightenment—as an ultimate reality or substance. The structure of this metaphysics is the same as the Brahmanist doctrine of atman or Taoist naturalism. In contrast to topical metaphysics, true Buddhism teaches the doctrine of dependent arising, that all beings are in the groundless flux of temporal becoming.
2. Since the doctrine of original enlightenment presupposes transcendental subjectivity, it contradicts the Buddhist notion of no-self and subjects people to egocentric authoritarianism.
3. As a kind of experientialism, the thought of original enlightenment also leads Buddhists to indulge in belief in an ineffable Suchness or Nature, which contradicts the spirit of true Buddhism without recognizing the priority of intellect, logic, and language.[21]

This same critique of metaphysics is visible in Matsumoto's criticism of *dhātu-vāda*, in which the doctrine of *tathāgata-garbha* (the matrix of Buddhahood) is singled out as a main target. As a metaphysics of origin or "locus" (*dhātu*), *dhātu-vāda* presupposes a One, a Real, or a Self (atman) underlying all existents (dharmas) as their common ground. In contrast to the permanence and substantiality of the One, all existents are reduced to illusory appearances. The presupposition of sameness in this metaphysics in turn conceals social discriminations and injustice in the sense that all differences are reduced to representations of an unchanging sameness.[22]

Compared to Heidegger's critique of logocentrism or self-centered rationality, the Critical Buddhists are more concerned with the authori-

tarian character of Idealist ontology. The philosophical and practical consequences of their position are clear in their attempts to reclaim the validity of reason, which they consider to have been lost in Sinicized forms of Buddhism. They insist that both the Cartesian tradition and true Buddhism lead to pluralism and individualism through the emancipatory power of reason. In the encounter with modernity, they take a firm stance against postmodernism or deconstruction, which they see as a direct offspring of topical thinking.[23] Like Habermas, the Critical Buddhists choose to carry out the project of modernity because they see that both the West and Buddhism share the same idea of enlightenment, namely as a quest for liberation from ignorance and domination. In this sense, their critique of *hongaku* and *tathāgata-garbha* metaphysics must not be dismissed too quickly as no more than sectarian ravings or a longing for fundamentalist certainties.

CRITICAL BUDDHISM IN MODERN CHINA

While the voices of Critical Buddhism from Japan have provoked heated controversy on both sides of the Pacific, attention has yet to be given to another movement of Critical Buddhism in modern China. In broader perspective, Critical Buddhism is merely one local case in East Asia of a variety of responses within Buddhism to the challenge of modernity. In this regard, we cannot pass over developments in areas like China and Taiwan without risking the confusion of a few trees for the whole forest.

Critical Buddhism in modern China is best represented by O-yang Ching-wu, the founder of the Chinese Institute of Buddhist Studies, and his successor, Lü Ch'eng. From the 1920s to the 1940s the Institute had devoted itself to the return to Indian Buddhism through promoting the study of Abhidharma, *Prajñāpāramitā* thought, Madhyamika, Yogacara, Vinaya, and Buddhist logic, in the hopes of reforming "false" Buddhism and reinforcing "true" Buddhism. This new Buddhist movement was based on three tenets:

1. Mind is quiescent by nature, but it is defiled by *kleśa*.
2. The proper model for Buddhist practice is cognitive conversion (*parāvṛtti-āsraya*) from the defiled mind to the quiescent mind.
3. The achievement of conversion results in a quiescent life-world made up of the interpenetration of the minds of sentient beings and the Buddhas, all of whom share the quiescent, perfected mind.

Obviously, this model is based on the Yogacara system.[24]

Taking these tenets as normative, O-yang and Lü denounced the ideas of original enlightenment and "Origin Returning" (*fan-pen huan-yüan* 返本還源), the ideological core of Chinese Buddhism (T'ien-t'ai, Hua-yen, Ch'an, and Pure Land).[25] They argue that these notions, as inventions of the Chinese apocrypha—*The Awakening of Mahayana Faith*, the *Leng-yen ching*, and *Yüan-chüeh ching* in particular—are to be rejected as totally heterodox.

Lü Ch'eng stresses the conceptual incompatibility between original enlightenment and the quiescence of mind. In addition to the historical unreliability of the foundational texts, the doctrine that mind *is* already enlightened by nature is not coincident with the doctrine that mind *ought to be* quiescent. In Lü's view, the doctrine of original enlightenment presupposes an Idealist ontology, while the notion of quiescent mind can be understood merely in terms of epistemological conversion. Lü goes further to point out that the doctrine of original enlightenment is necessarily coincident to conservative ideology because it implies no intention to change the real world. If one accepts this doctrine, then every effort should be expended to rediscover original enlightenment as a dynamic subjectivity, since it is only in this sense that one's religious journey can be said to have been completed. Focus on the quiescent mind, in contrast, sees cognitive conversion and progress ("transformation," *parāvṛtti-āsraya*) as a function of the mirror-like nature of mind in the epistemological sense ("the light of reason"). Lü Ch'eng takes this latter, epistemological stance in refuting the ontological position of original enlightenment.

It is also worth noting here that Lü Ch'eng stresses the importance of cognitive conversion as the foundation of sociopolitical reform and progress. In an article written in 1954, most likely under the influence of Marxist theories of the sociology of knowledge, Lü reinterpreted *parāvṛtti-āsraya* as the radical change of cognition that leads to a better knowledge of social reality, which in turn prompts social action in the direction of true social reform.[26] Not surprisingly, Lü saw the ontology of original enlightenment and its practice of "Origin Returning" as inclined to support the status quo and to reject calls for social change.[27]

Lü's approach implies further that the ideological distinction between Conservative Buddhism and Progressive Buddhism is drawn in terms of a contrast between ontology and epistemology. In this regard, it must be

said that Lü favors logos over mythos, logic over rhetoric. He concludes that, under the shadow of the doctrine of original enlightenment, all the Sinicized forms of Buddhism—including T'ien-t'ai, Hua-yen, and Ch'an—have been corrupted into forms of anti-intellectualism, pantheism, mysticism, and conservatism.[28] As if foreseeing the coming controversy between modernity and postmodernity, Lü never questioned the adequacy of rationality.

THE PLACE WHERE AN ABSENCE IS PRESENT

According to the Topical Buddhists, the story needs to be rewritten completely. Modernity cannot simply be imported from the West to the East as is. Its underlying reason-centered or subject-centered worldview needs to be brought into question. In contrast to the Critical Buddhist's uncritical acceptance of reason, Topical Buddhists are more skeptical of rationality. They view Western modernity as still ensnared in the metaphysics of identity. On this point they would consider themselves more critical and self-reflective on the problem of modernity than the Critical Buddhists.

In his critique of modernity, Nishitani Keiji, one of the most prominent Topical Buddhist philosophers, traces the roots of modernity to Cartesianism. According to Nishitani's analysis, Descartes conceived body and mind as two separate substances, belonging to two different worlds. The whole natural world, including the human body, becomes "the cold and lifeless world of death," the world of mechanism, in which each individual ego is "like a lonely but well-fortified island floating on a sea of dead matter."[29] This destiny that seems to have befallen modern men and women is Nishitani's concern.

In support of this concern, Nishitani sets out to expose the self-deception embedded in the ego of the Cartesian *cogito*. For Descartes and for modern people, the ego of the *cogito* is taken as the ultimate foundation of the certainty of our knowledge and existence. It is a pure and self-evident rationality. Nishitani digs more deeply into the roots of the ego and concludes that its self-consciousness is in fact a result of its being mirrored in the field of self-consciousness. That is, "because this ego is seen as self-consciousness mirroring self-consciousness at every turn and the *cogito* is seen from the standpoint of the *cogito*, ego becomes a mode of being of the self closed up within itself."[30] It is clear to Nishitani that

modernity is grounded on the self-enclosing, self-attaching ego—the same ego that Buddhism identifies as the constitutive cause of the samsaric world. Buddhism recognizes that rationality must be disenchanted and uncovered as a mere self-deception, as Hegel and Nietzsche were later to recognize. Thus for Nishitani the rise of nihilism from within the very bosom of modernity is a matter of dialectical necessity.

In Nishitani's scheme, modernity unfolds in three stages: the field of consciousness, the field of nihility, and the field of absolute emptiness. In the field of consciousness, as represented by Cartesianism, the world is structured within the subject-object duality. The object is known and appropriated through the representation of the subject "in pursuit of its desire."[31] Representational thinking, to which Heidegger ascribes the whole Western metaphysical tradition, characterizes the essence of modernity.[32]

In the field of nihility, a stage made necessary by disillusionment with representational consciousness, "things cease to be 'objects', and, as a result, appear as realities cut off from representation." In other words, nihility is itself a reality, and vice versa. Nishitani goes further to explain in Heideggerian terms: "the being of beings discloses itself in the nullifying of nothingness (*das Nicht nichtet*)."[33]

But Nishitani does not stop short at this Nietzschean-Heideggerian realization of nihility. Rather, he sets out to articulate a positive and affirmative notion of nothingness as the groundless "home-ground" of beings. In his words:

> Prior to the appearance that things take on the field of consciousness, where they are objectivized as external realities, and prior to the more original appearance things assume on the field of nihility, where they are nullified, all things are on the field of emptiness in their truly elemental and original appearances. In emptiness things come to rest on their own home-ground.[34]

In this regard he appeals to expressions of the Zen-Buddhist-awakened experience of nothingness such as "hills, rivers, the earth, plants and trees, tiles and stones, all of these are the self's original nature," and "all things come to realize themselves."[35]

It is precisely because of this conception of absolute emptiness that Nishitani and the Kyoto school are seen by the Critical Buddhists as the modern inheritors of *hongaku* thought.[36] This prompts us to ask: Does Nishitani slip back into mystical, speculative metaphysics? Does he com-

mit himself to something transcending language and reasoning, something not admissible in Buddhism? Again we listen to Nishitani in his own words:

> True emptiness is nothing less than what reaches awareness in all of us as our own absolute self-nature. In addition, this emptiness is the point at which each and every entity that is said to exist becomes manifest: as what it is in itself, in the Form of its true suchness....
>
> The unity of the absolute near side is not the result of a process but rather the original identity of absolute openness and absolute emptiness.... It is the absolute one, the absolute self-identity of the absolute two: the home-ground on which we are what we are in our self-nature and the home-ground on which things are what they are in themselves.[37]

To read passages on the literal surface, we cannot but agree with Hakamaya that Nishitani does indeed assert something called "the unity of the absolute," "the original identity," and "the absolute one" in terms that parallel the assertions of an ontology of original enlightenment or *dhātu-vāda*. What is more, his frequent appeal to Sino-Japanese Buddhist terms such as "nature-origination" (*shōki suru*), "reciprocal interpenetration" (*egoteki sōnyū*), and "immediacy" (*genjō*), suggest a reliance on the Huayen and Zen traditions, the most notorious examples of *hongaku* thought. If this is indeed the way to read Nishitani, then there seems no way around the criticisms raised by Hakamaya.

Surely this is not the only way to read Nishitani, let alone the only correct way. One may, for instance, consider his idea of the "Absolute" in light of the Zen and Nietzschean notion of "play." With the introduction of the notion of play into metaphysics, the field or topos of Absolute Emptiness need no longer be taken simply in the sense of a "substratum" or "ground" of existents. The "topos" would rather refer to our daily life-world in which (as Nishitani himself points out) all things exist "without aim or reason outside of themselves and become truly autotelic and without cause or reason, a veritable *Leben ohne Warum*."[38] This playful, self-emptying life-world is permanently *invisible* as long as the things of life are viewed only through the lenses of self-centered reason or subjectivity. It becomes *visible* only when envisaged in "playful *samādhi*." As Nishitani notes further, the visible in playful-samadhi must be empty of the *telos* or "substance" ascribed by the subject-as-reason. It is, therefore, neither necessary nor legitimate to read any meaning of "substance" into Nishitani's "field of absolute emptiness." We cannot afford to overlook the

deconstructive implications in the Idealist vocabularies employed by Nishitani and his fellow thinkers of the Kyoto school.

As for the troublesome notion of "topos" or "field," it is always understood by the Critical Buddhist as something illogical, irrational, or mystical. According to Nakamura Yūjirō, however, the meaning of "topos" in relation to "individual" can be traced back to an analogy with the role of the "chorus" in relation to that of the "hero" in Greek tragedy.[39] The Greek word *τόπος* means a "common ground" but with rich connotations of rhetorical theme, community, and common sense. "Topos" in this sense has long been restricted by logocentric tendencies in Western philosophy to something invisible and insignificant. The more obvious choice, particularly in the ethos of modernity, would be to place rhetoric beneath logic and the community beneath the individual. In this regard, the Topicalist has been at pains to note that modern men and women can only end up alienated from their "home ground" if they do not realize the absurdity of the logocentric ethos. Only through the reclaiming of the life-world can modern individuals be redeemed from the reason-centered ethos of modernity and its nihilistic consequences.

If the thinkers of the Kyoto school are seen to be obsessed by Hegelian and Heideggerian discourse, and to this extent not yet free of idealistic speculation, Malcolm David Eckel presents a methodological alternative in his 1992 book *To See the Buddha*. In an attempt to revitalize the context of Buddhist discourse, Eckel tries to retrieve the religious meaning of Bhāvaviveka's philosophical texts by placing them within a narrative and metaphoric context reconstructed in the light of Hsüan-tsang's pilgrimage report, rather than follow other scholars in treating him only as a logician and epistemologist.[40] Eckel makes clear that his aim in challenging the conventional assumption of the separation between theory and practice, elite and popular, religion and philosophy, and mythos and logos in particular is to "bring the complex and abstract concepts of Buddhist philosophy down to earth." In so doing, he concludes that "the logos of Bhāvaviveka's rational investigation is embedded in its own mythos."[41]

In the course of his hermeneutic praxis, Eckel clarifies his own critique of modernity, arguing that the emptiness of logos as well as the emptiness of mythos can only be perceived together through "a place that is empty." In his own words, to see a Buddha is nothing but to see "a Buddha as a place where an absence is present." By appealing to Nishitani

Keiji's notion of "absolute nothingness" as "place," Eckel expounds how a Buddhist perceives "things in their mere conventionality," which leaves no space for metaphysics of identity:

> The logic of place takes on a very distinctive character when one asks, as philosophers do, not just about the location of the Buddha but about the location of Emptiness.... Buddhist logicians, unlike the logicians of other Indian schools, did not think that it was possible, however, to perceive such an absence directly. A perception of the absence of something like a pot on a particular spot of earth had to be based on the empty spot of earth. Perception of Emptiness also had to be based on a perception of the thing that is empty. ***But if all things are empty of identity, in what does Emptiness reside?*** Jñānagarbha explains that it is the "thing itself" (*vastumatra*) in its mere conventionality: merely to see a conventional entity as it is, without superimposing on it any ultimate reality, is the same as seeing it as Emptiness.[42] (italics mine)

"Back to conventionality," as Eckel and the other Topical Buddhists claim, is tantamount to saying "back to the life-world," and "back to the life-world" is the same as "back to Emptiness." For Buddhism, there is no Emptiness perceivable without a "place" in our daily world. As suggested in Dōgen's verses, "A leap year is met one in four / Cocks crow at four in the morning,"[43] the experience of enlightenment is perceivable only in the signs of our daily world—the seasons, sounds, smells, touches, and so on—which are empty in themselves.[44]

SUFFERING IN A JOYFUL BUDDHISM

The controversy between Critical Buddhism and Topical Buddhism is not restricted to its contemporary episodes discussed in the foregoing. It has led to great ideological variety throughout the Buddhist tradition. What makes the quarrel especially significant in our times is that it has arisen in the context of Buddhism's encounter with modernity. But what is the meaning of this modern tale of two Buddhisms?

Both Critical Buddhism and Topical Buddhism agree that there is no room for metaphysics of identity or substance in Buddhist thinking. The reasons are obvious. The connections between metaphysics and desire have been recognized already from the earliest beginnings of Buddhism. In the twelve links of dependent arising we see that "on account of desire (*taṇhā*) there is clinging (*upādāna*)." The "clinging" is further classified

into four aspects: clinging to sense pleasures, to rituals, to metaphysical theories, and to soul or substance theories. As K. N. Jayatilleke remarks, "we believe in certain metaphysical theories and soul- or substance-theories because we are impelled by our desires to believe in them."[45] And we are impelled to believe in metaphysics, as Nietzsche points out, because we are always in need of security and comfort.

But we must not overlook a more complicated relation between metaphysics and the world-formation of life-and-death, as indicated by the last four links of depending arising: clinging (to metaphysics), becoming, birth, aging, and death. Unless this relation is fully clarified, we are not able to truly understand why the critique of metaphysics is every bit as important in Buddhism as it is in Western philosophy. On this issue, too, we find that both sides of the controversy do not disagree.

The discrepancy arises rather in a difference of opinion over how metaphysics is to be "overcome." On the one hand, for the Critical Buddhists, it entails an uncompromising destruction or elimination of (monist) metaphysics. Only after the complete "destruction" of metaphysics can a pluralistic, liberating world be established on the basis of pure rationality. For the Topical Buddhists, on the other hand, the modern liberalism and individualism that characterize modernity still fall under the shadow of subjectivism and logocentrism.[46] They retain a permanent suspicion of the "project of modernity," insisting all the while that their critique of logocentric modernity is neither a romantic reaction nor a kind of quasi-critique as proposed by the Critical Buddhist but an uncompromising "absolute critique" (to introduce a term coined by Tanabe Hajime) directed against reason itself. Without "absolute critique" or "great death," there will be no affirmation of "great life," no return of the life-world as the groundless "home-ground."

At this point I am not inclined to arbitrate the debate. Nor do the sectarian aspects of the question interest me. I wish merely to note that the mutual misunderstanding seems to me to outweigh their understanding of their respective positions. (For example, "absolute nothingness" or "original enlightenment" in Topical Buddhism is never taken to mean "monistic substance.") The more pressing question concerns what "stance" Buddhist thinkers will take in the confrontation with modernity and post-modernity. Will it be a fundamentalist Buddhism, a positivist Buddhism, a Heideggerian brand of Buddhism? Or will some of them dare, like the wandering Dionysius, to make metaphysics a playful enterprise? Perhaps

this latter, third alternative, will take us beyond "negative metaphysics" or "negative theology" and nudge Buddhism one step further in the direction of a "joyful science."

If Buddhism is viewed as a joyful science, suffering in metaphysics and modernity can be recognized without turning it into an obsession with utopian liberation. For the joyful Buddhist, the metaphysics of identity or subjectivity that belongs to the project of modernity, as conventional knowledge (*samvṛtti-satya*), is indispensable for ultimate knowledge (*paramārtha-satya*). It is also clear that the logic of either/or that is often employed by both sides in the debate fails to recognize the dialectical paradox involved in bringing metaphysics, suffering, and liberation into relationship with one another. Only by fully recognizing and affirming this intrinsic paradox can one play and laugh without losing the critical consciousness of suffering.

Thoughts on *Dhātu-vāda* and Recent Trends in Buddhist Studies

Takasaki Jikidō

The first thing that comes to mind in considering the major trends of the past ten years in Buddhist studies is the claim made by Hakamaya Noriaki and Matsumoto Shirō that the idea of *tathāgata-garbha* (which happens to be my area of specialization) is a pseudo-Buddhist way of thinking, or is not Buddhist at all.[1] Frankly, the claim came as something of a shock to me, and even now continues to weigh heavily on my mind. Since I have known Hakamaya and Matsumoto from the days when they attended my lectures as students and have kept up friendly relations with them ever since, I was not altogether unaware of their way of thinking and the path by which they arrived at their conclusions.

The idea that *tathāgata-garbha* thought has much in common with the teachings of the mainstream of Indian thought as represented by the Upaniṣads and Vedānta philosophy is a point I have often made myself, and was hardly any cause for alarm. But it is quite another thing to conclude that such a way of thinking is "not Buddhist" simply because it is similar to the mainstream of Indian thought. Here I part company with them.

As a form of Indian thought, it is only natural that Buddhism should have certain things in common with the mainstream of Indian thought that it would not, for example, have in common with Christianity or Islam. The problem, as I see it, is how one defines "Buddhism." Some definitions may even permit one to speak of "non-Buddhistic" forms of "Buddhism." But such talk is relative to the world of intra-Buddhist theoretical debate and should not be taken as absolute. But when I first heard the claim that "the doctrine of *tathāgata-garbha* is not Buddhist" I was reminded of Nichiren's attack on other Buddhist schools—that

nenbutsu leads to hell, Zen followers are devils, Shingon is the ruin of the nation, members of the Ritsu school are traitors, and so forth—and dismissed them as having nothing to do with normal academic debate.

Leaving to one side the question of whether or not *tathāgata-garbha* thought is Buddhist (a gesture to which the proponents of the idea will no doubt object), I would like to have a brief look at Matsumoto's proposed neologism *dhātu-vāda* as pointing to the specific structure of the doctrine of *tathāgata-garbha*.

Tathāgata-garbha thought and Buddhist Vijñāptimātravāda thought in many ways stand opposed to each other. For instance, the doctrine of *tathāgata-garbha* teaches the practice and attainment of a single vehicle (*ekayāna*), while the Vijñaptimātravāda teaches three vehicles (*triyāna*). Even so, I find the term *dhātu-vāda* a rather accurate expression of the common structure found in both. In this sense, it is a useful tool for discussing that question.

The idea of *dhātu-vāda* takes as its model terms such as *anādhikāliko-dhātuḥ* (a beginningless substance or basis), as expounded in the verses of the *Mahāyāna-abhidharma Sutra*,[2] or *eko dhātuḥ* (the one realm), as found in the even older *Anūnatvāpurṇatvanirdeśaparivarta*.[3] These terms refer to the idea that samsara and nirvana exist together or share a single "place" or "realm." This "place" is the context within which one passes, through practice, from samsara to nirvana. Those who experience this place as samsara are ordinary sentient beings; those who experience it as nirvana are Buddhas. For ordinary sentient beings, the *tathāgata-garbha* refers to the hoped-for result of Buddhahood, from the perspective of that potential. The *ālaya-vijñāna* (store consciousness) has as its basis the causes of samsara, and these must be "overturned" or "converted" for one to attain nirvana. In the *tathāgata-garbha* tradition, the manifestation of the bodhi-wisdom of the Dharma Body, which remains unmanifested in ordinary sentient beings, is called "the Dharma Body that bears the mark of the conversion of the ground (of enlightenment)." Certainly one may speak of this way of thinking as a "*dhātvasti-vāda*" rather than a "*śūnya-vāda*." Nonetheless, the "way of being" (*asti*) referred to here is not of a substantialist or essentialist sort, but existential. It is a kind of being that lacks selfhood (*anātman*). This is clearly the case at least in the teachings accompanying the two examples I have given. I refer to this idea of the continuity of samsara and nirvana through practice as *ekadhātu-vāda*.[4]

What, then, is the basis for this *ekadhātu-vāda*, the unity or continuity of samsara and nirvana? This is where the idea of the *dharmadhātu* enters into the picture. The interpretation given in the Yogacara tradition is that the *dharmadhātu* is equivalent to causality (*pratītyasamutpāda*); in this sense it is the ground of the noble Buddha Dharma, the teachings of the Buddha.[5] If one pursues the question further, one finds that this idea is based on the teaching of *dharmadhātu* in the *Avataṃsaka Sutra*, where the term was used in an attempt to explain the meaning of the Buddha's attainment of enlightenment. Still further back one discovers in the *Saṃyuttanikāya* of the Pāli canon the term *sā dhātu* in the sense of "the nature of all dharmas" (*dharmatā*).[6] There is yet another, distinct, meaning of *dharmadhātu* given in the Abhidharma tradition, that is, as the "things" or "phenomena" that are the direct and indirect objects of our consciousness (as one of the eighteen categories of "things").

The term *dhātu,* then, has at least two meanings: the sense of "realm" or "place" (or the collection of "things" in that place), and the sense of a "cause" (or the common features that allow the classification of all the "things" into a single group). This double meaning is basic to the notion of *dhātu-vāda*. Such double (or multiple) meanings are not uncommon in Buddhist terms. One need look no further than the word *dharma*, which can refer as well to a phenomenon itself as to the nature of a thing that distinguishes it from other things. The original Indian meaning was closer to the second meaning of the "nature" of a phenomenon. Grammatically speaking it is more accurate to use the term *dharmin* to refer to the phenomenon itself.

Or again, consider the term *pratītyasamutpāda*. Originally it referred to the "causal" side of the process of conditioned arising, in contrast to *pratītyasamutpanna*, which refers to the resultant side of the process. Tachikawa Musashi has pointed out recently that in Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, the term *pratītyasamutpāda* must be understood as including the meanings of both the causal and the resultant side.[7] Tachikawa goes on to note that Nāgārjuna deliberately avoids distinguishing between these two meanings so as to preserve them both in his use of the term. Nāgārjuna recognized that *pratītyasamutpāda* expresses the nature of all phenomena (*dharmatā*), and that this is the meaning of emptiness (*śūnyata*). He did not, however, use the term *dharmadhātu* in its causal sense because he did not wish to acknowledge an independent "dharma-nature" apart from the phenomena themselves. In this sense

Nāgārjuna's position could be called *adhātu-vāda*, though he did not deny dharma-nature in the sense of *pratītyasamutpāda* or emptiness, nor did he deny nirvana as the goal of Buddhist practice.

In the Vijñāptimātravāda tradition, the relationship between phenomena (dharmas) and the *dharmadhātu* is spoken of in terms of the unity of samsara and nirvana, that is, as the "realm" (*dhātu*) that is the basis for conditioned and unconditioned dharmas. This "realm" is none other than the unconditioned dharma of nirvana. The *tathāgata-garbha* tradition follows the same structure, except that it speaks in terms of the *dharmakāya* and Buddha; that is, a Buddha is one who has correctly perceived dharmas (or the *dharmadhātu*), and such a one is called a Dharma Body because he "has the Dharma as his body."

Examples can be found in the Āgama Sutras, where this *Bahuvrīhi* compound is used adjectivally, but it is the *tathāgata-garbha* tradition that first uses "Dharma Body" as an independent technical term. It is interesting to note that this term is also used in the sense of "the accumulation of dharmas" to mean the whole of the Buddha's teachings, or *sarvadharma*, such as in the teaching of the collection of dharmas in five parts, of which the Buddha's qualities consist.[8] The tendency to perceive the Buddha as one with the Dharma he has realized shares the same conceptual structure as the Upaniṣads, which teach that one "becomes" something by coming to know it.

The problem comes down to this. Is *dhātu-vāda*, or the way of thinking that is associated with *dhātu-vāda*, an essential element of Buddhism? If it is essential, how far back in the history of Buddhist thought can it be traced? Can its origin be found in the thinking of the Buddha Śākyamuni himself? The reference to *sā dhātu* in the *Saṃyuttanikāya* mentioned above speaks of the establishment of this *dhātu* (that is, dependent origination as the regular nature of dharmas) as a "law" or truth in such a way that it is established from the outset, "whether or not a Tathagata appears in the world" to discover and perceive it correctly. But this particular passage seems to stem from a period after *pratītyasamutpāda* had become established as the basis of the Buddha's teaching. The same idiomatic phrase ("whether or not a Tathagata appears in the world") is used in the *Aṅguttaranikāya* to speak of the "three characteristics of dharmas," beginning with "the transience of all things," as the established law or truth, but this also appears to be a later development.[9] Hence it is difficult to prove that the idea of *dhātu* as *pratītyasamutpāda* is directly connected

with the Buddha himself.

There is, however, a passage in the *Sutra of the Castle City* [*Nagara*] of the *Saṃyuttanikāya* that, while not linked to the doctrine of *pratītya-samutpāda,* refers to the Buddha as simply one who has "discovered" the Dharma.[10] In this context the "Eightfold Path" is presented as the same path that all Buddhas from time out of mind have trod. The same may be said of the discovery of the truth of *pratītyasamutpāda*.

The opening "Chapter on the Buddha" of the *Nidāna-Saṃyutta* (section XII of the *Saṃyuttanikāya*) claims that the Seven Buddhas of the Past all realized the teaching of *pratītyasamutpāda*, and that "eyes, wisdom, insight, and light were aroused concerning the undiscovered Dharma."[11] While these may not be the direct words of the Buddha, it is certainly true that the Buddha did not present himself as the author of the Path but only as one who discovered what was already there, one who "saw" the Dharma and thus awoke as a Buddha to become himself a teacher of that same Dharma. The Dharma is what the Buddha saw and what he taught. It is the foundation of Buddhism. In this sense Buddhism is different from the Indian mainstream that takes the idea of atman=brahman as its foundational doctrine, which is where we find the origin of *dhātu-vāda* in Buddhism.[12]

After the Buddha passed away, he was idealized and apotheosized, and this process of religious divination expanded the concept of *dhātu-vāda*. Mahayana Buddhism, in turn, emphasized the Buddha more than the Dharma, in contrast to the Abhidharma tradition, which maintained a central focus on the Dharma.[13] Mahayana Buddhism was also in closer contact with day-to-day life in Hindu society. These factors may have contributed to making Mahayana Buddhism more susceptible to influence by Hindu ways of thought.

Matsumoto bases his discussion on the assumption that Buddhism should not permit influence from other Indian ways of thinking. This may explain why he tries to proscribe any teaching that even slightly resembles non-Buddhist Indian thought or that seems to smack of *dhātu-vāda* tendencies. This leads him to reject samadhic concentration as well as the ideas of liberation and nirvana as non-Buddhist, and explains why he confines Buddhism to insight into *pratītyasamutpāda*. Still, the Buddha did experience both samadhic concentration and nirvana, and it cannot be denied that he instructed his disciples on these matters. There is also no evidence that he ever taught anything that would refute these teachings.

We might note that one of the reasons Matsumoto insists that *tathāgata-garbha* thought is not Buddhist is that it holds to seemingly substantialist ideas such as a "Great Self" or the four "positive" traits of nirvana as "eternal, blissful, selfhood, and pure." These ideas are undeniably similar to the idea of an atman, and it is hardly surprising that they should come up for question. An even stronger reason for Matsumoto's claim is that the *tathāgata-garbha* tradition served as the source of the development of the thought of original enlightenment (*hongaku shisō*) in Japanese Buddhism. His critique of the doctrine of *tathāgata-garbha* gives him the wedge he wants to drive into contemporary Japanese Buddhism and pry open the minds of its scholars. This aspect of Matsumoto's work runs parallel with the efforts of Hakamaya, and has provided his colleage with support for his own arguments. Of late Matsumoto's critique has been aimed at the source of Japanese Buddhism, namely, Chinese Buddhism and in particular the Ch'an tradition.[14] His arguments are sharp, but at times he lets his expectations overshadow the evidence and forces the facts to fit his theories.

Hakamaya, meantime, has focused the sights of his critique of *hongaku shisō* on Dōgen, claiming that the twelve-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō* written by Dōgen in his later years contains his true position, and that the earlier writings should be rejected in favor of the later ones.[15] Dōgen specialists have not been convinced.[16] Even Matsumoto criticizes Hakamaya for having over-idealized Dōgen and argues that the *dhātu-vāda* way of thinking found in early works of Dōgen such as the "Bendōwa" were not rejected by Dōgen even in his later years. I must say, I agree.

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There are further undercurrents to Hakamaya's and Matsumoto's criticism of the present state of Buddhist studies. One senses a dissatisfaction with the strong emphasis that has been put on objective textual studies in mainstream Japanese Buddhology. In the same vein, one cannot fail to feel a disillusionment with religious studies in general for having taken the ideal of value-free judgments to the point that almost anything claiming to be a religion deserves equal scholarly attention. Hakamaya and Matsumoto have taken the approach that Buddhology should concern itself with the question "What is Buddhism?" and pursue the truth of Buddhism from a subjective perspective, rejecting what is non-Buddhist

or anti-Buddhist. They call this "Critical Buddhism." It is my view that such judgments may serve to advance the cause of particular schools or sects within Buddhism, but that they are not the stuff of Buddhology. But now I understand that this very view has become the target of criticism.

[*Translated by Paul L. Swanson*]

A Reexamination of Critical Buddhism

Sueki Fumihiko

The term "critical buddhism" was used by Hakamaya Noriaki as the title of a 1990 book in which he defines it as the position that "Buddhism is criticism" or that "only that which is critical is Buddhism." Hakamaya further uses the term "critical philosophy" to distinguish it from "topical philosophy." For the purposes of this essay, I shall employ the term "Critical Buddhism" to refer to a movement in Buddhist scholarship that is represented by Hakamaya and one of his colleagues at Komazawa University, Matsumoto Shirō, and that is characterized by its critique of traditional attitudes in Japanese Buddhist studies. Strictly speaking, the positions of the two are not identical, but since they have collaborated so closely and have had considerable influence on one another, it does not seem out of place to treat them under the same rubric. I would also note that whereas the label of "Critical Buddhism" has been widely used among Buddhist scholars in the United States, this is not the case in Japan.

Although Hakamaya and Matsumoto prepared a number of critical studies in the early 1980s, they began to publish their main work in 1985. In that year Hakamaya released a number of important articles that were later to be included in his well-known book *Critiques of the Doctrine of Original Enlightenment*. It was in 1986, when Matsumoto read his paper "The Doctrine of *Tathāgata-garbha* Is Not Buddhist" at the annual meeting of the Japanese Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies, that Critical Buddhism first caused a stir in Japanese Buddhist studies.[1] In the aftermath Hakamaya and Matsumoto churned out one essay after the other, many of which were subsequently collected and published as separate volumes: Hakamaya's *Critiques* (1989), *Critical Buddhism* (1990), *Dōgen and Buddhism* (1992); and Matsumoto's *Pratītyasamutpāda and Emptiness* (1989) and *Critical Studies on Zen Thought* (1994).

The response in Japanese academic circles to their criticisms was mixed. A few scholars reacted positively, but most scholars withheld approval. Hakamaya and Matsumoto (especially Hakamaya) made no pretense to objectivity and politeness in presenting their ideas, but rode roughshod over the customs of Japanese academia, setting forth their subjective opinions in a bold and forthright manner, attacking other scholars head-on, and not infrequently using disparaging language. This was part of a strategy aimed at insuring that the issues they raised would not be ignored or get swept aside in the general current of minute scholarly problems. From the start, they wanted public attention and debate.

Their strategy succeeded and catapulted their names into prominence. But at the same time, their radical and aggressive attitude incurred the anger of most Japanese scholars and led to the unfortunate result that their underlying intentions were neither understood nor discussed for a rather long period. The handful of scholars who stood up for them included some of their colleagues at Komazawa University like Ishii Shūdō and Itō Takatoshi, who were able to read between the lines of the exaggerations of Hakamaya and Matsumoto. Perhaps the only person to respond seriously to their criticism in the early stages was Tsuda Shin'ichi, a somewhat unique scholar specializing in esoteric Buddhism. Most scholars simply ignored them, preferring not to get involved rather than to court danger. Critical Buddhism became the sort of issue in Japanese Buddhist scholarship that everyone knew about, but few discussed openly. Scholars in the United States, unaffected by the taboos of Japanese academia, took a more open-minded approach. The 1993 meeting of the American Academy of Religion included a panel on Critical Buddhism.

In any event, after Hakamaya and Matsumoto had finished the first stage of their work, Japanese scholars eventually began to take up the questions they were raising. In 1994 the Association of Buddhist Philosophy published a special issue of its *Journal of Buddhist Studies* in commemoration of ten years of the establishment of the association. In the lead article Takasaki Jikidō, the president of the association, made a survey of Buddhist studies in Japan over the past ten years, devoting more than half of his treatment to Critical Buddhism.[2] This left no doubt that he considered it to be the principal issue in the previous decade of Japanese Buddhist studies. In addition to the comments of Takasaki, articles by Maeda Egaku, Yoshizu Yoshihide, and Tsuda Shin'ichi in the same volume also took up the question. The taboo had begun to lift.

In this essay, I would like to begin with an overview of the issues raised by Critical Buddhism and the responses to it by Japanese scholars, and then go on to briefly outline my own participation in this debate and my current views on this issue.

ASSERTIONS AND SCHOLARLY REACTIONS

Hakamaya's Ideas

In contrast to Matsumoto Shirō, who usually approaches questions from an academic standpoint, Hakamaya often reverts to a journalistic style. His thoughts range broadly across a number of issues at the same time, weaving a complex web of connections that is not always easy to follow. Paul Swanson has distinguished three levels in the critique of Hakamaya and Matsumoto (see pages 27–8 above): the Buddhological, the sectarian, and the social-critical. I would like to add a fourth: the philosophical.

THE SECTARIAN LEVEL

An important stimulus to Hakamaya and Matsumoto's promotion of Critical Buddhism came from their participation in a committee formed to study the problem of discrimination in the Sōtō sect. Japanese Buddhism has long lent support to social discrimination—even from before the Tokugawa period—and contemporary Buddhism has come to recognize the need for self-examination in this regard. In contrast to the Jōdo Shin sect, whose fight against discrimination has a comparatively long history, the Sōtō sect has lagged behind. It was only after a discriminatory statement issued by the leaders of the Sōtō sect attracted widespread public attention that the sect began to take up the question in earnest.[3] The writings of Hakamaya and others on this question need to be read in this light.

Hakamaya concluded that the traditional doctrines that supported discrimination in the Sōtō sect had derived from the monistic view of the *hongaku shisō* or the doctrine of "original enlightenment." This explains in part his vehement attacks against *hongaku* thought. In its place, he promotes what may be called the "Protestant character" of Critical Buddhism, insisting on the need to modernize the teachings of the Sōtō sect, which has lagged far behind in terms of facing discriminatory elements in its own tradition past and present.

Naturally, the critique of traditional doctrines means grappling with the philosophy of Dōgen, the founder of the Sōtō sect. The "new" idea that Hakamaya proposes is that the main subject of the *Shōbōgenzō*, Dōgen's magnum opus, is a criticism of *hongaku shisō*. He further argues that the 12-fascicle version of the *Shōbōgenzō*, hitherto neglected, should be reinstated as Dōgen's consummate contribution.[4] The idea that the "Bendōwa," the prologue of the *Shōbōgenzō*, contains a criticism of Tendai *hongaku* thought is, of course, nothing new. Scholars outside the Sōtō tradition such as Hazama Jikō and Tamura Yoshirō have made this point often in the past. But prior to the publications by Yamauchi Shun'yū in 1985, there had been no public acknowledgment of the fact within the Sōtō sect. Hakamaya developed Yamauchi's ideas and argued that the *hongaku* thought criticized by Dōgen is not restricted to a tendency of the Japanese Tendai school, but is a way of thinking broadly accepted in Japan. He added that this criticism of *hongaku* thought is not merely the subject of one passage of the "Bendōwa," but constituted the main subject of the whole of the *Shōbōgenzō*. From his standpoint, the 75-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō*, which has been accepted as the core of Dōgen's philosophy, contains traces of the influence of *hongaku* thought and is thus inferior to the 12-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō* of Dōgen's later years, where Hakamaya finds a more decisive stand against *hongaku* thought.

THE BUDDHOLOGICAL LEVEL

Hakamaya's criticism of *hongaku* thought is not restricted to the sectarian level but encompasses a wide range of studies in the history of Buddhist thought. *Hongaku* thought in the narrower sense refers to a tendency within the Tendai school in medieval Japan characterized by the absolute affirmation of the phenomenal world, and occasionally referred to as "Tendai *hongaku* thought." *Hongaku* thought in the wider sense refers to tendencies in Buddhist philosophy to attach importance to the idea of "original enlightenment" as a result of the influence of the *Awakening of Mahayana Faith*.

Hakamaya's definition of *hongaku* thought is broader still. His definition includes three elements:

1. the assumption of substantial "place" (*topos*), usually mixed with non-Buddhist native or indigenous thought;
2. an ideology that is linked to authoritarianism and self-affirmation;

3. an attitude that makes light of the intellect and attaches importance to the "experience" of enlightenment.

In contrast, he proposes three defining traits of genuine Buddhism:

1. the idea of causation that is critical of the idea of substantial place;
2. the idea of self-negation and altruism based upon the idea of no-self;
3. the doctrine of dependent causality based on the faith and intellect.[5]

In this way, Hakamaya expands the meaning of the term *hongaku* thought to include not only indigenous anti-Buddhist elements in Buddhist history, but also non-Buddhist indigenous ideas that have influenced such anti-Buddhist elements within Buddhism. These are not restricted to Japan but are also to be found in India and China. According to Hakamaya, Buddhism becomes true Buddhism when it criticizes *hongaku* thought in this very broad sense.

Hakamaya's redefinition of *hongaku* thought has close parallels to Matsumoto's treatment of the doctrine of *tathāgata-garbha*, and in fact was clearly influenced by it. But unlike Matsumoto, who tries to clarify the fundamental ideas of Buddhism, Hakamaya's main interest is to criticize tendencies in Japan. This is why he focuses on *hongaku* thought rather than the doctrine of *tathāgata-garbha*.

Both Hakamaya and Matsumoto are specialists in Tibetan Buddhism who studied under Yamaguchi Zuihō, Japan's foremost Tibetologist. In the sense that Yamaguchi criticizes Buddhism in East Asia from the standpoint of Tibetan Buddhism, the Critical Buddhism of Hakamaya and Matsumoto may be considered a further development of Yamaguchi's position.[6]

THE PHILOSOPHICAL LEVEL

The term "critical" in Critical Buddhism derives from the Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico (1668–1744), who referred to the philosophy of Descartes as a "critical philosophy" to contrast it with his own "topical philosophy." Hakamaya, in contrast, sets out to criticize topical philosophy from the critical standpoint. For him, the "critical" represents true Buddhism, and the "topical" standpoint corresponds to *hongaku* thought. His support of the Cartesian critical attitude shows that his approach stands closer to modern rationalism than it does to either premodern irrational approaches or postmodern criticism. For those conversant with modern Japanese philosophy, the talk of "topos" or "place"

(*basho*) at once calls to mind the thought of Nishida Kitarō and the Kyoto school. Hakamaya's own critique of the Kyoto school, however, is not aimed at the mainstream figures like Nishida but at the nationalistic attitudes of figures like Umehara Takeshi.

THE LEVEL OF SOCIAL CRITICISM

As stated above, one of the sparks that ignited the cause of Critical Buddhism was the critique of social discrimination. Hakamaya's strong interest in social problems is patent. As noted earlier, he has spoken openly against recent Japanese nationalistic tendencies. He rejects the emperor system and related elements in contemporary Japanese society (such as reliance on harmony or *wa*). It is because of this radical social criticism that his activities have not been restricted to the academic world and have created something of a sensation in the wider Buddhist world of Japan.

Matsumoto's Ideas

Although the range of Hakamaya's activities is very wide, he owes much of his fundamental perspective to Matsumoto Shirō. In contrast to Hakamaya, Matsumoto has contributed a great deal to the study of more fundamental problems of Buddhism. Because of this, and the fact that the range of study is more restricted than that of Hakamaya, his studies have given Buddhist scholarship in Japan a stronger jolt. His main ideas appear in the 1989 book *Pratītyasamutpāda and Emptiness*, while critical essays against the Ch'an tradition in China are more prominent in his 1994 work, *Critical Studies in Zen Thought.* The core of his approach is laid out clearly and concisely in the opening essay of the former book, "The Doctrine of *Tathāgata-garbha* Is Not Buddhist."

According to Matsumoto, Buddhism is based on the principles of no-self and causation, which deny any substance underlying the phenomenal world. The idea of *tathāgata-garbha,* on the contrary, posits a substance (namely, *tathāgata-garbha)* as the basis of the phenomenal world. Theories that allow for such substances he calls *dhātu-vāda* (combining the Sanskrit words for substratum and opinion or theory). He asserts that *dhātu-vāda* is the object that the Buddha criticized in founding Buddhism, and that Buddhism is nothing but unceasing critical activity against any form of *dhātu-vāda*.

Matsumoto's idea clearly falls within the tradition of the Madhyamaka school in India and the dGe luk school in Tibet, and in this respect

represents a highly orthodox interpretation of Buddhist philosophy. The reason it caused such a sensation among Buddhist scholars is rather due to his radical criticism of the whole of the East Asian Buddhist tradition—including, of course, Buddhist scholarship in Japan—for tacitly assuming the orthodoxy of *tathāgata-garbha* or Buddha-nature theory. In this sense, his criticism represents a fundamental challenge to close the gap in understanding between Tibetan and East Asian traditions of Buddhism.

Responses to Critical Buddhism

As noted earlier, supporters of the efforts of Hakamaya and Matsumoto include a number of their colleagues at Komazawa University.[7] In particular, Itō Takatoshi and Ishii Shūdō have composed major works under their influence.[8] Itō, a specialist in Chinese Buddhism, agrees that Chinese Buddhism is dominated by the characteristics of the *dhātu-vāda* owing to the influence of Taoist philosophy. Ishii is a specialist of Chinese Ch'an history who has also studied the relationship between Chinese Ch'an and Dōgen. While he is critical of Hakamaya's ideas in some respects, the influence of Hakamaya and Matsumoto is apparent in his critique of Chinese Ch'an thought and in the importance he attaches to the 12-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō*.

One of the most radical opponents of Critical Buddhism is Tsuda Shin'ichi, a specialist in esoteric Buddhism who insists that Buddhism does allow for something similar to a substance grounding the phenomenal world.[9] In taking issue with Matsumoto, Tsuda admits to taking the standpoint of *dhātu-vāda*, claiming in effect, "I am a *dhātu-vādin*."[10] We may also mention here Ueda Shizuteru, one of the principal successors of the Kyoto school, who criticizes Hakamaya's interpretation of the *Shōbōgenzō* and claims that the "Genjō kōan" fascicle presents the final position of the *Shōbōgenzō*.[11]

MY PARTICIPATION IN THE PROBLEM OF CRITICAL BUDDHISM

In my own written work, I have made mention several times of the issues raised by Critical Buddhism, though without taking them up in any systematic way. The first mention dates from a 1988 essay that attempted a critical survey of the history of studies on Japanese Buddhism.[12] My main point was that Buddhist studies before and during World War II had strong ties to Japanese nationalism and that this fact prevented scholars

from studying the doctrinal problems of Japanese Buddhism objectively. On the one hand, I took a positive attitude to the criticisms of Hakamaya as a rejection of the facile nationalistic praise found in Japanese Buddhism. On the other hand, I questioned his ideas for leaving the impression of negating the whole of Japanese Buddhism. As an example, I mentioned the idea of *sansen sōmoku shikkai jōbutsu* 山川草木悉皆成仏 (mountains, rivers, grasses, and trees all attain Buddhahood), an idea praised by Umehara Takeshi and other nationalists and criticized as such by Hakamaya. My complaint there against Hakamaya was that he had not made the historical development of the idea sufficiently clear in his work.

Hakamaya responded to my criticism in detail in the preface of his 1989 book. His principal counterargument was that my attitude was too moderate to allow me to take part in the critique of social problems outside the academic world. Once again, he reiterated the problem of *sansen sōmoku shikkai jōbutsu*. I took up this question directly in my next book,[13] but did not, and have not, responded to his criticism of my moderate attitude, failing to see why moderate attitudes should necessarily be morally inferior to radical ones.

In a 1991 essay on medieval Tendai and *hongaku* thought,[14] I gave a positive evaluation of his criticism of *hongaku* thought for opening up a new perspective on the question. At the same time, I criticized his definition of *hongaku* thought as too broad to be useful for the study of the development of the idea. In addition, I posed some questions about the appropriateness of the three points of his definition of *hongaku* thought.

Hakamaya treated Hōnen and Myōe in his 1992 book, locating Hōnen on the side of the anti-*hongaku* thought and Myōe on the side of *hongaku* thought. I attacked the idea as simplistic,[15] noting that Myōe's critique of Hōnen, *Zaijarin*, followed Myōe's criticism that the uselessness of practice taught in the contemporary Kegon school was similar to *hongaku* thought. Myōe's criticism of Hōnen made a similar point. This demonstrates the problem with counterpositioning Myōe and Hōnen on the question of *hongaku* thought.

I also discussed Matsumoto's ideas in an essay on methodological problems of Buddhist studies.[16] I agreed with Matsumoto's criticism of the so-called objectivity of Buddhist studies. As for his criticism of the *tathāgata-garbha* theory, I find myself sympathetic with the sincerity of his intentions, although there are certain points with which I continue to

disagree. In my view, the standpoint of no-self that negates the *dhātu* is a standpoint that views the *dhātu* as a form of a negation. The very negation of the idea reconfirms the almost innate stubbornness with which it keeps appearing and reappearing in Buddhism. Because it rejects the solid foundation of a *dhātu*, the standpoint of no-self and emptiness tends to have an unsettling effect, with the result that efforts are made to find some way to counter the negation and restore the *dhātu*. This unsettling quality of the Buddhist standpoint, as I see it, has been a dynamic force in the history of Buddhism's development. In this context I have also proposed the idea of approaching Buddhism as a "method," to which I return at the conclusion of my remarks.

MY VIEW OF CRITICAL BUDDHISM

I am prepared neither to join camp with Critical Buddhists nor to reject it out of hand, but I do see the benefit of examining the questions they raise and feel that they will help deepen our understanding of Buddhism. In particular, I should like to focus on four points: the interpretation of Dōgen's philosophy and *hongaku* thought, the evaluation of Chinese Ch'an, the evaluation of native or indigenous ways of thinking, and an alternative to Critical Buddhism that I call "Buddhism as a method."

Dōgen and Hongaku Thought

Hakamaya and others have taken the tenth "question-and-answer" of the "Bendōwa" as a starting point and from there conclude that Dōgen's main intent was to criticize *hongaku* thought. This reading in turn led to the "discovery" of the value of the 12-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō*. The first problem to be examined, then, is whether or not this particular question-and-answer is the criticism of *hongaku* thought that Hazama and others claims it is.

He Yan-sheng recently published an essay in which he asserts that the object of the criticism of the tenth question-and-answer is not *hongaku* thought in Japan but the Hung-chou and the Ho-tse schools in the Chinese Ch'an tradition.[17] To support his interpretation, he points out that Dōgen cites the terms *reichi* 霊知 (spiritual intellect) or *reishō* 霊性 (spiritual nature) as used by the opponents whom he criticizes. Criticism against the *reichi* theory can also be found in the "Sokushin zebutsu" fascicle. While these terms are rarely found in the literature of *hongaku*

thought in the Japanese Tendai school before Dōgen, it is well known that Tsung-mi (780–841) of the Chinese Ho-tse school often used the term *ling-chih* (*reichi*). This raises a serious doubt concerning the view that the object of Dōgen's criticism is the *hongaku* thought of Japanese Tendai.

I would also draw attention to the *Jisshū yōdō ki* of Enni (1202–1280),[18] a work that surveys the doctrines of the ten sects of Japanese Buddhism—the six sects in Nara plus the Tendai, Shingon, Jōdo, and Zen sects—and asserts the superiority of the Zen sect. In this work Enni mentions the theory of *reichi* as characteristic of the Zen sect, and asserts that from the standpoint of the Zen sect, practice is unnecessary in that sentient beings have no evil desires and are already enlightened. This claim seems to be the target of Dōgen's criticism. It is not possible for Dōgen to have read the *Jisshū yōdō ki* before he wrote the "Bendōwa," because the latter was composed in 1231, whereas Enni sailed to China in 1225 and only returned to Japan in 1241. It is possible, however, that some of the advocates of Zen asserted similar ideas, and that Dōgen was trying to counter such a tendency.

In any event, it is by no means as certain as it may seem at first blush that Dōgen's criticisms were aimed specifically at Tendai *hongaku* thought, and still less at *hongaku* thought in general as Hakamaya asserts. To make any claims about Dōgen's intentions, it is important to locate the object of his criticism as clearly and precisely as possible.

As for the term "*hongaku* thought" itself, Peter Gregory uses it to characterize Tsung-mi's ideas.[19] It is true that Tsung-mi used the term *hongaku* as a key term in his philosophical system, and it is not inappropriate to apply it to his philosophy. But his main idea is not the same as the *hongaku* thought found in Japanese Tendai. Whereas the latter affirms the phenomenal world, Tsung-mi puts the stress on the self-awakening of the *hongaku* or the *reichi*. Such a development took place in Japanese Tendai on a full scale only under the influence of Chinese Ch'an ideas, although it was not absent before then. Because of this difference in their ways of thinking and in their use of the term, I prefer to avoid using the same term, *hongaku* thought, to point to these distinct trends.

As for the issue of the 12-fascicle and 75-fascicle versions of the *Shōbōgenzō*, the rediscovery of the value of the 12-fascicle version represents a significant contribution of Critical Buddhism. That having been said, I am not convinced that this is the only way, let alone the only correct way, to read Dōgen. Interpretations that put the emphasis on the 75-

fascicle version continue to retain their validity. The 75-fascicle version reflects Dōgen's effort to accept and interpret the koans of the Chinese Ch'an tradition. In this respect, Dōgen is a successor to the Ch'an tradition, and it is impossible to say simply that he is critical of it. If the 75-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō* is undervalued, there is no way to come to a fair appreciation of the work Dōgen did in the prime of life.

The Evaluation of Chinese Ch'an

From the standpoint of Critical Buddhism, Chinese Ch'an is criticized for being a kind of *hongaku* thought on the grounds that it stresses the direct experience of enlightenment and denies the validity of language. Even Ishii Shūdō says that the central idea of Chinese Ch'an is *kenshō* 見性 (seeing one's nature) and *tongo* 頓悟 (sudden awakening). *Kenshō*, he says, points to a return to the original foundation and *tongo* to the accomplishment of the return.[20] I find such interpretations too facile to cover the many phases of Chinese Ch'an.

The first question is whether in fact Chinese Ch'an denies the validity of language. To be sure, *pu li wen-tzu* 不立文字 (*furyū monji*; not using words) is one of the most famous slogans of the Ch'an school. But this does not of itself entitle us to take it literally. The Ch'an tradition requires proper, if not ordinary, expression. This is what Dōgen means by *dōtoku* 道得 (the attainment of the expression).

In daily life words points to things and ideas. We cannot get along without these everyday meanings, but at the same time we recognize that our words reach their limits when it comes to talking about how the world truly is. Nāgārjuna demonstrated in his *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* how the meanings of words do not necessarily correspond to the facts of the world. This is what he calls "emptiness."

The language of the koan tries to deconstruct the everyday system of the meaning in order to point to the side of the world that our words conceal from us. For this reason, the koan neither denies language nor does it claim to be a method for acquiring a language-transcending truth. It is rather a form of language that tries to open one up to a new way of seeing the world.

An example may help to make this clear. Chapters 70, 71, and 72 of the *Blue Cliff Record* deal with answers of Wei-shan, Wu-feng, and Yün-yen to the question of Pai-chang as to how one speaks "with your throat, mouth, and lips shut." Shutting the throat, mouth, and lips symbolizes

the denial of ordinary language, but it does not refer to the rejection of language as such, since Pai-chang asks each of them to say something. The three monks give quite different answers to the enigmatic question. For example:

> Pai-chang: With your throat, mouth, and lips shut, how will you speak?
> Wei-shan: Please, Teacher, you speak instead.
> Pai-chang: I don't refuse to speak to you, but I fear that (if I did) in the future I would be bereft of descendants.[21]

Although Wei-shan's words "Please, Teacher, you speak instead" seem to avoid Pai-chang's question, it is, in truth, an answer with which he tries to speak with his throat, mouth, and lips shut. Both Pai-chang's question and Wei-shan's answer have to do with a deconstruction of the language of daily life, not with the elimination of language altogether. Quite the contrary, Chinese Ch'an puts great stress on language, though always in such a way as to avoid confusion with our ordinary, everyday way of using words.

The next question is whether Chinese Ch'an is a type of *hongaku* thought based upon *tathāgata-garbha* or Buddha-nature theory. No doubt the Ch'an tradition presupposes the notion of Buddha-nature, but this is not to say that it simply affirms it. Consider, for example, the "Busshō" fascicle of the *Shōbōgenzō*, where Dōgen mentions many Chinese koans that treat Buddha-nature. We find that most koans take the form of an affirmation of Buddha-nature followed by its denial. The typical example is the koan by Chau-chou of the Buddha-nature of a dog. A monk asks Chao-chou whether a dog has the Buddha-nature, and Chao-chou answers both "yes" and "no" on different occasions. "Yes" seems to be the ordinary answer on the basis of the theory of Buddha-nature; upon further reflection, this answer seems too "easy." When Chao-chou gives the answer "No," he gives as his reason the ineluctable fact of *karma-vijñāna* (fundamental influences of no-consciousness that arouse desires), which impede the advance toward enlightenment. Whatever cannot attain enlightenment because of the *karma-vijñāna* would have to be said not to have the Buddha-nature. In this way, Ch'an makes the point that the affirmation of Buddha-nature is something that requires deep self-reflection.

The dispute over the *tathāgata-garbha* or Buddha-nature between Critical Buddhism and its opponents seems to be concentrated on the question of whether the *tathāgata-garbha* or Buddha-nature "exists" or not. It seems to me that the more important question is to clarify what the words mean.

The Evaluation of Native or Indigenous Ways of Thinking

As stated above, Critical Buddhists have criticized indigenous ways of thought and forms of Buddhism like *hongaku* thought that have come under their influence on the grounds that the aim of Buddhism is to criticize such ways of thinking. But Hakamaya fails to clearly demonstrate why indigenous modes of thought need to be rejected. In his article "*Tathatā* as Topos,"[22] Hakamaya makes a contrast in terms of brain physiology:

thinking with the right half of the brain	topical philosophy *hongaku* thought
thinking with the left half of the brain	critical philosophy Buddhism

It is impossible to arrive at the conclusion that Buddhism is correct and *hongaku* thought is wrong on the basis of this model. On the contrary, *hongaku* thought seems to have the same importance to Buddhism that the right side of the brain has to the left.

If anything, I feel the need for a closer examination of indigenous elements at work in Buddhist sects in Japan. Buddhism exists in Japan not merely as a system of individual faith and philosophy, but also as a complex of sects hierarchically structured and wielding considerably economic power. Most lay believers belong to this scheme by virtue of the traditional *danka* system and come in contact with Buddhism through funerals and memorial services which in turn provide the main source of financial support for the temples. Funerals and memorial services incorporate a great many indigenous elements, and to reject them would be tantamount to undermining the economic base of Japanese Buddhist institutions.

It was Keizan Jōkin (1268–1325) who first introduced native elements into the doctrines and ceremonies of the Sōtō sect, and thus developed the socioeconomic power of the sect. In this way, indigenous

elements came to be very important for Sōtō Zen as well as other Buddhist sects. What do the Critical Buddhists make of this situation? Were all the indigenous elements to disappear, the Sōtō sect would disappear with it. If Critical Buddhism is to take a clear position with regard to the Sōtō sect, they must address this question directly.

Buddhism as a Method

One of the great achievements of Critical Buddhism is that it has challenged the tradition of objective, value-free, positivistic Buddhist studies. The main concern of religion is not with objective facts of the outside world but with a way of life. Critical Buddhism is right to have insisted on this point, but it is inconsistent to turn around then and insist on the objectivity of their historical and doctrinal claims without falling into the very objectivism they set out to criticize.

In order to avoid this pitfall and lend greater flexibility to the spirit of Critical Buddhism, I propose a new approach to Buddhist studies that I call "Buddhism as a method."[23] It aims to understand Buddhism not as a fixed system but as a perspective from which to reflect on life and culture. The expression "Buddhism as a method" derives from the idea of studying "Asia as a method" proposed by Takeuchi Yoshimi, and "China as a method" proposed by Mizoguchi Yūzō.[24] Reflecting on the invasion of Asia by Japan, Takeuchi concluded that it resulted from a misguided form of modernization. In studying Asian countries that tried to struggle against the imperialism and colonialism of Western countries and Japan, he was struck by what seemed to him a new type of modernization different from that of the West. This led him to argue that Japan should abandon its adoration of the West and adopt a new approach towards its neighboring Asian lands. This rethinking he called "Asia as a method"—that is, a method for thinking about the world and the direction of history.

Takeuchi's approach made more sense when Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai were at the height of their power in China and when Gandhi and Nehru were active in promoting their ideals in India. But when these countries reached the limit of their development in the 1970s and 1980s, the idea lost its persuasive power. Mizoguchi stepped in at this point to advance the idea by advocating what he called "China as a method."[25] Observing that the study of China in Japan had been governed by the vested interests of Japan rather than by "China as it is," he proposed studying China as an independent cultural system, and then envisioning the world

as a collection of such independent cultures. In this way, the study of China became a method for reimagining the world.

Even though Mizoguchi viewed cultures a fair share more dispassionately than Takeuchi was able to, his position is not entirely satisfactory, in that it lacks the recognition that in studying a culture other than one's own, perfect impartiality is impossible. As I reflected on the attempts of Takeuchi and Mizoguchi, it occurred to me that we might broaden our perspective on Buddhism and consider it as a "method" along similar lines—namely, as a method to study Japanese culture. As a religion of foreign origins, Buddhism provides us with a perspective from which to see Japanese culture from the outside, as it were, and hence to combat ethnocentric or nationalistic views of culture. In addition, given the wide range of Buddhisms to be found through Asia, the study of Buddhism can serve as an effective means for taking a broader view of other Asian cultures, one unaffected by presumptions of cultural superiority. Finally, envisioning Buddhism as a "method" can also aid scholars in the attempt to look at Buddhism without the distortions of sectarian and doctrinal bias. As I see it, such an approach holds out more promise than the tack taken by Critical Buddhism.

Thoughts on the Ideological Background of Social Discrimination

Hakamaya Noriaki

This essay is one in a series of essays I have published this year criticizing the idea of "original enlightenment."[1] One factor that makes the criticism of original enlightenment so difficult is that so many influential intellectuals routinely and with such utter confidence repeat the idea that this doctrine represents the mainstream and quintessence of the Buddhist tradition. From there they go on to claim that because the idea permeates the whole of Japanese culture, the ideals of peace and harmony were able to take firm hold in Japan. Rejecting the doctrine of original enlightenment then becomes tantamount to rejecting the best of—if not even the whole of—Japanese culture. I am not resorting here to hyperbole. One finds examples of such thinking everywhere, as for example in the following newspaper column by Umehara Takeshi:

> [In contrast to my earlier ideas I now think that] Japanese Buddhism, while having the appearance of Buddhism, was greatly influenced by pre-Buddhist indigenous religion and thus became something quite distinct. Or perhaps it is better to say that Japanese Buddhism is the truly genuine development of the Mahayana Buddhist tradition—that Japan was already, in a latent form, a Mahayana country, so that with the introduction of Buddhism the latent became manifest as Japan developed into an *Eka-Mahayana* Buddhist nation, unique in the world....
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> [Prince Shōtoku, who deserves the utmost credit for establishing Buddhism in Japan, tried to employ people of talent in government offices and to break the shackles of the clan system.] To accomplish this he needed a philosophy of equality and unity, which Prince Shōtoku discovered in the *Śrīmālādevī Sutra* and the *Lotus Sutra*, considered to be the only sutras that teach Ekayana Buddhism. Prince Shōtoku later called this Eka-Mahayana.... He demonstrated that the doctrine of *tathāgata-*

> *garbha* was the other side of the coin of Ekayana thought.... After this, Japanese Buddhism developed along the lines of the *tathāgata-garbha* and Ekayana Buddhism advocated by Prince Shōtoku....
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> I especially wish to emphasize the uniquely Japanese development of this Ekayana Buddhism—where, unlike Indian or Chinese Buddhism, the doctrine of the Buddhahood of mountains, rivers, grasses, and streams evolved. In other words, the Buddhist—especially Mahayana Buddhist—doctrine of equality went beyond humanity, to encompass the whole of the natural world, beginning with animals and plants.... In this sense, though we often focus on the Buddhist assertion of human equality alive in the national polity of Japan today, it is the extension of this equality to mountains, rivers, grasses, and trees—unique to Japanese Buddhism—that is truly important, for it can stave off the destruction of nature resulting from the anthropocentric ideas so strong in European thought. Ours is a doctrine essential to the future of humanity.[2]

I hardly need mention that what Umehara calls "Ekayana Buddhism" or "*tathāgata-garbha* Buddhism" is what I mean by the doctrine of original enlightenment. If we follow his line of argument, we may well end up in the deluded notion that the Japanese alone, thanks to the doctrine of original enlightenment, have enjoyed a history of peace and equality, free of war and slaughter. This kind of blithely authoritative attitude, completely indifferent to the facts of the matter, combined with a loose logic that mixes indigenous religiosity with Ekayana Buddhism (the problem lying not in the claim that Japanese Buddhism was strongly influenced by pre-Buddhist indigenous religiosity, but that prior to the introduction of Buddhism Japan was already a latently Mahayana country), are all typical of the abuse perpetrated by a group of influential intellectuals who conceive of everything in terms of the doctrine of original enlightenment.

It is not the purpose of this essay to go after Umehara's ideas. I leave that for another time. My aim is to show how the doctrine of original enlightenment is representative of the very sort of establishment ideology that has been instilled in us unremittingly up to the present day, where it is typified in thinkers like Umehara. The primary focus of my critique is, therefore, the institutionalized and authoritarian character of the doctrine of original enlightenment. In so doing, the critique runs the risk of being itself politicized and removed from its academic moorings. There are already some who claim that my criticisms are too hasty and lacking in scholarly rigor. They say that I have strayed from my own field of expertise and trespassed into the territory of others in an attempt to cause

havoc; or that I split hairs over trivial details, throw out the baby with the bath, miss the whole picture, and so on. Nothing would please me more than if the publication of this essay would provoke direct criticism of my ideas without getting tangled up in tangential issues. I say this because I am convinced that Prince Shōtoku's constitutional mandate to "value harmony"—usually lauded as a Buddhist sentiment—is, in fact, political.

Actually, I do not see any reason to make a big fuss over the critique of the doctrine of original enlightenment. Quite the contrary, I believe that a simply unbiased look will disclose its authoritarian and institutional nature. I cannot resist repeating the words of Motoori Norinaga, who had the following to say when asked why he was more critical of Confucianism than Buddhism:

> Buddhism is a disorderly and composite tradition, and of course differs from the Way. Its harm is obvious and easily seen, and has already been argued by the Confucian scholars in China and in contemporary times by the Shintoists of our own country. There is thus no need to burden ourselves with repeating these arguments all over again. Confucian thought, in contrast, is not as obviously harmful or as obviously loathsome. Lacking this sort of reputation, and with explanations and doctrines that, on the surface, seemed entirely in keeping with the Principle (*dōri* 道理), these teachings have long been commonly believed. Even among the learned, there were none who did not base themselves in this thought. In modern times one occasionally finds Shintoists who criticize this way of thinking, but by failing to plumb the depths of what they are criticizing, they eventually slip back into the selfsame Confucian beliefs. Of old few have truly understood this mistake, and hence, because the Way seems at first glance to be without harm, the depth and measure of its harm surpasses that of Buddhism.[3]

It is the "obvious harm" of the doctrine of original enlightenment, then, that I shall endeavor to point out in this essay. As to the question of the "depth and measure" of the harm of the Confucian Way, I will leave that for another day.

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In his discussion of *kirigami* in Sōtō Zen,[4] Ishikawa Rikizan provided a concrete and exhaustive investigation of how, in a Japanese cultural climate that placed great value on secret transmissions, *kirigami* played a significant role in the development of the Sōtō community from medieval

times. These *kirigami* are only one example of social discrimination. I would like, from a religious point of view, to take up the doctrinal context that engenders and sustains such social discrimination. Because a religious point of view entails personal opinion, and because the ideas presented here have yet to be adopted by the Joint Conference of the Special Section of the Sōtō Doctrinal Advisory Committee (of which I am a member and to which I address these remarks), I have tried to restrict myself to questions of "ideological background" in order to refrain from introducing too many individual and idiosyncratic speculations of my own. The thoughts are mine, of course, but I have tried to keep the conclusions of the Joint Conference in mind as I express them.

Since its first meeting in January of this year (1985), the Joint Conference has held ten sessions focusing on the problem of karma. In order to keep our topic in focus we have been studying the question of "karma in the three times" (三時業) as presented in the first chapter of the *Shushōgi*.[5] The *Shushōgi,* a fundamental statement of doctrine for Sōtō members, does not itself use the language of social discrimination. The work does not date from the beginning of the Sōtō sect, but is rather a collection of materials from Dōgen's *Shōbōgenzō* compiled by Ōuchi Seiran (1845–1918) during the Meiji period and later officially recognized by the Sōtōshū.[6] This was why the Committee decided to broaden our investigation and look for discriminatory language not only in the *Shushōgi* but in its source, the *Shōbōgenzō*, as well. There we found only a handful of examples, such as *caṇḍāla* (*sendara* 旃陀羅), eunuch (Skt. *ṣaṇḍha,* Jpn. *ōmon* 黃門), and *paṇḍaka* (*funan* 不男), although it turned out that even these terms were not Dōgen's own but only appeared in citations from other works.[7] Even so, the fact that they were repeated was enough to merit an investigation into their place in the overall context of the work. We found that they are not examples of strong discrimination, and that compared to other Chinese and Japanese Buddhist texts—whether of the same era, earlier, or later—Dōgen's works are conspicuous for their lack of discriminatory language. Still, we did not feel confident to claim infallibility for our founder in this regard or to rest easy with the fortunate outcome of our study of the *Shushōgi* and the *Shōbōgenzō*. For, once the *Shushōgi* had been completed and was adopted as a text within the Sōtōshū, we do in fact find a conspicuous use of discriminatory language by Sōtō preachers who used the work, as indeed it is still used to this day. Matters have now gone far beyond anything that a simple recog-

nition of these facts can repair. I believe we have come to a point where we must question the very meaning of our religion, and thereby, perhaps for the first time, clarify the nature of the religious issues involved.

I believe that by focussing on the issue in this way a determination of the relationship between the *Shushōgi*, the *Shōbōgenzō*, and the discriminatory language used by Sōtōshū preachers can be expressed in terms that draw it beyond the confines of the Sōtō community and its doctrine—something that I consider absolutely crucial. Aside from questions surrounding the compilation of the *Shushōgi*, we need to determine whether the teachings of the Sōtō preachers who have used this officially recognized text for generations actually bears any resemblance at all to Dōgen's *Shōbōgenzō*. For what we find in these sermons is often the sort of easy answers to suffering and wisdom that Dōgen resisted his whole life. Let me clarify the point with a citation.

As is well known, immediately after his return to Japan from China Dōgen undertook a sharp critique of a number of questions then current among Japanese Buddhists; this critique makes up the "Bendōwa" chapter of the *Shōbōgenzō*. Regarding the popular notion of "eternal mind and perishable phenomena,"[8] he wrote:

> Question: Some have taught that "One should not fret over the constant flux of life and death. There is an extremely simple path to freedom from the cycle of life and death: by knowing the eternal, unchanging mind. This means that although the body dies the real essence of the mind never perishes. When you realize that the essence of the mind is not subject to the cycle of life and death and only exists temporarily in the body, you perceive that it continues to live on in various places without ceasing. It is constant and never changes throughout past, present, or future. To know this is to be released from the cycle of life and death. The cycle of life and death is put to an end, and when the body dies you enter the ocean of true being. When you merge with this ocean of being you possess the same cardinal virtues as the Buddhas and Tathagatas. Even if you comprehend this in your present life you nevertheless are different from a holy man because of the delusions accumulated in your former lives. If you fail to understand this [i.e., the unchanging and eternal nature of the mind] you will revolve forever within the cycle of life and death. Without further delay we should grasp the mind's immutability. What good is spending your entire life sitting quietly, without doing anything?" Is such a view in accordance with your interpretation of the Way of the Buddhas and Patriarchs?

> Answer: What you have just said is certainly not the Buddhist Dharma but rather the view of the non-believer Senika.[9]

Among the various dialogues in the "Bendōwa," this section on the "eternal mind and perishable phenomena" is the longest, an indication of just how much effort Dōgen put into its critique. Dōgen goes on at some length to criticize the idea of this eternal mind that "some have taught," but what is important to note here is that this critique was directed towards the doctrine of original enlightenment—a contagion spreading throughout the Japanese Buddhist world from its center on Mt. Hiei.

The first to clearly make this point was the great Tendai scholar Hazama Jikō;[10] more recently Yamauchi Shun'yū has also given attention to this issue from the Sōtō point of view.[11] Since Yamauchi's is a pioneering work within the Sōtō tradition, we may assume that the controversy has only just begun to unfold. Here I shall illustrate the significance of the passage apropos of the question of karma as it relates to the preaching of Sōtō evangelists.

I cannot emphasize enough the fact that the ideas Dōgen condemned as the "view of the non-believer Senika" constitute the doctrine of the "eternal mind and perishable phenomena,"[12] and that this doctrine is, in fact, none other than the doctrine of original enlightenment. Is it not ironic that this idea, criticized by Dōgen, has from his time up to the present been accepted as the mainstream of Japanese Buddhism, even among Sōtō believers who revere Dōgen as their founder?

The idea of "original enlightenment" refers to a fundamental enlightenment that transcends the phenomenal world.[13] All people are by nature primordially endowed with this enlightenment, which exists eternally. Since the doctrine implies that, at a level preceding awareness, the phenomenal transformations of samsara remain, it is of a single piece with the idea of "eternal mind and perishable phenomena."

It would appear, on the surface of things, that such a doctrine is a direct expression of equality, based on the recognition of a universal underlying enlightenment shared by all people. This is no more than a complete delusion. This simplistic and one-dimensional notion of original enlightenment asserts that truth lies in a monistic, underlying enlightenment, which turns out to be the dominant force behind the perpetuation of social discrimination. Even more alarming is the fact that, because of its longstanding predominance in the mainstream of Japanese Buddhism, the doctrine of original enlightenment is often considered to be *the* central

philosophy of Buddhism. I have not the confidence to speak of other Buddhist denominations, but would like at least to clarify the facts as far as the Sōtō sect is concerned. In a sense the clarification is superfluous, since even a cursory perusal of the sermons on the *Shushōgi* brings one again and again up against the very thing that Dōgen was criticizing. In any case, I wish to cite a few examples to illustrate the point.

In *Shūhō* No. 390, published by the Sōtō at the beginning of the Taishō era, we find a sermon on the fourth section of the first chapter of the *Shushōgi*. That chapter itself reads:

> In general, the principle of cause and effect is clear: without any doubt those who do evil fall and those who cultivate virtue ascend; if cause and effect ceased to exist or were invalid, there would be no appearance of the Buddhas in the world, and the Patriarch would not have come from the West.

The sermon on this passage reads as follows:

> The original foundation of the cosmos is one reality, the same and equal, with no separation between even the most minute particles; however, within the true essence of that one reality, same and equal, a single great spiritual force exists of its own power. That spiritual power manifests a wondrous function based upon the law of the universe that has not changed from past to present; that law is called the principle of cause and effect. From the great universe above to a single blade of grass or tree below, all things are born and nurtured according to this rule of cause and effect. Likewise with our physical bodies and minds, our sufferings and joys—nothing exists that is not according to this law. Actions in the past become the root cause that invites the fruits of the present; manifold causes and manifold effects flow continuously and without pause, without beginning or end. However, there are various differences in the fruits because there are myriad disparities (差別) in the root causes; hence those who do evil fall and those who cultivate virtue ascend. The environment of those who give rise to an evil mind and practice evil gradually degenerates, their position falls, and the nation becomes defiled; in contrast, the position of those who give rise to a virtuous mind and cultivate virtue ascends and the world becomes pure. Thus we must resign ourselves to the fact that the reason that we are born into this world and experience various and myriad punishments and rewards is entirely due to the causes and conditions of past lives.[14]

This is a good example of a deceptive logic that, starting from "one reality, the same and equal" as the original foundation of the cosmos,

suddenly jumps to accepting present "disparities" as the result of the karma of former lives. This insipid passage is also a splendid example of what Dōgen had criticized as the teaching of the heretical Senika. In spite of the fact that the portion of the *Shushōgi* that is being commented upon is itself directly lifted out of the "Jinshin inga" chapter of the *Shōbōgenzō,*[15] the preacher ends up contradicting the teaching presented there by Dōgen. In fact, the "Jinshin inga" does warn against denying cause and effect, and teaches the need for a deep belief in the principle of cause and effect. But it does *not* teach the acceptance of present disparities as the fruit of accumulated karma. On the contrary, Dōgen argues that the idea of an "ocean of true being" lying at the base of the cosmos, from which the various disparities arise and to which they again return, is itself the denial of cause and effect. For example:

> [Those who] deny this world say that though the form is in this world, in the end the [true] nature is the same as that of *satori*. This is because our [true] nature is the mind, and the mind is not the same as the body. This interpretation is that of the non-believers. They also say that upon a person's death there is assuredly a reuniting with the ocean of true being and regardless of whether one cultivates the Buddha-dharma one naturally returns to this ocean of awakening and there is no more cycle of birth and death, and hence there is no afterlife. This is the understanding of the non-believers. Even if [those who assert this] have the appearance of the monk, if they hold such false views they are not a disciple of the Buddha, for this is truly a heresy. From the rejection of cause and effect comes the error of denying this world and the future world. The rejection of cause and effect comes from the failure to meet and study with true good friends. If one spends time with a true good friend false views such as the rejection of cause and effect cannot occur. We should accept and have deep faith in these compassionate teachings of our Patriarch Nāgārjuna.[16]

There are, of course, complex doctrinal questions involved in determining just what kind of cause and effect Dōgen is advocating here,[17] but it is clear that in this passage from his later years (as was the case in his earlier "Bendōwa"), he is emphatically rejecting the teaching of an "eternal mind and perishable phenomena." It is equally clear that he holds this teaching of original enlightenment to be a denial of cause and effect. The same point is made in the "Daishugyō" chapter, though with a somewhat different accent.[18] Throughout his life, Dōgen maintained this critique of

"eternal mind and perishable phenomena" or original enlightenment, and did so by relating it explicitly to the question of cause and effect. But let us return to the sermons on the *Shushōgi*.

Harada Sogaku (1871–1961) had the following to say in a sermon on nearly the same portion of the *Shushōgi* cited above:

> In order to clearly understand the principle of "truly empty and profoundly existent" 真空妙有 and the principle of the "non-existent nature of cause and effect" 因果無性, we must above all know the truth of the monistic absolute 一元絶対. Immediately upon knowing the dharma of this monistic absolute, the principle of the true character of impermanence, no-self, and nirvana will be clearly resolved and thereupon one will conclusively obtain the seal of the one reality 一実相印. Therefore, one must first know the teaching of the three seals [of impermanence, no-self, and nirvana], for in ignorance of the three seals it is entirely futile to attempt to understand the path of the Buddhist patriarchs, that is, the seal of the one reality. In Sōtō we call this seal of reality the "true nature of the transmission" or the "most important matter of cause and condition."[19] In order to aid us in perceiving, accepting, and believing this, we express it in our Mahayana Zen as a distinction between the true (*shō* 正) and the provisional (*hen* 偏).
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> "True" means nondiscriminating equality; it is the aspect of the non-substantial (*mushō* 無性). "Provisional" means the myriad differences and manifold distinctions; it is the aspect of both temporal and spatial causal necessity. Thus the "true" points to the essential content, while the "provisional" points to the variety of appearances. In other words, the one refers to principle, the other to things. But the principle and the things are never two, but together constitute the true fact of the one absolute (唯一絶対の真事実). In today's language we would speak of "phenomena-in-"true existence," and "true existence"-in-"phenomena." This is the purport of our Mahayana Zen. The path to *satori* is what effects the Great Awakening to this fact. In the *Shushōgi* this is called the "precepts of the Buddha" (*bukkai* 仏戒).[20]

At the risk of repeating myself, the idea that if you "know the truth of the monistic absolute" you will immediately resolve "the principle of the true character of impermanence, no-self, and nirvana" and "conclusively obtain the seal of the one reality" is nothing other than the "extremely quick path to the freedom from the cycle of life and death" that Dōgen criticized in the "Bendōwa" as an utterly facile and worthless way to think—or better, to not-think. Without the slightest hint of discomfort

one sits there and simply announces that the true is the provisional and the provisional is the true, that discrimination is none other than equality and equality none other than discrimination. This is the very kind of "extremely quick path" that Dōgen found so completely disgusting. But far from being dismissed from the Sōtō circle as a heretic, Harada Sogaku was held up as its representative.

No doubt the reason the very ideas that Dōgen criticized managed to become central to Sōtō lies in the fact that the mainstream of Japanese Buddhism itself has long been dominated by the doctrine of original enlightenment. Whether consciously or unconsciously, Sōtō simply allowed itself to be swept along with the current rather than follow Dōgen and swim against it. This resulted in a formulation of doctrine based on ideas like the "five ranks," which Dōgen himself had despised.[21] I believe this also to be the reason that such works as the *Ts'an-t'ung-ch'i* (Jap. *Sandōkai*, 8th c., T. 48.327a–b) and the *Pao-ching-san-mei* (Jap. *Hōkyōzanmai*, 9th c., T. 47.515a–b) came to occupy important positions as scriptures within the Sōtō. (Indeed, Harada's ideas coincide perfectly with what we find in the *Sandōkai* and the *Hōkyōzanmai*.)

Kishizawa Ian (1865–1955), a great lecturer on the *Shōbōgenzō* and representative figure of Sōtō during the Meiji era who gave a *teishō* on these two texts, explained the doctrine as a secret teaching of Sōtō. For example, in the *Sandōkai* we read:

> The spiritual spring is pure in its brightness, while the streams flow in darkness; attachment to phenomena is originally delusion, but enlightenment is also not to agree with the principle.

And now Kishizawa's *teishō* on the passage:

> These four lines reveal the profound meaning of the *Sandōkai*. If just this much is absorbed, one has finished the reading of the *Sandōkai*. If the Buddha-dharma, the cosmic truth, is realized, philosophy and practice have also thereby been exhausted.
>
> This *Sandōkai* is extremely important in our doctrinal tenets, and in these few words the oral transmission of the Sōtō is exhausted.[22]

It may be true that this is how the oral transmission of Sōtō doctrine based on the idea of enlightenment is completed, but merely absorbing this teaching and returning to the ocean of true being, quickly and simply perfecting the truth of the universe and thereby exhausting the whole of philosophy and practice is, once again, the very thing that Dōgen condemned. If practice were fulfilled by merely absorbing this truth, then the

seated meditation that Dōgen stressed would also be unnecessary. But this is the kind of teaching that, in direct contradiction to Dōgen's intentions, took precedence in the Sōtō sect. Kishizawa continues:

> "The spiritual source is pure in its brightness." The "spiritual source" of course refers to the source of the water. Its flow is dispersed through the tributaries, which can then be followed back to the spiritual source. The source and its tributaries are one. The cause of the Buddhas arises from conditions, and the stem that arises from conditions is twisted to become the six-foot-long gilded body [of the Buddha-image], and the six-foot-long gilded body is twisted to become the stem. For this reason Buddhism teaches equality on the one hand and discrimination on the other. One aspect of the mind of the Indian sage [Śākyamuni Buddha] is called equality while the other is called discrimination, and this applies to social class as well. That is, [phenomenal differences in social] class + nondiscrimination [of the spiritual source] = the mind of the Indian sage. The two aspects becoming one is what is called the mind of the Indian sage. I have said this before, but thinking that if I repeat myself perhaps you will be able to understand it, I have said it again.[23]

What Kishizawa has to say is not so difficult that it bears repeating. The "spiritual source" he described is structured exactly like the "ocean of true being" that Dōgen singled out as the view of the heretic Senika: "When you merge with this ocean of being you possess the same cardinal virtues as the Buddhas and Tathagatas." Far from being hard to understand, its goal and essence belong to that "extremely quick path" that Dōgen had censured.

Of course, if Kishizawa wants to exaggerate the difficulty in order to mask its simplicity, that is up to him. But it was this very simplicity that allowed such slogans as "discrimination is equality and equality is discrimination" to be bandied about without the slightest reflection. It is precisely because there is no thought involved that people could babble this nonsense on and on without a care in the world, oblivious of the fact that they were helping to absolutize existing patterns of discrimination. Immediately after the remark just cited, Kishizawa makes a dim-witted attempt to give an example of the ridiculous equation he had dreamed up, "social class + nondiscrimination = the mind of the Indian sage":

> The master of this home [where I am giving this *teishō*] is not simply his five-foot-tall body. The master's body, I need hardly remind you, is comprised of the members of the family, and the whole household participates

> in it. The fortunes and misfortunes of the master are the fortunes and misfortunes of the family. When the Tokugawa bakufu perished, Edo was destroyed. And when Edo was destroyed, the Japan that the bakufu had ruled up to that time was also destroyed. The Japan of the bakufu era was the body of the Tokugawa bakufu. Because the Tokugawa bakufu was destroyed, the Japan that was the body of that bakufu was also destroyed. With the Meiji Restoration, the Japan that is the body of the Meiji Emperor appeared. It is not simply that Edo became Tokyo. Tokyo was born with the new Meiji Emperor. It is the Japan that arose simultaneously with the Meiji Emperor. Japan is the body of the Meiji Emperor. In the same way, the body of Śākyamuni Buddha is Śākyamuni's world. Śākyamuni's body is pure. The extent of the Tathagata's wisdom and the Tathagata's virtuous qualities are said to be the body of the Buddha. The Buddha's body is the world of the Tathagata's wisdom and the Tathagata's virtuous qualities. That world is called the pure land of great bliss.[24]

I don't mean to nitpick such a crude argument, but how in the world do we get from "Japan is the body of the Meiji Emperor" to "the body of Śākyamuni Buddha is Śākyamuni's world"? The metaphor seems to sanction and excuse just about any social situation in any time or place without any need for critical reflection. We need to pause and consider how such patterns of thinking can lead us from "bowing to the inevitability of karma" to resigning ourselves to social discrimination.

That social discrimination permeates the language of Sōtō preachers is clear. I wish to argue that the doctrinal background to this way of thinking is the establishment and popularization of the doctrine of original enlightenment on Mt. Hiei from the Kamakura period onward. Before we move on to a discussion of this point, it may serve our purpose to cite the example of yet another esteemed teacher. The following is not based directly on the *Shushōgi*, but comes from a general dharma talk by Arai Sekizen (1864–1924). The talk opens like this:

> The universe is in essence a spiritual dynamic (霊動体). Its origin is truly empty and eternally quiescent, but because it is a spirit moving continually and without rest, its deepest workings are also continually and ceaselessly changing. Yet within those changes there is a fundamental law that unites past and present. It is called the law of original cause and related effect. The effect necessarily follows from the cause, and that effect again becomes a cause that is tied to a new effect. In this way the cause becomes an effect and the effect a cause, in inexhaustible and infinite succession.

> The beginning of this world, the movement of the sun and moon, the changing of the four seasons, the blooming of the flowers and the falling of the autumn leaves, the drifting of the clouds and the downpour of the rains, the movement of the breezes and the flow of the streams—all of this activity takes place in complete accord with the law of cause and effect. So, too, with our birth into this world and our death. There is nothing whatsoever that is not controlled by this law of cause and effect.[25]

This sounds more like Saṃkhyā philosophy than a Buddhist dharma talk; but then again, in Japan, thanks to the doctrine of original enlightenment, this kind of thing has come to be considered properly Buddhist.[26]

Arai starts with the proposition of a truly empty and eternally quiescent "origin" that is said to be the foundation of the universe, not a mere philosophical notion but a deep "functioning" in constant flux. Its particular changes and movements are not arbitrary but are controlled by a law that admits of no exceptions—in effect absolutizing discrimination. This is the same as the doctrine of original enlightenment in the *Awakening of Mahayana Faith*, the main source for the ideas of "essence" and "function" in East Asian Buddhism.[27] It is also the same doctrine that Dōgen spent his entire life criticizing.

I didn't choose this talk of Arai Sekizen's because it is unique or unusual, but because it is so typical of what one finds everywhere. The illustrious position he holds within Sōtō only makes his remarks all the more convincing and thus once again illustrates that the dominant view in Sōtō is more in line with the doctrine of original enlightenment à la *The Awakening of Mahayana Faith* than it is with Dōgen. If a teacher is armed with this kind of doctrinal arsenal, it is a simple matter to inflict the absolutization of social discrimination on unsuspecting believers.

As to how the doctrine of original enlightenment could become so firmly established within the mainstream of Japanese Buddhism, a certain consensus was reached in our study group. First of all, questions were raised concerning the foundational Buddhist ideas of impermanence and emptiness and how the radically different notion of *tathāgata-garbha* in India, the land of Buddhism's birth and development, opposed it. We next considered how in the fourth to fifth century in China this same *tathāgata-garbha* thought—similar to and yet not Buddhism—came to be established within the Buddhist community as the tradition of original enlightenment. A similar development within the history of the Chinese Ch'an school was also discussed.[28]

With a few modifications the doctrine of original enlightenment took root in Japan along the same lines of its development in China. Despite a few distinctive twists, such as the oral teachings on the *kirigami*, the Japanese version can clearly be traced back to Chinese Buddhism and the overwhelming influence of the *Awakening of Mahayana Faith.* For example, the *Ryōbu shintō nizu*,[29] traditionally ascribed to Kūkai but today universally considered an apocryphal text of the Kamakura period, was composed in an atmosphere in which the idea of original enlightenment enjoyed a great popularity, centered on Mt. Hiei. Although this work is thoroughly Japanese in form, as was the *kirigami*, the influence of the *Awakening of Mahayana Faith* is unmistakable. But whatever forms the idea of original enlightenment took in order to enter and then define the mainstream of Japanese Buddhism, Dōgen's censure remains: this is not a correct interpretation of Buddhism.[30]

Where shall we locate the *Shushōgi* within Sōtō once we have understood that the preachers who worked from the text used it to foster social discrimination based on the doctrine of original enlightenment and counter to the ideas of Dōgen? This remains an important and vexing problem inasmuch as the work has served as the main text for Sōtō householders since the Meiji era. I foresee the debate on this question continuing for some time. In my own view, no matter how closely the *Shushōgi* relies on the *Shōbōgenzō*, as a compilation it lacks coherent philosophical form and can in no way be compared to the straightforward style of the *Shōbōgenzō*. But to say that it is a collection of extracts does not mean that there is no pattern to it (be it political or religious), which is why the committee has seen the need to study the situation of Japanese Buddhism in the Meiji period surrounding its compilation.[31]

In Okabe Kazuo's report it was noted that the Sōtō university was set up in Azabu in 1882, the Sōtō institutional rules were codified in 1885, the first edition of the *Gyōji kihan* (*Manual of Religious Ceremonies*) was published in 1889, the Sōtō Fusōkai (Sōtō Support Assembly) formed around Ōuchi Seiran (the compiler of the *Shushōgi)* in 1887, and in 1890 the *Shushōgi* was officially recognized by the Sōtō. I was personally struck how during this time of institutional consolidation, the doctrinal background of those who supported Meiji Buddhism after the anti-Buddhist movement was marked not only by the idea of original enlightenment but also by their Confucian training. Original enlightenment and Chu-hsi style Confucianism show a similar structure in that

both place a fundamental importance on the idea of “principle” (理), making it easy to imagine how they could join hands in the Meiji intellectual world of government-sponsored universities and national priorities.

Chu-hsi studies, begun by Hayashi Razan and adopted by the bakufu as the educational foundation of the government, based its support for the social order of the day on the concept of “principle” as the natural order of the universe. Meantime the Sōtō sect—like all of Japanese Buddhism, maintaining the illusion of being Buddhist by crowding under the umbrella of original enlightenment theory—justified its support for the official government education of the bakufu by seeing it as a “phenomenal” world grounded in an underlying “principle,” a “function” of a deeper “essence,” a “provisional” expression of the “true,” a specific social “discrimination” outweighed by a universal human “equality.” It is hardly surprising that the language of social discrimination should be present in abundance. But however deeply Sōtō participated in this justification of social discrimination through recourse to religious doctrine, Dōgen himself had been absolutely opposed to the doctrine of original enlightenment that spawned this insensitive and thoughtless way of reasoning, and was consistent throughout his life in condemning it.

The contradiction does not promise to resolve itself quickly, nor can I do much here to advance the discussion. I would, however, like to devote the remainder of my remarks to a question related to this contradiction, and to do so, as I mentioned at the outset, from a religious point of view.

One of religion’s most momentous concerns is the problem of death. Although it may appear off the point, I would like to begin by citing a remark by Motoori Norinaga. One of Norinaga’s students once asked him about death: “Buddhism and Confucianism teach the doctrine of cause and effect or the principle of Heaven and Earth and thereby give people peace of mind, but does Shinto have [any teachings that impart] such peace of mind?” I cite the end of Norinaga’s reply:

> Some would say that Shintō has no [teachings that impart] peace of mind, but even among the one or two people out of a thousand who have some understanding of such matters, the question of what becomes of us after we die remains a difficult one to answer. Yet this is the first thing everybody worries about, which is altogether natural.
>
> Buddhism is grounded on awareness of this fact. And so, when they sense the approach of death, even those who do not normally believe in the Buddha are driven by their insecurity to follow this path. This is a

natural and reasonable human sentiment.

Nor is it unreasonable that people do not understand Shintō, which gives no assurance as to what happens after a person dies. Peace of mind in Shintō means that everybody, the good as well as the evil, will go to the land of darkness (*yomi no kuni*). It does not mean, as the ancient writings make clear, that the good will be reborn in a good place.

But if this is all we have to say, Confucianists and Buddhists alike will dismiss it as utter folly. And even the foolish will reject it, since they are used to hearing the teachings of the Buddha. Buddhists are able to accommodate human emotions in a most engrossing way in their teaching of peace of mind after death, and Confucianists have the principle of Heaven and Earth as a truth to teach. People are used to such Buddhist and Confucian teachings, and as a result believe them.

In Shintō, however, peace of mind means that the good and the evil alike go to the land of darkness, but there is no principle to this truth and so nobody accepts it. Indeed such a principle would be beyond people's comprehension. Confucian or Buddhist teachings, while engrossing, are in fact designed to entice people. In ancient days, before people in our country had heard of the teachings of Confucius or Buddha, people were not so calculating and simply believed that they would go to the land of darkness after death. They had no feeling about this other than sorrow, and yet neither did they have any doubts; nor did anybody ask for a rational explanation. For although the land of darkness is a defiled and evil place, that is where each of us is to go after we die. This is why there is nothing more sorrowful in this world than death. But Confucianism and Buddhism give all sorts of reasons as to why such intense sorrow need not bring them to grief. This is obviously not the true way.[32]

Norinaga's criticism gives a superb look at the character of the Buddhism of his time, a Buddhism that was entirely colored by the doctrine of original enlightenment.[33] Apart from a few anonymous monks who shared the sufferings of the people, Buddhism in Japan at that time—and all the way up to today—took the doctrine of original enlightenment as its foundation and from there encouraged people to accept their karma, giving "all sorts of reasons as to why such intense sorrow need not bring them to grief." The sermons of the Sōtō preachers on the *Shushōgi*, expounding their "knowledge" of the principle of cause and effect, thus led to a complete indifference towards "others" and in this way supported oppressive controls over them. The sermons also illustrate how the same principle was "designed to entice people."

I am certain the true Buddhism taught by Śākyamuni had nothing whatsoever to do with this sort of cleverly manufactured explanation, but rather, through a deep understanding of impermanence, opened the way to increasing one's awareness of the suffering of others. I also believe that, not only in the case of Buddhism but for religion in general, the depth of a religion is measured by the depth of the suffering that it brings to light.

Dōgen also spoke of the awareness of impermanence that comes at the time of death and, awakened to the true suffering of this world, wrote:

> When one suddenly experiences impermanence [at the time of death], neither kings, ministers, relatives, servants, wives and children, nor treasures can save one. There is only a single thing that will carry over to the land of Darkness (*yomi*), and what will follow one is just this good and evil karma.[34]

This is completely different from the use of cause and effect to explain away another's lot in life; it represents a deep acceptance of one's own karma.

I fear I may have given the impression of maligning Sōtō Zen. In line with my belief that the depth of a religion is measured by the depth of the suffering that it brings to light, I therefore wish to make a proposal for consideration of the Religion Section of the Buraku Liberation Research Center Religion Group, not as a political issue but as a religious problem. I realize that the question I am about to raise is a difficult one, but this does not exempt us from taking it up in religious discussion.

In the introduction to his *Human Liberation and Karma*, Komori Tatsukuni gives a biting account of his mother's habit of accepting her misfortunes and ignorance as "due to deep karma."[35] I want to ask whether we should lay all the blame on her own mistaken understanding of the Buddhist doctrine of karma. I most certainly would not. Far more ignorant and far more to blame are those preachers who simply tell others to "accept your karma," and make no attempt at a deep understanding of their own karma. In this sense, when I read that his mother understood the depths of her suffering as "due to deep karma," I can only believe that she was in fact in touch with an extremely deep and noble religious truth.[36]

If one is given to deception, there is no better place to exercise it than at the juncture of religion and politics. It is my fervent hope that in the future we will be better able to face this juncture together, honestly and without deception.

[*Translated by Jamie Hubbard*]

Buddhism and the Kami

Against Japanism

Matsumoto Shirō

The aim of this short essay is a critique of Japanism (*nihonshugi* 日本主義). Let me begin by noting that the approach I take stands directly opposed to those who insist on objective and value-free scholarship. My standpoint is subjective and value-laden throughout. In "Science as a Profession,"[1] Max Weber argued for "freedom from values" (*Wertfreiheit*), held up as the ideal an objective approach that eliminates subjective value judgments, an ideal in which technical scholarship is restricted to its own specialization and refrains from excursus into other fields. This runs directly counter to my own ideal of scholarship, which is fundamentally subjective and thus forever informed by values.

Weber must be given credit, however, for having touched on the heart of the matter. As his title makes clear, he felt it necessary to insist on value-free objectivity in order to distinguish scholarship from other professions and to establish it as an independent discipline. The problem is that his definition is tantamount to insisting that the scholar cease to be human. Nothing is easier for us scholars than to abstract from the fullness of our humanity and erase from the picture anything that smacks of values or ideals. Such a perspective is of course welcomed by the social establishment. Aside from those predisposed to accept the status quo without question, no group could be more innocuous than a community of scholars who, in the name of "objectivity" and "freedom," have forsworn themselves against meddling in the status quo. From the start, the retreat from values supports the values in force, and all too often leads to compromising objectivity in order to remain in the good graces of the enforcing powers-that-be. If we ask what is the foremost establishment value in Japan today, the answer can be put quite simply—Japanism. It is on this theme, accordingly, that I shall concentrate my comments.

IMPLICIT JAPANISM

Japanism may be defined roughly as the location of ultimate or absolute value in "Japan." I further distinguish two forms of Japanism: "implicit" and "pure." By implicit Japanism I mean the direct or indirect glorification of Japan, independently of whether those who subscribe to it are aware of the fact that they are glorifying Japan or not. The theory of a Japanese "folk Buddhism" (民俗仏教論) is a good example of this implicit Japanism.[2]

I cannot claim to have researched the premises of this theory adequately and am even somewhat unsure of how to define it properly. Tentatively we may say that the basic idea of folk Buddhist theory is that Buddhism has been absorbed into the indigenous ethos of Japan and in the process effected the absolutizing of that ethos. Typical of this approach is the claim that whatever foreign religious traditions have been introduced into Japan, the basis (or "original mentality") behind the religious consciousness of the Japanese remains unchanged: a reverence for the ancestors (memorials for the dead). A concrete example of this general formulation can be had from the following discussion between Umehara Takeshi and Yamamoto Shichihei:

Umehara: And so lately I have begun to question whether or not Japanese Buddhism can be considered real Buddhism.

Yamamoto: Yes, one does start to wonder.

Umehara: Doctrinal matters aside, if we look at what is actually done in the name of Buddhism, it consists mainly of funerals, the O-bon and O-higan festivals for the ancestral spirits, and other anniversary memorial services. Is there any way that this can be considered Buddhism? The most ancient forms of Shinto survive in the north and south of Japan, which leads one to suspect that the ancient religious ceremonies of Japan are still preserved among the Ainu or around Okinawa. And if we look at their understanding of religion, what we find in fact is that it consists entirely of ***memorial services for the dead***. When we die, our ancestors await us in heaven. The spirits of the dead are sent off to heaven, then return at O-bon or O-higan, only to be sent back again. By and large this is the form of religion that is preserved in the north and the south of Japan. In actual practice, then, this is what Buddhism does. ***Because doctrine is unimportant to the Japanese,*** it is assumed that a Buddhist monk need do nothing more than perform funerals, O-bon services, memorial

> services, O-higan services and the like. If this is so, I am not sure that these ceremonies can really be called Buddhist so much as pre-Buddhist Shinto.[3]

The above exchange shows that the theory of folk Buddhism is one of the main pillars of support for the kind of "Japanology" (*Nihongaku* 日本学) that Umehara espouses. Umehara's words also typify the folk Buddhist position that, in general, Buddhist doctrine is of no value or at best only of formal value, thereby uncritically absolutizing the base of religious consciousness shared by the Japanese "masses." In this way, the idea of "ancestor worship" seems to be revered without qualification. Although this way of thinking dominates current research in Japanese folk studies and cultural anthropology, the warning of the historian Kuroda Toshio is very much to the point:

> Most importantly, as long as this sort of (perverted) perception is taken as a self-evident truth, the connection between right-wing Shinto ideology and the folk studies and cultural anthropology that support it can only grow stronger.[4]

In other words, while on the surface these disciplines advocate objectivity and freedom from value judgments, the reality is that their idea of a Japanese folk Buddhism puts their work at the service and support of establishment values. Such is the invariable fate of all "value-free" theories.

As the distinction between implicit and pure Japanism implies, I take the ethnocentrism of the former to be of an "impure" sort, and in this regard I offer the Japanology of Umehara as a prime example. From beneath the flutter of the monk's robes the glint of polished armor quickly catches the eye. While robing himself outwardly in a critique of National Studies (*kokugaku* 国学) that espouses an objective, value-free, many-faceted, multilayered, global approach to Japanese research,[5] next to the skin he wears the heavy plated armor of belief in the "superiority of the Japanese race." In a discussion between then Prime Minister Nakasone and Umehara, Nakasone summed up his understanding of Umehara's ideas: "The original character of Japanese culture, the most ancient in the world, is still fully present in the Japan of today, and it is that to which both Buddhism and Confucianism have been adapted." Umehara agreed entirely with the characterization. Even though no mention is made of the "superiority of the Japanese race," the context in which these words were spoken, and repeated almost verbatim, establishes it as a clear assumption:

Nakasone: You have written that "the basis of Japanese culture was formed before the Yamato court, in the time of the Jōmon period, prior to the introduction of agricultural cultivation." In Japan we have excavated earthenware that is twelve thousand years old, *the* oldest in the world. This is four-thousand years older than the oldest earthenware discovered in Mesopotamia, the so-called birthplace of civilization. *The original shape of that culture is still entirely alive in today's Japan, and both Buddhism and Confucianism have adapted to it.* The framework of the Jōmon period lived on in the midst of these foreign cultures or ideas, and took them in. In other words, you are saying that Buddhism and Confucianism did not effect any great changes in Japan. Have I caught your sense?

Umehara: When I was thirty-five years old I began to question whether European philosophy was enough, and realized that a wonderful philosophy was hidden right beneath my feet. From that time on I changed directions and have spent twenty-five years since studying Japan. My conclusion from these twenty-five years, *as the Prime Minister has just said, is that after all is said and done, Japanese culture is indeed a most ancient culture.*[6]

Likewise, in his "Speech on Intellectual Standards" (22 September 1986) Prime Minister Nakasone again referred to the "oldest earthenware in the world," as "the spiritual structure of our ancestors from the Jōmon period.... In any case the oldest earthenware in the world has been discovered in Japan.... The discovery of earthenware from twelve-thousand years ago proves just how old the history of this country is."[7] What makes it possible for him to draw a straight line from the presence of the world's oldest earthenware remains to the great age of Japanese culture and history is nothing other than his conviction of the "superiority of the Japanese race."

It was in this speech, it will be recalled, that Nakasone laid the blame for America's educational problems on the country's Afro-Americans. But the real underlying problem with his remarks is not so much the open insult as the fact that it was premised on his conviction of Japanese superiority.

As a Buddhist, I opposed the establishment of Umehara's International Research Center for Japanese Studies on the grounds that it is no more than a façade for the promotion of ideas of cultural supremacy, which of course devalues all foreign religions, including Buddhism.[8]

Umehara's view that "Buddhism" consists in the doctrine of *tathāgata-garbha*,[9] the "attainment of Buddhahood by mountains, rivers, grasses, and trees (山川草木悉皆成仏)," and Prince Shōtoku's teaching of "harmony" (*wa* 和) is well known. What is often forgotten is just how much this very "philosophy of harmony" was touted in wartime Japan. I would cite, by way of example, the following remark from the same dialogue cited above:

> Another thing is the Japanese attitude towards nature. I mean, we have always protected nature because we have managed to preserve intact from our days as hunters an understanding of nature according to which "mountains, rivers, grasses, and trees all attain Buddhahood." We need to resurrect this unique characteristic.[10]

Note also the following comment of Prime Minister Nakasone:

> We Japanese are not monotheists. We go through a cycle that draws us into the world of polytheism, being born into Nature and returning to Nature at death. The mountains, rivers, grasses, and trees are our brothers: this is the origin of the notion that "mountains, rivers, grasses, and trees all attain Buddhahood." …In a larger sense, however, the idea that "mountains, rivers, grasses, and trees all attain Buddhahood" belongs less to Buddhism than it does to a transmission of the Japanese people dating from the Jōmon period.[11]

Obviously Umehara and Nakasone are in complete agreement, and the point on which that agreement pivots is the conviction that the idea that "mountains, rivers, grasses, and trees all attain Buddhahood" is praiseworthy not for being Buddhist but for representing a traditional and uniquely Japanese worldview or understanding of nature that has persisted from the ancient Japanese "days as hunters" or the "Jōmon period." This is entirely coincident with Umehara's claim that "doctrine is unimportant for the Japanese." In his "Speech on Intellectual Standards," Prime Minister Nakasone again alluded to the idea of all of nature attaining Buddhahood, but made himself look rather ridiculous by quoting Dōgen to the effect that "grasses, trees, and the land (国土) all attain Buddhahood."[12] He had also cited this passage earlier in a policy speech to the Diet on 27 January 1986, which makes me wonder just how happy Buddhists, and in particular Sōtō Zen Buddhists, can be with this sort of attention.[13]

Similarly, there are many examples of Umehara's lauding the philosophy of harmony (*wa* 和) inscribed in the Seventeen-Article Constitution.[14]

As a concrete example of emphasis on this philosophy in wartime Japan, we may cite the *Kokutai no hongi* 国体の本義 (*Cardinal Principles of the National Entity of Japan*). The significance of this work, compiled and published in March 1937 immediately after the controversy over whether the role of the emperor transcended the state or was simply an organ of the state (February 1935) and the February 26th Incident (February–March 1936), is well known. By explicitly rejecting the idea that the emperor was simply a functionary of the state and confirming the ideology of a divine nation, the aim was to mobilize popular sentiment for national purposes—the most important of which was to prepare for full-scale war.

The first chapter of the *Kokutai no hongi* includes a section on "Harmony and Truth" in which the ideology of harmony is spelled out. The Lu-kou-chiao Incident took place in July of 1937 (the year that the *Kokutai no hongi* was published), provoking Japan to invade China and launch itself into an all-out war of aggression. This, together with the later Nanking Incident (December 1937), reveals the true character and historical reality of the "philosophy of harmony" taught in the text. It seems apropos of the discussion here to cite from this rather lengthy work—which, in its entirety, ought to be considered required reading for all Buddhists in Japan—in order to get a clearer idea of the sort of "harmony" it was advocating:

> When we trace the marks of the facts of the founding of our country and the progress of our history, what we always find there is the *spirit of harmony.* Harmony is a product of the great achievements of the founding of the nation, and is the power behind our historical growth; while it is also a humanitarian Way inseparable from our daily lives. The spirit of harmony is built on the *concord of all things* [lit., the fusion of all things]. When people determinedly count themselves as masters and assert their egos, there is nothing but contradictions and the setting of one against the other; and harmony is not begotten. In individualism it is possible to have cooperation, compromise, sacrifice, etc., so as to regulate and mitigate this contradiction and the setting of one against the other; but after all there exists no true harmony....
>
> Harmony as of our nation is not a mechanical concert of independent individuals of the same level that has its starting point in (cold) knowledge [lit., reason], but *a great harmony that holds itself together by having the parts within the whole through actions that fit the parts... with all things having their characteristics, mutually different and yet manifesting their [individual] characteristics, that is, manifesting the essential qualities [lit.*

> *essential nature* 本質] *through the parts… that thus harmonize with the monastic world* [*sic*; lit., monistic world, world of one truth: *ichinyo no sekai* 一如の世界]. That is, harmony as in our nation is a great harmony of individuals who, by giving play to their [individual] characteristics, and through difficulties, toil and labor, *converge into one. Because of* [*individual*] *characteristics and difficulties, this harmony becomes all the greater and its substance rich.* Again, in this way individualities are developed, and special characteristics become beautiful and at the same time even *enhance the development and well-being of the whole.* [15]

Here we see the basic premise of the philosophy of harmony. The passages I have italicized strike me personally as a statement of Hua-yen philosophy, but in any event there is no other word that sums up the base ideology than "totalitarianism." No reason for the existence of the many elements that make up the whole is allowed other than that they consolidate the whole into a single unity. In effect, what is demanded of each element is simply that it "eliminate the self and return to the one" or "extinguish the self to serve the public." More conventionally, the idea of "fulfilling one's destiny" is laid out as follows:

> Going a step further, this harmony must also be made to materialize in communal life. Those serving in Government offices as well as those working in firms *must* [*all*] *follow this Way of harmony.* In each community there are those who take the upper places while there are those who work below them. *Through each one fulfilling his portion is the harmony of a community obtained.* To fulfill one's part means to do one's appointed task with the utmost faithfulness, each in his own sphere; and by this means do those above receive help from inferiors, and inferiors are loved by superiors; and in working together harmoniously is beautiful concord manifested and creative work carried out.[16]

That this way of thinking was not restricted to the militarist extremists can be seen from comments made by Nishida Kitarō in a public lecture on philosophy sponsored by the Japan Committee for the Promotion of the Sciences in October of 1937, the very year that the *Kokutai no hongi* was issued. "Japan," he announced, "has preserved in all things its *self-identity* with the Imperial Family as the center." At the same meeting, Takakusu Junjirō also commented:

> Our nation, from the time of its founding, has been *totalitarian.* We have preserved that totalitarianism until today.… One needs to fully comprehend the Kegon (Hua-yen) truth, with everything in perfect

> order, and should expect to devote oneself to public service with *not a speck of self remaining*. I long to see everybody forget their selves, discarding their selves in order to countenance the affairs of the nation.[17]

Returning to the *Kokutai no hongi*, we see that the main accent is put on an extreme nationalism:

> The spirit of self-effacement is not a mere denial of oneself, but means living to the great, true self by denying one's small self. Individuals are essentially not beings isolated from the State, but each has his allotted share as *forming parts of the State*. And *because they form parts, they constantly and intrinsically unite themselves with the State*; and it is this that gives birth to the spirit of self-effacement.[18]

That even the principle of "harmony" is bent to the service of affirming war becomes clear in the following passage:

> And this harmony is clearly seen also in our nation's martial spirit…on the occasion of the Emperor Jinmu's august expedition to the East martial spirit was exercised. But this *martial spirit is not* (*a thing that exists*) *for the sake of itself but for the sake of peace* [*lit., harmony*], and is what may be called a sacred martial spirit. Our martial spirit does not have for its objective the killing of men, but the giving of life to men. This martial spirit is that which tries to give life to all things, it is not that which destroys. That is to say, it is a strife that has peace [lit., harmony] as its basis with a promise to raise and to develop; and it gives life to things through its strife. Here lies the martial spirit of our nation. War, in this sense, is not by any means intended for the destruction, overpowering, or subjugation of others; and it should be *a thing for the bringing about of great harmony* [大和], that is, peace, doing the work of creation by following the Way.[19]

Such is the real nature of the "philosophy of harmony." Not surprisingly, the *Kokutai no hongi* quotes the first clause of Prince Shōtoku's Seventeen-Article Constitution in full as the authoritative proof of its "philosophy of harmony." As the above citations make patent, the totalitarian and nationalistic understanding of "august harmony" in the first clause cannot be dismissed as mere misinterpretation. As Hakamaya noted in his essay "Thoughts on the Ideological Background of Social Discrimination," the Seventeen-Article Constitution itself is totalitarian and nationalistic and in no sense can be said to teach religion.

So nowadays we have Prime Minister Nakasone and scholar Umehara Takeshi singing the praises of the *uniquely Japanese* "philosophy of har-

mony." Just how different their claims are from the claims of the *Kokutai no hongi* that a mere fifty years ago were made to support militarism and plunge Japan into disaster is a question the reader—particularly, the Buddhist reader—is best left to ponder alone. Let me offer only the following summary. The *Kokutai no hongi*, by not rejecting Buddhism in its entirety as a foreign religion, represents a form of implicit Japanese nationalism, as do the claims of Prime Minister Nakasone and Umehara Takeshi who insist that "Buddhism was adapted to the Japanese spirit." It is this idea of adaptation—or perhaps better put, of homogenization—that I find so treacherous because it puts the full weight on the side of the Japanese "spirit" and relegates Buddhism to a position of insignificance. This is how the Japanese spirit became absolutized. Of course, the reason this kind of nationalism is always kept implicit is that its proponents all belong to the establishment, and the establishment, of course, can never openly espouse pure Japanism. This makes it all the more more dangerous.

CRITIQUE OF PURE JAPANISM

Let us move on to a critique of "pure Japanism," which I define as the idea that Japan as such is a thing of absolute value. As representatives of this position I would like to single out Kawabata Yasunari, Motoori Norinaga, and Mishima Yukio.

The Japanism of Kawabata's Aesthetic Optimism

Of the three representatives of pure Japanism, Kawabata's Japanism is the one I feel the strongest aversion to naming "pure." But the fact is, his brand of aesthetic and optimistic Japanism and glorification of nature is so regularly lifted up as a model by optimistic Japanese intellectuals, that I have no choice but to bring it up for question. In his Nobel Prize speech, "Japan the Beautiful and Myself," Kawabata had the following to say about the uniqueness of the Japanese spirit:

> Seeing the moon, I become the moon, and the moon seen by me becomes me. *I sink into nature and become one with nature*. . . [the Zen disciple] enters a state of impassivity, with *no thought and no conception*. He *loses the self and enters the realm of nothingness*. This is not the nothingness or the emptiness of the West. It is rather the reverse, a universe of the spirit of an inexhaustible treasury, an emptiness in which everything communicates freely with everything, transcending bounds, limitless.

> There are of course masters of Zen, and the disciple is brought toward enlightenment by exchanging questions and answers with his master, and he studies the scriptures. The disciple must, however, always be lord of his own thoughts, and must attain enlightenment through his own efforts. And *the emphasis is less upon reason and argument than upon intuition*, immediate feeling. Enlightenment comes *not from the teaching of others but through the eye awakened inwardly. Truth is in "the discarding of words," it is "independent of language."*[20]

Glorifying the beauty of Japanese nature, and taking the uniqueness of the Japanese spirit to be "sinking into nature" or "becoming one with nature" is an ethos found in wartime Japan as well. For example, the attempt to locate the uniqueness of the Japanese spirit in a "unity or harmony with nature" that contrasts with the Western "conquest of nature" had earlier been laid out in the *Kokutai no hongi*:

> Again, this harmony is also seen in the intimate relationship between man and nature. Our country is surrounded by the sea, excels in mountains, (is blessed with) limpid waters and with (happy) changes in the four seasons, and has *natural features not found in other countries.* These beautiful natural features were brought to birth by the heavenly deities together with the (many) deities; and though they be things on which one may set one's affection they are (certainly) not objects of fear. It is here that our national trait to love nature is begotten and *the harmony between man and nature* is established. India, for instance, is overpowered by her natural features, and in the Occident one senses the subjugation of nature by man, and there is not found a deep harmony between man and nature as in our country. On the contrary, *our people are in constant harmony with nature.*[21]

If we seek a Buddhist background to this ethos of harmony with nature, there is no better place to begin than with the notion that "mountains, rivers, grasses, and trees all attain Buddhahood" (so lauded by Umehara), or the common understanding of the Tendai doctrine of original enlightenment, which provides the undergirding and is assumed to be the culmination of Mahayana Buddhist thought.[22] This way of thinking has also been taken to be representative of "Zen" Buddhism, as can be seen from Kawabata's use of such phrases as "no thought and no conception" (無念無相), "direct intuition" (直観) or "nonreliance on language" (不立文字). All of these ideas are based on the doctrines of *tathāgata-garbha* and original enlightenment and as such all can also be

counted among the objects of the criticism of the doctrine of *tathāgata-garbha*. (In this connection, Kamalaśīla's critique of Chinese Zen in the Samye debate that took place in eighth-century Tibet is still worthy of attention.) To put it simply, if somewhat idiosyncratically, it all comes down to whether or not being a rock, which in the true sense of the term has "no thought and no conception," is preferable to being a human.

The Japanism of Motoori Norinaga

Next I would like to turn to the Japanism of Motoori Norinaga, a thinker who—through the graces of Hirata Atsutane—has had considerable influence on later generations, and whose impact has extended to the political realm as well. Let us consider here opposing estimations of Norinaga offered by Kobayashi Hideo and Hakamaya Noriaki.

Although Kobayashi himself took the posture of defending the value of "thought" in his famous debate with Masamune Hakuchō, in fact he devalued it by praising Norinaga for having kept the "real life" of the first floor apart from the "thought" of the second floor by removing the stairway between the two.[23] Hakamaya countered by drawing attention to Norinaga's praise of the Confucian scholar Dazai Shundai (who rejected Shinto) as a "true Confucian," thus demonstrating that the true character of Norinaga's thought does not entail a separation of the intellectual life from real life.[24]

According to Hakamaya, not only did Norinaga oppose the idea of "original enlightenment," but he was one of those rare thinkers able to see deeply into the importance of language. On both counts, Hakamaya asserts, he is comparable to Dōgen.[25] I find this correct as far as original enlightenment goes, but must say I was surprised by what I found when I actually dived into Norinaga's work. What he had to say about "the way of the gods" and the emperor system not only shows no intellectual belief in the importance of language, it also sinks to the level of mere naturalism and pragmatism. Consider the following passage expressing his worship of the idea of "the natural, the of-it-selfness" (*onozukara*) to which no wisdom (*sakashira*) need be added, and its concomitant rejection, if not outright denigration, of language:[26]

> Since our honourable country is called Kamunagara Yasukuni, the divine land ruled in peace, we do well to recall what is written in the *Nihon Shoki* in the chapter "Naniwa no nagarano mikado" concerning the term *kamunagara*. It is said that in following the way of the kami, he [the

> emperor] himself becomes the way of the kami. To follow the way of the kami means that his way of ruling this world is to rule it the way it has been done since the age of the kami, *without the addition of any human wisdom*. In this way, by calmly ruling the world as it had been ruled since the age of the gods, *the way of the kami functions naturally and of itself*, making it unnecessary to seek anything outside of it. It has itself become the way of the gods. And so when we speak of "our current deity" [the emperor] or the "Great Land of Eight Islands," it means that the reign of the emperors down through the ages has become the reign of the gods. This is also the sense in which the word *kamunagara* is used in poetry like the *Man'yōshū*. And in fact this is what the people of China meant when they called our country the "land of the gods." In ancient times, *no one even spoke in terms of a "way."* Our country was then simply the country where everything conforms to the gods and *nothing was expressed in language.*[27]

But it was the following passage that sealed my view on the matter once and for all:

> As we all were born of the spirit of the gods (*musubi no kami no mitama* 産巣日神のみたま), we know by nature all that needs to be done in life and so do it. By virtue of the spirit of the gods, then, what is to be done is known to all things that live in the world, including birds and insects, each in its own way, and so it is done. Among living things, human beings were born superior, and in accord with that superiority *they know whatever they should know and do what they are supposed to do, so why is there any need to force them beyond that?* If human beings were not able to know or act without being taught, then they would be inferior to even the birds and insects. Goodness, righteousness, ritual propriety, humility, filial piety, brotherhood, loyalty, trustworthiness, and the like are all things that human beings are supposed to do. *As long as these are the things that they are supposed to do, they will know it by nature and will do it well even without relying on such teachings.* The Way of the Sages was fashioned with the aim of forcing order on a country that was difficult to rule. This went beyond the limits of what human beings should be, so that the things that were forced on them and strictly taught are not the True Way.[28]

Here, Norinaga is saying that there is no need to force human beings to do more than what comes naturally, because by nature they are already disposed to do what needs to be done. "Since [human beings] naturally do as much as they ought, why do we have to force them to do more?"

On reading these lines, the image of the crucifix of the Japanese *Kirishitan* martyrs came to mind, and I thought to myself, How foolish it would seem to Norinaga that one should die for one's beliefs! As is always the case with a "naturalist," he was too much the optimist and pragmatist to imagine him putting his life on the line—even for the "way of the kami" that he extols in *Naobinomitama*.

I am not sure, in the end, whether it makes sense or not to think of ideals or ideas as realizable in actuality. But insofar as those ideals are pragmatic and given to compromise, surely they no longer qualify as "ideals." Insofar as Norinaga looked down on the intellectual life, he tended towards naturalism, a tendency that, through Atsutane, was to become more pronounced as time went on.

The Pure Japanism of Mishima Yukio

Finally, I would turn to Mishima Yukio, whose death is already more than fifteen years behind us and to whom I feel I should pay my respects as a truly pure Japanist—by which I mean idealistically and intellectually pure. Mishima's intense intellectual commitment to Japanism is apparent in the level of consistency he achieved between what he thought and what he did. For him, Japan was an absolute value, so much so that he could not conceive of his own existence without Japan or of Japan without the emperor, the logical consequence of which was that without the emperor he himself did not exist.

Set against the backdrop of Kobayashi Hideo's pragmatic Japanism, Mishima's purity shines all the more brightly. Once in 1970 when fielding questions in a meeting with students, Kobayashi was asked about the emperor. He began his response by first making it clear that he was not making political statements, and only then went on to laud the emperor's virtues.[29] This sort of guarded commitment is the polar opposite of what we see in Mishima, particularly in his final years. Even before people he did not know, Mishima would begin his talks with the shout, "Long live the emperor!" There is more involved here than simply a difference between an "ethos for life" and an "ethos for death." It is a matter of a fundamental difference in the purity of convictions.

Mishima had the following to say in a debate with the young revolutionaries of the Students Movement at Tokyo University in May of 1969:

> It's okay if things don't work out. I am Japanese. I was born Japanese and I will die Japanese, and that is all right with me. I have no desire whatsoever to remove these limits....
>
> I cannot take away from myself the fact that I have Japanese nationality. I am convinced that this is my destiny.[30]

I cannot read these words without being moved, so much am I struck by the earnestness with which Mishima faced an audience, most of it twenty years his junior and more, and expressed his real feelings candidly. I find this a most eloquent, even beautiful, expression of Japanism.

What made Mishima so fanatic about Japan? This is a question that has pestered me since I began to read his works a few weeks ago. The initial stimulus came from the remarks of a friend that "among Japanese writers only Akutagawa Ryūnosuke and Mishima Yukio were able to prove the existence of the external world."[31] The words rather took me aback. Taking "external world" in the sense of the *bāhyārtha* that the mind-only school of Buddhist philosophy rejected, I understood the remark to mean that most of the time we are so immersed in the world of self-identity within our own mind that there is no way for us to reach the pure or absolute other of "external objects." But Mishima Yukio, through action (行為), was able to break out of the literary world of self-identity (自己同一). In any case, I was driven to seek in Mishima's works an answer to the roots of his extreme Japanism, and was particularly struck by phrases like "cultural continuity" and "temporal continuity" in his essay "In Defense of Culture."[32]

On the surface, the idea of cultural continuity seems to provide the key to Mishima's Japanism, but at the same time it looks to be the same as the "self-identity" that I would have expected him to reject. If *tathāgata-garbha* thought is a philosophy of identity, then the theory of mind-only is a philosophy of "self-identity."[33] Unlike mere identity, self-identity somehow brings temporality into the picture; that is, it suggests the possibility of a self-enclosed past. Nowadays it is the fashion among Japanists to wave the flag of "the racial identity of the Japanese people,"[34] but Mishima was less attracted to this kind of optimistic "identity" than to the pessimism of "continuity." Indeed, he would even use the ordinary word "time" to refer to this idea of "temporal continuity," as we see in the following:

> The base of a people, the *mentality of the Japanese, has persisted*—this is the problem of time that I have been talking about. The Japanese who

> have learned to give shape to space are the new Japanese like all of you. But the country is still full of Japanese who *live within time. These are the Japanese who cannot find a way to make sense of space.*[35]

The unity of meaning between the "time" of the above passage and the self-enclosed time of the mind-only school is well attested in his final work, the *Sea of Fertility* tetralogy. The beginning and end of the work read like a Yogacara sermon on mind-only, and there are portions that can even be called technical explanations of the theory of the "storehouse consciousness" (*ālayavijñāna*), all of which indicate just how deeply Mishima was involved with Yogacara thought. Mishima rightly called this work "a tale of dreams and reincarnations," for surely nothing is more suited to Yogacara idealism than dreams and transmigration.

The question I began with, however, had to do with how Mishima viewed the existence of the external world of objects. In the end, I came to the conclusion that Mishima must have had a total aversion to the Yogacara world of self-identity. His distaste for transmigration was stronger than most, and he was always preoccupied with breaking out of the mind-only world of the writer:

> Everything abomination—debauchery, death, madness, pestilence, destruction.... How was it that such things could so entice the heart and allure the soul outward. Why did souls have to "exit," discarding easy, dark, and quiet dwellings? Why was it that the human heart rejected tranquil inertness?
>
> That was what happened in history and with individuals. If men did not do thus, it was because they surely felt that they could not touch the wholeness of the universe. Inebriated, disheveled, tearing their clothes, and exposing their genitals, blood dripping from the raw flesh in their mouths—by such actions, they must have felt they could scratch the surface of that wholeness.[36]

Mishima finally tore himself away from the world of mind-only through the act of suicide, but I hardly think this was intended to confirm the existence of the external world. Indeed, if it demonstrated anything, it was the *non-existence* of the external world, in the sense that the only thing he could envision outside of the realm of his own mind was death. This is why he can be thought of as a consummate Yogacarin. For Mishima the external object, that is, the pure "other," was always death, and the encounter with that pure other was the fundamental force driving his thought.

Mishima Yukio demonstrated with his own life—or rather, with the ending of his own life—that "pure Japanism is necessarily a philosophy of death." The truth of that proposition (which I find to be true without exception) is in no way contradicted by the fact that the underlying motivation of his thought was not pure Japanism at all but rather a philosophy of death. In other words, because he understood the truth of that statement, he made himself into a pure Japanist in order to bring himself to death:

> This temper, further distilled and purified, formed Isao's world, one Honda had not shared with him in his younger days, one he had observed only as an outsider. Noting how Isao's youthful Japanese mind, struggling in absolute isolation, had destroyed itself, Honda could not but realize that what had permitted him to live the way he had was the strength of Western thought, imported from the outside. *Unfertilized thinking [about uniqueness] brings death.*[37]
>
> If one wished to live, one must not cling to purity, as Isao had done. One must not cut oneself off from all channels of retreat; one must not reject everything.
>
> Nothing had ever forced Honda to probe the question of an *unadulterated [pure] Japan* more deeply than had Isao's death. Was there any way to live honestly with Japan other than by rejecting everything, than by rejecting present-day Japan and the Japanese people? Was there no other way of living than this most difficult one, in which ultimately one murdered and then committed suicide? Everyone was afraid to say, but had not Isao given proof by his acts?[38]

Mishima saw that in order to be really pure, one had to let go of life (an idea that should please Kobayashi Hideo). This impression is corroborated by the fact that Mishima's Japanism was more intense in his later life than during the war years, although already in wartime he had become fascinated with the philosophy of death.

In any case, the rare coincidence of thought and action we see in Mishima Yukio produced a Japanism of the highest purity, a purity whose end demonstrates more clearly than any mere argument can that pure Japanism is a philosophy of death. As a Buddhist, I stand opposed to any and all philosophies of death, and must therefore renounce pure Japanism in its entirety.

OPPOSITION TO JAPANISM

In conclusion, I should like briefly to clarify my own position concerning Japan. Somehow I cannot sympathize with the position of "no-Japanism" (無日本主義), a rather odd phrase that I take to mean the "notion that Japan does not actually exist or that there is no entity that actually corresponds to the word 'Japan'." Montesquieu is reported to have said that, "I am of necessity a human being, but it is by accident that I happen to be a Frenchman."[39] I find this flippant in comparison with Mishima's assertion that being Japanese was his "destiny," or with what Uchimura Kanzō wrote in his diary on 11 August 1921: "I have a desire to someday cease being a Christian and become a pure Japanese." Such words have a religious ring to them.[40]

I find myself in sympathy with the following passage from the writings of Hori Tatsuo, which seems to me the perfect response to the question of "Buddhism and the Kami":

> Perhaps it is because of all of the ancient remains—the temples or old pagodas—in this area known from of old as Ikaruga no sato, but the surroundings have the air of something out of time immemorial. Over there, centered on Yumedono, was where Umayado no miko [Prince Shōtoku] lived, whose sincere contemplation, perhaps unwittingly and without his ever realizing it, deeply inspired everything around him. And so, as the surrounding mountains and forests were at an ever-increasing pace awakened from their primeval slumber, *the numberless small kami that dwelled therein* were driven out, and the hearts of the villagers who had gazed morning and night on those mountains and those forests gradually calmed down and they were led to drink deeply of the *joy of life*.
>
> It would probably take two or three years of study, but I should like to write a story telling of the mournful parting of those numberless kami as they set forth on their journey of exile to faraway lands as the new religion of Buddhism was transmitted to Japan and gradually came to replace them. I would choose a young nobleman for the main character and would have him feel profound sympathy for the banished kami; but even in his longing, he would be awakened to the new faith. Would that not make a fine tale?[41]

Mishima was envious of Hori Tatsuo's ability to write such exquisite prose effortlessly, but he was not particularly arrested by this passage or its message. Hori's words are a farewell, overflowing with love and devotion for Japan, spoken from the viewpoint of the new religion. In it he makes

a contrast between Buddhism as a philosophy of life and pure Japanism as a philosophy of death. The notion that the ancient Japanese view of life was optimistic and only turned pessimistic with the introduction of Buddhism is nonsense propagated by people who know not the first thing about the meaning of religion. In fact, the ancient Japanese had no ground for any kind of hope. Their lives were spent in the frightened but stoic anticipation of death and the journey to the dreaded land of darkness (*yomi no kuni*). Their first hope for life, the first conviction of resurrection in the next world, came through the encounter with Buddhism.

As for my personal relationship with Japan, I can only say that I consider love of Japan to be a form of self-love. I experience Japan as an extension of my own mind and body; just as I love my own body, so do I love Japan. Self-love, narcissism, is sweet and enticing, easy to fall into and hard to climb out of. Love, on the other hand, is rooted not in the self but in the other. If it is directed to the self, it is not love but mere self-attachment.

The Buddhist teaching of no-self leads to the two conclusions:

1. One should detest oneself.
2. One should love only the absolute other (God or Buddha).

As a Buddhist who follows the doctrine of no-self, I must never get to the point of loving Japan as an extension of my own physical self. Although I believe that I ought not love myself, the fact is that I most certainly do; and even though I believe that I ought not love Japan, I find I cannot avoid it. Still, the teaching of the Buddha is absolute, which leaves me no other choice than to conclude: *A Buddhist must not love Japan*.

[*Translated by Jamie Hubbard*]

Tendai *Hongaku* Doctrine and Japan's Ethnocentric Turn

Ruben L. F. Habito

One of Hakamaya Noriaki's early essays presenting his thoughts on Critical Buddhism was given as a talk at a Buraku Liberation Center in Osaka.[1] In it he examines discriminatory attitudes and language within the Sōtō Sect and traces their roots to *hongaku shisō*, or the doctrine of originary enlightenment.[2] He has amplified these thoughts in subsequent essays, and his position can be summarized as follows: *hongaku shisō* is to be rejected as a pernicious way of thinking that harbors and abets attitudes not only of social discrimination but also of cultural chauvinism and ethnocentrism.[3]

The surge of militaristic nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, which motivated Japan to invade and colonize neighboring Asian countries and which eventually led her to an aggressor's role in the Second World War, can be seen as an outcome of these attitudes. Further, these problematic attitudes were not eradicated with Japan's defeat in the war, but were even further fanned by the economic successes Japan has enjoyed since the postwar years, continuing up to the present.

This same set of attitudes also serves to bolster and maintain the hierarchical structure of Japanese society, often depicted as a pyramid with the Tennō[4] at the top. It is within this hierarchical structure that certain groups (such as Koreans, Chinese, and Southeast Asians residing in Japan, as well as members of the groups traditionally treated as outcasts in society, namely those who come from the *hisabetsu-buraku* or discriminated communities) are treated as second- or third-class citizens.

The key point here is that these problematic attitudes of cultural chauvinism, ethnocentrism, and social discrimination, connected with many of Japan's past and present social ills, find their roots in a mode of thinking nurtured in the Japanese Buddhist tradition, that is, the doctrine

of originary enlightenment (*hongaku shisō*). Developed in medieval Tendai circles, this doctrine and the way of thinking associated with it continued to influence various aspects of Japanese culture and society from the medieval period on.[5]

Here we will not take up the intricate philosophical arguments presented by Hakamaya. Rather, this essay is offered as an excursus that may shed light on possible historical connections between Japanese ethnocentric attitudes and Tendai *hongaku shisō*. The first section will present a rough outline of this Tendai doctrine of originary enlightenment. The second section will highlight the shift in Japanese consciousness that occurred around the late thirteenth and early fourteenth century, a shift that we may call an "ethnocentric turn," discernible from a comparison of two texts dealing with Japan's imperial lineage: the *Gukanshō* (written by the Tendai monk Jien around 1219) and the *Jinnō shōtōki* (written by Kitabatake Chikafusa between 1339 and 1343). The third section will examine other late-thirteenth-century texts that corroborate this shift in the understanding of Japanese identity. Our fourth (final) section will offer reflections on the possible link between this ethnocentric turn and the Tendai doctrine of originary enlightenment.

TENDAI *HONGAKU* DOCTRINE IN MEDIEVAL JAPAN

It was the work of Tamura Yoshirō, who held the Chair of Japanese Buddhism at the prestigious University of Tokyo in the 1970s, that brought wide attention to the significance of the Tendai doctrine of originary enlightenment (*hongaku*) in Japanese cultural, social, and religious history. Here we will present only the barest outline of the subject.[6]

In brief, the doctrine of *hongaku shisō* involves an absolute affirmation of this world of phenomena—this world of birth-and-death—as the very embodiment of the perfection of Buddhahood itself. The following passages illustrate this kind of affirmation.

> As one thinks of attaining Buddhahood, of inevitably becoming born in the Land of Bliss, one is to think this way: My very mind—this itself is the truth of Suchness. As one thinks that the Suchness that pervades throughout the Dharma-realm is my own body, then I myself am the Dharma-realm, and one is not to think that there is anything other than this. As one is enlightened on this, the myriad Buddhas of the Dharma-realm and all the bodhisattvas all dwell within my very body. Apart from

> my own body, looking for Buddha elsewhere is to lack the realization that my very own body is Suchness itself. If I realize that Suchness and I are one and the same thing, Śākyamuni, Amitābha, Bhaiṣajya-guru, and all the myriad Buddhas of the ten directions, Samantabhadra, Mañjuśrī, Avalokiteśvara, Maitreya, and the myriad bodhisattvas are not apart from my very own body.[7]
>
> Therefore, we are the body of Suchness: as one thinks thus, in the evening and in daylight, in action, standing still, sitting and lying down, without forgetting, and keeps it in one's mind, there is no doubt about the fact that this very body itself is the Buddha. If so, then, believing in the teaching of the Esoteric (Shingon) sect, wherein one is enjoined to think: "I am Mahāvairocana," this very body itself is Buddha. All my actions and movements become the sign of Suchness. Therefore, every utterance of the tongue, every word, is itself true mantra. Every form of the body, every movement, is itself the secret mudra. Every thought and every memory is the Central Point of Veneration (*honzon*). Every delusive idea and thought is itself Esoteric contemplation. Have this mind in you, do not forget: keep it in mind, this very body itself is Buddha. I myself am Suchness. I myself am Mahāvairocana.[8]

The doctrine of originary enlightenment expressed in its most extreme form is an affirmation of *this* ordinary human being *as such*, full of desires and delusions and imperfections, as nothing less than the perfection of Buddhahood itself. In other words, it affirms that *this very self is Buddha*, that there is nothing that is not Buddha, and that what is called "attainment of Buddhahood" is nothing but realizing the fact that one already is Buddha *just as one is.* Consequently, to aspire to Buddhahood in the conventional sense, that is, by leaving home, entering a monastery, taking up rigorous discipline and religious practice of meditation, is to pursue a misguided ideal if one does so thinking that one could thereby become what one is not (that is, a Buddha).

On the basis of this logic, Śākyamuni—the historical Buddha who was born in India and who attained enlightenment after years of arduous practice, who taught the Four Noble Truths and the Eightfold Path and established the sangha—is considered only a "provisional" Buddha, as with the other Buddhas named in the sutras. This very body, here and now—*this* is the real Buddha.

This extreme form of the doctrine of originary enlightenment could easily (and has) become an excuse for religious laxity or the abandonment of practice altogether, or could lead to rationalizations of immoral or irre-

sponsible behavior. The doctrine thus came under severe criticism from serious Buddhist practitioners, such as the Tendai monk Hōchibō Shōshin (twelfth century) and Zen Master Dōgen (1200–1253).[9]

Tamura Yoshirō has demonstrated how the founders of the new Buddhist movements of the Kamakura period (notably Hōnen, Shinran, Dōgen, and Nichiren), having spent part of their religious careers as monks at the Tendai training center on Mt. Hiei, came to know of this doctrine in some way or other, and formulated their core teaching either as a reaction to or under some form of influence of this doctrine, and how it was indeed a pervasive influence in Japanese medieval society.[10] Kuroda Toshio has noted how this doctrine came to serve an ideological buttress for the religiopolitical establishment (*kenmon taisei*) of the medieval period, characterized by an intertwining power structure involving mutually advantageous ties among elite groups, including the imperial court and ruling families, the military class, and religious leaders based in their temples with huge landholdings (*shōen*).[11] In short, the absolute affirmation of this-worldly reality that was the central thrust of this doctrine of originary enlightenment served to provide religious legitimation to the political and economic structure of the time, bolstering an "orthodoxy" based on the convergence of political, economic, and religious interests of the ruling elite.[12]

In the next two sections we will look at historical documents that reflect features of Japanese mentality from around the thirteenth to early fourteenth centuries, as a basis for considering the role of *hongaku* thought in Japanese history.

THE *GUKANSHŌ* AND THE *JINNŌ SHŌTŌKI*

The *Gukanshō* and the *Jinnō shōtōki*, written roughly a century apart, both describe the reigns of Yamato rulers and emphasize their continuity in the line of succession. Both provide a list of the successive Japanese Tennō with descriptions of their reigns, but each in its own way is written with a particular intent, that is, to demonstrate a particular theme or argue a case in point addressing issues faced by its author's contemporaries.

The running theme in the *Gukanshō* is the elucidation of the cosmic principles (*dōri*) for the governance of the land of Japan, based on following the will of the gods. The "will of the gods" being argued for in this case is in favor of a policy of cooperation between the imperial

courtiers and the military rulers who have set themselves in positions of power in Kamakura.

The point to note here is that the gods are depicted as taking special concern for the welfare of the inhabitants of this land ruled in direct succession by the descendants of Jinmu Tennō. It is in this connection, that is, referring to Japan as a country especially under the protection of the gods, that the term *shinkoku* is used. In short, the special favor the gods confer over the land of Japan is directly linked to the fact that it continues to be ruled by a descendant of Jinmu, at whose service many of the presumed intended readers of the *Gukanshō* (that is, imperial courtiers and others sympathetic to the court in Kyoto) find themselves to be.

The guiding concern of the *Jinnō shōtōki,* on the other hand, is the legitimation of the lineage of the Southern court ruled by the Tennō Godaigo, at that time set in direct political and military conflict with its Northern rival. In other words, the emphasis on the direct line of succession of Tennō since ancient times up to Godaigo is linked with the claim that "the gods are on our side," as opposed to the usurpers in the Northern court.

The following are some notable features of the *Gukanshō*:

First, its geographical view is very much based on traditional Buddhist cosmology, which places the center of the world at Mt. Sumeru. The Buddhist dharma is depicted as spreading outwards from this center, from Jambudvīpa (the Indian subcontinent), eastwards to China, and then to Japan. Thus Japan is presented as on the outer fringes of this cosmos, as a "peripheral land" (*hendo*).

Second, its view of history is based on the Buddhist notion of the Latter Age of Dharma (*mappō*). There appears also a view that Japan would have a hundred rulers (*hyaku-ō*) before the coming of the end. It is in this light that the opening lines of the treatise can be understood: "Now we are on the eighty-fourth reign and not many more are left."[13] The implication here is that the movement of history is that of decline, and that the only way to stem the decline temporarily is to manage the affairs of the state according to cosmic principles (*dōri*) as ordained by the gods. It is to elucidate these principles and to persuade the reigning authorities to abide by them, and thus bring the chaotic states of affairs characteristic of the times to some semblance of order, that served as motivating factors in the writing of the *Gukanshō*.

In sum, in this treatise, the term *shinkoku* does not appear to present any significant development in meaning since its use in the *Nihon Shoki*, wherein it simply referred to Japan as a land that the gods favored and whose governance they took an active interest in as it continued to be ruled by a direct descendant of Jinmu.[14]

With the *Jinnō shōtōki* written a century later, however, we find a marked change in the image of Japan. First, Japan is no longer described as in the periphery of the Buddhist cosmology, but is now depicted as at the center of the world, still using the imagery from the same cosmology but now reversing it in Japan's favor:

> Japan is in the ocean off the continent of Jambu. The Great Teacher Dengyō of Mt. Hiei and High Priest Gomyō of Nara both wrote that Japan is the "central land." This would make it the land of Cāmara between the southern and eastern continents. Yet the *Avataṃsaka Sutra* says: "In the ocean to the northeast is a mountain. It is called Diamond (*kongō*) Mountain." This seems to refer to Mt. Kongō of Japan, and therefore indicates that our country is situated in the ocean to the northeast of both India and China. As a land apart, it has been independently ruled by a divinely descended line of sovereigns.[15]

Secondly, the view of the future based on the acceptance of decline in the *Gukanshō* gives way to an optimistic prospect of an eternal reign of the descendants of Amaterasu. For example, dispelling a popular "(mis)conception" that the imperial regalia had been destroyed or lost in the past during those troubled times in which the reigning Tennō were besieged by enemies, the *Jinnō shōtōki* affirms:

> People must be clearly informed about the nature and history of the imperial regalia. One hears that those not so informed believe the mirror met destruction in either the Tentoku or Chōkyū eras of the ancient age, and that the Kusanagi sword was lost in the sea at Dannoura. This is absolutely untrue. We regard the original regalia as absolutely vital to the very existence of our country and as the seed bed of its virtue. So long as the sun and the moon continue to traverse the heavens, we can be secure in the knowledge that none of the regalia is missing. How can there be any doubt about this when Amaterasu in her mandate has stated: "The imperial institution shall prosper eternally with heaven and earth themselves"? We must continue to have absolute faith that there will be such prosperity in the future.[16]

This is a significant point to note, in that the *Jinnō shōtōki* appears to have cast aside the consciousness of the Latter Days of Dharma that characterized twelfth- and thirteenth-century thinking, and that lay in the background that led to the rise of the noted new Buddhist movements of the Kamakura period. In place of this consciousness of a degenerate age, we find an optimism toward the future that is grounded in the faith that the gods will continue bestowing their favor on this land.[17]

On the above two points, then, namely in the shift in Japan's place in the cosmological scheme from periphery to center, and in the displacement of the pessimistic sense of the "latter days" giving way to an optimistic vision of a prosperous future for Japan, we find the marked difference in the view of Japanese identity in the *Gukanshō* and the *Jinnō shōtōki*.

Another aspect that shows a marked difference in the attitude to self-identity that sets the *Jinnō shōtōki* apart from its predecessor is that *shinkoku Nippon* is also understood as including the sense of sacredness both of the land as well as of the people inhabiting it. In other words, in the *Gukanshō* as well as in previous writings that refer to the term *shinkoku*, it is presented on rather abstract terms as based on the favor accorded by the gods toward the land of Japan and on the fact that the descendant of the gods continues to "rule" the land (as Tennō).[18] The *Jinnō shōtōki* in contrast presents a very concrete and vivid picture of this divine blessing, describing the sacredness of the land itself, with all the gifts of nature therein, as well as the divine lineage of the inhabitants themselves.

> The rice we daily eat is an imperial benefice, and the pure well water we drink each day is a blessing from the gods.[19]
>
> The people of the land (*tenka*= literally, "under heaven") are all children of the gods. The gods have thus made it their earnest wish (*hongan*) to bring people's lives to true peace and contentment.[20]

This sense of sacredness of the land and the people is a new feature in the understanding of the term *shinkoku*. This is a sense referred to in the *Jinnō shōtōki* that we can also find expressed in other writings composed around this time, one that was not fully manifest in previous writings.[21]

There is another difference to be noted: although the term *shinkoku* appears in both treatises, the latter presents it as an expression that proclaims Japan's superiority over other countries known at the time. For example, the author compares Japan with India and China, and refers to

the creation stories and the vicissitudes of history characteristic of each.

> In our country alone, the imperial succession has followed in unbroken line from the time when heaven and earth were divided until the present age. Although, as inevitable within a single family, the succession has at times been transmitted collaterally (*katawara yori*), the principle has prevailed that it will invariably return to the direct (*sei*) line. This is entirely the immutable mandate of Amaterasu, and is the reason why Japan differs from all other countries.[22]

To summarize, there is a marked shift in attitude that has taken place between the *Gukanshō* and the *Jinnō shōtōki* regarding the understanding of Japan and its place in the world. From being in the periphery (*hendo*) of the known world, Japan is now placed at the center of the cosmos. From being in a "latter age of the dharma" that is only heading toward further degeneration, the land of Japan is affirmed as going toward a glorious and prosperous future with the blessing of the gods. Further, the meaning of Japan as divine land has now advanced one significant step: in addition to the understanding of *shinkoku* as a land favored by the gods and as a land wherein the descendants of the gods "rule" in unbroken succession, the sense of the sacredness of the land and the people of Japan comes to the fore in the latter treatise. These three aspects in the understanding of *shinkoku Nippon* become the basis for affirming Japan's superiority over other countries in the world.

> Great Japan is the divine land. The heavenly progenitor founded it, and the sun goddess bequeathed it to her descendants to rule eternally. Only in our country is this true. There are no similar examples in other countries. This is why our country is called the divine land.[23]

This raises a question: is the difference in the view of Japanese self-identity between the *Gukanshō* and the *Jinnō shōtōki* as described above simply a difference in the individual perspectives of the respective authors who happened to write a century apart, or is this difference one that reflects at least to some degree a change in the social awareness of the time? If the latter is the case, a concomitant question is: what were the factors that brought about this change?

A thorough examination of the events and features of Japanese society around this period from the early thirteenth to the early fourteenth century based on available evidence is necessary to answer the above questions properly. My suggestion is that the difference was more than an

individual one between Jien and Chikafusa, and that it is indicative of a changing awareness of Japanese self-image reflected in other textual sources as well. The next section will offer support for this suggestion.

JAPANOCENTRISM IN LATE THIRTEENTH-CENTURY DOCUMENTS

Thirteenth-century Japan was a tumultuous period in many ways. It was a period of sociopolitical and economic upheaval, as well as one of religious and cultural ferment, and in many ways was a pivotal period.[24]

A singular element stands out as a likely factor in the change in Japanese self-image around this time: the sense of national crisis brought about by the Mongol invasion threats, and the widespread jubilation after the double defeat of the Mongols as they approached Japan's shores, greatly aided by auspicious storms that devastated the invading fleets (1274 and 1281). These storms were dubbed *kamikaze* (divine winds), bolstering the belief that Japan was indeed a land favored by the gods.

The *Hachiman Gudōkun*, a treatise describing the prayer rituals conducted at the Hachiman Shrine at Iwashimizu, composed during the reign of Hanazono (1308–1318), glorifies the "noble and wise divine land of Nippon,"[25] whose populace joined in earnest prayer and ritual observance imploring the gods and buddhas for help against the invader. The same treatise gives an account of an invocation supposedly offered by the respected monk Eison (Shien Shōnin) of Saidai-ji in Nara during a public prayer service, including the following:

> As a foreign country threatens to invade us, men and women from high and low all lament in sorrow.... "Are the gods now about to destroy this divine land? Have the buddhas all abandoned it?"...
>
> The promise made by the god Hachiman, "as the authority of the noble rulers weakens, and the power of the people comes to naught (I will come to their aid)"—is this not precisely for this moment? We implore, then, quickly send your divine power and dispel the hateful enemy.
>
> If we compare foreign countries with this our land, the Mongols are descendants of dogs, while on the other hand the people of Japan are descendants of the gods. The difference between these is as great as the distance between heaven and earth. How can one compare gods with dogs?[26]

The very first page of this same treatise already indicates the tenor of the whole regarding its view of the land of Japan:

> The five provinces and seven paths of this island of Akitsu (Japan), as well as the drifting clouds and rains that fall, are all shrines and altars. Each and everyone of its people, from the ruler to the masses, are all descendants of the heavenly and earthly deities. This land is outside the reign of the great Brahma, the deva king. It is separated from the Middle Country (China) and from other foreign regions. The three Koreas have recognized fealty to this land, but our country has never belonged to another. The gods of the three thousand thrones and the hundred deva kings all protect its gates.... The gods are never derelict in their protection. The buddhas never cease to extend their invisible aid. Who would dare go against this divine land (*shinkoku*)?[27]

This *Hachiman Gudōkun*, written by a priest or priests of a Shrine dedicated to the war-god Hachiman some years prior to the *Jinnō shōtōki*, reports of the concerted efforts of the whole populace at invoking the help of the gods in a time of national crisis. It is one further testimony of the new self-understanding of *shinkoku* that includes the sense of sacredness of the land and of its people, coupled with a sense of superiority to other countries.

Another document of extreme interest is the *Keiran Shūyōshū*, reportedly written in the year 1318 by a Tendai monk named Kōshū. This is a voluminous work that presents in encyclopedic form the various facets of Tendai Buddhism practiced and taught at Mt. Hiei at the time. On the basis of what is written in an introductory section of the document, the author was a monk who was not only schooled in the Tendai and Shingon traditions, but also learned in other Buddhist schools such as Zen, Kegon, Sanron, Hossō, Kusha, and Jōdo, in addition to being well-versed in Shinto doctrine and ritual.

The following passages are noteworthy:

> Since our country (Japan) is a divine land, there are numerous appearances of the gods. This being the case, the god that is the appearance of the Great Teacher Śākyamuni for our times is Hie, the Great Manifestation.[28]
>
> The gods are no other than Dainichi (Mahāvairocana). Śākyamuni is an appearance of Buddha. Now at this present time our country is the home country of Dainichi. Saiten (India) is the country of the provisional Buddha, Śākyamuni. Therefore, the tree of enlightenment that is the place of the coming into the world of the Mountain King (Sannō) is this home land of Dainichi (Nippon).

> The bodhi tree in Saiten (India) is a place of the manifestation of the provisional body.[29]
>
> Our country is the center of the Three Thousand Great Worlds. Therefore it receives the protection of the gods. Because of this it can never be invaded by a foreign country.[30]

The last passage is particularly worthy of note in that it places emphasis on Japan's invulnerability to "foreign invasions"—an obvious reference to the experience of recent decades, which from all indications has made a strong imprint in the popular mind.

The two previous passages call attention to the reversal of traditional Buddhist cosmology, where the Indian subcontinent (as the birthplace of the Buddha) was at the center and Japan at the periphery.[31] Japan is now regarded as the center of the cosmos, and the Mountain King Hie (god of the shrine at Mt. Hiei, seat of the Tendai school) is identified as the very embodiment of Śākyamuni. The Śākyamuni who was born in India is regarded as a (mere) provisional body, whereas the home of the true Dharma-body identified with Dainichi (Mahāvairocana) is this land of Japan.[32]

Another set of writings that offer testimony to a new understanding of the self-image of Japan are the works that laid the foundations of Ise Shinto, the *Shintō Gobusho*, or "Five Treatises of Shinto." Attributed to the Watarai family (Watarai Yukitada, 1236–1305; Watarai Ieyuki, 1256–1362; Watarai Tsunemasa, 1263–1339), these were most likely written in the middle part of the Kamakura era, that is, the late thirteenth century.

The *Yamatohime no Mikoto Seiki*, one of the five treatises (probably written between 1177 and 1180),[33] proclaims:

> Thus I have heard: The Great Country of Nippon is a divine land. Receiving the protection of the gods, the nation (*kokka*) attains peace and well-being (*anzen*). Receiving the worship and devotion of the nation, the gods increase in power and majesty.[34]

These five Shinto treatises develop this basic idea and present the details of the establishment of the country by the gods, and of the continued maintenance of the same under divine protection. Two notable features here are, first, the use of the term "nation" (*kokka*), and, second, the description of the mutual bond of give-and-take between the nation and the gods. In other words, the gods bestow protection and ensure the well-being of the nation, and the nation accords its worship and devotion

to the gods, glorifying them and increasing their power and majesty. "Nation" here can be read as the populace as a whole—from the ruling Tennō and the nobility, the religious functionaries, to the masses of people, united in mind and heart. Needless to say, this union of mind and heart in worship and devotion toward the gods was the experience realized in the prayer services and rituals performed vis-à-vis the threat of Mongol invasion.

There are many more documents from this period that corroborate the above findings regarding the change in Japanese self-image that occurred from the latter part of the thirteenth century.[35] Here I have introduced only a few salient examples that support the suggestion that an "ethnocentric turn" happened at this point in Japanese history.

HONGAKU SHISŌ AND JAPANESE ETHNOCENTRISM

In the above sections we have highlighted a period in Japanese history, namely, the early thirteenth to the early fourteenth century—the period between the writing of Jien's *Gukanshō* (1219) and Kitabatake Chikafusa's *Jinnō shōtōki* (1339). Taking our cue from the noticeable difference in the view of Japan's place in the cosmos between the latter and the former, we took a look at some other documents written within this period, looking for corroboration of the thesis that the difference was more than just between the two individual authors. We have called this change in awareness an "ethnocentric turn," based on the difference in the view of history, of Japan's place in the cosmos, and on the difference in the understanding of the term *shinkoku*.

Our hypothesis, then, is this: the kind of logic operative in the doctrine of originary enlightenment provided a theoretical basis for the shift in the placement of Japan from the periphery to the center of the cosmos. Our clue is in the mode of thinking that affirms that "this very body is the (real) Buddha" and that regards the historical (Śākyamuni) Buddha born in India as merely a "provisional" Buddha.

This logic could be called a "reverse Copernican turn," as it inverts the respective places of the sun and the earth in the scheme of things. The sun (Dainich i= the "real" Buddha, the *dharmakāya*) is located in *this* very place, that is, Japan (Nippon = "the source of the sun"), and the earth (the historical Buddha who walked this earth and lived in India) is "over there" on the other side. Needless to say, this involves the reversal

of the traditional Buddhist cosmology that places Mt. Sumeru at the center (with Jambudvīpa, or India, as the southern subcontinent contiguous to the center) and locates Japan at the periphery (*hendo*). The passage cited above from the *Keiran Shūyōshū* presents a clear example of this logic put in application: Dainichi (Mahāvairocana), whose home is Japan, is the real Buddha; Śākyamuni, who was born and lived in India, is only a provisional Buddha.

Underlying this logic of reversal is the mode of thinking that distinguishes "real" (*honmon* = genuine, originary, true) from "provisional" (*shakumon* = appearance, trace, vestige), a key feature of the Tendai tradition originating from the works of T'ien-t'ai Master Chih-i (538–597). This is a mode of thinking applied in the interpretation of the *Lotus Sutra*, wherein the first half is considered "provisional teaching," that is, the teaching of the historical Buddha in India based on skillful means of guiding sentient beings to awakening, and the second half is regarded as the "real teaching," the teaching of the Tathagata of Immeasurable Life that transcends history and continues to work on behalf of all sentient beings throughout all ages. This real-provisional distinction is a thought category in the Tendai tradition that had great influence in many circles.

This category also came to be a pivotal one as Buddhism spread its influence in Japan, as it served a useful function in addressing the question of the nature of the relationship between the gods who protect Japan and the Buddhas named and described in the sutras that came from India, China, and Korea. Thus, the theory that the Japanese divinities are (provisional) manifestations of the (real) Buddhas from the Western lands (India)—the *honji-suijaku* theory—served as a framework for understanding the relationship between the gods and the buddhas. This theory finds frequent mention in writings that date from the late Heian period on, and it became an accepted framework for several centuries.

In writings that date around the latter part of the thirteenth century, however, we begin to see a reversal of the roles of buddhas and gods within the framework: the gods are now viewed as "real"(*honji*) and the buddhas as "provisional" (*suijaku*). This reversal has been called the *han-honji-suijaku* theory, and we find its fuller development in the writings of Yoshida Kanetomo (1435–1511)[36] and subsequent Shinto theorists.[37] Here again, the role of the Tendai doctrine of originary enlightenment has been identified as quite significant in grounding and encouraging such developments.

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS

Japanese ethnocentrism found unequivocal official expression in the *Kokutai no hongi*, issued by the Ministry of Education under the militaristic Japanese government in 1937.[38] The fervent nationalism that swept the whole country in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth century, coupled with the militarism that drove Japan to invade its neighboring Asian countries, eventually plunging her head-on into the Second World War, can be seen as concrete manifestations of the ethnocentric mentality that took shape and developed through the earlier centuries of Japan's history.

After its disastrous defeat in the Second World War, Japan undertook a remarkable program of reconstruction, and within a generation succeeded in achieving the status of a world economic power. At this point of history, various indications point to the continuance, and arguably the resurgence in different forms, of those same ethnocentric attitudes that have informed the Japanese self-image and their ways of relating to the rest of the world.[39]

Critical Buddhism has raised a sharp socioethical critique against the Japanese Buddhist establishment and Japanese society as a whole, for harboring and abetting attitudes of social discrimination, cultural chauvinism, and ethnocentrism. This critique has touched a sensitive nerve, felt not only in Japanese Buddhist circles but also in the wider public arena. The discussion deserves to be pursued on various levels, to include the historical as well as the philosophico-religious and sociopolitical aspects of the issue. This paper is but one modest attempt to contribute to the discussion, considering the putative link between Japanese ethnocentrism and the Tendai doctrine of originary enlightenment.

The *Lotus Sutra* and Japanese Culture

MATSUMOTO Shirō

THE PRESENT ESSAY ON the *Lotus Sutra* and Japanese culture is an extension of my argument that the doctrine of *tathāgata-garbha* is not Buddhist.[1] The question I put myself here is, What is the teaching of the *Lotus Sutra*, perhaps the most influential Buddhist scripture in East Asia? I have organized my remarks in response to the views of Hirakawa Akira, one of the leading Japanese authorities on Buddhism, whose standpoint can be summarized in three points:

1. The idea of the "one vehicle" (*ekayāna*) in the *Lotus Sutra* indicates a principle that unifies the "three vehicles" (*triyāna*).
2. The idea of "the attainment of Buddhahood by all beings" in the *Lotus Sutra* is the same as the idea that "all sentient beings have Buddha-nature" in the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sutra*, resulting in a view of the *Lotus Sutra* colored by the doctrine of *tathāgata-garbha*.
3. Stupa worship was the basis for the formation of the *Lotus Sutra*.

THE "ONE VEHICLE": UNIFYING PRINCIPLE OR SPECIFIC OPTION?

What is the function of the idea of "one vehicle" in the *Lotus Sutra*? Hirakawa writes:

> Although the followers of each of the three vehicles—sravakas, pratyekabuddhas, and bodhisattvas—all perform the different practices of their respective vehicle, they make equal progress on the path to Buddhahood. According to the chapter on "Means," "There is only one vehicle, not two or three" (T 9.8a). In contrast, according to the *Vimalakīrti Sutra*, the followers of the sravaka-vehicle are disparaged as having "rotten" or inferior seeds and are said to have no possibility of realizing Buddhahood. However, if sravakas and pratyekabuddhas cannot realize ultimate salvation, then the teaching of the *Vimalakīrti Sutra* cannot be called a complete version of Mahayana, since some beings are not included within

the scope of the Buddha's compassion. The One-Buddha-vehicle teaching of the *Lotus Sutra* probably arose out of the need to formulate a Mahayana teaching that would account for the salvation of Hinayana practitioners. In historical terms, after a period of emphasizing the opposition of and differences between the Hinayana and Mahayana traditions, Mahayana thinkers formulated new teachings such as those of the *Lotus Sutra*, which would encompass the two traditions. The appeal of such teachings was based on the popularity of stupa worship.[2]

The one vehicle of the *Lotus Sutra* includes and unifies the sravaka vehicle and the pratyekabuddha vehicle.... This does not mean that one enters into the bodhisattva vehicle after totally abandoning the vehicle of the sravaka, but that the practice of the sravaka vehicle itself becomes the practice of the bodhisattva vehicle.[3]

According to Hirakawa, the idea of the "one vehicle" in the *Lotus Sutra* provides a principle for unifying Hinayana and Mahayana. This obviates the need for abandoning the Hinayana and converting to Mahayana, because the way of the sravaka is seen as a practice for attaining Buddhahood. I disagree with this interpretation.

The idea of "one vehicle" in the *Lotus Sutra* should be understood in light of verses 53–55 in the second chapter on "Means":[4]

Sravaka (Voice-hearers) of the Leader (*nāyaka*)
Who hear the Dharma I preach,
If they hear or bear in mind even a single verse,
They shall all undoubtedly attain Enlightenment. [53]

There is only One Vehicle (*yāna*),
For in the world there is no second nor third,
Except a differentiation between vehicles
[Taught] by the Supreme Ones as skillful means. [54]

The protector of the world is born into the world
In order to clarify and teach the wisdom of the Buddha (*buddha-jñāna*).
There is only one purpose, and no second.
The Buddhas do not lead beings through the Hinayana. [55]

The teaching in these verses is illustrated in Diagram 1 (see p. 390).

I maintain that the true intent of the *Lotus Sutra* is to teach that even though three vehicles are taught as a skillful means, only the Mahayana (i.e., the *Buddha-yāna*) is real and true. The existence of three vehicles is presupposed in the *Lotus Sutra* teaching of one vehicle. We may assume

DIAGRAM 1

three vehicles = means		one vehicle = real
3. *Śrāvaka-yāna*		✖
2. *Pratyekabuddha-yāna*		✖
1. *Bodhisattva-yāna*	⟶	*Buddha-yāna* (Mahayana)

that prior to the compilation of the *Lotus Sutra* there was a form of Mahayana (reflected in the *Prajñāpāramitā* sutras)[5] in which "Hinayana" and Mahayana either coexisted or were set in opposition to one another. With the appearance of the chapter on "Means" in the *Lotus Sutra*, however, the assertion was made that, of the three vehicles, only the Mahayana (the *Buddha-yāna*) is the true one. Whereas previously the other two vehicles were granted some validity, they were declared invalid with the coming of the *Lotus Sutra*. The core teaching of the chapter on "Means" is that the two lower vehicles are not really vehicles leading to Buddhahood at all, because they are inadequate to the task. What, then, qualifies a form of Buddhism as valid and adequate to be called a vehicle to Buddhahood? The answer is, the form that provides Buddha-wisdom (*buddha-jñāna*) or allows beings to attain Buddhahood. This disqualifies the ways of the sravaka and pratyekabuddha. Only the Mahayana—the "vehicle" of the bodhisattva and the Buddha—is a "vehicle" for this attainment.

From the ancient past it was taken as accepted wisdom that the idea of one vehicle in the *Lotus Sutra* could be summarized in the phrase "the attainment of Buddhahood by the sravaka and pratyekabuddha" (*nijō sabutsu* 二乗作仏). Unlike Hirakawa, I maintain that this does *not* mean that sravakas and pratyekabuddhas can attain Buddhahood while remaining in their current "way." If they want to attain Buddhahood they must abandon their current state and convert to Mahayana. In Chinese Buddhism this conversion was expressed in the phrase "turning from the inferior and entering the great" (*eshō nyūdai* 廻小入大), and this was set up as a necessary condition for those of the two vehicles to attain Buddhahood. More specifically, this conversion involves *hearing* the teaching of the one vehicle through the preaching of the *Lotus Sutra* and *believing* in this message. All who believe in the *Lotus Sutra* will attain Buddhahood, but those who do not believe will never attain Buddhahood. This is the basic stance of the *Lotus Sutra*.

The core teaching that runs through the chapter on "Means" is that the two vehicles are incapable of leading people to Buddhahood, and are thus useless "vehicles." The verses cited above are the clearest expression of this idea, which is accurately transmitted in Kumārajīva's translation (T 9.8a20–22):

> In order to preach Buddha-wisdom
> The Buddhas come into the world.
> Only this one cause is true,
> For the other two are unreal.
> To the very end he does not resort to the Lesser Vehicle
> To ferry the beings across.[6]

On the basis of these verses we can say that the *Lotus Sutra* makes the following identifications:

The two vehicles = the "other two" = Hinayana = "unreal"

The Buddha-vehicle = the "one cause" = Mahayana = "real"

In short, the one-vehicle teaching of the *Lotus Sutra* is neither a conciliatory nor a syncretistic teaching. It calls for a radical choice that involves rejecting what is wrong and accepting what is right. In a different time and place, Dōgen (1200–1253) was to take the same standpoint. In the *Shōbōgenzō zuimonki* he says:

> If someone comes to ask about the teaching or the essentials of practice, a monk must always answer him truthfully. Even if the person seems to be someone of no talent or is a beginner with little knowledge and cannot understand, the monk must not reply with an expedient or untrue answer. The spirit of the bodhisattva precepts requires that he answer only with the Mahayana teachings, even if the questioner is a Hinayana person who asks of the Hinayana way. This is how the Tathagata taught during his lifetime. The provisional teachings of expediency are really of no value. The last True Teaching [of the *Lotus Sutra*] alone has real worth. Do not worry about whether or not the person understands; just answer with the truth.[7]

Here Dōgen clearly states that the bodhisattva ideal requires that Mahayana teachings must be taught even to those who do not understand or who explicitly ask for the Hinayana teachings, and that this was also the way taken by the Buddha himself. Further, the "expedient" or provisional means are worthless, and the truth must be told regardless of the capacity of the listener to understand. This is the radical one-vehicle teaching of

the *Lotus Sutra:* that Mahayana alone is right, and the other teachings are wrong and useless.

The differences of this position from Hirakawa's should be obvious. I have illustrated it in Diagrams 2 and 3. In short, Hirakawa understands the one vehicle to mean a unifying principle that incorporates the two vehicles of the sravaka and pratyekabuddha. I understand the one vehicle as a principle that involves rejecting the two vehicles and choosing Mahayana.

Another way to look at the difference between the two theories is to note that Hirakawa's view involves four vehicles, while mine involves only three. I am aware of Kariya Sadahiko's opinion that the traditional controversy between the so-called four-vehicles theory and the three-vehicles theory is flawed in the very way in which the problem is expressed,[8] but here again I beg to differ. This controversy concerns the issue of whether or not the one vehicle is to be identified with Mahayana, and this issue cannot be ignored when discussing the teaching of the *Lotus Sutra*.

Why, then, has the three-vehicle versus four-vehicle controversy remained unresolved all this time? The answer is really quite simple: the

DIAGRAM 2

One Vehicle as a Unifying Principle

three vehicles = means → one vehicle = real

3. *Śrāvaka-yāna*
2. *Pratyekabuddha-yāna* → *Buddha-yāna*
1. *Bodhisattva-yāna*

DIAGRAM 3

One Vehicle as a Specific Option

~~*Śrāvaka-yāna*~~

~~*Pratyekabuddha-yāna*~~

Mahayana

teaching of the three-vehicle theory in its pure sense has never been accepted in the history of Buddhism in East Asia. By "pure sense" I mean the teaching of the three-vehicle theory that does not depend on the idea of *tathāgata-garbha*, or the structure that I call *dhātu-vāda*.

Among modern Japanese scholars Fuse Kōgaku, whose monumental study of the formation of the *Lotus Sutra* was published more than half a century ago, seems to be the only one to interpret the idea of one vehicle in terms of the three-vehicles theory.[9] He speaks of the "transcendent" one vehicle (or what I call the "one vehicle as a unifying principle"), and rejects the idea in favor of singling out the one vehicle from among the three.[10] All other modern Japanese Buddhist scholars interpret the one vehicle of the *Lotus Sutra* in terms of "merging," "reconciling," or "unifying" the three vehicles, sometimes explicitly, sometimes implicitly supporting the "four-vehicles" theory.[11] In this sense, Hirakawa may be said to represent the standard view of Japanese Buddhologists.

The problem is that the idea of one vehicle as a unifying principle cannot account for Dōgen's position that "only Mahayana is true" or Nichiren's radical and intense decision that "only the *Lotus Sutra* is correct." In general the new Buddhist movements of the Kamakura period elected for clear-cut "choices" of certain teachings or practices, in contrast to the prevalent ethos of "reconciliation" and "unity" represented by the Tendai and Shingon schools. This latter ethos is best represented by the Tendai tradition of "original enlightenment" (*hongaku hōmon* 本覚法門), which derived in turn from *tathāgata-garbha* thought and its *dhātu-vāda* structure. Let us now turn to the question of the relationship between the *Lotus Sutra* and the doctrine of *tathāgata-garbha*.

THE *LOTUS SUTRA* AND THE DOCTRINE OF *TATHĀGATA-GARBHA*

As is well known, Hirakawa interprets the *Lotus Sutra* in terms of the doctrine of *tathāgata-garbha* and Kariya criticizes him for it.[12] We may begin with Hirakawa's actual words:

> The technical term "Buddha-nature" (*buddha-dhātu*) does not appear in the *Lotus Sutra*, but the same notion is nevertheless expressed in ideas like the prophecies or assurance of Buddhahood for the sravakas (*shōmon juki* 声聞授記) and the attainment of Buddhahood by those of the two vehicles (*nijō sabutsu*). We may therefore say that the idea of one vehicle is not only a [particular] teaching but also the ground or basis of the

> teachings, and is in fact the ideal that "every being has Buddha-nature." One cannot say that those of the two vehicles can attain Buddhahood without acknowledging that every being has Buddha-nature.[13]
>
> The idea that all beings can attain Buddhahood (or, to put it negatively, that there is no one who cannot attain Buddhahood)[14] is the same idea as "all beings have Buddha-nature."[15]

In short, Hirakawa identified the idea in the *Lotus Sutra* that all beings can attain Buddhahood with the teaching of the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sutra* that "all sentient beings without exception have Buddha-nature." I have argued elsewhere at length that these two positions are different, and that since the doctrine of *tathāgata-garbha* is a form of *dhātu-vāda*, it is a philosophy of discrimination that, in the end, will claim that there are people who can never attain Buddhahood.[16] Diagrams 4 and 5 illustrate this point, and show the structure of the idea of one vehicle taught, respectively, in the *Śrīmālādevī Sutra*[17] and in the *Mahāyanasūtrālaṃkāra* of the Yogacara school.[18]

I consider both of these structures to be *dhātu-vāda*, but there is a theoretical development from structure 4 to structure 5. The crucial difference is that while there are movements of both production and dissolution in structure 4, only the unilateral movement of production remains in structure 5. This reflects the *gotra* theory of the Yogacarins, which teaches that the *gotra* (lineage) of each type is fixed and cannot be overcome.

There is yet another difference between the two structures. The term "Mahayana" in Diagram 4 has changed to *tathāgata-dharma* in Diagram 5. This reflects an important feature of *dhātu-vāda* texts, namely that they seem to support the three-vehicles theory while in fact logically maintaining the four-vehicles theory. In discussing the relation between the one vehicle and the three vehicles, the Yogacarins were interested only in the realm of the super-locus. As a result, they understood the three vehicles to coexist as fixed and different entities, while at the same time asserting that Mahayana was superior. This pattern resembles the state of affairs prior to the introduction of the idea of the one-vehicle by the *Lotus Sutra*. Even more pernicious is the fact that the difference between the vehicles and their superior-inferior relationship is ontologically solidified on the basis of a single and real locus, which inevitably leads to an ideology of discrimination. I call this type of *dhātu-vāda* the "*gotra* theory," and I consider it to display the same discriminatory traits that we find in the related ideas of *kula* (clan) and *vaṃśa* (lineage) in Indian society.

DIAGRAM 4



DIAGRAM 5



On a related point, we noted in commenting on a citation from Hirakawa earlier in this essay that he considers the *Vimalakīrti Sutra*, which disparages the sravaka as "rotten seed," to predate the *Lotus Sutra*, attributing its origins to a period when there was pronounced confrontation between Hinayana and Mahayana. I would argue, however, that the *Vimalakīrti Sutra* clearly postdates the *Lotus Sutra*, both because it teaches an extremely discriminatory *gotra* theory[19] and because its teaching is a form of *dhātu-vāda*.[20]

We may now turn to the question of why some *dhātu-vāda* literature seems to teach the three-vehicle theory when in fact it is based on the logic of the four-vehicle theory. To begin with, the *dhātu-vāda* tendencies of Vasubandhu's *Treatise on the Lotus Sutra* (**Saddharmapuṇḍarīkopadeśa*, T No. 1519) are clearly revealed in the following passages:

> [The *Lotus Sutra*] clearly manifests [the idea that] all sentient beings are endowed with Buddha-nature (*buddha-dhātu*). [T 26.9a]

> The Dharma body (*dharmakāya*) is the same for the sravakas, pratyekabuddhas, and the Buddhas. [T 26.7a]

Here the terms *buddha-dhātu* and *dharmakāya* refer to a single basic locus, of which individual sravakas, pratyekabuddhas, and Buddhas are "super-loci." Nevertheless, Vasubandhu clearly teaches the three-vehicle theory in the famous passage at the end of his treatise in which he supports "rejecting the two and clarifying the one" (破二明一).[21]

I would note here that the intent of this phrase is quite different from the three-vehicle theory that I accept and have illustrated above in Diagram 3. Whereas in my understanding the one-vehicle idea of the *Lotus Sutra* involves a total negation or rejection of the two vehicles, Vasubandhu admits the validity of all three vehicles and then sets out to establish their superior-inferior relationship. His reasoning clearly is based on the *gotra* theory, as reflected in the use of the common Yogacara-Vijñānavāda theory of the "four kinds of sravaka." According to this theory, sravakas are classified into four groups: the fixed (決定), the arrogant (増上慢), the transformed (応化), and those converted to bodhi (廻向菩提). Vasubandhu claims that of these four types of sravaka, only the last two are included among the sravaka who are assured in the *Lotus Sutra* of eventual enlightenment. It is important to note that in this scheme these two types of sravaka, who can attain Buddhahood, originally possess the lineage (*gotra*) of a bodhisattva and only assume the provisional form of sravakas, while the "real" sravakas who are fixed in the lineage of a sravaka can never attain Buddhahood. Herein lies the basis for the fundamental notion of the Yogacaras that bodhisattvas alone can attain Buddhahood but sravakas cannot, and that there is a definite difference between the three vehicles.

What is even more astonishing is that this discriminatory notion of the superiority of Mahayana on the basis of the *gotra* theory has even crept into the *Lotus Sutra* itself. In his insistence that the sravaka practices

themselves can become the practices of a bodhisattva, Hirakawa relies on two passages from Kumārajīva's Chinese translation of the *Lotus Sutra*:

a. Inwardly concealing their bodhisattva-conduct
  and outwardly showing themselves to be voice-hearers,...[22]

b. What you are now treading
  Is the bodhisattva path.
 By the gradual cultivation of learning,
  You shall all achieve Buddhahood.[23]

It is clear that these two passages are based on the *gotra* theory and support the position that bodhisattvas can attain Buddhahood but sravakas cannot.

To further complicate matters, these passages are suspect on text-historical grounds. For example, I agree with Kariya that the first passage (a) is a later addition to the text.[24] As for the second passage (b), the entire fifth chapter on "Medicinal Herbs" is highly problematic, as indicated by the fact that Kumārajīva's translation is missing the entire last section of the chapter. The quoted verse comes at the end of the chapter in Kumārajīva's translation, and though Kariya goes so far as to reject most of the chapter as inauthentic,[25] he retains this verse as part of the authentic *Lotus Sutra*. In any case, the problem still remains that this passage contains features characteristic of *dhātu-vāda*. In fact, I have argued elsewhere that the *dhātu-vāda* features are so prominent in this chapter that it is the earliest clear instance of *dhātu-vāda* in Buddhist literature.[26] Whatever the merits of this claim, the Sanskrit text reveals even more clearly the *dhātu-vāda*-like logic of this passage:

śrāvakāḥ...caranti ete varabodhicārikāṃ (131.11–12)
These sravakas...are practicing the excellent practices for enlightenment.

Evidently this statement teaches a *gotra* theory based on a *dhātu-vāda* structure, in that it implies that "these sravakas, who are listening to the *Lotus Sutra* at this time, are really bodhisattvas who possess the *gotra* of a bodhisattva." By relying on these passages, Hirakawa throws his entire interpretation of the *Lotus Sutra* into question. Not that he is not in good company. Chi-tsang (549–623), one of the most important Chinese commentators on the *Lotus Sutra*, regarded passage (a) as crucial to the correct understanding of the sutra. According to Suemitsu Yasumasa, Chi-tsang divided the sravakas into five groups, classifying Śāriputra, the four great sravakas, and Pūrṇa among the "concealed bodhisattvas who

outwardly show themselves to be sravakas."[27]

According to Chi-tsang's view, all the sravakas who are assured of final enlightenment or Buddhahood in the *Lotus Sutra* are really bodhisattvas who possess the bodhisattva *gotra*, and the real sravakas who have the sravaka *gotra* can never attain Buddhahood. In other words, Chi-tsang admits the existence of a group of people who are eternally incapable of attaining Buddhahood. This conclusion by Chi-tsang should not really surprise us, given his fundamental commitment to *dhātu-vāda*.[28] Contrary to Chi-tsang and Hirakawa, I take the position that their interpretation of the *Lotus Sutra* is informed by the doctrine of *tathāgata-garbha* and *dhātu-vāda*, and that they have seriously misconstrued its real message.

STUPA VENERATION AND THE *LOTUS SUTRA*

I part company again with Hirakawa on the issue of stupa veneration and the *Lotus Sutra*. Hirakawa emphasizes the important role of stupa veneration in the *Lotus Sutra* and says:

> As for the origin of the *Lotus Sutra*, it is most reasonable to say that it appeared from a context of stupa veneration.[29]

Hirakawa's famous hypothesis is that Mahayana Buddhism itself arose from lay-centered Buddhist groups composed of believers who were neither strictly monks nor laity.[30] He also notes the connection between stupa veneration and the doctrine of *tathāgata-garbha* in that both share the use of the term *buddha-dhātu*, with the primary meaning being "the relics or bones of the Buddha."[31] In his words:

> If the original nature of the mind is pure, the manifestation of that original nature is equivalent to the attainment of Buddhahood. The Mahayanist's vow to attain Buddhahood was based on the belief that the mind is innately pure.[32]

According to Hirakawa, then, accepting the *tathāgata-garbha*-type idea of an innately pure mind or Buddha-nature is prerequisite to arousing an aspiration for enlightenment (*bodhicitta*). This is tantamount to saying that there can be no Mahayana Buddhism without the doctrine of *tathāgata-garbha*! I find this unacceptable. It seems to me that his logic of seeing *tathāgata-garbha* as a necessary element for the arising of Mahayana Buddhism is erroneously adopted to provide theoretical support for

the stupa-veneration theory.

Unlike Hirakawa, I maintain that stupa veneration was not endorsed in the original form of the *Lotus Sutra*. I admit that the diverse and frequently diametrically opposed theories concerning the formative history of the *Lotus Sutra* have give risen to a multitude of still unsolved problems. But at the same time, I support the theory of Fuse Kōgaku, who argues that verses 78 to 96 of chapter two on "Means" (which expound on Buddhist stupas and statues) are a later addition.[33] As further evidence of this theory, let us turn our attention to some religious and philosophical problems regarding the Buddhist stupas.

To begin with, for Hirakawa the term "stupa veneration" means the veneration of an architectural structure wherein the Buddha's relics (bones) are deposited and guarded. In other words, it refers to relic worship. The salient question is: What are Buddha relics? What are the bones that remain after the Buddha's death? To answer the question properly, we need to clarify the meaning of the concepts of nirvana (*nibbāna*) and death in the *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta*.

In an earlier essay I undertook a critical etymological analysis of the commonly accepted interpretation of the term *nibbāna*.[34] In lieu of the usual way of reading "nir+vā+ana" or "nir√vā" as the root for *nirvāṇa,* in the sense of "blowing out the flame (of defilements)" or "extinction," I proposed a derivation from the root "nir√vṛ" (to uncover), which would give the meaning of "emancipation; liberation; getting rid of coverings." I therefore took *nibbāna* to be synonymous with *nirvṛti*, which in turn is synonymous with *vimukti* or "emancipation."

It is important to note that these two terms, *nibbāna* and *vimukti* (or *mokṣa*), were in use prior to the advent of Buddhism, and that they referred originally to the emancipation or liberation of the spirit (atman) from its confinement in the body (non-atman), like a snake casting off its skin. This idea of emancipation or liberation has two features: it is based on *ātma-vāda*, and it idealizes the final abandonment of the body in death. This notion erroneously found its way into the Buddhist tradition by way of texts like the *Mahāparinibbāna-sutta*, whose author or authors interpreted the Buddha's death as the release of his spirit (atman) from its bodily confinement (non-atman). Thus we find the celebrated passage in this sutta that one should "take refuge in atman" (*atta-dīpā viharatha*),[35] a clear indication of the idea of *ātma-vāda*. The passage teaches that one should take refuge in an atman that survives eternally after having been

released from the body through physical death.

This sutta not only teaches the idea of an eternal atman but also justifies the veneration of relics by identifying the relics (bones) of the Buddha with an eternal atman. The crucial phrase is "*sarīrān' eva avasissiṃsu,*" or "only bones remained."[36] This refers to the historical fact that after the cremation of the Buddha's body, only the bones (*sarīrāni*) remained. What, then, are these "bones" or "relics"? They symbolize something that survives the flames of cremation and continues to exist forever. In other words, they are identified with the atman that survives physical death. As a result, the relics are later called *buddha-dhātu*. It is only a short step for the Mahayana *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sutra* to identify this term with the Buddha-nature and *tathāgata-garbha*. In fact this is the next logical step, because all of these terms refer to an eternal and imperishable atman.[37]

To summarize, it is clear that stupa veneration is simply the worship of relics of the Buddha that symbolize and project the idea of an eternal atman. Such stupa veneration is a direct contradiction to the basic Buddhist doctrine of no-self (anatman) and dependent arising (*pratītya-samutpāda*), and cannot be accepted. In fact the practice was entrusted to lay people, concerning whom we lack the information to determine whether and to what extent we could even call them Buddhists.

Not to be overlooked in this regard are the passages in the *Lotus Sutra* itself that explicitly reject stupa veneration and the worship of relics, such as statements in chapter 10 on the "Preachers of Dharma" and in chapter 17 on "The Discrimination of Merits."[38] The most important passage is the portrayal of the Buddha Prabhūtaratna ("Many Jewels") in chapter 11, "The Apparition of the Jeweled Stupa." When Śākyamuni opens the door to Prabhūtaratna's stupa, he finds not dead relics but a living, flesh-and-blood Buddha seated in meditation. The superb research Kariya Sadahiko has done on this question is not to be overlooked. Nearly thirty years ago, on the basis of ancient Central Asian manuscripts, Kariya noted that the term *pariśuṣka-gātraḥ* ("having a dried up body")[39] should be emended to *apariśuṣka-gātro* ("having a body that is not dried up"), so that the Buddha in the stupa is seen to have a beautiful body that lives forever.[40] This reading is supported by Toda Hirofumi, one of the leading authorities on the philological study of the *Lotus Sutra*, who proposes his own emendation: *paryaṅkaṃ baddhvā 'pariśuṣkagātro 'saṃghaṭṭitakāyo*.[41]

Kariya argues further that this Buddha appears as a *saṃbhogakāya* ("reward" body) rather than as a *dharmakāya*.[42] Since the theory of the three types of Buddha-body was grounded on a *dhātu-vāda* structure that takes *tathatā* or *dharmakāya* to be the locus (*dhātu*), the question of whether the eternal Buddha taught in the *Lotus Sutra* (in chapter 16 on "The Life-span of the Thus Come One") is a *dharmakāya* or a *saṃbhoga-kāya* takes on great significance. If the *Lotus Sutra* is understood in terms of *dhātu-vāda*, it is natural to assume that the eternal Buddha of the *Lotus Sutra* is *dharmakāya*. A typical example is the Tendai *hongaku* tradition of medieval Japan, which takes the idea of *dharmakāya* a step further to teach the existence of an "originally enlightened Buddha who is beyond all actions." In sharp contrast to these *dhātu-vāda*-based interpretations, Chih-i (538–597), the founder of the T'ien-t'ai school and the most important Chinese Buddhist philosopher, sides with the *saṃbhogakāya* position. In the *Fa-hua wen-chü* he writes that the chapter 16 of the *Lotus Sutra* "clarifies in general [the teaching of] the three bodies [of the Buddha], but its specific intent is to clarify the *saṃbhogakāya*."[43] Nichiren inherits this standpoint from Chih-i.[44] I agree fully with Kariya's position and would add that this image of the Buddha who lives forever, in chapter 17, is mirrored in the "eternal and true Buddha" whose image appears in the chapter on "The Life-span of the Thus Come One."

I differ slightly from Kariya only in arguing that the vision of the *Lotus Sutra* as presented in the chapter on "The Apparition of the Jeweled Stupa" is actually a denial of stupa veneration. I see its clear repudiation of the veneration of relics and its symbolic representation of death to be a rejection of the idea of nirvana as a representation of death in favor of an everlasting and living Buddha. The *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sutra*, on the other hand—despite the prior example of the *Lotus Sutra*—reverts to attachment to the doctrine of *tathāgata-garbha* and a philosophy of death based on ideas of relics (*dhātu*) and atman. In a word, it teaches *dhātu-vāda*. Here again we see the danger of interpreting the *Lotus Sutra* in terms of the doctrine of *tathāgata-garbha*. Such an approach can only lead to grave errors and fallacious conclusions.

PERSONAL THOUGHTS ON JAPANESE CULTURE

While I admit that I have no expertise in the general field of Japanese culture, I find myself unable to stand by idly and allow recent theories of

Japanese culture based on the idea of *tathāgata-garbha* to go unchallenged. There is a tendency in certain circles to present an overly optimistic view of the "identity" of Japanese culture as a culture exhibiting the following characteristics:

1. The elevation of naturalism (illustrated by the idea of "the enlightenment of trees and plants") over humanism.
2. The elevation of experiential antirationalism (the mysticism of Zen or tantric Buddhism) over logic and intellect.
3. The elevation of totalitarianism over individualism, which in turn paves the way to corporate nationalism, in a forced application of *wa* or "harmony."[45]
4. The elevation of animism and polytheism or pantheism, on the grounds of relativism, over absolute monotheism.[46]

I would argue that this way of presenting Japanese culture derives from the "generative monism" or *dhātu-vāda* of the doctrine of *tathāgata-garbha*. Not that this is anything terribly new. We find it already, for example, in the *Kokutai no hongi,* a tract on national polity issued by the Ministry of Education in 1937, where the the idea of *wa* or "harmony" is traced to the Seventeen Article Constitution attributed to Prince Shōtoku (574–622), and is emphasized in a nationalistic or totalitarian context.

These same views of Japanese identity are now being advocated by people like Umehara Takeshi, Director of the International Research Center for Japanese Culture.[47] By his own admission he advocates and beautifies the ideas of *tathāgata-garbha*, the "enlightenment of grass and trees," as an animistic polytheism. Umehara-like expositions on Japanese culture begin, to one degree or another, with assumptions (of the sort commonly found in "decline-of-the-West" theories) that Western rationalism, rugged individualism, and anthropocentric ways of thinking and acting are all deeply rooted in a Judeo-Christian tradition that has irrevocably declined and fallen, and has proved itself incapable of rescuing humanity from its current problems. "Oriental thought," in particular Japanese traditions like *wa* and the nature-centered view of the world, is offered as an alternative to help us out of our predicament.

I wish to state in the strongest possible terms that the particularity of the Japanese does not lie in a simple "oneness with nature." The Japanese people are not perpetually in an ecstatic state induced by staring at flowers and trees. We are not vegetable-like human beings. What makes us dis-

tinctively human is the same thing that makes Westerners human: we can think.

If "not thinking" were the ideal for humanity, as proposed in the idea of *tathāgata-garbha* propagated by a certain celebrated Chinese Ch'an master called Mo-ho-yen at the bSam yas debate in ninth-century Tibet,[48] we should all suspend life and rush to becomes plants and stones and relics. If Japan has achieved a considerable degree of economic development, this success is also due in great part to the positive influences of rationalism, individualism, and consciousness of human rights. (I hasten to add, however, that these ideals have yet to sink deep roots in Japan, at least not to the degree that they have in the West.) Why, then, should we abandon our dignity as human beings and return to "nature," to "plants and trees," and to "the Orient"?

I am not blind to the current movements across the globe to protect nature and animals from the environmentally disastrous work of human hands. I, too, recognize the need to raise ecological consciousness, but with one obvious proviso: "It is worse to kill human beings than to kill nature or animals." Let us not forget, either, that the ecological movements of today were *not* generated by Eastern naturalism. They were initiated by Westerners, and founded on the traditions of rationalism and respect for human rights. It is simply not logically possible to derive the environmental movement and environmental ethics from an Eastern naturalism expressed in such phrases as "mountains, rivers, plants, and trees are all enlightened." Such "naturalism" leads nowhere but to the "natural state of doing nothing." It does not direct us to think or actively to seek remedies to our problems. In order to acknowledge the "wrongs" brought about by destruction of the natural world and to right these wrongs by changing our way of living, we need to think and to act. But it is this very thinking and acting that is totally rejected in the "no-thinking" and "no-action" of Eastern naturalist philosophy.

Personally speaking, it is my destiny to be a Japanese, but I am fervent in my desire to distance myself from those who naively advocate ideas of Japanese culture thick with antirationalistic praise for "Japan," "the East," "nature," and "harmony," ideas based on the doctrine of *tathāgata-garbha* and *dhātu-vāda*.[49]

[*Translated by Paul L. Swanson*]

Notes

Page references to articles included in this volume are set in italics.

Introduction

[1] For the context of this incident, the ensuing debate, and its role in Critical Buddhism see Bodiford, "Zen and the Art of Religious Prejudice."

[2] See the essays on method in the *Journal of the Association of Buddhist Studies* 18/2 (1995); for examples of the practice of cultural criticism in Buddhist studies see the essays in Lopez, ed., *Curators of the Buddha*.

[3] On the role of normative scholarship in Buddhist studies see the recent issue of *Journal of the Association of Buddhist Studies* 18/2 (1995), including José Cabezón, "Buddhist Studies as a Discipline," 256–60, and Luis O. Gómez, "Unspoken Paradigms," 201–3, 204–12.

[4] Donald S. Lopez, Jr., "A Sangha-less Sangha," in *Tricycle* 5/3 (Spring 1996), 101.

Why They Say Zen Is Not Buddhism

[1] For details see Paul Groner, *Saichō: The Establishment of the Japanese Tendai School*. (Berkeley: Buddhist Studies Series 6, 1984), 91–106.

[2] D. Seyfort Ruegg has objected to my gloss of *tathāgata-garbha* as "womb of the Buddha," arguing that this is "a meaning which this expression simply does not have in the relevant Sanskrit texts, any more than does its Tibetan equivalent" (see "Some Reflections on the Place of Philosophy in the Study of Buddhism," 170). However, the Chinese translation (*ju-lai-tsang,* Jpn. *nyoraizō*) contains the meaning "womb" and many facets of East Asian Buddhism use the term very explicitly in this sense. Scholars familiar with Chinese Buddhist terminology and its use in the East Asian Buddhist tradition should have no trouble accepting this meaning. There are also numerous examples of the use of the meaning of "womb" even in the Indian tradition. As William Grosnick (in Donald S. Lopez, Jr., ed., *Buddhism in Practice* [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995], 92) says with regard to the earliest *tathāgata-garbha* text:

> The term *tathāgatagarbha* has often been translated by Western scholars as "matrix of the tathāgata," but "matrix" does not exhaust the wide range of meanings of the Sanskrit term *garbha*. The author of the *Tathāgatagarbha Sūtra* seems to have been well aware of this, since he employs many of these different meanings of *garbha* in the various similes with which he illustrates the meaning of the *tathāgatagarbha*. In

its most common usage, *garbha* means "womb," and the eighth simile of the sūtra likens the *tathāgatagarbha* to an impoverished, vile, and ugly woman who bears a noble, world-conquering king in her womb.

Matsumoto has dealt with this issue in detail in his chapter on "*Padma-garbha* and *tathāgata-garbha*," *Critical Studies on Zen Thought*, 411–543.

3 This is not to say that there are no Sanskrit terms that carry similar nuances or that "there is no Sanskrit correspondence." However, *pen-chüeh* is a Chinese creation and not a translation from the Sanskrit (certainly not of *prakṛti*). In this sense it can be distinguished from, e.g., terms such as *ju-lai-tsang* for which there is an identifiable Sanskrit equivalent: *tathāgata-garbha*. For a counter argument see D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra*.

4 See the translation by Hakeda Yoshito, *The Awakening of Faith* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967). On the controversy over the origin of the *Awakening of Mahayana Faith*, see recent works by William Grosnick (for example, "The Categories of *T'i, Hsiang*, and *Yung*: Evidence That Paramārtha Composed the *Awakening of Faith*," *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 12/1 [1989]: 65–92) and Whalen Lai, "A Clue to the Authorship of the *Awakening of Faith*: Śikṣānanda's Redaction of the Word '*Nien*'." *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 3/1 (1980): 34–53.

5 For details on the Chinese apocrypha and the *Jen-wang ching* see my *Foundations of T'ien-t'ai Philosophy: The Flowering of the Two Truths Theory in Chinese Buddhism* (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1989), 41–50; and Robert E. Buswell, Jr., *The Formation of Ch'an Ideology in China and Korea: The Vajrasamādhi-Sūtra, A Buddhist Apocryphon* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989). See also Buswell's collection, *Chinese Buddhist Apocrypha* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1990).

6 For details on this sutra see Buswell, *The Formation of Ch'an Ideology* .

7 Translation by Hakeda, *The Awakening of Faith*, 37.

8 For details see the authoritative essay on the subject by Tamura Yoshirō: "An Outline of the Tendai Theory of Original Enlightenment" in Tada et al., eds., *The Texts of the Tendai Original Enlightenment Tradition*, 477–548.

9 See the *Ta-ch'eng chi'i-hsin lun i-chi*, T No. 1846.

10 For details see my introduction to the special issue on Tendai Buddhism in the *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 14/2–3 (1987); see also in the same issue the articles on "The Characteristics of Japanese Tendai" by Hazama Jikō and "Inherent Enlightenment and Saichō's Acceptance of the Bodhisattva Precepts" by Shirato Waka. The reader is also directed to the collection of four essays on *hongaku shisō* by Sueki Fumihiko, Jacqueline Stone, Paul Groner, and Ruben Habito in *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 22/1–2 (1995).

11 See Tamura, "An Outline of the Tendai Theory of Original Enlightenment."

12 It is often assumed that these phrases are quotes from a Mahayana text, but in fact they are not, at least as far as I was able to determine. See Miyamoto Shōson 宮本正尊, "'Sōmoku kokudo shikkai jōbutsu' no busshōronteki igi to sono sakusha"「草木国土

悉皆成仏」の佛性論的意義とその作者 [The author of the phrase "grasses, trees, and land all attain Buddhahood" and its meaning in light of Buddha-nature theory], *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku kenkyū* 9/2 (1961): 672–701. There are similar phrases, such as *issai shujō shitsu'u busshō* (all sentient beings have the Buddha-nature) in the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sutra*, but such Mahayana texts do not go so far as to admit that even non-sentient things have Buddha-nature. In fact, at least one passage in the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sutra* says exactly the opposite: "That which is without Buddha-nature is the ground, the trees, gravel, and rocks. That which is other than these non-sentient things is all called Buddha-nature" (T No. 375, 12.581a22–23 and 828b26–27). See Jamie Hubbard, "Absolute Delusion, Perfect Buddhahood: The Universal Buddha of the San-chieh-chiao," in Griffiths and Keenan, eds., *Buddha Nature*, 75–94.

13 Shōshin is known for his voluminous commentaries on the major works of T'ien-t'ai Chih-i, the creative genius and founder of the T'ien-t'ai tradition; it is said that Shōshin was so involved in his studies that he was not aware of the contemporary struggle between the Taira and Minamoto families, a situation comparable to a German scholar in the 1940s being unaware of World War II.

14 See Tamura Yoshirō, "Critique of Original Awakening Thought in Shōshin and Dōgen," and the collection of Tamura's *Essays on Hongaku Shisō*, especially 393ff. See also Yamauchi Shun'yū on *Dōgen's Zen and the Tendai Hongaku Tradition*, 718ff.

15 See the translation of this essay in the present volume, pages *165–73.*

16 For a translation of this exposition in the *Mahāvagga* see Henry Clarke Warren's *Buddhism in Translations* (New York: Atheneum, 1962, reprint of 1896 edition published by Harvard University Press), 83–7.

17 Matsumoto takes pains to point out that he is not using the term "native" in a derogatory sense.

18 See the translation of this essay in the present volume, pages *356–73.*

19 See the partial translation of this chapter in this volume: "The Meaning of 'Zen'," pages *242–50.*

20 Dan Lusthaus challenges this conclusion with regard to Lin-chi; see his essay on "Critical Buddhism and Returning to the Sources" in this volume, pages *30–55.*

21 See "The Significance of the Critique of Original Enlightenment," 1–34.

22 "The Significance of the Critique of Original Enlightenment," 9.

23 "The Significance of the Critique of Original Enlightenment," 13.

24 See the translation of this essay in this volume, pages *339–55.*

25 See the translation of Matsumoto's "Buddhism and the Kami," pages *356–73.*

26 For Hakamaya's reflections on this occasion, see below, pages *137–8.*

27 For a detailed analysis of this issue, see the article by Steve Heine below, *251–85.*

28 This introduction is included in this volume, pages *56–80.*

29 It may seem superfluous to note this for Western scholars, but it is a radical stance in the world of Japanese scholarship. In contrast, the Western world of scholarship may need some of the tolerance and graciousness more typical of Japanese scholarship.

Hakamaya's essay is translated below, pages *113–44*. See also the essay by Paul Griffiths in this volume, pages *145–60*.

[30] This paper was published later in Heisig and Kiyota, *Japanese Buddhism,* 145–62.

[31] This essay is included in *Critical Buddhism*, 275–304.

[32] "A Critique of the Zen School," 64.

[33] See "Buddhism as Critical of the Idea of 'Nature'," 386.

[34] The paper was published in Japanese in the Komazawa University journal. Compare the paper written by Matsumoto for the same conference, translated below, pages *388–403*.

[35] The essays, entitled "Akugō fusshoku no gishiki kanren kyōten zakkō" 悪業払拭の儀式関連経典雑考 [Miscellaneous thoughts on texts related to rituals to remove evil karma], have appeared in a variety of Komazawa journals, from *Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyōgakubu kenkyū kiyō* 50 (1992): 247–74, for the opening article, to the *Komazawa Tanki Daigaku kenkyū kiyō* 24 (1996): 67–91, for the sixth.

[36] Ishii Shūdō, *Studies on the History of the Ch'an School during the Sung Period,* ix.

[37] Yoshizu Yoshihide, *Studies in the history of Hua-yen-Ch'an philosophy*, 10.

[38] Itō Takatoshi, *Critical Studies on Chinese Buddhism*, 57.

[39] See Tada et al., eds. *The Texts of the Tendai Original Enlightenment Tradition*; and the works by Hazama Jikō, Shimaji Daitō, and Tamura Yoshirō in the bibliography at the end of the present volume.

[40] Hakamaya would add that they are both the same *dhātu-vāda*, and that neither are Buddhist. It should be noted that Tamura was not naively uncritical of *hongaku shisō*; see, for example, his article on "Critique of Original Awakening Thought in Shōshin and Dōgen."

[41] Matsumoto (*Pratītyasamutpāda and Emptiness*, 147) points out that Takasaki gave a paper entitled "On So-Called *Dhātu-vāda*" at the conference of the Association of Indian and Buddhist Studies in 1988. However, this paper did not appear in the *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku kenkyū* issue that published the proceedings of the conference.

Tathāgata-garbha Thought II (1989), *What is Buddha-Nature?* (1990), and *"Daijō kishinron" o yomu* 「大乗起信論」を読む [Reading the *Awakening of Mahayana Faith*] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1991) are books by Takasaki that were under preparation long before the appearance of Matsumoto's and Hakamaya's critiques; Takasaki's remarks have been appended to the end of the books.

[42] Takasaki, *Reading the Awakening of Mahayana Faith*, 206.

[43] Takasaki, *Tathāgata-garbha Thought II*, 373.

[44] Takasaki, *Tathāgata-garbha Thought II*, 373ff..

[45] Takasaki, *Reading the Awakening of Mahayana Faith*, 212. For a more recent response by Takasaki, see the comments translated in this volume, pages *314–20*.

[46] Hirakawa Akira 平川彰, ed., *Nyoraizō to Daijō kishinron* 如来藏と大乗起信論 [*Tathāgata-garbha* and the *Awakening of Mahayana Faith*] (Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1990), 78ff.

[47] It should be noted that Hirakawa's essay was written in response to Matsumoto's early article on the *Śrīmālādevī Sutra*, and does not take into account his later developments on the theme.

[48] See Schmithausen, *Buddhism and Nature*, 53–62.

[49] *Buddhism and Nature*, 62. For a discussion of Schmithausen's view see the article by Paul Griffiths in this volume, pages *145–60.*

[50] For a look at the issue of social discrimination and the Sōtō sect, and the mixed reactions to Critical Buddhism, see William Bodiford, "Zen and the Art of Religious Prejudice."

[51] See Ian Reader's articles on "Zazenless Zen," *Japanese Religions* 14/3 (1986): 7–27; and "Transformations and Changes in the Teachings of the Sōtō Zen Buddhist Sect," *Japanese Religions* 14/1 (1985): 28–48.

[52] Ōgoshi Aiko 大越愛子, Minamoto Junko 源 淳子, and Yamashita Akiko 山下明子, eds., *Seisabetsu suru Bukkyō* 性差別する仏教 [Buddhism as a promoter of sexual discrimination] (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1990), 9–13. See also Minamoto Junko, *Feminizumu wa, ima koso nihonshugi no kaitai o: Umehara Takeshi hihan* フェミニズムは, 今こそ日本主義の解体を—梅原猛批判 [Feminism must dismantle "Japanism" now: A critique of Umehara Takeshi], in *Femilōgu: Nihonshugi hihan* フェミローグ—日本主義批判 [Femilogue: A critique of Japanism] (Kyoto: Genbunsha, 1990).

[53] See my article "T'ien-t'ai Chih-i's Concept of Threefold Buddha-nature: A Synergy of Reality, Wisdom, and Practice," in Griffiths and Keenan, eds. *Buddha Nature,* 171–80.

[54] An important step in this direction is made by Sallie King in her recent book on *Buddha Nature.* See also the article by King in the present volume, pages *174–92.*

Critical Buddhism and Returning to the Sources

[1] Exactly when and how Buddhism lost the ethical edge that is clearly discernible in the early Pali literature is a matter of controversy, and will not be explored here. For an important example of Chinese Buddhist ethical acuity from as late as the Yüan dynasty, see Sechin Jagchid, "The Mongol Khans and Chinese Buddhism and Taoism," *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 2 (1979): 7–28.

[2] One example: In the Kamakura-Edo eras certain temples, called *enkiri-dera*, acted as sanctuaries for battered and mistreated women and offered the only means by which women could divorce their husbands, that is, by serving as nuns for three years. The most famous of these temples was Tōkei-ji in Kamakura. The *enkiri-dera* institution was abolished in the Meiji period. By contrast, in the mid-1980s a substantial number of women from Thailand and the Philippines were being brought to Japan, under false pretexts, to serve as prostitutes. Some Thai women sought sanctuary in a Buddhist temple, but they were refused refuge or assistance. Some of the Philippine women, who were Christian, sought assistance from a Christian organization, which actively took up their cause; this eventually led to a number of Thai as well as Philippine women being returned to their homelands. The Japanese public is aware of these events.

[3] While Western scholarship has played a role in the Japanese study and deepening appreciation of Indian and Tibetan sources—many Western scholars have spent time in Japan exchanging ideas with their Japanese colleagues, and several leading Japanese scholars have spent time in the West (including Hakamaya)—Japanese scholarship has dominated the field. It is not uncommon for Western scholars of East Asian Buddhism to have learned and relied on Japanese scholarship for their own understanding of Indian precedents to East Asian developments, and these have been presented to their Western students—thus, in effect, transmitting the traditional "misinformation" presupposed in East Asia. Nonetheless, Buddhist studies have become increasingly an international effort.

[4] Nanjō Bun'yū 南條文雄 (Anglicized as Bunyiu Nanjio), *A Catalogue of the Chinese Translation of the Buddhist Tripitaka* (A translation of the *Ta-ming san-tsang sheng-chiao mu-lu* 大明三藏聖教目録) (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1883).

[5] See Nakamura Hajime, *Indian Buddhism*.

[6] The general structure of his book follows the order of texts as they appear in the *Taishō* edition, and might be considered an abridged summary of its contents. As for East Asian presuppositions, I cite only one example: "The term *cittamātra* originally meant that Citta (Mind) is the basis of all phenomena, but in later days it was equated with the concept of *vijñaptimātratā*" (363). Nakamura's historical sequence is backwards, but this reversal has been the assumption of *dhātu-vāda* ideologues since the mid-T'ang dynasty.

[7] Nakamura's critical appraisal of the texts he describes draws on his familiarity with Pali, Sanskrit, and Tibetan materials, substantial Japanese scholarship, and a full complement of Western studies.

[8] Nakamura (346) cites, for instance, Pa-chow's criticism of early translations of the Pali *Mahāparinibbāna suttanta*, which Pa-chow had recently translated into contemporary Chinese: 所以初期的漢譯經典頗不易讀, 若無注疏則了解實難, 其最劣者是有失原義, 不爲無益, 反而有實.

[9] This is most evident in his treatment of Yogacara materials (chs. 17.B and C) and *tathāgata-garbha* texts (ch. 16.M), but this bias intrudes throughout his text.

[10] *Aśvaghoṣa's Discourse on the Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana*, trans. by D. T. Suzuki (Chicago: Open Court, 1900).

[11] D. T. Suzuki, *Studies in the Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra* (Boulder: Prajñā Press, 1981) and *The Laṅkāvatāra Sūtra*.

[12] See pages 182 and 282. In a third place (335) he refers only to "the author of the *Awakening of Faith*" without naming him. Note how each of the three mentions becomes increasingly more reticent about identifying Aśvaghoṣa as the author.

[13] One frequently finds Indian scholars in this century, influenced by Suzuki and other East Asian scholars, attributing the *Awakening of Mahayana Faith* (often "Sanskritized" as *Mahāyānaśraddhotpāda-śāstra*) to Aśvaghoṣa. The more perspicacious Indian scholars have remained skeptical.

[14] Aśvaghoṣa also lived several centuries before either the Yogacaric or *tathāgatagarbha* models and vocabulary employed by *Awakening of Mahayana Faith* were developed.

[15] That activity itself is the inevitable result of the historico-philological methods developed in the West for Biblical scholarship in the 19th century, methods that have similarly problematized the historical origins of Christianity in terms of the problem of the "historical Jesus," Gospel redaction, and early Church history.

[16] Most Christian theologians have long argued that the historicity of Jesus and his resurrection must be presumed as a base minimum for Christian faith. Christianity, inasmuch as it grounds its theology upon a notion of God intruding decisively into human history at a certain place and at a certain time, seems more dependent on historical verification than does a tradition like Zen, which, many of its adherents would argue, is grounded upon an existential rather than historical verification. I will question that claim.

[17] Cf. Tsukamoto Zenryū, *A History of Early Chinese Buddhism: From Its Introduction to the Death of Hui-Yüan*, trans. by Leon Hurvitz, 2 vols. (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1985). There are two chapters on the Prajna Schools. Cf. also Whalen Lai, "Before the Prajñā Schools: The Earliest Chinese Commentary on the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā*," *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 6/1 (1983): 91–108; and "The Early Prajñā Schools, Especially 'Hsin-Wu', Reconsidered," *Philosophy East and West* 33/1 (1983): 1–19.

[18] Robinson argues that these polemics only occur in Hui-yüan's writings aimed at a popular audience, but not in his more rigorous works, but the jury is still out on this. See Richard Robinson, *Early Mādhyamika in India and China* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1967), 102–6.

[19] East Asian authors citing Nāgārjuna overwhelmingly draw on the *Ta chih tu lun* rather than the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*.

[20] Cf. Wŏnhyo's commentary on the *Awakening of Mahayana Faith*, in which he paraphrases *Tao-te-ching* 25, substituting "Mahayana" for "Tao." Wŏnhyo, a Korean contemporary of Hsüan-tsang, strongly influenced Fa-tsang, especially as to the importance of *Awakening of Mahayana Faith*.

[21] For example, the debates as to whether the *ālaya-vijñāna* was pure or not; or Paramārtha's novel theory of a ninth "pure" consciousness, the so-called *āmala-vijñāna*, that seems to have been, at least in part, his idiosyncratic translation of *āśraya-paravṛtti* ("overturning the basis").

[22] This dispute is detailed in Ming-wood Liu's unpublished dissertation, "The Teaching of Fa-tsang: An Examination of Buddhist Metaphysics" (University of California, Los Angeles, 1979).

[23] Paramārtha's translation, T No. 1593; Hsüan-tsang's of the main text, T No. 1594; of Vasubandhu's comm., T No. 1597; of *Asvabhāva's comm., T No. 1598.

[24] *Sheng-tsung shih-chü yi lun* 勝宗十句義論 (Skt., *Daśapadārtha-śāstra)*, T No. 2138. This has been translated into English by Ui Hakuju, with an appended Chinese text, as *The Vaiśeshika Philosophy*, edited by F. W. Thomas (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies 22, 1962).

[25] Shih-hu et al. translated Dignāga's *Prajñā-pāramitā-saṃgraha-kārikā* (T No. 1518); an English translation with the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts by Giuseppe Tucci is found in

"Minor Sanskrit Texts on the Prajñāpāramitā," *Journal of the Royal Asian Society* (1947): 53–75; Ui Hakuju's 宇井伯寿 Japanese translation is in his *Jinna chosaku no kenkyū* 陳那著作の研究 [Studies on the writings of Dignāga] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1958), 233–329; see M. Hattori, *Dignāga on Perception*, 7, n. 40, for further references. Dignāga's *Hastavāla-prakaraṇa-vṛtti* was translated by Paramārtha, T No. 1620, and after Hsüan-tsang by I-ching (T No. 1621); there is an English translation by F. W. Thomas and Ui Hakuju, "The Hand Treatise, a Work of Āryadeva [*sic*]," *Journal of the Royal Asian Society* (1918): 267–310; Ui's Japanese translation is in his *Studies on the writings of Dignāga*, 133–65. *Ālambana-parīkṣā-vṛtti* was translated by Paramārtha, T No. 1619 (see Hattori, *Dignāga on Perception*, 8 [n. 45] for further references).

[26] T No. 1628. I-ching later translated this again (T No. 1629). The Japanese translation of Ui Hakuju appears in his *Indo tetsugaku kenkyū* 印度哲学研究 [Studies on Indian philosophy], vol. V, 505–694.

[27] I see Hakamaya's insistence on the importance of "thinking" for Buddhism in this context, though the implications he draws go beyond this historicist observation.

[28] Hsüan-tsang engaged in serious debates with Buddhists and non-Buddhists wherever he traveled. These debates were often the first and/or most significant events for him in each locale. He would test the understanding and knowledge of his hosts or opponents, and refute or correct their misconceptions. I-ching, another Chinese pilgrim who, in imitation of Hsüan-tsang, journeyed to India several decades later, confirms the importance of logic for the basic training of Indian monks in his various writings. See especially his *Nan-hai chi-kuei nai fa ch'uan* 南海偈歸內法傳, ch. 34, which describes the curriculum at Nālandā. It included heavy doses of grammatical theory and logic.

[29] In ancient times Chinese logic had been developing, particularly in the Neo-Mohist school, but it seems to have been completely aborted by the Han dynasty.

[30] Cf. the first chapter of Peter Gregory, *Tsung-mi and the Sinification of Buddhism*.

[31] Hakamaya devotes one entire book to arguing that in his most mature writings Dōgen overcomes the *hongaku* and *dhātu-vāda* tendencies in his other writings. Hakamaya also exempts T'ien-t'ai Chih-i from the charge of *dhātu-vāda*. I would also nominate Lin-chi and Chih-li as candidates for exemption.

[32] Hsüan-tsang mentions none of them, but I-ching, a few decades later, is already citing Dharmakīrti, who is no longer alive, as a towering intellectual figure on the Nālandā scene. He must have risen to eminence just after Hsüan-tsang's time in India. Candrakīrti and the rest came later.

[33] This is clearly evident in early works such as the *Chao lun* and equally apparent in the writings of Chih-i, Fa-tsang, and many others.

[34] T'ien-t'ai and Hua-yen retained some complexity in their meditative practice, at least for a while. In Japan, the Shingon school retains the most elaborate forms of meditation, but its metaphysics, starting with the writings of Kūkai, display a substrative ontology that in India would be seen as more in line with Hindu than with Buddhist thought. The term *shikan taza* and its ideology were coined by Dōgen.

[35] *Buddhānusmṛti* meditation practices were also originally quite intricate and multiphased, including elaborate visualizations and detailed rituals—but as *nenbutsu* (Chn. *nien-fo*) they were eventually reduced, by and large, to the chanting of "Namu A-mi-t'o-fo" (Jpn., Namu Amida Butsu); this sort of practice was adopted by Nichiren, whose followers chant: "Namu myōhō renge kyō," paying homage to the *Lotus Sutra* rather than to Amida Buddha.

[36] Two prominent examples are the autobiographies of the Ming Buddhist monk, Han-shan te-ch'ing, and of Hakuin, both describing more than a half dozen awakenings, each successively "deepening" and overturning the previous experience.

[37] That enlightenment applies to anything other than humans is soundly rejected by Hakamaya. In this he has the weight of the Indian tradition behind him. Human birth was consistently touted as the necessary condition for achieving enlightenment. It being exceedingly difficult to attain birth as a human, so went the polemic, one should not waste one's opportunity here and now. Some later formulations allowed that one might reach the threshold of enlightenment in a human life and complete the task as a deva in one of the heavens in the life that immediately followed (or even later, in a Buddha-Land, such as Maitreya's Tuṣita Heaven), but the idea that plants and rocks are enlightened never occurred in India.

[38] Classic expressions of these maps detailing the *mārga* step by step include such Abhidharma literature as *Abhidharmakośa* and *Mahāvibhāṣa*, Harivarman's **Satyasiddhi*, *Vimutimagga*, *Yogācārabhūmi-śāstra*, *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, and the *Avataṃsaka Sutra*.

[39] T No. 1666, 32.576b15–18.

[40] Several commentators on *Awakening of Mahayana Faith*, most notably Wŏnhyo, Fa-tsang, and Han-shan, have expended great energy to unfold this passage with great depth and profundity. The first two commentators are in some respects the preceptors of *hongaku* thought precisely for this reason (Han-shan lived too late to have been a founding influence). Also, to some extent the polemics in Sung T'ien-t'ai between the Orthodox "On-Mountain" position, especially as championed by Chih-li, and the heterodox "Off-Mountain" branch, revolved around the question of the degree to which Off-Mountain T'ien-t'ai had become infiltrated by the *dhātu-vāda*-type thought of Hua-yen. The Japanese Tendai school seems more closely aligned to *dhātu-vāda*-style T'ien-t'ai thought than to the more orthodox positions of Chih-i and Chih-li. Hakamaya alludes to this in his *Critiques of Original Enlightenment*, 8, where he argues, rightly I believe, that *hongaku* thought in Japanese Tendai should be traced to the *Awakening of Mahayana Faith* rather than to orthodox Chinese T'ien-t'ai. He claims that Chih-i rejected "original enlightenment" and the *Awakening of Mahayana Faith*; the sole mention of the *Awakening of Mahayana Faith* in Chih-i's writing is strongly suspected of being a later interpolation.

[41] *The Awakening of Mahayana Faith*'s famous answer to this question, the wave simile, fails to answer the problem. The simile asserts that wind is ignorance, the sea is enlightenment, and that waves (momentary deluded thoughts) are caused by the wind generating waves; the waves, however, never lose their essential "wetness" (enlightenment nature). Obviously this simile neglects to explain where the wind came from. The

sea is not ubiquitous. T'ien-t'ai's famous response to the "one-sided" claim that Buddha-nature is exclusively pure was to argue that Buddha-nature has a tinge of evil within, that, among other things, enables it to recognize and respond to the evil and suffering of sentient beings. Students of Chinese thought will instantly recognize this debate between Hua-yen and T'ien-t'ai as a replay of the debate between Mencius and Hsün Tzu on human nature (which became a dominant theme during the early Han Dynasty), now clothed in Buddhist vocabulary.

[42] I am thinking particularly of Chih-li's *Shih-pu-erh-men chih-yao-chao* 十不二門 指要鈔 (T No. 1928), which argues with a lucidity and sharpness—and a striking ability to zero in on logical flaws in his opponents' positions—rarely seen in Chinese texts.

[43] More accurately, the central notion of *Awakening of Mahayana Faith* is the One Mind with two aspects: a Suchness Mind that is eternal, immutable, etc.; and a samsaric mind in and from which all arises and ceases, including the enlightenments. In other words, enlightenment is officially categorized as "samsaric," but original enlightenment implies an identity—by way of *tathāgata-garbha*, which links the two aspects—with the Suchness Mind.

[44] *Awakening of Mahayana Faith* describes this as "converting" those who are *aniyata-raśi* (undetermined to pursue the Mahayana path to enlightenment) into *niyata-raśi* (determined to pursue Mahayana). This conversion, too, is a euphemism for *bodhicitta*.

[45] The passage lends itself to this interpretation as a result of its use of the term "because" (故) between initial and final enlightenment (which I ignored in the translation above); this allows the full passage to read:

> What is the meaning of the term "enlightenment"? It means the mind in-itself 心體 apart from the characteristics of (deluded) thought-instants 念相. "Apart from the characteristics of (deluded) thought-instants" (means it) is the same as the realm of *ākāśa* (spatiality); there is nothing it does not pervade. The single characteristic of the *dharma-dhātu* is identical to the Tathāgata and equal to the *dharma-kāya*. On the basis of this *dharma-kāya* it is called "original enlightenment."
>
> For what reason? The meaning of original enlightenment is contrasted to "initial enlightenment." Becoming initially enlightened is precisely identical to original enlightenment. Initial enlightenment means that *because* dependent on original enlightenment there is non-enlightenment, and *because* dependent on non-enlightenment, there is said to be initial enlightenment. Further, *because* of becoming enlightened to the Mind-Source, it is termed "final enlightenment." *Because* (if one is) not enlightened as to the Mind-Source, there is no final enlightenment.

This interpretation further confuses the distinction between the four enlightenments. Matsumoto and Hakamaya have identified this passage as seminal for the *hongaku* form of *dhātu-vāda*.

[46] Note that the reevaluation of Dōgen's writings, especially his 12-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō*, by Hakamaya, uses a completely different approach, namely, a philosophical evaluation of the writing's import rather than a mere philological appraisal of its sources and influences. I will discuss some aspects of Matsumoto's treatment of Lin-chi later.

47 Similarly, while one may be tempted to presume that an illuminating book, poem, film, or song must have an enlightened author behind it, in reality we find that such is often not the case. Artistic perspicacity need not depend on the artist being perspicacious in any other sphere than her art.

48 Nāgārjuna vigorously refuted the notion of self-verification. Cf. *Mūla-madhyamakakārikā* 1, 7.8–12, etc.

49 See Matsumoto, *Pratītyasamutpāda and Emptiness,* 153.

50 Louis de La Vallée Poussin, ed., *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā de Candrakīrti* (St. Petersburg: Bibliotheca Buddhica 4, 1903–1913)*,* 54.

51 Hsüan-tsang's orthodox Yogacara views the three self-natures—*parikalpita* (fictive construction), *paratantra* (causal dependence), and *parinispanna* (perfecting)—in the light of the dialectic expounded in the *Madhyānta vibhāga*, viz. *parikalpita* is the imposition of fictive, erroneous desires and predilections onto the causally produced sensorium (*paratantra*). *Parinispanna* is the "emptying" of *parikalpita* from *paratantra*, the removal of erroneous conceptions and cognitions from the causal flux, such that the causal flux is "purified" and seen as it is. Thus *parinispanna* is not the culmination of the three natures, but the "antidote" (*pratipakṣa*) to the disease of *parikalpita*. *Paratantra* is doubled in this scheme: There is a defiled *paratantra* (contaminated by *parikalpita*) and a purified *paratantra* (devoid of *parikalpita* because the latter has been eliminated by *parinispanna*).

The three self-natures are also called three non-self-natures (*tri-niḥsvabhāva*), since the first is never real, the third is only the absence of the first in the second, and the second is the definition of emptiness. The *Triṃśikā* 24 explains it thus: "The first [*parikalpita*] is characterized as not having a (self-)nature; the second (i.e., *paratantra*) lacks a self-originating nature [*paratantra* literally means "dependent on others"]; the last [*parinipanna*], [lacks self-nature] because of its remoteness and detachment from the former's (i.e., *parikalpita*'s) nature of being attached to atman and dharmas."

52 Matsumoto, *Pratītyasamutpāda and Emptiness*, 370, n. 50, argues that "according to the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, pratītya-samutpāda* is not merely 'cause and effect arising in a moment' 因果時間生起, but also 'cause and effect in the past, present, and future' 三時因果." This is entailed in his notion of "religious time" (*shūkyōteki jikan*). There is a certain sense in which one might construe *MMK* 26 to support Matsumoto's contention, but the rest of *MMK* certainly would problematize that formula, especially the chapters on "time" (e.g., 2, 11, 19). Many of the arguments in other chapters of *MMK* hinge on Nāgārjuna's critique of the notion of "three times," so Matsumoto's claim needs to be evaluated in that light.

53 The Vaibhāṣikas did hold a theory of potentiality, but in this they were criticized by other Buddhists, especially the Sautrāntikas. The orthodox Yogacara theory is more complex: the "seeds," which are treated similar to "potentialities," are said to be momentary, each seed causing its replacement, moment after moment in a series.

54 Material cause, which some Buddhist schools did entertain, was ultimately seen as a subspecies of efficient cause.

[55] This is too complex an issue to develop further here. Key causal notions in China were yin-yang interactive theory, the five phases, notions of resonance and "response" (*kan-ying* 感應), and the rather "magical" arising of something (and many things) from a primordial Void (*pen-wu* 本無) to which they return and which subtends them even while they exist.

[56] This is not the place to document and analyze this transformation, which entails a long and detailed history. One sees it as early as the *Chao lun* and the intriguingly un-Indian interpretations by Chinese pundits of the milk to ghee sequence in *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sutra*, and as late as the debate between On-Mountain and Off-Mountain T'ien-t'ai in the former's critique of "purified" dependent arising. I plan to take this up in a book I am preparing on the sinicization of Buddhism.

[57] Since jataka stories presume that a continuous identity perdures across many lives, they seem to promote the notion of self (*ātman*) or invariant personhood (*pudgala*) rather than *anātman* (no-self).

[58] See Suzuki, *Laṅkāvatāra,* 282–4. For v. 766, see *Bhagavad Gītā*, ch. 11, vv. 12, 19–32; the *Laṅkāvatāra* gives this theme a decidedly apocalyptic tone. See vv. 786–9, for more on the *Laṅkāvatāra*'s apocalyptic vision. Also, cf. the notion of one taste (*ekarasa*) espoused in the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sutra* (ch. 1) with the notion of many tastes implied in v. 767.

[59] See the *Ambaṭṭha sutta* and *Tevijja sutta* of the *Dīgha Nikāya*.

[60] On redactions and sources of the *Hua-yen Sutra*, cf. Nakamura, *Indian Buddhism*, 16.G.

[61] *Wa* is a cornerstone of Japanese social interaction and social theory, and it pervades business and political ethics. According to Matsumoto and Hakamaya it has become little more than a screen reifying the status quo, fortifying it against meaningful challenge, dissension, or change ("disharmony")—in effect, protecting inequalities and discriminative attitudes in Japanese society.

[62] Nobuyoshi Yamabe's article in this volume (*193–204*) addresses that issue.

[63] A good deal of the criticism aimed against the claims of Hakamaya and Matsumoto revolves around whether Dōgen, Tsung-mi (see Peter Gregory's essay in this volume, *286–97*), and others actually expound the ideologies and positions that the Critical Buddhists attribute to them or not, or, as in the case of Dōgen, whether the Critical Buddhist attempts to distance them from the problematic target positions are legitimate.

[64] Immersed as we are these days in the age of "methodology," this point can be easily overlooked. *Choosing a target* does not require that one can successfully hit it with the first or every shot. A target is that toward which one aims; the target is not struck until the method of aiming and firing has been perfected, but the interim practice does not delegitimize the target itself.

[65] The *Mahāvagga* forms part of the Theravada Vinaya. *Mahāvagga* 1 describes the *anuloma* and *pratiloma* sequences (direct, from the first to the twelfth, and reverse, from twelfth to first) of the classical twelve-link version, claiming that contemplation of this idea occupied Buddha during the first weeks of his awakening, and that clearly seeing the twelve links constitutes awakening.

[66] Matsumoto asserts (*Pratītyasamutpāda and Emptiness*, 1) his preference for the twelve-link version, but gives no textual-historical reasons why that version should have precedence over the other formulations found in the Pali canon.

[67] 赤肉團上, 有一無位眞人, 常從汝等緒人面門出入. *Lin-chi lü* 1.

[68] Two eyes, two nostrils, two ears, one mouth, the anus, and the genital opening.

[69] Matsumoto refers to this omniscient self as atman, while the Jains tend to prefer the term *jīva* in this context.

[70] Since the Buddhist *āsava* theory treats the mind and its generating of these *āsava* as conditioned processes, this model, according to Matsumoto, opposes atman.

[71] Matsumoto uses *shinzō* (心臟) rather than just *shin* (心) to avoid initially confusing the heart-organ with mind, a common conflation in East Asian Buddhist texts. In Sanskrit *hṛdaya* (heart) connotes "essence, core," and is etymologically unrelated to the various terms used for mind and mental activities (*citta*, *manas*, *vijñāna*, etc.); in Chinese and Japanese "heart" and "mind" are denoted by the same word: 心. Matsumoto's interpretation of "lump of red flesh" as "heart-organ" is interesting, but not conclusive. Others have interpreted the "lump" as a reference to the body in general, associated with such notions as Chuang-tzu's "Great Clod" (*ta-k'uai* 大塊; see *Harvard-Yenching Concordance to Chuang Tzu* [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1956], 3/2/4, 16/6/24, and 17/6/57), just as the "true man" clearly evokes one of Chuang-tzu's ideal types (though Lin-chi has added the qualifier "no rank").

[72] The true man of no rank is related to the lump of red flesh, one supposes Matsumoto to be claiming, as the mind-ground (the *dharma-dhātu* or mind nature) relates to phenomenal mental experiences, as a permanent, metaphysical substratum for the ephemeral happenings that take place on its basis. Referring to *Platform Sutra* sec. 31, which defines "no-thought" (*wu-nien* 無念) ["Let your own nature always remain pure, so that the Six Consciousnesses in passing through the Six Gates will be neither separated from nor be attached to the Six Dusts produced by the objects and sense-organs and will be able to come and go freely"; adapted from Wing-tsit Chan's translation, *The Platform Scripture* (New York: St. John's University Press, 1963), 83], Matsumoto offers the following substitutions (the *Platform Sutra* term first, followed by its "equivalent" in *Lin-chi lü*): "self-nature" = "true man of no rank," "six gates" = "face gate," "going" 去 = "exiting" 出, "coming" 來 = "entering" 入. Matsumoto further writes: "Even though the phrase 'lump of red flesh' is not found in the *Platform Sutra*, there is the phrase 'Mind is the ground, Nature is the king,' in which 'Nature' is the atman that exists on the Mind/heart ground…" (338). Later in *Lin-chi lü*, "mind-ground" is used in a similar context, but is Lin-chi being ironic? He says:

> All of you eagerly seek the Buddha, the Dharma, and deliverance; you seek to escape from the Three Worlds. You foolish people, if you want to get out of the Three Worlds, where then can you go? The Buddhas and Patriarchs are only phrases of adoration. Do you want to understand the Three Worlds? They are no different from your mind-ground right now listening to Dharma. One thought-instant of your mind of lust (*rāga*) is the desire world (*kāma-loka*); one thought-instant of your mind of anger (*pratigha*) is the form world (*rūpa-loka*); one thought-instant

of foolishness (*moha*) is the formless world (*ārpya-loka*). These are the furniture of your house....

That brilliant "existentializing" of Buddhist cosmology hardly seems atmanic. Compare Irmgard Schloegl's translation, *The Zen Teaching of Rinzai* (Berkeley: Shambhala, 1976), 45; the translation of Ruth Fuller Sasaki, *The Recorded Sayings of Ch'an Master Lin-chi Hui-chao of Chen Prefecture* (Kyoto: Institute for Zen Studies, 1975), 26; and the Chinese text, 14.

[73] One significance of Matsumoto's attention to Lin-chi is that it broadens the critique of Zen from the Sōtō sect—to which, as a professor at Komazawa University, he has been associated—to the Rinzai (Lin-chi) sect. These are the two Zen schools in Japan. Korea, on the other hand, follows Lin-chi exclusively. We will have to wait and see how Korean scholars and Buddhists react to Matsumoto's interpretation of Lin-chi.

[74] For instance, does an appeal to tantra as the historical link between Upaniṣadic/Hindu ideology and the Chinese Buddhism of Lin-chi's day account for other, earlier instances of such ideology and/or terminology in Chinese and even Indian Buddhism? Are there instances prior to the introduction of tantra of such terminology or ideology evident in China? Is Matsumoto's discussion of "face gate" tenable or plausible? Are the three models he identifies the only possible candidates, and is the opposition between "inward" and "outward" as central or explanatory as he makes it? How appropriate is it to interpret Lin-chi in terms of the *Platform Sutra*? Are they really ideologically synonymous, or is the superimposition of the latter's terminology prejudicial and unwarranted? It is not my intent to pursue in detail these questions further here, though some discussion of the last three questions will be offered.

[75] A very common strategy used in Biblical studies to preserve the religious significance of the historical Jesus.

[76] According to the *Platform Sutra* (sec. 53), Hui-neng's final message and summary of his teaching is encapsulated in an extended verse he entitled "Liberation [by finding] True Buddha [in] Self-nature," all about the "pure self-nature" opposed to the Māra of false, defiled, deluded views. Elsewhere Hui-neng summarizes the basis for nondifferentiation between gradual and sudden thus (sec. 16): 自識本心, 自見本性 (oneself recognizing original mind, oneself seeing original nature).

[77] Schloegl's translation, *The Zen Teaching of Rinzai,* 44–5; compare Sasaki, *The Recorded Sayings,* 25, and Chinese text on page 14.

[78] See the version of Buddha's awakening as progressing through three watches of the night; the third watch, culminating in the realization of *pratītya-samutpāda*, parallels the description of the three highest *abhiññā*s, with "realization" of *pratītya-samutpāda* being replaced by "eliminating the *āsava*." See also the *Tevijja-vacchagotta sutta* of the *Majjhima Nikāya*.

[79] "Only seeing that dharmas are empty of marks, your single thought-instant of mind has a place to rest which is called the 'bodhi tree' " (see Schloegl, p. 46; Sasaki, p. 26, Chinese text, p. 14).

[80] Cf. Schloegl, secs. 22b, 12b; 11b, d; 14b, c; 15a, b; 16a; 17b; 21a; 22b; 26; 28; 29c; 30; 33a; 35; 37; 39; 40b; 85b; and passim. Schloegl follows Yanagida's divisions, and generally divides the text into smaller segments than Sasaki, making it easier to locate passages by these references.

[81] We leave as an open question whether or not Critical Buddhists are also engaged in sustained misreadings.

Critical Philosophy versus Topical Philosophy

[1] See also Matsumoto Shirō's *The Path to Buddhism*, 66–7 and 78–9.

[2] Technically speaking, the Japanese *basho* 場所 is used to translate *topos* and *bashoron* 場所論 to translate *topica*, the methods or theory of *topos*. [Translator's note: There is also a sense in which *basho* is used to refer to a singularity, *the* single or unified *topos*, referring more to the "ground" or "field" of all things. In general, this essay is concerned with topical philosophy, that is, philosophy premised on a precritical and linguistically transcendent truth.] For more details on *topos* and *topica* see Nakamura Yūjirō 中村雄二郎, *Basho (toposu)* 場所 (トポス) [Topos] (Tokyo: Kōbundō, 1989), although I do not share his enthusiasm for the standpoint.

[3] Ernesto Grassi, "Critical Philosophy or Topical Philosophy? Meditations on the *De nostri temporis studiorum ratione*," in *Giambattista Vico: An International Symposium*, G. Tagliacozzo and H. V. White, eds. (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1969), 44–5. Grassi's citation abridged certain comments that I have restored from Giambattista Vico, *De nostri temporis studiorum ratione*, translated by Elio Gianturco as *On the Study Methods of Our Time*, 13–14.

[4] Concerning *topica* Aristotle writes:

> As far as the choice of ground (*topos*) goes, the philosopher and the dialectician are making a similar inquiry, but the subsequent arrangement of material and the framing of questions are the peculiar province of the dialectician; for such a proceeding always involves a relation with another party.

Aristotle, *Topica*, Book 8, Chapter 1 (Eng. translation, 675). Compare my essay "*Tathatā* as Topos," in *Critiques*, 273–318.

[5] *Reading Vico,* special edition of *Shisō,* February 1987.

[6] *Gakumon no hōhō* 学問の方法 (Tokyo: Iwanami Bunko, 1987).

[7] See his *Apology for Apologetics* and the introduction to *On Being Mindless* (La Salle: Open Court, 1986), which contains a good discussion of method. In this regard, see also the review by Odani Nobuchiyo 小谷信千代, "Pōru J. Guriffisu kyōju no hōhōron ポールJ.グリッフィス教授の方法論 [The methodology of Professor Paul J. Griffiths]," *Bukkyōgaku seminā* 46 (October 1987): 60–5.

[8] See the essays gathered together in *Critiques of Original Enlightenment.*

[9] Included in Matsumoto Shirō, *Pratītyasamutpāda and Emptiness,* 11–97, 335–71.

[10] Nakamura Yūjirō 中村雄二郎, *Kyōtsū kankakuron* 共通感覚論 [An essay on common sense] (Tokyo: Iwanami Gendai Sensho, 1979), 300–301; in this work Nakamura

understands "common sense" to mean the *sensus communis.*

[11] Nakamura, *Topos*, 245; emphasis added.

[12] *The Method, Meditations and Philosophy of Descartes*, trans. by John Veitch, 160.

[13] *The Method of Descartes*, 161.

[14] *The Method of Descartes*, 197–8.

[15] Vico, *On the Study Methods of Our Time,* 13.

[16] [Translator's note: For a schematized listing of the opposition between *veritas* and *verisimilis* consult the chart that appears in *Critiques,* 289 (reproduced in this volume, page *89*). For a discussion of the notion that the factual priority of the *verisimilitas* indicates its superiority, see also 288–96 of the same work.]

[17] For a discussion of *pratītyasamutpāda* as critical Buddhism in India, see Matsumoto Shirō, *Pratītyasamutpāda and Emptiness,* and for a discussion of the theory of original enlightenment, the topical Buddhism of China and Japan that has completely overwhelmed and absorbed critical Buddhism throughout East Asia, see my *Critiques of Original Enlightenment.*

[18] Perhaps referring to Vico, *On the Study Methods of Our Time*, 13.

[19] Grassi, "Critical Philosophy or Topical Philosophy?," 50.

[20] Nakamura, *Topos,* 46–7.

[21] *The Method of Descartes*, 149.

[22] *The Method of Descartes*, 150.

[23] It seems to me in fact that wherever I look in Descartes, he is dealing with "time," as, for example, "I thought that I ought not to approach it till I had reached a more mature age (being at that time but twenty-three)" (*The Method of Descartes*, 165).

[24] Nakamura, *An Essay on Common Sense*, 251.

[25] Michael Ende, *Momo*, trans. by Maxwell Brownjohn (London: Puffin Books, 1985), 143. [Hakamaya's instincts were correct: The German in fact reads *Herz.* — Translator].

[26] Ende, *Momo*, 142. The title of this chapter in English is "Nowhere House" (the Japanese translation follows the German closer: "Momo arrives in the Land of Time"). While I am not entirely sure how to best understand the English "nowhere" or the Greek *οὐ*, I relate it to Matsumoto Shirō's interpretation of "non-abiding" (*mujū* 無住; Skt. *asthāna*, *apratiṣṭhāna*, *apratiṣṭhita*): "[therefore we can understand *susthito 'sthānayogena* to mean] the proper abiding (properly stable) that is established through a union with that which itself has no basis (the basis of all things)." *Pratītyasamutpāda and Emptiness,* 234.

[27] Ende, *Momo*, 135.

[28] This is how I read the direction his philosophy took from his first and second works, *Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience* and *Matière et Mémoire* through his last major work, *Les deux sources de la morale et de la religion.*

[29] *Akutagawa Ryūnosuke zenshū* 芥川龍之介全集 [The Collected Works of Akutagawa Ryūnosuke] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1958), vol. 5, 209.

[30] 史記 [*The Book of History*], in *Chūgoku no koten* 中国の古典 [Chinese classics] (Tokyo: Gakushū Kenkyūsha, 1984), vol. 14, 152. The quotation is a summary.

[31] *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu*, trans. by Burton Watson, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), 35, 93, 356.

[32] See note 26 above for Matsumoto's reading of "non-abiding," which suggested the idea to me.

[33] *Tao Te Ching,* trans. by Victor Mair (New York: Bantam Books, 1990), 59.

[34] *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu*, 81.

[35] Itō Jinsai, *Childlike Questions*, 20.

[36] *Childlike Questions*, 53.

[37] See, for example, Itō Takatoshi's "Sōjō to Kichizō—Chūgoku ni okeru chūkan shisō juyō no ichimen" 僧肇と吉蔵—中国における中観思想受容の一面 [Seng-chao and Chi-tsang: One facet of the acceptance of Madhyamika thought in China]. This and related articles have been collected in his book *Critical Studies on Chinese Buddhism* (1992).

[38] See Shirakawa Shizuka 白川静, *Jitō* 字統 (Tokyo: Heibonsha, 1984), 283 (for *wu*) and 106 (for *chüeh*).

[39] From Motoori Norinaga's *Kuzubana* くず花, included in *Collected Works of Motoori Norinaga,* vol. 8, 178–9. See my *Critiques of Original Enlightenment,* 37.

[40] *Collected Works of Motoori Norinaga,* vol. 8, 167.

[41] *Collected Works of Motoori Norinaga,* vol. 8, 158.

[42] From Motoori Norinaga's *Tamakatsuma* 玉勝間, included in *Collected Works of Motoori Norinaga,* vol. 1, 228–9.

[43] On Norinaga's positive attitude towards language and propositions see also my *Critiques,* chapters 4, 6, and 8. For Norinaga's opposite attitude that praises *onozukara* ("of itself," "naturally"), see chapter 3 in Matsumoto's *Pratītyasamutpāda and Emptiness*, esp. 104–6.

[44] *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu*, 81.

[45] *The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu*, 81.

[46] On the problems with Kobayashi's idea of perception see chapter 3 of *Critical Buddhism.*

[47] Nishitani Keiji 西谷啓治 and Yagi Seiichi 八木誠一. *Chokusetsu keiken: seiyō seishinshi to shūkyō* 直接経験—西洋精神史と宗教 [Immediate experience: Religion and the Western intellectual tradition] (Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1989), 157–8. The quote from the Introduction appears on page ii.

[48] *Immediate Experience,* 180.

[49] Ōe Kenzaburō, *Grave across the Tightrope*, 12.

Topophobia

[1] This point needs to be stressed, since many have assumed that Hakamaya and Matsumoto are looking for "true" Buddhism in the sense of what is earliest or what they believe Śākyamuni himself to have taught. In fact, however, as Matsumoto made clear in his comments at the 1993 AAR panel on Critical Buddhism, even Śākyamuni's teachings and practices need to be questioned, leading to the conclusion that if it could be proven that Śākyamuni himself actually did teach the doctrine of *tathāgata-garbha,* the critical attitude would still have to reject it as incompatible with the doctrines of no-self and causal interdependence.

[2] For Hakamaya negation or denial means simply rejection. See, for example, his rejection of a cataphatic interpretation of Buddha-nature as but an "affirmation at a higher level" of the denial of self, an interpretation that he sees as contrary to the Platonic meaning of "judgment" as "assertion" (*phasis*) and "denial" (*apophasis*); Hakamaya, "Buddhism as Self-Criticism," 118. Interesting in this regard are C. W. Huntington's recent remarks on the connection between apophatic language and poetic language in "A Way of Reading," *The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 18/2 (1995): 279–308.

[3] Hakamaya, "The Realm of Enlightenment in *Vijñaptimātratā*," 21.

[4] Hakamaya, "Critical Philosophy versus Topical Philosophy," *56.*

[5] Hakamaya, "Critical Philosophy versus Topical Philosophy," *79.*

[6] These propositions are in turn often associated with generative monism and are typical as well of the "rhetoric of immediacy" that dominates Ch'an/Zen discourse; hence Matsumoto's claim that "if zen [the practice of dhyana] means the cessation of conceptual thought, then zen is a denial of Buddhism itself" (Matsumoto, "The Meaning of 'Zen,'" *244*).

[7] Hakamaya, "Critical Philosophy versus Topical Philosophy," *58.*

[8] Hakamaya, "Critical Philosophy verses Topical Philosophy," *67.*

[9] John Veitch, trans. *The Method, Meditations and Philosophy of Descartes*, 161; cited in Hakamaya, "Critical Philosophy versus Topical Philosophy," *62.*

[10] W. A. Pickard-Cambridge, trans., *Topics*, in *The Basic Works of Aristotle* (New York: Random House, 1941), 188. The other works in the *Organon* include the *Categories*, *On Interpretation*, the *Prior* and *Posterior Analytics*, and *On Sophistical Refutations.*

[11] Some of its methods, at first blush, look remarkably similar to those adopted by Nāgārjuna or Geluk debaters, as in Aristotle's relating of the act of definition to dialect: "A 'definition' is a phrase signifying a thing's essence.... If we are able to argue that two things are the same or are different, we shall be well supplied by the same turn of argument with lines of attack upon their definitions as well" (*Topics*, 91). For a comparison of Aristotelian categorical syllogisms and the "Collected Topics" tradition of Tibetan logic and debate see Daniel E. Perdue, *Debate in Tibetan Buddhism* (Ithaca: Snow Lion Publications, 1992), 836–49.

[12] *Topics*, 189–90.

[13] Hence first principles of the physical world, the metaphysical grounds of things, are knowable only by God, although they *are* knowable insofar as they can be "remade" through experimentation. Though this renders such first principles unknowable in a final or certain sense, it by no means implies that the first "places" of arguments cannot be discovered or that in the absence of an absolutely certain first principle all argument becomes equally valid (or invalid). It is rather reminiscent of Gödel's proof or Heisenberg's uncertainty principle, both of which have led to important technological applications while denying absolute certainty of first principles.

[14] *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, Paul Edwards, ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1972), 8: 249. Hakamaya calls this humanism the indigenous tradition (*dochaku shisō*) of the West, but feels that the challenge of the semitic traditions, especially Christianity, to this humanism has been so strong that topical philosophy has never been more than an undercurrent in the West.

[15] *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 8: 249.

[16] Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy* (New York: Image Books, 1960), 6/1: 179–89.

[17] Hakamaya, "Critical Philosophy versus Topical Philosophy," *58.* Hakamaya likens the Japanese importation of Vico's topical philosophy to the eager Western consumption of Japanese versions of topical philosophy, in particular Taoist-inspired versions of Zen Buddhism, the so-called life-affirming phenomenalism of indigenous Japanese pantheism, the notion of Oriental harmony, and the philosophies of the Kyoto school. In this he sees the West as thoroughly beguiled by Orientalist rhetoric, and he writes, for example, of the negative reception that Paul Griffiths received when, at a conference in Madison in 1985, he advocated a strategy for interreligious dialogue of critical and rational demonstration in place of the triumphalist and mystical stance of Nishitani; Hakamaya, "Critical Philosophy versus Topical Philosophy," *59.* The paper that Griffiths read at this conference was later published as "On the Possible Future of the Buddhist-Christian Interaction" in Heisig and Kiyota, eds., *Japanese Buddhism;* see also the record of the discussions of his paper in the same volume, 185–91.

[18] Hakamaya, "Critical Philosophy versus Topical Philosophy," *61*; emphasis added by Hakamaya.

[19] Hakamaya, "Critical Philosophy versus Topical Philosophy," *62.*

[20] Hakamaya, "*Tathatā* as Topos," 289.

[21] See, for example, Karl Potter, *Presuppositions of India's Philosophies* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1963); Paul Griffiths, *On Being Mindless* (La Salle: Open Court, 1986); Peter Gregory, ed., *Sudden and Gradual: Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Thought* (Honolulu: University of Hawai"i Press, 1987); Robert M. Gimello, "Mysticism and Meditation," in *Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis*, Steven Katz, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978).

Other works that deal with interesting aspects of this debate include Bernard Faure's *Rhetoric of Immediacy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991) and Anne Klein's

mapping of the "discovery" and "development" models of Tibetan Buddhist practice to "essentialist" and "postmodern" feminist perspectives in her recent *Meeting the Great Bliss Queen: Buddhists, Feminists and the Art of the Self* (Boston: Beacon Press, 1995).

[22] D. Seyfort Ruegg, *Buddha-Nature, Mind and the Problem of Gradualism in a Comparative Perspective*, 3.

[23] Cf. Nagao Gadjin's discussion of "what remains" in emptiness as the "arithmetical subtraction" of the *tathāgata-garbha* tradition versus the conversion of consciousness model in the Yogacara tradition ("'What Remains' in Śūnyatā: A Yogācāra Interpretation of Emptiness," in Minoru Kiyota, ed., *Mahāyāna Buddhist Meditation: Theory and Practice* [Honolulu: University of Hawai"i Press, 1978], 66–82). See also Matsumoto's critique of *nibbāna* as deriving from a root of *nir + vṛ*, meaning "uncover" and related to its pre-Buddhist meaning of liberation (*vimukti*) of the atman from its covering or bodily confines ("The *Lotus Sutra* and Japanese Culture," *399*).

[24] Nagao, "An Interpretation of the Term 'saṃvṛti' (Convention) in Buddhism," *Silver Jubilee Volume of the Zinbun-kagaku Kenkyūjō*, 1954.

[25] See, for example, Seyfort Ruegg, *Buddha-Nature*, 191–2.

[26] Seyfort Ruegg, *Buddha-Nature*, 8; see also his "Some Reflections on the Place of Philosophy in the Study of Buddhism," 171, 178.

[27] The *Lotus Sutra*, for example, adopts an inclusivist approach to other Buddhist traditions, yet both Hakamaya and Matsumoto cite it as an instance of critical thinking because of its ultimately exclusivist approach to anything other than its own message; see Matsumoto, "The *Lotus Sutra* and Japanese Culture"; see also my "Buddhist-Buddhist Dialogue? The *Lotus Sutra* and the Polemic of Accommodation," *Buddhist-Christian Studies* 15 (1995): 119–36.

[28] Hakamaya, "Critical Philosophy versus Topical Philosophy," *62.*

[29] Hakamaya, "Critical Philosophy versus Topical Philosophy," *64.*

[30] "Mysterious," or *yuan*, is also central to the Japanese religio-poetic notion of *yūgen*, and the logic of the open-ended and reflexive infinite that informs the aesthetic notion of *yūgen* is very similar to the logic of the infinite *tao*: William LaFleur, "Symbol and Yūgen: Shunzei's Use of Tendai Buddhism" in his *The Karma of Words: Buddhism and the Literary Arts in Medieval Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 80–106.

[31] As seen in Hakamaya's chart on page *89* a sequential notion of time, alien to such a utopia, is extremely important for Critical Buddhism (*date-*vāda* vs. *dhātu-vāda*); see Matsumoto, "On *Pratītyasamutpāda*." See also Ian Harris's discussion of the difference between temporal and spatial understandings of *pratītyasamutpāda* and their import for an environmental ethic in "Causation and Telos: The Problem of Buddhist Environmental Ethics," *Journal of Buddhist Ethics* 1 (1994): (http://www.psu.edu/jbe/jbe.html).

[32] Hakamaya, "Critical Philosophy versus Topical Philosophy" *71.*

[33] This absolute nature of the primordial *topos* is especially problematic in a Buddhist context, given the usual Buddhist insistence on the related or dependent existence of *all* things. It also raises the practical question of how to get from here (ignorance) to there (knowledge), typically resulting in one sort of a "leap" or "sudden" approach.

[34] There is also the logical issue of an accommodation based upon a prerational and nonpropositional experience smuggling in (incoherently) rational and propositional claims such as, for example, the interesting and complex claim that "the Tao that can be spoken of is not the constant Tao."

[35] It can also be noted that governance was, in fact, a central concern of "philosophical" Taoism (clearly related to legalist teachings), and that the Machiavellian attitude towards the state of citizenry corresponds to the Japanese adage about the preferred condition for a baby, namely, fat and asleep.

[36] The Tao, of course, is not really a unity in the sense of a single thing (i.e., the Tao is not an example of substantival monism). Nondifferentiable or noncalculable in its infinite scope, the Tao is rather more like the universe described by chaos theory, a universe that is "chaotic" not because there is no order or differentiation but because that order cannot be calculated owing to the infinite phenomena upon which it is contingent. If it is true that the butterfly flapping its wings in Texas affects the weather in Tokyo, there will never be a supercomputer powerful enough to calculate all of the parameters necessary to accurately forecast the weather—to which the topicalist response is simply to trust in the spontaneity of nature, getting wet when it rains and hot when the sun shines.

[37] Hakamaya, "Critical Philosophy versus Topical Philosophy," *72*.

[38] Hakamaya, "Critical Philosophy versus Topical Philosophy," *73*; see also *77*.

[39] See, for example, his critiques of the "simple path" in "Ideological Background," *343*.

[40] Hakamaya, "The Significance of the Critique of Original Enlightenment," 5.

[41] Hakamaya, "Critical Philosophy versus Topical Philosophy," *73*.

[42] Hakamaya, "Critical Philosophy versus Topical Philosophy," *73*.

[43] Hakamaya, "Critical Philosophy versus Topical Philosophy," *74*.

[44] Hakamaya, "Critical Philosophy versus Topical Philosophy," *73*.

[45] T No. 1666, 32.576b; cited in Hakamaya, "The Significance of the Critique of Original Enlightenment," 6.

[46] Hakamaya, "The Significance of the Critique of Original Enlightenment," 6–7.

[47] Hakamaya, "Critical Philosophy versus Topical Philosophy," *58–59*; to see just how important the construction of a "place" for Japanese thought in the history of philosophy was deemed among Japan intellectuals see the various essays in Heisig and Maraldo, eds., *Rude Awakenings: Zen, the Kyoto School, and the Question of Nationalism*.

[48] Kasulis, "Whence and Whither: Nishitani's view of History," in Taitetsu Unno, ed. *The Religious Philosophy of Nishitani Keiji* (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1989), 261–2.

[49] Kasulis, "Whence and Whither," 261.

[50] Kasulis also cites the monist unity of the Vedāntan Brahman, the "original face before our parents were born" of Ch'an/Zen, *tathāgata-garbha*, *ālaya-vijñāna*, and the "quiet point [of the Tao] out of which all creativity spontaneously flows" as other examples of "the theme of going back to the origin." All, of course, are given by Hakamaya as examples of what Buddhism most decidedly is *not*.

[51] Tanabe Hajime, *Philosophy as Metanoetics*, trans. by Takeuchi Yoshinori (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986), 2.

[52] Nishitani's thought has likewise been criticized as "triumphalist," that is, guaranteed by self-validating experience and beyond the possibility (and hence need) of rational demonstration. See Griffiths, "Buddhist-Christian Interaction," 155–57 (and note 17 above). In his conclusion Griffiths offers his version of the proper approach to the fact of disagreements over religious truth claims, an approach that is (not surprisingly) almost identical to Hakamaya's notion of critical philosophy:

> The only intellectually defensible mode of dealing with such disagreements is the critically realist, a mode which takes seriously the scope and importance of metaphysical disagreement within and among traditions, which sees such disagreement as a philosophical challenge, and which attempts to develop system-neutral criteria to assess and evaluate each side of the disagreement—and perhaps in some instances to conclusively demonstrate that one side or another is false. (158)

[53] See also William Bodiford, "Zen and the Art of Religious Prejudice."

[54] "Scholarship as Criticism," *122*; English translation from Robert Morrell, *Early Kamakura Buddhism*, 53.

[55] "Philosophical Background of Social Discrimination," *348–9*. In a similar vein we read in Arima Tatsuo, *The Failure of Freedom* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), 13–14:

> The philosophical category of pure experience, with all its logical embellishments, was used to spread social resignation as a means of achieving individual enlightenment.... It encourages a kind of religious submission to reality. This being the ultimate reality, there is no need for the self to remold its social surroundings.

[56] "Scholarship as Criticism," *123*, citing Umehara Takeshi, *Saichō Meditations*, 201.

[57] That this ideology has contemporary currency is illustrated in the case of the Mitsubishi employee in Normal, Illinois, who complained about sexual harassment only to be "disciplined for her 'inability to get along with coworkers.' On her record it says that she forgot the principle of 'wa'" (Ellen Goodman, "Hostility with Economic Undertones," *Daily Hampshire Gazette*, 3 May 1996, 8). The most disturbing aspect of this incident is her *coworkers'* reaction against her complaint and those of numerous others at the plant, fearful as they were of losing the goodwill and hence economic benefit that the Japanese corporation brought to the community. Clearly the ideology of *wa* demands the sacrifice of individual happiness for the prosperity of the group.

[58] "Scholarship as Criticism," *134*, citing Iyanaga Nobumi, *The Fantasy Orient*.

[59] See, for example, "Scholarship as Criticism," *127–30*, where Hakamaya criticizes the notion of an underlying and unchanging "constitution" of Japan as hegemonic and trampling on the sensibilities of, for example, Japanese Christians and other minorities. The triumphalism of this position is also evidenced in the facile opposition between Eastern spirituality and Western rationality and materialism found, for example, in Abe Masao's recent essay, "Critical Reflections on the Traditional Japanese View of Truth," in Fu and Heine, eds., *Japan in Traditional and Postmodern Perspectives*.

[60] Ichikawa Hakugen is another critic who assailed the philosophy of "as it is" as morally vacuous, and Hakamaya's critique echoes Ichikawa's assessment of the logic of the identity of contradictories as the logic of an inclusivist topos:

> The logic of *soku-hi*, that is, the logic of the absolutely contradictory self-identity in which non-freedom, just as it is, is freedom, in which [according to some] "to become servant of every situation" (to sacrifice the self and serve the public in the holy war) is to "become master of every situation" (as in Mahayana Zen), played the social and political role [of promoting the imperial system].... In the place of absolute nothingness, existence and nonexistence, value and anti-value, rationality and irrationality, are identical. More than a logic of confrontation and rejection, this is a logic of magnanimity and harmony. This is [a function of] the non-conflictuality and tolerance of place [*basho, topos*].

Cited in Christopher Ives, "Ethical Pitfalls in Imperial Zen and Nishida Philosophy," in Heisig and Maraldo, eds., *Rude Awakenings*, 26.

[61] Bernard Faure has critiqued this as the "utopian" nature of Nishida's philosophy:

> Although Nishida desired to elaborate a philosophy of the 'concrete,' his concepts of 'pure experience,' 'absolute nothingness,' and so on, remained fundamentally abstract and dualistic. If applied thoroughly, the Mahayana logic of nonduality would deny the possibility of 'pure experience,' or even the linguistic pertinence of the expression, since the very distinction between pure experience and the 'impure' ordinary experience, or between philosophical/metaphysical language and ordinary language, remains, not only dualistic, but utopian.

"The Kyoto School and Reverse Orientalism," in Fu and Heine, eds., *Japan in Traditional and Postmodern Perspectives*, 254–55. For an example of the continued insistence on Zen transcendence precisely in the face of such criticism see Hirata Seikō, "Zen Buddhist Attitudes to War," in Heisig and Maraldo, eds., *Rude Awakenings.*

[62] The best-known argument for the mediated nature of our experience is found in Nathan Katz, "Language, Epistemology, and Mysticism" in his edited collection *Mysticism and Philosophical Analysis* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1978).

[63] Robert Sharf, "Whose Zen? Zen Nationalism Revisited," in Heisig and Maraldo, *Rude Awakenings,* 44.

[64] "Ideologicalical Background of Social Discrimination," *350.*

[65] Cited in Hakamaya, "Scholarship as Criticism," *124*; cf. Hirata Seikō's contrary insistence on a Zen transcendence that does simply float along: "Zen adopts itself freely to the spirit of the times. What is called 'progress'...is from the Zen point of view simply change," in "Zen Buddhist Attitudes towards War," in Heisig and Maraldo, eds., *Rude Awakenings*, 14–15.

[66] Hakamaya, "Critical Philosophy versus Topical Philosophy," *80.*

[67] Others have recently taken note of the fact that emphasis on a uniquely Japanese appreciation of "pure experience" prior to thought is a construction that both mirrors and inverts Western forms of Orientalist discourse. See Bernard Faure, "The Kyoto School and Reverse Orientalism"; Robert Sharf, "The Zen of Japanese Nationalism,"

History of Religions 33/1 (1993): 1–43. For an analysis of Japanese religiosity from a completely different perspective that nonetheless finds its basis in prerational experience see Neil McMullin, "Historical and Historiographical Issues in the Study of Pre-Modern Japanese Religions," *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 16/1 (1989): 29, and my critique of this as replicating *Nihonjinron* discourse in "Premodern, Modern, and Postmodern: Doctrine and the Study of Japanese Religion," *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 19/1 (1992): 10–11.

68 Hakamaya, "Scholarship as Criticism," *116*.

69 Weber, "Science as a Vocation," 146, cited in Hakamaya, "Scholarship as Criticism," *130*; see also Griffiths, "The Limits of Criticism," *151–2*.

70 Hakamaya, "Scholarship as Criticism," *114–5*.

71 Hakamaya, "Critical Philosophy versus Topical Philosophy," *60*. Matsumoto notes: "[I stand] directly opposed to those who insist on objective and value-free scholarship. My standpoint is subjective and value-laden throughout" ("Buddhism and the Kami," *356*). In a paper given recently at the Third Annual Conference of the International Association for Asian Philosophy and Religion (Taiwan, June 1996), Matsumoto explains his change of perspective after being confronted with the problem of discrimination within Sōtō Buddhism:

> What is Buddhism? To put such a question or to pose such a problem seemed useless to me, on the grounds that such a problem can never be solved from the standpoint of objective scholarship. But confronted with the problem of discrimination in Buddhism, my view has changed. To be a Buddhist, I have come to see, is to be responsible for the evil deeds done by Buddhists. And, to be a Buddhist is incompatible with being a scholar in the objective sense. For these reasons I have abandoned objective scholarship and have taken up a subjective standpoint.

72 Matsumoto, "Buddhism and the Kami," *356*.

73 Hakamaya, "Scholarship as Criticism," *131*.

74 Hakamaya, "Scholarship as Criticism" *122*.

75 One of the most pervasive ideas in contemporary Buddhist literature is that the experience of emptiness spontaneously and inevitably gives rise to compassion, inasmuch as it is equivalent to the experience of infinite interdependence. This relationship is more problematic than it seems. Indeed, it even appears difficult to find a source for such an idea in nontantric Indian Buddhist texts. See the BUDDHA-L discussion between 27 July 1995 and 9 November 1995 under the various subject threads "Connection between Shunyata and compassion," "wisdom/compassion," and "Emptiness and Compassion" (BUDDHA-L@ulkyvm.louisville.edu). If the relationship between absolute purity and delusion is difficult, the denial of any connection is no less problematic. For without some sort of originally pure mind, repository of pure seeds, or the like, one cannot explain how a defiled mind can ever give rise to purity. The lotus flower may be able to grow in the muck, but without a seed the muck will not produce blossoms on its own. Thus in the classical Yogacara view of Asaṅga and Vasubandhu, for example, consciousness was seen as the source of defilement but only the *support* of purity, the seed of

which was hearing the pure dharma as the outflow of the *dharma-dhātu* (*dharmadhātu-niṣyanda*); see Hakamaya, "The Realm of Enlightenment." I think that it could be further argued that it is this difficulty that led to both the strong incorporation of the tradition of pure mind in Yogacara as well as the Yogacara/*tathāgata-garbha* synthesis of such texts as the *Laṅkāvatāra-sūtra* and the *Awakening of Mahayana Faith*.

[76] Particularly thought-provoking among many recent self-reflections on the role of a critical stance in Buddhist scholarship are the comments of T. Griffith Foulk, "Issues in the Field of East Asian Buddhist Studies: An Extended Review of *Sudden and Gradual: Approaches to Enlightenment in Chinese Thought*," *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 16/1 (1993): 93–180; Luis O. Gómez, "Unspoken Paradigms: Meanderings through the Metaphors of a Field," *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 18/2 (1995): 183–230; José Ignacio Cabezón, "Buddhist Studies as a Discipline and the Role of Theory," *Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 18/2 (1995): 231–68; and Donald S. Lopez, Jr., "At the Feet of the Lama," in his *Curators of the Buddha*.

[77] For a delightful and insightful essay on the fact and role of judgmental hierarchies in our life see Philip Zaleski, "A Peculiar Test," in *First Things* 40 (1994): 9–12.

[78] See, for example, Umehara's comments cited in Matsumoto, "Buddhism and the Kami," *357*.

[79] Hakamaya, "Scholarship as Criticism," *131*; cf. Matsumoto, "The Doctrine of *Tathāgata-garbha*," *166*.

[80] Although often framed in categories such as *neyārtha/nītārtha*, original (or early) Buddhism, the "core philosophy of Buddhism," and the like, it is a very rare academic study indeed that has not found its subject to be in conformity with Buddha-dharma and thus implicitly engaged in normative scholarship.

[81] If, as Rey Chow (*Writing Diaspora: Tactics of Intervention in Contemporary Cultural Studies*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993) and others have argued, it is significant that Area Studies is a "discipline" whose inception derives from the cold war (many graduate students in Buddhist Studies programs from the sixties through the eighties in the United States, myself included, were supported by United States Defense Department scholarships), it is also worth noting how often international conferences, book publication, and even positions in Buddhist Studies are supported by Buddhist organizations. As I note below, I do not by any means think that such support is suspect or renders our scholarly work illegitimate; on the contrary, just as receipt of government funding gave me a sense of responsibility towards critical scholarly work as a civic duty, my occupancy of the Yehan Numata Chair in Buddhist Studies makes me feel all the better about critical scholarly work as an ethical duty—perhaps one can call it the academic form of properly engaged Buddhism.

[82] In *An Apology for Apologetics*, Paul Griffiths argues for the need of properly grounded (that is, critical) apologetics.

[83] Griffiths, "The Limits of Criticism," *151*.

[84] Roger Corless, *The Vision of Buddhism* (New York: Paragon House, 1989), 125.

[85] See, for example, Bernard Faure's criticism of Hakamaya's "intellectual terrorism" in "Reverse Orientalism," 267–9.

[86] There is even a hint of a development in this direction in Vico's thought, as Max Fisch noted: "In the [earlier] *Ancient Wisdom* [1710], God made realities, and man in his most Godlike making made only fictions. In the [later] *New Science* [1744], man in his most Godlike making makes realities." "Vico and Pragmatism," in *Giambattista Vico: An International Symposium*, G. Tagliacozzo and H. V. White, eds. (Baltimore: The John Hopkins Press, 1969), 413.

[87] Vico, *On the Study Methods of Our Time*, xiii.

[88] On the difference between the "truth" and the "true" in Vico see Max H. Fisch, "Vico and Pragmatism," 407–14.

[89] For a timely introduction to the subject see Steven D. O'Leary, *Arguing the Apocalypse: A Theory of Millennial Rhetoric* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).

[90] This is not to suggest that for any experience to be considered a valid producer of knowledge it must be the case that the experiencer subject the experience or its resultant insight to rational scrutiny; see Paul Griffiths's comments in this volume regarding the "unbearable burden of epistemic duty" that such a view would impose.

Scholarship as Criticism

[1] For a related discussion, see my "Critique of the Kyoto School."

[2] "600 Words on Academic Rumors," 2.

[3] Max Weber, "Science as a Vocation," 146.

[4] *The Method, Meditations and Philosophy of Descartes*, 203.

[5] Ernesto Grassi, "Critical Philosophy or Topical Philosophy? Meditations on the *De nostri temporis studiorum ratione,*" 39–50.

[6] Iwasaki Minoru 岩崎 稔, "Sōki o meguru toposu: Vīko to Hēgeru" 想起をめぐるトポス—ヴィーコとヘーゲル [Memories of topos: Vico and Hegel], *Shisō* (1987): 233–55, 239.

[7] Sasaki Chikara 佐々木力, "Vīko no kindai kagakuron: Dekarutoteki sūgaku-shizengaku ni kōshite" ヴィーコの近代科学論—デカルト的数学自然学に抗して [Vico's idea of modern science: Against Cartesian mathematics], *Shisō* (February 1987): 119.

[8] Kimura Seiji 木村誠司, "Chibetto Bukkyō ni okeru ronrigaku no ichizuke" チベット仏教における倫理学の位置付け [The place of logic in Tibetan Buddhism], in Yamaguchi Zuihō, ed., *Chibetto no Bukkyō to shakai* チベットの仏教と社会 [Buddhism and society in Tibet] (Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1986), 365–401.

[9] On the same day, I went to the meeting of the Japanese Association of Tibetan Studies, where I met Matsunaga Yūkei, President of Kōyasan University. He was looking at the piece in the *Mainichi Shinbun*. Aside from his mention of the outlandish expense involved in sponsoring such a symposium, it is perhaps better that I not mention the rest of his comments.

[10] A "non-affirming negation" is a negation that implies no affirmation. For instance, "There is no mountain" simply negates the existence of a mountain and does not imply "There is a plain."

[11] Kurita Isamu 栗田勇, "Saichō to hongaku shisō: Jo no jo" 最澄と本覚思想—序の序 [Saichō and original enlightenment: Prolegomenon to an introduction], *Bungei* (February 1987): 258–67. See also the works cited in Hakamaya, "Thoughts on the Ideological Background of Social Discrimination" and "Norinaga's Critique of Ryōbu Shinto."

[12] Shimaji Daitō, "The Need to Study Early Japanese Tendai," 189.

[13] See Kuroda Toshio, *State and Religion in Medieval Japan,* 413ff. Regarding my preference for the term "original enlightenment" over "the structure of esoteric–exoteric Buddhism" (顕密体制), see my "Buddhism and the Kami: Thoughts against Japanism," 219–20.

[14] Kurita Isamu, "Saichō and Original Enlightenment," 258–9.

[15] Umehara Takeshi, *Saichō Meditations,* 219.

[16] See my "Critical Look at the 'Four Criteria'," in *Critiques*, 184–208.

[17] Dōgen, "Shizen biku" chapter of the *Shōbōgenzō.*

[18] See my essays "The Definitive Standpoint for Understanding Dōgen" and "How to Read the 'Bendōwa'." In vol. 29 of *Shūgaku kenkyū*, Kumamoto Hideto complained in a brief note about the sectarian tone of my articles. I do not deny that I am developing an "apologetic" from a sectarian point of view. As I have argued in the present essay, my reason for doing so is that I believe that true criticism of a tradition demands that one be standing inside of it. Moreover, the sense of my "apologetic" is that Dōgen alone is the Sōtō sect and without Dōgen there is no Sōtō sect. I do not recall ever having claimed the authoritarianism of patriarchal lineage. I welcome those who insist on the historical reality of the Sōtō "sangha" to read through the present essay and write up their arguments. In reply, I would be happy to provide a fuller account of my position.

[19] Taken from the works of Myōe Shōnin; Eng. trans., R. Morrell, *Early Kamakura Buddhism*, 53. See also Kurita Isamu, Dōgen no yomikata: Ima o ikikiru tetsugaku: *Shōbōgenzō* 道元の読み方—今を生き切る哲学—正法眼蔵 [How to read Dōgen: Philosophy for living today: The *Shōbōgenzō*] (Tokyo: Shōdensha, 1984), 91–2.

[20] See my "Thoughts on the Ideological Background of Social Discrimination," "The Definitive Standpoint for Understanding Dōgen," and "How to Read the 'Bendōwa'."

[21] Kurita, *How to Read Dōgen*, 93.

[22] "Bukkyō" chapter of the *Shōbōgenzō*; Eng. trans. vol. 3, 85.

[23] Umehara, *Saichō Meditations,* 178–92.

[24] Umehara, *Saichō Meditations,* 201.

[25] Nara Yasuaki 奈良康明, ed., *Bukkyō no jissen* 仏教の実践 [The practice of Buddhism], Nihonjin no Bukkyō 日本人の仏教 2 (Tokyo: Tōkyō Shoseki, 1983). Matsumoto's name does not appear on the cover though he wrote the entire book with the exception of chapter 7. He later revised it and published it under his own name as *The Path to Buddhism.*

[26] Considerations of space oblige me to omit the exam questions here. I encourage the reader to take it. I am told the students had no difficulty understanding the contrast and produced some superb answers, showing how a little less bias and a lot of common sense produces better judgments than what comes out of establishment types like Umehara who are blinded by their adherence to stereotypes.

[27] *Kokutai no hongi,* 51.

[28] See Matsumoto, "On *Pratītyasamutpāda*," 94.

[29] *Komazawa University Campus Newsletter* 150 (25 May 1987), 1.

[30] Cited in Fujiyoshi Jikai's afterword to volume 6 of Hisamatsu Shin'ichi 久松真一, *Hisamatsu Shin'ichi chosakushū* 久松真一著作集 [The collected writings of Hisamatsu Shin'ichi] (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1995 [expanded reprint]), 524.

[31] Immediately after this lecture I began writing "A Critique of the Kyoto School" with the intention of taking up this question. In the end, I decided it unfair to criticize what had not yet appeared in print. But as the piece is soon to be published and as Fujiyoshi has often repeated his claim that the "Pure Land is merely an *upāya*," I do not think it out of place to take it up here.

[32] Etō Jun 江藤 淳, *Dōjidai e no shisen* 同時代への視線 [A glance at our times] (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyūjo, 1987), 145.

[33] *A Glance at Our Times,* 145.

[34] *A Glance at Our Times,* 164–5.

[35] *A Glance at Our Times,* 161.

[36] *A Glance at Our Times*, 147.

[37] [Translator's note: The nomenclature used for World War II in Japanese has come to be seen as disclosing a political stance: "The Greater East Asian War" is the preferred term for those who emphasize Japan's intent to "liberate" Asian countries from their Western colonialist oppressors (hence, perhaps, Etō's assertion below that "Japan never declared war on China"); the "Pacific War" is usually understood to refer primarily to the war with the United States and its allies.]

[38] Etō, *A Glance at Our Times,* 238.

[39] "The Keen Eye of History," (1939) in *Kobayashi Hideo zenshū* 小林秀雄全集 [The collected works of Kobayashi Hideo] (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1968), vol. 7, 190.

[40] Etō, *A Glance at Our Times,* 156.

[41] Etō, *A Glance at Our Times,* 234–6.

[42] Etō, *A Glance at Our Times* 176–7.

[43] Weber, "Science as a Vocation," 146.

[44] Weber, "Science as a Vocation," 146.

[45] Weber, "Science as a Vocation," 153.

[46] Compare the citation from Nakamura Hajime in Kurihara Toshie 栗原淑江, "Bukkyō ni okeru genseikan no shosō: M. Uēba no Bukkyōron" 仏教における現世観の諸相—ウェーバーの仏教論 [Buddhist views of this world: Weber's idea of

Buddhism], *Tōyō Tetsugaku Kenkyūjo kiyō* 2 (1986), 39, n. 3.

47 Odaka Kunio, trans., *Shokugyō toshite no gakumon* 職業としての学問 (Tokyo: Iwanami Bunko), 80. See Weber, "Science as a Vocation," 154.

48 Mase Hiromasa 間瀬啓允, "Shūkyō tagenron no tetsugaku" 宗教多元論の哲学 [The philosophy of religious pluralism], *Shūkyō kenkyū* 61/1 (1987): 133–4.

49 Iyanaga Nobumi, *The Fantasy Orient: The Genealogy of Orientalism,* 369–70.

50 Nakamura Yūjirō, "Kindai no chōkoku to posuto-modan—Nishida Kitarō e no ichi shiten" 近代の超克とポストモダン—西田幾多郎への一視点 ['Overcoming modernity' and postmodernity: A view of Nishida Kitarō], *Gendai shisō* (January 1987): 38–51; and "'Zettai mujunteki jiko dōitsu to Nihon bunka': Aru kokoro no ronri to sono shatei" 絶対矛盾的自己同一と日本文化—或る心の論理とその射程 ["The self-identity of absolute contradictories" and Japanese culture: A logic of the heart and its scope], *Shisō* (January 1987): 5–21. See also Kawakami Tetsutarō 河上徹太郎 and Takeuchi Yoshimi 竹内好, eds., *Kindai no chōkoku* 近代の超克 [Overcoming modernity] (Tokyo: Fūzanbō, 1979). See also my essay, "Critical Philosophy versus Topical Philosophy," translated in this volume, pp. *56–80.*

51 See the essays "Overcoming Modernity" and "Nishida Kitarō to Kobayashi Hideo: Nihon no kindai no naka no keiken to jiko" 西田幾多郎と小林秀雄—日本の近代のなかの経験と自己 [Nishida Kitarō and Kobayashi Hideo: Experience and the self in Japanese modernity], *Shinchō* (February 1987): 198–214. This latter article is mentioned by Akiyama Shun 秋山駿 in his *Mainichi Shinbun* review ("Bungei jihyō" 文芸時評 [Evaluation of the arts], 28 January 1987) in fawning praise for Nishida's "rich suggestion of the integration of philosophy and literature." Not only is the article undeserving of such epithets, it left me doubting the author's ability simply to read the text he is reviewing. Since Akiyama himself published a book-length discussion of Kobayashi, *Soul and Design* (*Tamashii to ishō* 魂と意匠 [Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1985]), one would expect him to be familiar with Kobayashi's essay "Scholars and Bureaucrats" (*Collected Works,* vol. 7, 78-86, esp. 84). Had he read Kobayashi's critique of Nishida, which still has a point today, it would have gone a long way towards tempering his stupid comments about Nishida's "integration of philosophy and literature." Instead, mindlessly swept along by the wave of postmodernism, he felt he had to do his part by "integrating" Nakamura and Kurita into the picture. Literary criticism bleating in tune with the flock is not to be trusted. I, too, feel a need to revise my estimation of Kobayashi, but before doing so I plan to read the whole of the sharp criticism brought together by Mitsuda Ikuo 満田郁夫, "Kobayashi Hideo to Motoori Norinaga" 小林秀雄と本居宣長 [Kobayashi Hideo and Motoori Norinaga], *Gun* 6 (1986). I strongly urge Akiyama to do the same.

52 Takeuchi Yoshirō 竹内芳郎, "Posutomodan ni okeru chi no kansei" ポストモダンにおける知の陥穽 [The Postmodern trap of intelligence], *Sekai* (November 1986): 105–6.

53 Takeuchi Yoshirō, "Sengo Nihon no tetsugaku no jōken: Nakamura Yūjirō shi ni kotaeru" 戦後日本の哲学の条件—中村雄二郎氏に答える [The terms of postwar Japanese philosophy: A reply to Nakamura Yūjirō], *Shisō* (March 1987): 146–55. For a discussion of the debate between Takeuchi and Nakamura see Nishijima Takeo's 西島建男 column in the evening edition of the *Asahi Shinbun*, 6 April 1986, "Gendai tetsugaku o tou:

Takeuchi-Nakamura ronsō" 現代哲学を問う—竹内中村論争 [Questioning contemporary philosophy: The Takeuchi-Nakamura debate]. Unlike Nakamura, Takeuchi responded directly to the three questions that were put to each of them. One should note particularly that Nakamura himself considers postmodern thought a form of "syncretism"—despite the fact that "syncretism" is neither an "idea" nor a system of thought at all. See my "Buddhism and the Kami: Against Japanism," 221, n. 4.

54 *Komazawa University Campus Newsletter* 150 (25 March 1987).

55 See my "Critique of the *Vimalakīrti Sutra.*"

56 Takasaki Jikidō, *An Introduction to Buddhism.*

57 Takasaki Jikidō 高崎直道, "Aisatsu—Bukkyō shisō gakkai hossoku ni saishite" 挨拶—仏教思想学会発足に際して [Welcoming remarks at the inauguration of the Association of Buddhist Philosophy], *Bukkyōgaku* 19 (1986), 3.

58 Takasaki, *What is Buddha-Nature?*, 142.

59 Weber, "Science as a Vocation," 143.

60 Yamaguchi Zuihō, *Tibet,* vol. 1, iii; emphasis added.

61 *Tibet,* vol. 1, iii–iv; emphasis added.

62 Nakamura Hajime 中村 元 and Saegusa Mitsuyoshi 三枝充悳, *Baudda* バウッダ (Tokyo: Shōgakkan, 1987), 22; emphasis added.

63 See my review essay, "Kobayashi Hideo's *Motoori Norinaga.*"

64 See my "*Vijñāpti-mātra* and *Anātman:* My 'Seated Meditation' "; and "Thoughts on 'Truth' while Reading *Sickness unto Death.*"

65 See Robert A. Thurman, *Tsong Khapa's Speech of Gold in the Essence of True Eloquence: Reason and Enlightenment in the Central Philosophy of Tibet* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 91, n. 124.

66 Yamauchi Shun'yū 山内舜雄, ed., *Religious Studies I*; published privately in 1979.

The Limits of Criticism

1 Paul J. Griffiths, *An Apology for Apologetics.*

2 For example, in the *Adhyāśayasañcodana-sūtra* it is said that whatever has been well said (*subhāsitam*) has been said by the Buddha (*buddhabhāsitam*). This sutra is an early Indian work (ca. second century AD), no longer extant but quoted in Louis de La Vallée Poussin, ed., *Bodhicaryāvatārapañjikā* (Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1901–1914), 431–2; and in P. L. Vaidya, ed. *Śiksāsamuccaya* (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1961), 12. See my own *On Being Buddha: The Classical Doctrine of Buddhahood* (Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 1994), chapter 2, for some details.

3 William A. Christian, Sr. calls this the "A-T/R schema," meaning that if a doctrine is an authentic (A) doctrine of the community, then it must be true (T), in the case of a descriptive doctrine, or right (R), in the case of a commendatory one. See his *Doctrines of Religious Communities:A Philosophical Study* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), 68–86.

[4] I mean especially Wilfred Cantwell Smith. Views such as this are implied by or explicitly stated in many of his works, most notably in *The Meaning and End of Religion* (New York: Macmillan, 1963) and *Towards a World Theology* (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1981).

[5] I base what is said here mostly upon Hakamaya's essay "*Tathatā* as Topos." Page 289 includes a useful chart showing the key differences between critical and topical philosophy as Hakamaya sees them (reproduced above, *89*). See also Hakamaya's essays "Critical Philosophy versus Topical Philosophy" and "Scholarship as Criticism," translated in this volume.

[6] Max Weber's ideas about ideal types are clearly stated in his "Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions," in Gerth and Wright, *From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology*, 323–39, esp. 323–4.

[7] On mirror imagery in Buddhism see: Paul Demiéville, "Le miroir spirituel," *Sinologica* 1/2 (1947): 112–37; Alex Wayman, "The Mirror-Like Knowledge in Mahāyāna Buddhist Literature" *Asiatische Studien* 25 (1971): 353–63, and "The Mirror as a Pan-Buddhist Metaphor-Simile" *History of Religions* 13 (1974): 251–69. And for some texts on the *ādarśa-jñāna* see Paul J. Griffiths, John P. Keenan, Hakamaya Noriaki, and Paul L. Swanson, *The Realm of Awakening: A Translation and Study of the Tenth Chapter of Asaṅga's Mahāyānasaṅgraha* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 104–6. See Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), for some criticism of this as a governing trope in philosophy.

[8] See, for example, *Critical Buddhism*, 38–9, for Hakamaya's rejection of appeals to authority, illustrated by his reading of Ōe Kenzaburō's *Grave across the Tightrope* in 1989, and his identification of such appeals with topicalism.

[9] On this see Dignāga's *Pramānasamuccaya*, the *pratyakṣa* chapter of which is available in English: Hattori, *Dignāga on Perception*.

[10] Yogacara Buddhist theorists tend to call these adventitious defilements *āgantuka-kleśāḥ*. See, for example, Sitansusekhar Bagchi, ed., *Mahāyānasutrālaṅkāra of Asaṅga* (Darbhanga: Mithila Institute, 1970), 59; Hakamaya Noriaki and Arai Hiroaki, tr., *Daijō shōgon kyōron* 大乗荘厳経論 [*Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*], Shin Kokuyaku Daizōkyō, Yuga-yuishiki Bu 12 (Tokyo: Daizō Shuppan, 1993), 168–9. A standard Indian example is that of a cataract in the eye: this affects vision but is not intrinsic to the visual sense and can be disposed of.

[11] Rorty is again relevant and typical here in his identification of philosophy as just one more kind of writing. See Richard Rorty, *The Consequences of Pragmatism: Essays 1972–1980* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), 90–109.

[12] The connections that Hakamaya makes between religion, philosophy, and scholarship are most evident in his "Scholarship as Criticism," translated in this volume.

[13] A representative selection of Hakamaya's polemics against all this can be seen in his essay "The Anti-Buddhist Character of *Wa* and the Antiviolent Character of Buddhism."

[14] Max Weber, "Science as a Vocation."

[15] I leave entirely untreated here the interesting question of whether Hakamaya's exegesis of Weber is likely to be correct, though I suspect, in an amateurish way, that on this matter at least it probably is.

[16] See Alvin Plantinga, *Warrant* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993); and William Alston, *Epistemic Justification* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989).

[17] Plantinga, *Warrant*, vol. 2, 29.

[18] John Locke, *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, ed. by P. H. Nidditch from the fourth edition of 1700 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1975), IV.17.xxiv.

[19] If one compares the epistemology of Locke, in the *Essay*, with that of Hume, in the *Treatise of Human Nature*, one sees that while they certainly do not agree on everything, epistemologically speaking they are both broadly internalist in their approach. By contrast, Augustine, in the *De Utilitate Credendi* ("On the Usefulness of Believing," in John Burleigh, trans., *Augustine: Earlier Writings* [Philadelphia: Westminster, 1953]); Thomas Reid, in the *Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man,* ed. by A. D. Woozley (London: Macmillan, 1941); and J. H. Newman, in *An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1985) offer broadly externalist views.

[20] *Critical Buddhism*, 114, 133.

[21] *Śraddhā* is listed under the attributes of criticalists in *Critical Buddhism*, 289.

[22] Lambert Schmithausen, "Buddhismus und Natur," in Raimundo Panikkar and Walter Strolz, eds., *Die Verantwortung des Menschen für eine bewohnbare Welt im Christentum, Hinduismus und Buddhismus* (Freiburg: Herder, 1985).

[23] Hakamaya, "Buddhism as Critical of the Idea of 'Nature'."

[24] Schmithausen, *Buddhism and Nature*, especially 53–62.

[25] Schmithausen, *Buddhism and Nature*, 56.

[26] See *Buddhism and Nature*, 56, n. 317, for Schmithausen's shifty footwork in this connection.

[27] Hakamaya, "Buddhism as Critical of the Idea of 'Nature'," 396–7.

[28] Schmithausen, *Buddhism and Nature*, p. 588.

[29] See Hakamaya, *Critical Buddhism*, p. 16, where Śākyamuni is said to be the first criticalist in India.

[30] But no more shaky than Schmithausen, who prefers the dubious reconstructions of Tilmann Vetter, *The Ideas and Meditative Practices of Early Buddhism* (Leiden: Brill, 1988). Hakamaya's apparent rejection of the deliverances of positivist Weberian historiography is of a piece with his self-identification as a Buddhist, and of what I hope is his principled externalism in epistemology. The truth is that Hakamaya's views as to what Śākyamuni taught are just as well-grounded as Schmithausen's or Vetter's: all of them have a very low probability of being true.

[31] Schmithausen acknowledges at the beginning of *Buddhism and Nature* (2) his own deep emotional and axiological commitments to the view that the "atrocities perpetuated by man against nature" and "the tremendous loss of natural beauty and diversity" are disastrous and indefensible. But he immediately goes on to say that his goal in the work

under discussion is to "describe and analyze, as objectively as possible, the attitude of the Buddhist tradition towards nature"—as if this could be done without permitting his ideological commitments to permeate his reading of the Buddhist tradition.

[32] Schmithausen, *Buddhism and Nature*, 62.

Comments on Critical Buddhism

[1] These comments were read as part of my response at the panel on Critical Buddhism at the annual conference of the American Academy of Religion in Washington, D.C., on 22 November 1993.

[2] On my approach to Tibetan Madhyamika philosophy, see my "The Mādhyamika Philosophy of Tsong-kha-pa."

[3] See *Pratītyasamutpāda and Emptiness*, 153.

[4] For my criticism of Hakamaya's theory on this point, see my essay on "Deep Faith in Causality" (1991), reprinted in my book *Critical Studies on Zen Thought*, 579–630.

[5] See *Pratītyasamutpāda and Emptiness*, 239–47.

[6] I consider the *Suttanipāta* to be a kind of ascetic literature that was quite popular in India at the time of the Buddha, and that advocated the liberation (*mokṣa*) of the soul (atman) from the body and its desires through ascetic practices. This is an idea based on *atma-vāda*. I cannot accept Nakamura Hajime's method of studying early Buddhism, insofar as he understands the verse portions of the early Buddhist texts like the *Suttanipāta* as the primary sources for clarifying the teachings of the Buddha. On this issue see my "Critical Considerations on Buddhism" (1994), 132–55.

[7] See *Pratītyasamutpāda and Emptiness*, 200–207.

[8] See my essay on "The Meaning of 'Zen'" in this volume, *242–50*.

[9] For more details on these two types, see my *Critical Studies on Zen Thought*, 96–103 and 589–97.

The Doctrine of *Tathāgata-garbha* Is Not Buddhist

[1] This essay was inspired by the writings of four of my colleagues in the Sōtō sect: Takasaki Jikidō, *The Formation of Tathāgata-garbha Thought*; Yamauchi Shun'yū *Dōgen's Zen and the Tendai Hongaku Tradition*; Yamaguchi Zuihō, "Tibetan Studies and Buddhism"; and two essays by Hakamaya Noriaki, "Thoughts on the Ideological Background of Social Discrimination" and "The Definitive Standpoint for Understanding Dōgen." I understand the work of Yamauchi, Yamaguchi, and Hakamaya to be critical of the notion of *tathāgata-garbha*. (Yamaguchi and Hakamaya are no longer in the Sōtō sect.)

[2] See "On *Pratītyasamutpāda*."

[3] *Mahāvagga*, I, 1.3; English translation by T. W. Rhys Davids and Hermann Oldenberg in *Vinaya Texts*, Part I (Sacred Books of the East 13), reprinted by Motilal Banarsidass, 1974), 78.

[4] Tamaki Kōshirō 玉城康四郎, "Bukkyō ni okeru hō no kongentai" 仏教における法の根源態 [The fundamental structure of Buddhist dharma], in Hirakawa Akira Hakase Kanreki Kinen Ronbunshū 平川彰博士還暦記念論文集, *Bukkyō ni okeru hō no kenkyū* 仏教における法の研究 [The study of "dharma" in Buddhism](Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1975), 59.

[5] Tsuda Shin'ichi 津田真一, "Engi-setsu no konkyo no isō to shite no hō no kōzō" 縁起説の根拠の位層としての法dharmaの構造 [The structure of dharma as the requisite foundation of the theory of *pratītyasamutpāda*], in Hirakawa Akira Hakase Koki Kinenkai, ed., *Essays in honor of Dr. Hirakawa Akira,* 71–3, 79, 82. The passage cited is from page 77.

[6] See my "On *Pratītyasamutpāda*" for a critique of Tsuda's ideas and my interpretation of *pratītyasamutpāda*.

[7] Hirakawa Akira 平川 彰, *Shoki daijō Bukkyō no kenkyū* 初期大乗仏教の研究 [Studies in early Mahayana Buddhism] (Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1968), 202 n. 1. The passage referred to is found in the Vaidya edition, 3, l.18 (T No. 224, 8.425c24).

[8] See my "The Ekayana Theory in Yogacara."

[9] Ui Hakuju understands the scriptural reference to *icchantika* in the *Ratnagotravibhāga* ("*icchantika* are those forever lacking the capacity for nirvana," Johnston, ed., 37) to be the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sūtra*; see Ui Hakuju 宇井伯寿, *Hōshōron kenkyū* 宝性論研究 [Studies in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1959), 536, n. 4.

[10] See Takasaki, *The Formation of Tathāgata-garbha Thought*, 137, 161–2.

[11] The Dharmakṣema translation reads: "All sentient beings possess the Buddha-nature; because of this nature, upon the severing of the innumerable myriads of defilements, the highest perfect enlightenment can be attained, except for the *icchantika*" (T No. 374, 12.404c).

[12] Dharmakṣema's translation reads: "Even the *icchantika* possess the Buddha-nature; it is, however, covered by the filth of limitless transgressions and it is not able to emerge, like a silkworm in its cocoon. Because of their karma, they are unable to give rise to the *wondrous cause of enlightenment* and will revolve in samsara forever" (T No. 374, 12.419b).

[13] Takasaki, *The Formation of Tathāgata-garbha Thought*, 161, 166.

[14] Takasaki, *The Formation of Tathāgata-garbha Thought*, 419.

[15] In other words, *gotra* and [*bodhi-*]*hetu* are not the same as *dhātu* and *garbha*.

[16] See my "The *Srīmālādevī Sutra* and Ekayana Theory."

[17] See, for example, Takasaki, *The Formation of Tathāgata-garbha Thought,* 762; *A Study on the Ratnagotravibhāga* , 60–1; *An Introduction to Buddhism*, 221.

The Doctrine of Buddha-Nature Is Impeccably Buddhist

[1] *Fo hsing lun,* T No. 1610, 31.787–813. Vasubandhu's authorship is doubtful. The *Buddha-Nature Treatise* draws heavily upon the *Ratnagotravibhāga* and clearly shows

considerable influence from Paramārtha, who espoused Buddha-nature ideas throughout his career. Many scholars, including myself, believe that Paramārtha is the most likely author of the work.

[2] I have treated this subject in greater detail in my *Buddha Nature*. Some of the translations in the present chapter appeared there in slightly different form.

[3] T 31.793a14–16, 20–21.

[4] T 31.798c1–7, 10–12.

[5] T 31.798b26–798c1, 798c12–21.

[6] T 31.787a8.

[7] T 31.787a8–21, 787b6–16, 27–28.

[8] T 31.811b17–24.

[9] T 31.788c18–24.

[10] T 31.787b4–5.

[11] T 31.787b8–9.

[12] Matsumoto, "The *Lotus Sutra* and Japanese Culture."

[13] T 31.794b8–14.

[14] T 31.795c25–27.

[15] T 31.794c.

[16] *Tathāgatagarbha-sūtra*, T No. 666, 16.457b28–457c3.

[17] These antiauthoritarian ideas often pertain to the authority of others and do not extend to one's own authority over others. A critical view of one's own authority is an exceedingly rare development, however, even among the persecuted, as colonial American religious history clearly shows.

[18] Thich Nhat Hanh, *Being Peace* (Berkeley: Parallax Press, 1987), 13, 15.

The Idea of *Dhātu-vāda* in Yogacara and *Tathāgata-garbha* Texts

[1] Matsumoto, "The *Śrīmālādevī Sūtra* and Ekayana Theory," 313.

[2] Hakamaya, "Critical Notes on the *Awakening of Mahayana Faith*," 66.

[3] Matsumoto, "Deep Faith in Causality: Thoughts on Dōgen's Ideas," 201–2 (581–2).

[4] Hakamaya, "The Significance of the Critique of Original Enlightenment," 8 *et passim*.

[5] Matsumoto, "On *Pratītyasamutpāda*," 67.

[6] This chart is a composite of the charts from three of Matsumoto's essays: "The Ekayana theory in Yogacara," 305; "The Doctrine of *Tathāgata-garbha* Is Not Buddhist," *170* and "On *Pratītyasamutpāda*," 67.

[7] Matsumoto, "The Doctrine of *Tathāgata-garbha* Is Not Buddhist," *170–71*.

[8] Hakamaya adds two additional features to this list:

7. Super-loci are unconditionally encompassed by locus.
8. Super-loci are expressible with words, but locus is beyond verbal expression.

See his *Dōgen and Buddhism*, 28, 129; and "The Characteristics of the Zen Sects," 81.

[9] Matsumoto, "The Doctrine of *Tathāgata-garbha* Is Not Buddhist," *171.*

[10] Matsumoto, "The Doctrine of *Tathāgata-garbha* Is Not Buddhist," *171.*

[11] Matsumoto, "The Doctrine of *Tathāgata-garbha* Is Not Buddhist," *171.*

[12] *dharmadhātor asambhedād gotra-bhedo na yujyate* |
ādheya-dharma-bhedāt tu tad-bhedaḥ parigīyate || (Wogihara, 77.28–9)

[13] More precisely, we might say that all sentient beings possess the *tathāgata* within themselves.

[14] Matsumoto, "The Doctrine of *Tathāgata-garbha* Is Not Buddhist," *171.*

[15] Matsumoto does not consider this an appropriate translation. See "The Doctrine of *Tathāgata-garbha* Is Not Buddhist," *169.* My use of the word is merely for the sake of convenience.

[16] The Sanskrit reads:
tatra gotraṃ katamat | *samāsato gotraṃ* ***dvi-vidham*** | *prakṛtisthaṃ samudānītaṃ ca* |
tatra prakṛtisthaṃ gotraṃ yad bodhisattvānāṃ ṣaḍāyatana-viśeṣaḥ | *sa tādṛśaḥ paramparâgato 'nādi-kāliko dharmatā-pratilabdhaḥ*
tatra samudānītaṃ gotraṃ yat pūrva-kuśalamūlâbhyāsāt pratilabdhaṃ |
tad asminn arthe dvi-vidham apy abhipretaṃ | *tat punar gotraṃ bīja****m ity a****py ucyate dhātuḥ prakṛtir ity api* | (Wogihara, 3.1-8; bold type indicates reconstructions by Wogihara)

[17] Hakamaya, "*Tathatā, Dharmadhātu, Dharmatā,*" 261.

[18] See Hakamaya, *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* (1993), 44–5.

[19] This reconstruction is supported by the following correspondence in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*: *rang bzhin gyis gnas pa* (Derge No. 4037[Wi]2b4) = *prakṛtistha* (see quotation in note 16 above).

[20] The Tibetan reads:
mdor-bsdu na khams ni gnyis yod de | *rang-bzhin gyis gnas-pa* dang | *goms-pas yongs-su-brtas-pa'o* |
de la rang-bzhin gyis gnas-pa ni ji-ltar khams bco-brgyad-po 'di dag so-sor nges-par rgyud-la-yod-pa'i sa-bon no ||
*de la goms-pas yongs-su-brtas**-*pa'i khams ni dge-ba 'am mi-dge-ba'i chos sngon gyi skye-ba gzhan-dag tu kun-tu [D. du]-brten[Pek. bsten]-pa gang yin pa de-dag yang-dag-par-grub-par bya -ba'i phyir* | *da-lta sa-bon yongs-su-brtas**-*pa rten la gnas-pa yin te* | *des na de rkyen chung-ngu-tsam la yang dmigs nas des bkri-zhing des 'gro-bar 'gyur ro* || (Pek. No.5540, vol.111[i]330a3–6; Derge No.4039[Zi]288b1– 3; T 30. 846c18–23)
* Pek. has *rtas*, but Derge has *brtas.*

See my essay, "Shoki Yugagyōha ni okeru kai no shisō ni tsuite: *Akṣarāśi-sūtra* o megutte 初期ゆ伽行派に於ける界の思想について—*Akṣarāśi-sūtra* をめぐって [The *dhātu* theory in early Yogacara: A study of the *Akṣarāśi Sutra*]," in *Machikaneyama ronsō*:

Tetsugaku hen 待兼山論叢—哲学篇 12 (1987): 26–9. Note that the last sentence is not translated in the citation.

[21] *Paripuṣṭaṃ* [*gotram*] of *kārikā* III.4 is interpreted as *samudānītam* [*gotram*] in the *Bhāṣya* (Sylvain Lévi, ed. *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*. Paris: Honoré Champion, 1907, 11.10–12).

[22] The *Vastusaṃgrahaṇī* gives Yogacara interpretations of the sutras of the *Saṃyuktāgama*, and the portion we have just seen is an introduction to the chapter discussing the sutras on *dhātu*. See Mukai Akira 向井 亮, *"Yugashijiron Shōjibun* to *Zōagon gyō—Ron* shosetsu no *Sōō Āgama* no taikō kara *Zōagon gyō* no soshiki fukugen'an made, fu *Ron Shōjibun-Kyō* taiō kankei ichiranhyō『瑜伽師地論』摂事分と『雑阿含経』—『論』所説の相応アーガマの大綱から『雑阿含経』の組織復原案まで—附『論』摂事分–『経』対応関係一覧表 [The *Yogācārabhūmi* and the *Samyuktāgama*: The synopsis of the *Samyuktāgama* given in the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the hypothetical reconstruction of the original system of the *Samyuktāgama*, with concordance between the *Vastusamgrahaṇī* and the *Samyuktāgama*], *Hokkaidō Daigaku Bungakubu kiyō* 33/2 (1985): 36). My interpretation is based on the contents of this chapter and the relevant sutras. See my "The *Dhātu* Theory in Early Yogacara," 21–4 (see note 20 above).

[23] Hakamaya, "A Source of the Three-Vehicle Theory," 135–6. Even in a more recent writing, he reconfirms this point; see his "*Tathatā, Dharmadhātu, Dharmatā*," 259.

[24] Further, compare the following passage from the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (Wogihara, 401, 4–11):

> *yat punas tad eva bījaṃ vibhjyâneka-prakāraṃ gṛhṇāti | idam nānā-dhātu-jñāna-balāt | sa punar dhātu-pravibhāgaḥ samāsataś catur-ākāro veditavyaḥ | prakṛtisthaṃ bījam pūrvâbhyāsa-samutthitaṃ bījam [|] viśodhyaṃ bījaṃ | tad-yathā parinirvāṇa-dharmakāṇām | aviśodhyaṃ ca bījaṃ | tad-yathā aparinirvāṇa-dharmakāṇām | yat tāvat yathā-dhātv-anurūpaṃ pratipad-avatāraṃ prajānāti | idaṃ nānā-dhātu-jñāna-balāt |*
>
> That [the Buddha] analyzes the seed [that gives rise to *adhimukti*] and understands many types [of them], [is done] by means of the wisdom of manifold *dhātu*. The divisions of *dhātu* should be known, in sum, as fourfold: the seed existing by nature; the seed actualized by former habitual practice; the seed to be purified, namely of those who have the nature of *parinirvāṇa*; and the seed that cannot be purified, namely of those who do not have the nature of *parinirvāṇa*. That [the Buddha] knows the practice and entrance [to the truth] in conformity with the *dhātu* is by means of the wisdom of manifold *dhātu*.

Here again *dhātu*, *bīja*, (and *gotra*) are treated interchangeably. The expression *nānā-dhātu-jñāna-bala* clearly presupposes the manifoldness of *dhātu* in this context.

[25] This is the opinion of Sthiramati in the *Sūtrālaṃkāra-vṛttibhāṣya* (Pek. No. 5531, vol.108[Mi] 46a7–b4):

> *…ji-tar* ***Ri-lu'i phung-po bstan-pa'i mdo*** *las | bcom-ldan-'das kyis 'di-lta-ste | dge-slong-dag ri-lu'i phun- po 'phang-du yang dpag-tshad gcig-tsam la chu zheng-du yang dpag-tshad gcig-tsam yod-pa'i ri-lu'i phung-po de las skyes-bu la-la-zhig gis lo brgya'am lo brgya 'das nas ri-lu gcig blangs te | ri-lu 'di ni nyan-thos kyi khams su*

gtogs | ri-lu 'di ni rang-sangs-rgyas kyi khams su gtogs zhes smras na yang ri-lu de myur-du zad cing med-par 'gyur gyi sems-can gyi khams ni de-ltar zad par mi 'gyur ro zhes gsungs-pa lta-bu'o ||

gsung-rab 'di la khams zhes bya-ba'i don gang zhe na |

Khams mang-po bstan-pa'i mdo *dang sbyar na ni mig la-sogs-pa'i khams tha-dad-par bstan-pa'i sgo-nas khams dpag-tu-med-pa 'on-kyang 'di'i skabs su ni rigs la khams zhes bya ste | khams zhes kyang bya | rigs zhes kyang bya | rgyu zhes kyang bya | sa bon zhes kyang bya ste | rnam-grangs su gtogs so || …gang 'dod-chags la-sogs-pa'i rigs yod-pa de-dag ni 'dod-chags bskyed-pa nyid kyi rgyu byed kyi zhe-sdang bskyed-pa'i rgyu mi-byed-pa bzhin-du theg-pa gsum gyi rigs tha-dad-pa rnam-pa gsum yang med-du mi-rung ste | rigs tha-dad-pa gsum med na ci'i phyir theg-pa rnam-pa gsum du 'gyur-ba mi-rigs so ||*

…As is stated by the Blessed One in the *Akṣarāśi-sūtra* (*Ri-lu'i phung-po bstan-pa'i mdo*): "O monks, [imagine that] a person takes one seed of *akṣa* from a heap of *akṣa* seeds, which is one *yojana* in width and height, in one hundred years or even more and says, 'This *akṣa* seed belongs to the *dhātu* of sravaka, this *akṣa* seed belongs to the *dhātu* of pratyekabuddha.' Even in that case, those *akṣa* seeds will soon be exhausted, but the *dhātu* of sentient beings will not be exhausted."

[Question:] What is the meaning of *dhātu* in this teaching?

[Answer:] According to the *Bahudhātuka-sūtra* (*Khams mang-po bstan-pa'i mdo*), *dhātu* are boundless in terms of the various *dhātu*, such as eye-*dhātu*, stated [there], but in this chapter [of the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*], *dhātu* refers to *gotra*. *Dhātu*, *gotra*, *hetu* (cause), and *bīja* (seed) are all synonymous.… The origins (*rigs*, *gotra* [=*dhātu*]) of lust (*'dod-chags*, *rāga*) and so forth only function as the cause of the arising of lust and not of hatred (*zhe-sdang*, *dveṣa*); in the same way, the threefold *gotra*s of the three vehicles cannot be nonexistent [as the distinct causes of the three vehicles]. Without the threefold distinction among *gotra*s, the reason of the [distinction among] the three vehicles would not be understandable.

The reference to the *Sūtrālaṃkāra-vṛttibhāṣya* here is far from arbitrary. This portion of the *Sūtrālaṃkāra-vṛttibhāṣya* is a discussion of the *Akṣarāśi-sūtra*, and the *Vastu-saṃgrahaṇī* discusses the same sutra just after the aforementioned introduction. See Hakamaya, "A Source of the Three-vehicle Theory," 132–7, and Yamabe, "The *Dhātu* Theory In Early Yogacara," 24–9.

[26] The Sanskrit reads:

…etac caiva kathaṃ bhaviṣyaty eṣāṃ prahīṇaḥ kleśa eṣām aprahīṇa iti | prāptau satyāṃ etat sidhyati tad-vigamâvigamāt |

āśraya-viśeṣād etat sidhyati | āśrayo hi sa āryāṇāṃ darśana-bhāvanā-mārga-sāmarthyāt tathā parāvṛtto bhavati yathā na punas tat-praheyāṇāṃ kleśānāṃ praroha-samartho bhavati | ato 'gni-dagdha-vrīhivad abījī-bhūte āśraye kleśānām prahīṇa-kleśa ity ucyate | (P. Pradhan, ed., *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* [Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1975, second edition], 63.19-23)

See my "*Bīja* Theory in *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*," *Indogaku Bukkyōgaku kenkyū* 38/2 (1990): 929. The translation of the first paragraph, not translated in the main text, is as follows:

> [Question: If there is no *prāpti* (acquisition) as one of the *citta-viprayukta-saṃskāra*,] how do you explain the distinction between those who have abandoned defilements (*kleśa*) and those who have not? If there is *prāpti*, [the distinction] is made in terms of the association with or separation from the [*prāpti*].

27 Note also that *bīja* and *gotra* are treated synonymously throughout the Yogacara texts, and that the close affinity between the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* and the *Yogācāra-bhūmi* has already been established by several Japanese scholars, one of the most important of whom is none other than Hakamaya himself in his "On *Pūrvācārya*." I see no problem therefore in interpreting the *gotra* of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* by means of the *bīja* of the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*.

28 Compare the following passage from the *Triṃśikā-bhāṣya* (Sylvain Lévi, ed., *Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*. Paris: H. Champion, 1925, 38.28–9):

> *tasmiṃś* [=*kleśa bīja*] *cāpanīte na punas tenāśrayeṇa kleśānām utpattir iti sōpadhiśeṣo nirvāṇa-dhātuḥ prāpyate* |
>
> When that [seed of defilement] is removed, no defilements arise from that body (*āśraya*), and thus *nirvāṇa-dhātu* with remainder is attained.

29 Compare the following passage from the *Madhyāntavibhāga-ṭīkā*, which is also discussed by David Seyfort Ruegg in his *La Théorie du tathāgatagarbha et du gotra*, 98:

> *gotrasya ca viśuddhy-artham,*
>
> *tasya śūnyatā prakṛti-śūnyatā, atrâiva kāraṇam āha, gotraṃ hi prakṛtir iti, kuta etat, ata āha, svābhāvik**ād iti svābhāvikam anādi-kālikam, an-āgantukam ity arthaḥ, yathânādi-saṃsāre kiñcic cetanaṃ** kiñcid acetanam evam ihâpi kiñcit ṣaḍāyatanaṃ buddha-gotraṃ kiṃcic chrāvakâdi-gotram iti* | *na câkasmikatvaṃ gotrasyânādi-paramparâgatatvāc cetanâcetana-viśeṣavad iti* |
>
> ***sarva-sattvasya tathāgata-gotrikatvād atra gotram iti tathātā*** * ***jñeyam ity anye*** |
>
> (Yamaguchi, 55.19–56.6; bold text indicates reconstruction by the editor)

* According to Yamaguchi, Peking and Narthang editions have *de bzhin du shes bya'o* (Derge also has the same reading, No. 4032[Bi]216b3). He suggests, however, amending the text to read *de bzhin nyid du shes bya'o* and reconstructs *tathātvaṃ*. His suggestion seems plausible, but if that is the case, probably *tathatā* is the more likely Sanskrit. As we shall see later in the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra-vṛtti*, there were obviously some who interpreted *gotra* as a universal principle (*dharmadhātu*, etc.).

> "In order to purify the *gotra*" (*Madhyāntavibhāga* I.19a)
>
> Its emptiness is the *prakṛti-śūnyatā*. [The *Bhāṣya*] states the reason for this as follows: "[It is] because *prakṛti* is *gotra*." How so? Therefore, [the *Bhāṣya*] says, "for it is inherent," which means "from the beginningless past" and "not adventitious." Just as something is sentient and something is insentient from the beginningless transmigration, so too here, some six-sense-basis has *buddha-gotra*, and some *śrāvaka-gotra*. [The distinction] is not accidental, because *gotra* has been transmitted continuously from the beginningless [past], as has the distinction between the

sentient and the insentient.

Others say, "Since all the sentient beings have *tathāgata-gotra*, here *gotra* should be known as *tathatā*."

This juxtaposition of the two interpretations of *gotra* is important. The first opinion largely agrees with our interpretation of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. As we shall see later, the meaning of *gotra* is redefined in later *tathāgata-garbha* texts. It seems that the Yogacara school was itself not entirely free from the influence of such reinterpretation at the time of Sthiramati.

[30] In the system of *abhidharma*, *anāsrava* mental elements fall in the category of *mārga-satya*:

ya ete mano-dharma-manovijñāna-dhātava uktāḥ
sāsravânāsravā ete trayaḥ (I.31cd)
ye mārga-satyâsaṃskṛta-saṃgṛhītās te 'nāsravā anye sāsravāḥ | (Pradhan, 21.23–25)

The *dhātu* of *manas*, dharma, and *manovijñāna* were mentioned [in verse I.31ab],
These three are defiled or pure.
Those that are included in [the categories of] *mārga-satya* and *asaṃskṛta* are pure, others are defiled.

Dharmadhātu contains *caitasikā dharmāḥ* (mental functions) in the Sarvāstivāda system. Since supramundane wisdom (an *anāsrava* mental element) is pure but not *asaṃskṛta* (which includes only *ākāśa*, *pratisaṃkhyā-nirodha*, and *apratisaṃkhyā-nirodha*), it is included in the category of *mārga-satya*. Naturally, *mārga-satya* is considered *saṃskṛta* (*mārga-satyasya saṃskṛtatvāt*, *Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā*, Wogihara, 12.25), and therefore requires causes and conditions to arise (*hetu-pratyaya-janitā rūpâdayaḥ saṃskṛtāḥ*, ibid., 12.22).

Thus, according to the framework of *abhidharma* Buddhism, supramundane wisdom is *saṃskṛta*, and requires its cause.

[31] *Asaṃskṛta* is beyond causality. See the following passage of the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* (Pradhan, 91.4–6):

saṃskṛtasyâiva dharmasya hetu-phale bhavataḥ |
nâsaṃskṛtasya te || (II.55d)
kiṃ kāraṇam | *ṣaḍvidha-hetv-asaṃbhavāt pañca-vidha-phalâsaṃbhavāc ca* |

Only for a *saṃskṛta* dharma, there are cause and fruit.
They [do] not [exist] for an *asaṃskṛta* [dharma].
For what reason? [It is] because neither the sixfold causes nor fivefold results are appropriate [for an *asaṃskṛta* dharma.]

[32] According to the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* in the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*, *tathatā*, which is regarded as *asaṃskṛta* (*de-bzhin-nyid ni 'dus-ma-byas yin no*, Pek. No. 5539, vol.111 ['i] 5a7), is not a (generative) cause (*de-bzhin-nyid ni rgyu ma yin no*, Pek. No. 5539, vol.111['i] 7a4–5); *tathatā* only falls in the category of *ālambana-pratyaya* (*de-bzhin-nyid ni dmigs-pa'i rkyen gyis bsdus-pa kho-na yin no*, Pek. No. 5539, vol.111['i] 5b7).

From the point of view of Yogacara history, however, the real problem may be the identification of *tathatā* with *asaṃskṛta*. The separation of *tathatā* from phenomenal *vastu*, which has been pointed out by Hakamaya in his essay "*Nirvikalpa-jñāna* in Yogacara Literature," 219, may be related to this identification. One also finds important exceptions in the *Sopadhikā-* and *Nirupadhikā-bhūmi* of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*. See Lambert Schmithausen, *Der Nirvāṇa-Abschnitt in der Viniścayasamgrahaṇī der Yogācārabhūmiḥ* (Vienna: Verlag der Österreichischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1969), 42–5. See also the *Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lun* 顯揚聖教論 (T 31.581c5–8), which states that all the actions of the Buddha arise on the basis of the **asaṃskṛta-dharmakāya*.

[33] For example, *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* IX.57. See Yamabe, "On *Tathatā-ālambana-praryaya-bīja*," 80–1. Peter Harvey notes that the *Atthasālinī* 221 and the *Visuddhimagga* 668 (both PTS editions) also state that "a path takes *nibbāna* as its object, and this is void (as void of attachment, etc.) *animitta* and desireless." See his "'Signless' Meditations in Pāli Buddhism," *The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 9/1 (1986): 30.

[34] Here again this interpretation is in harmony with the framework of *abhidharma* Buddhism. The *Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā* (Wogihara, 45.9–12; compare *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* 13.22–3, quoted in the riposte, n. 23) reads:

> ***asaṃskṛtaṃ na dhātuḥ syāt*** | <u>*na*</u> *hy asaṃskṛtam asaṃskṛtasyânyasya vā* <u>*sabhāga-hetuḥ*</u> |
> ***citta-caittānāṃ tarhîti*** | *kiṃ* | *ākarā iti prakṛtaṃ* | *dvayaṃ pratītya vijñānasyotpattir iti sarva-dhātavo vijñānasya sa-saṃprayogasya pratyayo 'vaśyam* <u>*ālambanam*</u> <u>*adhipatiś*</u> *cêty ākarāḥ* |
> [Question: If the word *dhātu* is defined as cause,] ***asaṃskṛta* [dharma] would not be a *dhātu***, because *asaṃskṛta* is <u>not a homogeneous cause</u> (*sabhāga-hetu*) of either *asaṃskṛta* or *saṃskṛta*.
> [Answer:] **Of mind and mental functions**. What [does this incomplete sentence of the *Bhāṣya* mean]? The origin (*ākara*) is the subject [of discussion]. Because consciousness arises in dependence on two conditions [i. e., objects and sense organs], all the *dhātu* are necessary conditions for consciousness and things associated with consciousness as <u>cognitive objects</u> (*ālambana*) and as <u>supports</u> (*adhipati*). Thus [they are called] origins.

Bold type here indicates citations of the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*. The sense of the passage is that an unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) dharma that does not generate anything is called *dhātu* or "cause" merely in virtue of becoming the cognitive object of consciousness. According to the Sarvāstivāda *abhidharma*, no consciousness can arise without a cognitive object, so that even an unconditioned dharma can aid the origination of consciousness by becoming its object. It is only in this sense that an unconditioned dharma is regarded as "cause." It never generates anything directly.

[35] According to the *dhātu-vāda* arguments, universal *dharmadhātu* must generate all the dharmas, but I fail to find anything in the Yogacara literature to support such a view. Even in those special cases when *dharmadhātu* is referred to as a "cause," this only has to do with supramundane wisdom (or perhaps more precisely, the first moment of the

supramundane wisdom). Other elements arise from ordinary, plural seeds. See Lambert Schmithausen, *Buddhism and Nature*, 55, n. 311.

[36] As Matsumoto points out concerning the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra-bhāṣya* XI.53-59; XII.19–23, a universal *dharmadhātu* is also mentioned in the Yogacara literature in contexts dealing with the distinction of *gotra*. The main point in the passages referred to is that *ekayāna* doctrine, which is *ābhiprāyika* (possessed of hidden intent) according to the Yogacara school, was taught by the Buddha because the three vehicles share the same *dharmadhātu*. According to remarks on the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* XI.53 in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra-ṭīkā* and the *Sūtrālaṃkāra-vṛttibhāṣya*, the *ārya-dharma* of the three vehicles arise when they realize the same *dharmadhātu*, which is *yātavya*. On the basis of these passages, Matsumoto maintains that in Yogacara doctrine the universality of *dharmadhātu* does not deny the diversity of dharmas but rather serves as their ground. See Matsumoto, "The Ekayana Theory in Yogacara," 307–12.

The universality of *dharmadhātu* is also mentioned elsewhere in Yogacara texts in conjunction with *ekayāna*. See the *Saṃdhinirmocana Sutra* IX.32; cf. VII.14; *Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lun* T 31.581b20–5; *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* X.32 and relevant commentaries. See also Hayashima Osamu 早島 理, "*Chos yoṅs su tshol baḥi skabs* or *Dharmaparyeṣṭy adhikāra*: The XIth Chapter of the *Sūtrālamkāravṛttibhāṣya*, Subcommentary on the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra*," pt. 3, *Nagasaki Daigaku Kyōiku Gakubu jinbun kagaku kenkyū hōkoku* 28 (1979): 46–57. In all of these passages, *dharmadhātu* is mentioned only in order to dismiss the *ekayāna* doctrine. It should be noted that Yogacara considers *ekayāna* no more than a provisional teaching and never gives it final approval. In other words, the universal *dharmadhātu* is not a positive proof of the *gotra* distinction. Yogacara hesitantly admits the universality underlying the three vehicles only to the extent that they share the *dharmadhātu*. When Yogacara thinkers do try to establish the doctrine of *gotra* distinction, they typically resort to the diversity of *dhātu*. A good example of the contrast between the usage of pluralistic *dhātu/gotra* and that of monistic *dharmatā/ ekayāna* may be found in the *Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lun* (T 31.580c28–581b25). The typical structure of the Yogacara theory of *gotra* found in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, and other older portions of the *Yogācārabhūmi* is unquestionably pluralistic.

[37] Matsumoto ("The *Śrīmālādevī Sutra* and Ekayana Theory," 328) maintains that in India, Yogacara and *tathāgata-garbha* thought fall under the same rubric of *dhātu-vāda* and that there was no controversy between them. John P. Keenan, "Original Purity and the Focus of Early Yogācāra," *The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies* 5/1 (1982): 15, agrees on this latter point. This is not strictly true, however. The *Chêng wei-shih lun* 成唯識論 (**Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, T 31.8c18–9a7) expressly rejects the *prakṛti-prabhāsvara* theory. Although the text attributes this theory to the Vibhajyavādin, it is certain that the *Chêng wei-shih lun* is opposed to the *tathāgata-garbha* way of thinking. See the *Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā* 阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論 (T 27.140b24ff.).

[38] The question of whether *tathatā* takes part in causation or not is an important measure for distinguishing *tathāgata-garbha* theory from other Buddhist ways of thought. See Fujita Masahiro 藤田正浩, "Shoki nyoraizō kei kyōten to engi shisō" 初期如来蔵系経典と縁起思想 [Early *tathāgata-garbha* scriptures and *pratītyasamutpāda*], in *Essays in*

Honor of Dr. Hirakawa Akira: Issues in Buddhist Thought (1985), 214.

[39] The Sanskrit reads:

asamskṛtād apravṛtti-lakṣaṇād api tathāgatatvād anābhogataḥ sarva-saṃbuddha-kṛtyam ā saṃsāra-koṭer anuparatam anupacchinnaṃ pravartate | (E. H. Johnston, 8.11-12; Nakamura Zuiryū 中村瑞隆, ed. *Ratnagotravibhāga* [Tokyo: Sankibō Busshorin, 1961], 13.17–19)

All the actions of the Saṃbuddha arise without effort from the essence of Tathāgata (*tathāgatatva*) ceaselessly and continuously until the end of *saṃsāra*, even though it [*tathāgatatva*] is unconditioned [*asaṃskṛta*] and has the characteristic of non-arising.

[40] The Sanskrit reads:

samāsato 'nāsrave dhātau tathāgata-garbhe caturo 'rthān adhikṛtya catvāro nāma-paryāyā veditavyāḥ … tad-gotrasya prakṛter acintya-prakāra-samudāgamârthaḥ | *yam adhikôtyfiktam* | *sadāyatana-viśeṣaḥ sa tādṛśaḥ paraṃparâgato 'nādi-kāliko dharmatā-pratilabdha iti* | (*Ratnagotravibhāga*, Johnston, 55.10–17; Nakamura, 107.23–109.10.

In sum, the *anāsravadhātu*, that is *tathāgata-garbha*, is to be known by four names corresponding to its four meanings.… [The second is] the meaning of the inconceivable way of transmission (*acintya-prakāra-samudāgamârtha*) of the nature of the *gotra*. Concerning this [meaning], it is said that the distinct state of the six sense-bases [of bodhisattvas] was naturally acquired in the beginningless past and has been transmitted in the same way [up to the present].

The identification of *prakṛtistha-gotra* with *tathāgatagarbha/tathatā* may have been influenced by the *Kāśyapaparivarta*, which equates *gotra* with *asaṃskṛta*. Here, it should also be noted that the oldest Chinese translation by Lokakṣema has 羅漢滅 (**arhad nirodha*) instead of *gotra* (A. von Staël-Holstein, ed., *Kāśyapaparivarta*, [Shanghai: The Commercial Press, 1926], sec. 102). It is conceivable that the original **arhad-nirodha* was later replaced by *gotra* as the *tathāgata-garbha* theory developed. Ronald Davidson also questions whether the word *gotra* represents the original expression here ("Buddhist Systems of Transformation: *Āśraya-parivṛttil-parāvṛtti* among the Yogācāra" [Ph. D. dissertation. University of California, Berkeley, 1985], 101–2). On the other hand, Friedrich Weller is suspicious of the expression **arhad-nirodha* ("Kāśyapaparivarta nach der Han-Fassung verdeutscht," in *Friedrich Weller Kleine Schriften* (Stuttgart: F. Steiner, 1987), 1157–61.

[41] The Sanskrit reads:

tatra paścād antaśo mithyātva-niyata-saṃtānānām api sattvānāṃ kāyeṣu tathāgata-sūrya-maṇḍala-raśmayo nipatanti … | *yat punar idam uktam icchantiko 'tyantam aparinirvāṇa-dharmêti [sic] tan mahāyāna-dharma-pratigha icchantikatve hetur iti mahāyāna-dharma-pratigha-nivartanârtham uktaṃ kālântarâbhiprāyeṇa* | *na khalu kaścit prakṛti-viśuddha-gotra-saṃbhavād atyantâviśuddhi-dharmā bhavitum arhati* | (Johnston, 36.16–37.4; Nakamura, 71.8–16.)

Compare this with the following passage from the *Śrāvakabhūmi*:

ihâparinirvāṇa-dharmasya pudgalasyâdita evâlaya-tṛṣṇā sarveṇa sarvaṃ sarvathā ca sarva-buddhair āśraya-sanniviṣṭā aprahāṇa-dharmiṇī bhavaty anutpāṭyā dūrāgatā pragāḍha-sanniviṣṭhā idaṃ prathamam agotraka-sthasya pudgalasya liṃgaṃ* || (Takahashi Hisao 高橋尚夫, Matsunami Yasuo 松濤泰雄, Katsube Takatoshi 勝部隆敏, eds. "Bonbun *Shōmonji*: Sho yugasho chū shushōji, wayaku, kamon 梵文声聞地—初瑜伽処中種姓地,和訳,科文 [Sanskrit text of the *Śrāvakabhūmi*: *Gotrabhūmi* in the *prathamam yogasthānam*], *Taishō Daigaku Sōgō Bukkyō Kenkyūjo nenpō* 3 (1981): 199–201; Karunesha Shukla, ed., *Śrāvakabhūmi* [Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1973], 16.15–18)

Both editions of the text have *anutpādyā*, but the Tibetan has *ma bshig pa* (*bshig pa* = to destroy, break; Pek. No. 5537, vol. 110[Wi]8a8); Hsüan-tsang 不可傾拔 (T 30.398a4). I read it as *anutpāṭya*.

Here, for a person who by nature cannot attain *parinirvāṇa*, attachment to the *ālaya* is fixed from the very beginning in the body and cannot be removed or uprooted by any means at all, not [even] by all the Buddhas. [The attachment] has been transmitted from the distant past and is firmly fixed. [This is] the first sign that a person is not abiding in *gotra*.

42 For example, in the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha*, in which *dharmadhātu* plays an important role in soteriological contexts, the distinction among *gotra* is no longer stressed.

43 The Tibetan reads:

*'jig-rten las 'das-pa'i chos-rnams ni de-bzhin-nyid la dmigs-pa'i rkyen gyi sa-bon dang-ldan-par skye'i bag-chags bsags-pa'i sa-bon dang-ldan-pa ni ma yin no (*lokottara-dharmās tathatâlambana-pratyaya-bījā utpadyante na tûpacita-vāsanā-bījāḥ)* (Pek. No. 5539, vol. 110[Zi]30b1)

Supramundane dharmas arise with *tathatā*, which is the cognitive object [of meditation], as their seed (*bīja*), and not with accumulated residue (*vāsanā*) as their seed (*bīja*).

44 The Tibetan reads:

gal-te bag-chags bsags-pa'i sa-bon dang-ldan-par skye-ba ma yin na | de-lta na ni ci'i phyir gang-zag yongs-su-mya-ngan-las-'das-pa'i chos-can gyi rigs gsum rnam-par-bzhag-pa dang | gang-zag yongs-su-mya-ngan-las-mi-'da'-ba'i chos-can gyi rigs rnam-par-gzhag-pa mdzad de | 'di-ltar thams-cad la yang de-bzhin-nyid la dmigs-pa'i rkyen yod pa'i phyir ro zhe na | (Pek. No. 5539, vol. 110[Zi]30b1–3)

One may ask: "If [supramundane dharmas] do not arise with accumulated residue as their seed, then how does it come about that there are people of the three kinds of *gotra* that can attain nirvana and those of the *gotra* that cannot attain nirvana? For *tathatā* as a cognitive object exists for everybody."

45 The Sanskrit reads:

eka-mṛd-dravyâbhinirvṛttâika-tejaḥ-paripakva-kṣaudra-śarkarâdi-bhājana-bhedôdāharaṇena |

Corrado Pensa, ed., *Abhisamayālaṃkāra-vṛtti* (Rome: IsMEO, 1967), 77.14–15; see D. Seyfort Ruegg, "Ārya and Bhadanta Vimuktisena on the Gotra-Theory of the Prajñāpāramitā," *Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens und Archiv für*

Indische Philosophe 12–13 (1968): 310–11; Matsumoto, "The *Śrīmālādevī Sūtra* and EkayanaTheory," 317, 334.

[46] For example:

asati tu gotre sarveṇa sarvaṃ sarvathā bodher aprāptir eva veditavyā (*Bodhisattvabhūmi*, Wogihara, 11.18–19)

If there is no *gotra*, however, it should be known that the attainment of enlightenment is by any means at all impossible.

See also note 41 above.

[47] The *Vṛtti* follows the theory of the *Abhidharmakośa* that admits a limitless conversion of *śrāvaka-gotra* until the stage of *mūrdhan* (Pensa, 78.4–7; Seyfort Ruegg, "Ārya and Bhadanta Vimuktisena," 312). Thus, the possibility of conversion for sravakas is much greater than in the Yogacara theory, which allows conversion only for the *aniyatagotra*. I have not done an exhaustive study of the use of the word *gotra* in the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya,* but my impression is that the *gotra* in this text follows the tradition of *gotrabhū*—namely, that it represents the virtuous equivalent of the *nirvedha-bhāgīya* attained in the course of the practice. See Takasaki Jikidō, "Gotrabhū to gotrabhūmi" [*Gotrabhū* and *gotrabhūmi*], in Kanakura Hakase Koki Kinen Ronbunshū Kankōkai, ed., *Kanakura Hakase koki kinen—Indogaku bukkyōgaku ronshū* 金倉博士古稀記念—印度学 仏教学論集 [Festschrift for Dr. Kanakura: Essays on Indian and Buddhist studies] (Kyoto: Heirakuji Shoten, 1966), 330–1; Seyfort Ruegg, "Pāli *Gotta*/*Gotra* and the Term *Gotrabhū* in Pāli and Buddhist Sanskrit" (in *Buddhist Studies in Honour of I. B. Horner*, L. Cousins, A. Kunst, and K. R. Norman, eds., Boston: Reidel, 1974), 200. In this system, *gotra* does not seem to be something that exists of itself so much as something acquired through practice, so that one cannot apparently attain *śrāvaka-gotra* without practicing *śrāvaka-yāna*. If this is the case, it is very different from the kind of predetermination we find in the Yogacara system.

[48] For this reason, I disagree with Matsumoto's view that discrimination is more essential in this verse ("A Critique of Realism," 141–2).

[49] *ādhāraḥ pratipatteś ca dharmadhātu-svabhāvakaḥ* (Wogihara, 17).

[50] The translation of the omitted portion runs as follows:

They should explain the meaning of the word "*prakṛti*" in [the compound] "*prakṛtistha-gotra*." If it is used in the sense of "cause," it also applies to "the [*gotra*] attained by condition;" what [then] is the difference in meaning [between these two classes of *gotra*s]? [If we take the word "*prakṛti*"] in the sense of *dharmatā*, there is no such problem. Otherwise, [we can also say] that their [definition of] *gotra* is nominal (*prajñaptika*), while [ours] conforms to [the real] aspect [of dharmas] (*lākṣaṇika*). Therefore, [our interpretation] does not agree with [their interpretation].

[51] According to Takasaki Jikidō, "Shushō ni anjū suru bosatsu: Yugagyōha no shushōron, josetsu 種姓に安住する菩薩—瑜伽行派の種姓論・序説 [A bodhisattva resting in *gotra*: An introduction to the Yogacara theory of *gotra*]," in *Indo shisō to Bukkyō* : *Nakamura Hajime Hakase kanreki kinen ronshū* インド思想と仏教—中村元博士還暦記念論集 [Indian thought and Buddhism: Essays in honor of Dr. Nakamura Hajime]

(Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1973), 209, the expression *gotrastha* almost never appears in Mahayana sutras and is typical of the Yogacara literature. It is very likely that the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra-vṛtti* is anticipating an objection from the Yogacara side here.

[52] The Sanskrit reads:

> *tad anena dharma**dhātur evārya-dharmāṇāṃ hetutvāt** prakṛtistham gotram pratipatty-ādhāra ity upadarśayati* | …
> *ṣaḍāyatana-viśeṣo gotraṃ tad dvi-vidham: pratyaya-samudānītaṃ, prakṛty-avasthitaṃ cêty apare* | *taiḥ prakṛtistha-gotre prakṛty-abhidhānasyârtho vācyaḥ* | *kāraṇa-paryāyaś cet tad api pratyaya-samudānītam* | *iti kim artha-viśeṣaḥ* | *dharmatā-paryāye punar eṣa doṣo nâsti* | *prajñaptikaṃ vā teṣāṃ gotram, idaṃ tu lākṣaṇikam* | ***ato** na tenâdaḥ saṃgacchate* |
> *nanu ca dharmadhātor gotratve* sarvo gotra-sthaḥ prāpnoti, tasya sāmānya-vartitvāt* | *yathā câlambyamāna ārya-dharmāṇāṃ hetur bhavati, tathā gotram ucyata** iti kim atrâtiprasaṅgaṃ mṛgayati* | (*Vṛtti*, 76.17–77.7; cf. Seyfort Ruegg, "Ārya and Bhadanta Vimuktisena," 309–10; bold type indicates reconstruction by the editor, Pensa)

* The text has *gotratraṃ*, but the Tibetan is *rigs nyid yin na* (Pek. No. 5185, vol. 88 [Ka] 68b1).

** Although the text has a daṇḍa after ucyata, judging from the saṃdhi, this daṇḍa should be removed.

The translation of the last phrase is:

> Then why does one seek for [the charge of] an excessive application (*atiprasaṅga*) on this matter?

[53] For example, see Edward Conze, *The Prajñāpāramitā Literature* (revised and enlarged edition, Tokyo: Reiyukai, 1978), 102–3.

Response

[*] Editors' note: This response was given orally by Matsumoto Shirō at the panel on Critical Buddhism at the annual conference of the American Academy of Religion in Washington, D.C. in November 1993.

[1] Unrai Wogihara, ed., *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, 3, lines 1–8.

[2] See Hakamaya, *Critical Buddhism*, 261, lines 14–15.

[3] Citing Unrai Wogihara, ed., *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, 3, lines 1–8.

[4] Hakamaya's translation carries the same meaning; see his *Critical Buddhism*, 261.

[5] Yamabe translates the text of the *Sūtrālaṃkāra-vṛttibhāṣya* (Peking ed., Mi, 46a7–b4) in note 25 of his essay.

[6] Hakamaya has already shown my error in this, pointing out that the words in questions are synonymous in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, i.e., "bījaparyāyāḥ punar dhātur gotraṃ prakṛtir hetuḥ…paryāyā veditavyāḥ" (Vidhushekara Bhattacharya, ed. [Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1957], 26, lines 18–19); cf. Hakamaya, *Critical Buddhism*, 261.

[7] Cf. "tatra prakṛtisthaṃ gotraṃ yad bodhisattvānāṃ ṣaḍāyatanaviśeṣaḥ. sa tādṛśaḥ paraparāgato 'nādikāliko dharmatāpratilabdhaḥ" in Wogihara, ed., *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, 3, lines 2–4.

[8] In note 50 Yamabe translates a passage from the *Abhisamayālaṃkāra-vṛtti* of Ārya-vimuktisena.

[9] Yamabe notes that "*Tathatā* is synonymous with *dharmadhātu*, which, according to Hakamaya and Matsumoto, gives rise to all the mundane and supramundane elements. It should be noted, however, that the role of *tathatā* in soteriological contexts of the Yogacara system (especially in the *Yogācārabhūmi*) is rather limited. If it is sometimes called the cause of holy dharmas (namely supramundane wisdom), it is because *tathatā* assists the arising of supramundane wisdom by becoming its cognitive object or *ālambana-pratyaya*." It should be noted, however, that *tathatā* is called "locus" (*pada*, *gshi*) in the *Jñānālokālaṃkāra Sutra* (Peking ed., Kha, 321b8).

[10] Cf. Matsumoto, "The Ekayana Theory in Yogacara," 307; see also Matsumoto, *Pratītyasamutpāda and Emptiness*, 316.

[11] Johnston, ed., *Ratnagotravibhāga*, 36.

Riposte

[1] Matsumoto, "The Ekayana Theory in Yogacara," and "The *Śrīmālādevī Sutra* and Ekayana Theory."

[2] Matsumoto, "The Doctrine of *Tathāgata-garbha* Is Not Buddhist," *171.*

[3] My view on this matter is close to that of Takemura Makio 竹村牧男, from whom I have drawn a few references for these notes. See his *Yuishiki sanshōsetsu no kenkyū* 唯識三性説の研究 [Doctrine of the three self-natures in the philosophy of consciousness-only] (Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1995), 381–407.

[4] Matsumoto, "*Tathāgata-garbha* Is Not Buddhist," *169*; "The Ekayana Theory in Yogacara," 307.

[5] He may be basing his remarks here on Takasaki Jikidō's *The Formation of Tathāgata-garbha Thought*, 190, n. 56, but this is my conjecture.

[6] Among the meanings for *dhā-* given in the Monier-Williams *Sanskrit-English Dictionary* are: "to put, place; present to; generate, cause; seize, support; to accept, obtain." As for *-tu*, its original function was to indicate the abstract form of the verb (action) itself; but more often this suffix indicates what has been brought about by action, the place or means of the action, or even the carrier or the agent of the action. See Albert Debrunner, *Altindische Grammatik* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1954), 665, section 489. Louis Renou notes that the Vedic usage of the suffix *-tu* was already oriented to concrete aspects, such as temporal or numerical division and the results or instruments of the process (*Le suffixe -tu- et la constitution des infinitifs,* Monographies sanskrites, part 2 [Paris: Adrien-Maisonneuve, 1937], 17).

[7] Renou (*Le suffixe -tu*, 8) gives the following meanings as the usage of *dhātu* from the time of the *Mahābhārata* and Buddhist texts onward: "element, basis; primary

material, mineral; grammatical root; plane; bones, relics."

[8] Renou, *Le suffixe -tu*, 8–9.

[9] Renou, *Le suffixe -tu*, 16.

[10] Renou, *Le suffixe -tu*, 9.

[11] Quoted and translated in Renou, *Le suffixe -tu*, 16.

[12] Renou, *Le suffixe -tu*, 16.

[13]The Sanskrit reads:

ity ete catvāraḥ svalakṣaṇôpādāya-rūpa-dhāraṇād dhātavaś catvāri mahā-bhūtānṛty ucyante (Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya 8.13)

These four elements [earth, water, fire, and wind] are called *dhātu* because they *hold* (*dhāraṇa*) their own characteristics and composite matters.

atha kasmād ete kāma-rūpârūpya-dhātava ity ucyante | svalakṣaṇa-dhāraṇād dhātuḥ | (*Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* 112.24)

[14] The Sanskrit reads:

kāṭhinyâdi-svalakṣaṇam cakṣur-ādy-upādāya-rūpaṃ ca dadhātîti dhātavaḥ

Dhātu are so called because they hold the characteristics of hardness, and so forth, and the composite matters, such as the eye.

Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā 32.33–33.1. Even here, judging from Yaśomitra's gloss, we may conclude that *dhā-* should probably be taken in the sense of "to hold," not "to put on," and that *-tu* indicates an agent, not a place.

[15] Matsumoto, "The Ekayana Theory in Yogacara," 306–7; "Response," pages *205–7* above.

[16] The Sanskrit reads:

anādi-kāliko dhātuḥ sarva-dharma-samāśrayaḥ |
tasmin sati gatiḥ sarvā nirvāṇâdhigamo 'pi ca[*] ||

[*]*Triṃśikā* has *vā* instead of *ca*. The Sanskrit text has been retrieved from the *Triṃśikāvijñapti-bhāṣya,* Sylvain Lévi (1925), 37.12–13; and from the *Ratnagotra-vibhāga*, Johnston, 72.13–14; Nakamura, 141.19–21.

[17] Matsumoto, "The Ekayana Theory in Yogacara," 306.

[18] "The Ekayana Theory in Yogacara," 306.

[19] For example, the *Pañcavijñānakāya-saṃprayuktā-bhūmi* of the *Maulībhūmi* gives three types of *āśraya* as the bases for the five types of sense-consciousness (*sahabhūr-āśraya* [*sic*], "simultaneous basis"; *samanantara-āśraya*, "previous moment [of mind] as basis"; and *bīja-āśraya*, "*bīja* as basis"; *Yogācārabhūmi* [*Pañcavijñānakāyasaṃprayuktā-bhūmi*], Vidhushekara Bhattacharya, ed. (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1957), 4.6–7, etc. These three correspond to *adhipati-pratyaya, samanantara-pratyaya,* and *hetu-pratyaya* respectively (see the *Chêng wei-shih lun* 成唯識論, T 31.19b22–28), and indeed as a technical term *āśraya* seems to mean little more than simple *pratyaya*, with little spatial connotation. It is particularly clear in the case of *samanantara-āśraya* that when one thing precedes another, it cannot be the locus of the latter.

Matsumoto may disagree here, given his claim that in the *dhātu-vāda* structure *dhātu* (= locus) precedes dharmas (= super-locus; "*Pratītyasamutpāda*," 68), but it is very hard to see how this position can be reconciled with his statement: "For example, when a book sits on a desk, the book is a super-locus, and the desk is the locus" (Matsumoto, "The Ekayana Theory in Yogacara," 307). At least in ordinary language, we cannot speak of the desk as the locus of a book unless the two coexist.

[20] Matsumoto, "The Ekayana Theory in Yogacara," 306; "The *Lotus Sutra* and Japanese Culture."

[21] The Sanskrit reads:

tatra katame dhātavaḥ | katamad dhātu-kauśalyam | āha | aṣṭādaśa dhātavaḥ | cakṣur-dhātū rūpa-dhātuś cakṣur-vijñāna-dhātuḥ | śrotra-dhātuḥ | śabda-dhātuḥ | śrotra-vijñāna-dhātuḥ | … | yat punar ete 'ṣṭādaśa-dharmāḥ[*] *svaka-svakād dhātoḥ svaka-svakād bījāt / svaka-svakād gotrād jāyante nirvartante prādurbhavantîti | jānāti rocayaty upanidhyāti | idam ucyate dhātu-kauśalyam || yad aṣṭādaśānām dharmāṇāṃ svaka*[**]*-svakād dhātoḥ pravṛttim jānāti | tad evam eti* [?] *hetupratyaya*[***]*-kauśalyam etad yad uta dhātu-kauśalyaṃ* || (Karunesha Shukla, ed. *Śrāvakabhūmi* [Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1973], 244.12–245.11; T 30.434a4–11)

[*] Text, *etān aṣṭādaśa-dharmān.* [**] Text, *svaru-*. [***] Text, *-pratya-*.

[22] Compare *pūrvôtpannaṃ cakṣuḥ paścimasya sabhāga-hetur ity ākaro dhātuḥ* (*Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā* 45.8).

[23] The Sanskrit reads:

gotrârtho dhātv-arthaḥ | yathâikasmin parvate bahūny ayas-tāmra-rūpya-suvarṇâdi-gotrāṇi dhātava ucyante (*sic*) *evam ekasminn āśraye santāne vā aṣṭādaśa gotrāṇi aṣṭādaśa dhātava ucyante | ākarās tatra gotrāṇy ucyante | ta ime cakṣur-ādayaḥ kasyâkarāḥ | svasyā jāteḥ | sabhāga-hetutvāt |*
asaṃskṛtaṃ tarhi na dhātuḥ syāt | citta-caittānāṃ tarhi [|] (P. Pradhan, ed., *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* [2d ed. Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1975], 13.19–23)

Concerning the last line, see the *Abhidharmakośa-vyākhyā* 45.10–12 (quoted in note 3 in my essay above). This passage of the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* is also discussed in Hakamaya, "*Tathatā* as Topos."

[24] See also the following passages:

sajātīyānāṃ cakṣur-ādīnāṃ hetutvād dhātava ucyante |
te 'pi evaṃ sabhāgānāṃ rūpâdīnāṃ hetu-bhāvād dhātava ucyante |
te 'pi sabhāgānām eva cakṣur-ādi-vijñānānāṃ hetu-bhūtatvād dhātava ucyante |
atra pūrva-cakṣur-ādaya uttara-*cakṣur-ādīnām eva hetavo bhavanti na tatrânyaḥ kaś cid ātmânyo vā hetur vidyata ity evaṃ dhātu-kauśalyād ātmani hetu-grāha-vyāvṛttiḥ |* (*Madhyāntavibhāga-ṭīkā*, 143.18–19, 21–144.1, 144.3–4, 144.14–17; bold type indicates reconstructions by the editor, Yamaguchi).

[25] The Tibetan reads:

> *mig yin la mig-gi-khams ma yin pa ni dgra-bcom-pa tha-ma'i mig gang-yin-pa ste mu dang-po'o* || (Pek. No. 5539, vol. 110[Zi]81b5–6)

Compare *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra-bhāṣya*, Lévi, 152.4–5.

[26] Further, see the following passage, also from the *Pañcavijñānakāya-saṃprayuktā-manobhūmi* of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī:*

> *mig dang mig-gi-rnam-par-shes-pa gal-te rgyu dang 'bras-bu'i dngos-po yin na de-lta na ci-ltar de gnyis lhan-cig gi dngos-por* (Pek. *po*) *'gyur* | *gal-te lhan-cig gi dngos-po yin na ni de-ltar na ji-ltar de gnyis rgyu dang 'bras-bu'i dngos-por rung zhe na* | *smras pa* | *sa-bon dang myu-gu bzhin du mig la* (Pek. *las*) *brten te rnam-par-shes-pa skye ba ni mi rung ngo* | *de ci'i phyir zhe na* | *mig ni mig-gi-rnam-par-shes-pa skyed-pa'i-rgyu ma yin pa'i phyir te* | *'on-kyang gnas-kyi-rgyu yin-pas de'i-phyir de gnyis ni mar-me dang 'od-bzhin du* (Pek. om. *du*) *lhan-cig gyi dngos-po dang rgyu dang 'bras bu'i dngos pos rung ngo* || *mig dang mig-gi-rnam-par-shes-pa ji-lta-ba bzhin-du* | *rna-ba dang sna dang lce dang lus dang de-dag gi rnam-par-shes-pa rnams kyang de bzhin du blta-bar-bya'o* || *gzhan-du na rang gi sa-bon las skye- bar-gyur na mig la-sogs-pa'i rnam-par-shes-pa gnas med-ba las 'byung-bar 'gyur-bas mi rung ngo* || (Pek. No. 5539, vol. 101[Zi] 85a3–6; Derge No. 4038[Shi], 81b1–3; T 30.610c28– 11a5)
>
> [Question:] If eye and eye-consciousness are cause and result, why are the two simultaneous? If they are simultaneous, how can they be cause and result?
>
> Answer: It is unreasonable for eye-consciousness to arise depending on the eye as a sprout [arises from] a seed. Why is this so? Because eye is not the generative cause of eye-consciousness but a supportive cause. Therefore, even though they are simultaneous, the two can be cause and result like a lamp and its light. And like the eye and eye-consciousness, so, too, ear, nose, tongue, body and their consciousness should be understood in the same way. If this were not so, when the eye-consciousness arises from its own seed (**svabīja*), it would arise without a basis (**āśraya* = *indriya*), which goes against reason.

Here again, the clear assumption is that a generative cause (*bīja*) must precede its result (in this case, consciousness). What is simultaneous with the result can be its supportive cause (= *indriya*, "sense faculty") but not its generative cause. See also the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, Shukla, 199.1, where *dhātu* is linked to *hetu*, and *āyatana* to *pratyaya*.

We note, further, that the generative cause (*skyed pa'i rgyu*, 正生因, **janmahetu*) is clearly differentiated from the supportive cause (*gnas kyi rgyu*, 建立因, **pratiṣṭhāhetu*; reconstruction based on the correspondence among *pratiṣṭhârtha* [*Yogācārabhūmi*, Bhattacharya, 111.6] = *gnas par byed pa'i don* [Pek. No. 5536, vol. 109 (Dzi)67a4] = 建立義 [T 30.302a26–7]). Again, we should note that *pratiṣṭhā* does not necessarily mean "locus." In the Yogacara literature, *prati-sthā-* is a very general word that can be used without particular spatial connotation. The usage of this word suggests that *pratiṣṭhā* is semantically very close to *āśraya*, both terms meaning "support" in a very broad sense or even simply "condition." Observe the following passage from the *Yogācārabhūmi* (*Savitarka-savicārâdi-bhūmi*) 111.6:

> *pratiṣṭhârthaḥ pratyayaḥ* |

"Condition" (*pratyaya*) has the meaning of "support" (*pratiṣṭhā*).

Here, *pratyaya* is clearly a general term including all kinds of conditions. Further in the same text (105.6–10) we find:

kiṃ-pūrvā kiṃ pratiṣṭhāya kiṃ saṅgamya kasya dharmasyôtpattir bhavati* | *svabīja-pūrvā bījâśrayaṃ sthāpayitvā tad-anyam āśrayam rūpiṇam** arūpiṇam vā karma ca pratiṣṭhāya sahāyam ālambanaṃ ca saṅgamya kāma-pratisaṃyukutānāṃ rūpa-pratisaṃyuktānām ārūpya-pratisaṃyuktānām apratisaṃyuktānām utpāditā bhavati* | *tac ca yathā-yogam* |

* Text *ki.* ** Text *pratirūpiṇam.* Tib. *gzugs can* (Pek. No. 5536, vol. 109 [Dsi]62b8–63a1)

Preceded by what, based on what, and meeting with what, what dharma arises? Preceded by its own seed, <u>based on the bases other than the seed as basis and karma belonging to the [realm with] form and the [realm] without form</u>, meeting with accompaniments and a cognitive object, [dharmas] bound to the [realm of] desire, [the realm of] form, [the realm] without form, and unbound [to any realm] arise as appropriate.

Here, the word *pratiṣṭhāya* concerns supports other than *svabīja* (= *dhātu*), as well as all the worldly karma. If so, it will not make sense to say that something rests on so many "loci" at the same time. In particular, since karma is not regarded as matter in the Yogacara school, it cannot be a "locus" on which something rests. We are therefore led to conclude that this school used the word *pratiṣṭhāya* as a technical term meaning "based on, supported by" in a very broad sense without any spatial connotation. In addition, the relation between *bīja* and its fruit is expressly excluded from the referent of *pratiṣṭhāya*.

27 Again, this argument is applicable only to portions that do not presuppose *ālaya-vijñāna*. As is well known, the causal relationship between *ālaya-vijñāna* and *pravṛttivijñāna*s is considered to be simultaneous, but I believe this relationship became possible only after the introduction of *ālaya-vijñāna*.

28 A potentially problematic passage appears in the *Pañcavijñānakāya-saṃprayuktā-manobhūmi* of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī*, which defines the word *dhātu* as follows:

khams kyi don gang zhe na | *smras-pa* | *khams kyi don ni ryu'i don dang sa-bon gyi don dang rang-bzhin gyi don dang rigs kyi don dang cha-phra-ba'i don dang gzhi'i don to* |

ci'i phyir na mya-ngan-las-'das-pa'i-dbyings dang nam-mkha'i (Pek. *nam-kha'i*)-*khams la khams zhes bya zhe na* | *smras-pa* | *sdug-bsngal mi-skye-ba'i bzhi'i don dang lus dang mig la-sogs-pa yongs-su-gyo-ba'i bzhi'i don gyis so* || (Pek Zi 82b6–7; D Zhi 79a5–6; T 30.610a1–4)

What is the meaning of *dhātu*? Answer: The meaning of *dhātu* is "cause" (*rgyu,* 因, **hetu*), "seed" (*sa-bon*, 種子, **bīja*), "nature" (*rang-bzhin*, 本性, *prakṛti*), "origin" (*rigs*, 種姓, **gotra*), "subtle" (*cha-phra*, 微細, *sūkṣma*), and "support" (*bzhi*, 任持, **ādhāra*).

Why are *nirvāṇa-dhātu* and *ākāśa*(space)-*dhātu* called *dhātu*? Answer: [They are called so] because of the meaning of becoming the support (*bzhi*, **ādhāra*) of the

non-arising of sufferings and because of the meaning of becoming the support of the movement of the body, the eye, and so forth.

If the *nirvāṇa-dhātu* and *ākāśa-dhātu*, which are defined as **ādhāra*, are universal elements underlying all phenomena, this would argue in favor of Matsumoto's position, but the possibility of such a reading seems rather slim. If we look at the *Bahudhātuka Sutra* (T 1.723a8–24c4; *Bahudhātuka-sutta, Majjhima-nikāya* No.115 [3:61–7]; see Hakamaya, "A Source of the Three-Vehicle Theory," 134), which is a classic passage on the "manifold *dhātu*" theory, *ākāśa-dhātu* appears as one of the six elements that constitute sentient beings—earth, water, fire, wind, space (空, **ākāśa*), and consciousness (T 1.723b11– 12; *Majjhima-nikāya* 3: 62.21–23). What is more, the explanation of the above quotation seems to imply that "space" here refers primarily to the cavities within our bodies, not to the totality of the macrocosm. The term *nirvāṇa-dhātu* itself does not appear in the *Bahudhātuka Sutra*, though it would be the semantic equivalent of terms like 滅界 (**nirodha-dhātu*, as opposed to 色界 **rūpa-dhātu*, and 無色界 **ārūpya-dhātu*; T 1.723c1) and 無為界 (**asaṃskṛta-dhātu*, as opposed to 有為界 **saṃskṛta-dhātu*; T 1.723c12), both of which appear in the list of the *Bahudhātuka Sutra*. Since *nirvāṇa-dhātu* is entered upon liberation from samsara, it must be a realm distinct from the realm of samsara (as exemplified by *rūpa-, ārūpya-*, and *samskṛta-dhātu*). It does not seem to me that *nirvāṇa-dhātu* was conceived as a universal ground of all phenomena (at least at this stage of doctrinal development). As Renou observes to be the case in the *Ṛgveda*, *dhātu* seems here to have functioned as "a principle of division," not as a universal ground. In any case, the passage from the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* clearly presupposes that these *nirvāṇa-dhātu* and *ākāśa-dhātu* are not (generative) causes. I therefore conclude that the passage is unable to lend any support to Matsumoto's generative monism model.

[29] *Mahāyānasaṃgraha-bhāṣya*, Pek. No. 5551, vol. 112 (Li)147b6; *Mahāyānasaṃgrahopanibandhana*, Pek. No. 5552, vol. 113 (Li)238b8–39a1; *Vivṛtagūḍhārthapiṇḍa-vyākhyā,* Pek. No. 5553, vol. 113 (Li)368a2–3, etc.; Takeda Yoshio, ed., *Triṃśikā-ṭīkā* (Kyoto: Teijiya, 1938), 152.8.

[30] This impression is enhanced when we compare this verse with the following two from the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra* (XI.32–3):

sva-dhātuto dvayâbhāsāḥ sâvidyā-kleśa-vṛttayaḥ |
vikalpāḥ saṃpravartante dvaya-dravya-vivarjitāḥ ||
*ālambana-viśeṣâpteḥ** *sva-dhātu-sthāna-yogataḥ* |
ta eva hy advayâbhāsā vartante carma-kāṇḍavat ||

* The text has *-āptiḥ*, but the Tibetan version of the *Bhāṣya* has *thobs pa yis* (Pek. No. 5527, vol. 108 [Phi]184a1), also the *Vṛttibhāṣya* has *dhob pa yi* (see *Mahāyāna-sūtrālaṃkāra-vṛttibhāśya*, 96.7, in Hayashima, "*Chos yoṅs su tshol baḥi skabs* or *Dharma-paryeṣṭy adhikāra*"; the *Ṭīkā* does not quote this word). Here I read the text as *āpteḥ*.

Mental constructions appearing as two, and functioning as ignorance and [other] defilements, they arise from [their] own *dhātu* without having the substance of the two. From acquiring the distinguished cognitive object by the Yoga staying in their own *dhātu*, these same [mental constructions] arise without appearing as two, just like [softened] leather and a [straightened] stick.

Although the *Bhāṣya* identifies the first *svadhātu* as *ālaya-vijñāna* and the second as *tathatā,* it is doubtful that we can interpret the same word in two consecutive verses in different ways. Possibly the original purport of the verses was that both delusion and wisdom hinged on the same *svadhātu*. If that is so, the possible link with the *Abhidharma Sutra* verse deserves serious examination.

[31] In sources that do not presuppose the *ālaya-vijñāna* theory, it is the whole of personal existence (*āśraya*) that maintains seeds. In the sources that do have the *ālaya-vijñāna* theory, *ālaya-vijñāna* basically takes over the function of *āśraya* (Lambert Schmithausen, *Ālayavijñāna: On the Origin and the Early Development of a Central Concept of Yogācāra Philosophy* [Tokyo: International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1987], vol. 1, 51) and is regarded as the seed-holder. In either case, in addition to the expression "seeds/ *dhātu* exist in *āśraya/ ālaya-vijñāna*" (as in the pericope that appears above), *āśraya/ālaya-vijñāna* as a whole is occasionally equated directly with a seed (without being marked as plural; see Schmithausen, *Ālayavijñāna*, vol. 1, 158; vol. 2, 454; *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra-bhāṣya* 169.6 [on XIX.49]). Since there seems to be no doubt that early *bīja/dhātu* theory was pluralistic, the linguistic conventions of the Yogacara thinkers should be understood to have allowed such singular expression, even in cases where a plural was intended. The singular form, on the surface, does not necessarily preclude the plural sense. In the *Abhidharma Sutra* verse, no mention is made of *ālaya-vijñāna*. Nevertheless, in reading it as Yogacara text, it is clear that the *dhātu* is constantly interpreted as *ālaya-vijñāna*. This makes it possible to argue that the singular *dhātu* does not necessarily exclude a plurality of *dhātu*.

In connection with this latter verse, if it is understood as an expression of the idea that both transmigration and nirvana are based on *ālaya-vijñāna*, the most likely source of such an idea prior to the *Mahāyānasaṃgraha* is the *Pañcavijñānakāya-saṃprayuktā-manobhūmi* of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* (the so-called "*Pravṛtti* Portion" and "*Nivṛtti* Portion": Schmithausen, *Ālayavijñāna,* vol. 2, 299–30, n. 226). It is there, too, that the *Akṣarāśi Sutra*, a locus classicus of the "manifold *dhātu*" theory, is cited ("*Nivṛtti* Section," Hakamaya, 39–40). This suggests that the same pluralistic idea was underlying the verse of the *Abhidharma Sutra*. See also Hakamaya, "Critical Notes on the *Awakening of Mahayana Faith*," 75–76.

[32] See "The Idea of *Dhātu-vāda* in Yogacara and *Tathāgata-garbha* Texts," page *199.*

[33] *dharma-tulyatvād eka-yānatā śrāvakâdīnāṃ dharmadhātor abhinnatvād yātavyaṃ yānam iti kṛtvā* (68.17–18).

[34] See Matsumoto's "Response," *205–7.*

[35] *Mahāyānasūtrālaṃkāra-vṛtti-bhāṣya*, Hayashima, 48.

[36] See Matsumoto, "The Ekayana Theory in Yogacara," 307.

[37] *ārya-dharma-hetutvād dharma-dhātuḥ. ārya-dharmāṇām tad-ālambana-prabhavatvāt. hetv-artho hy atra dhātv-arthaḥ.* (23.23–24.2).

[38] See Matsumoto's "Response,". *205–7.*

[39] Pek. No. 768, vol. 28(Khu)321b8. See also Matsumoto's "Response."

40 Nishio Kyōō 西尾京雄, *Butsujikyōron no kenkyū* 仏地経論之研究 [Studies in the *Buddhabhmui-upadeśa*] (Tokyo: Kokusho Kankōkai, 1982), vol. 2, 24–5; Takasaki, *The Formation of Tathagata-garbha Thought*, 604.

41 "*Nivṛtti* Portion," Hakamaya, 41, 66; Yamabe Nobuyoshi, "Shinnyo shoennen shūji ni tsuite" 真如所縁縁種子について [On *tathatā-ālaṃbana-pratyaya-bīja*], in *Kitabatake Tensei Kyōju kanreki kinen—Nihon no Bukkyō to bunka* 北畑典生教授還暦記念—日本の仏教と文化 [Commemorative for Professor Kitabatake Tensei: Japanese Buddhism and culture] (Kyoto: Nagata Bunshōdō, 1990), 79–80.

42 See note 26 above.

43 See my "On *Tathatā-ālaṃbana-pratyaya-bīja*," 80–7.

44 See note 36 of my essay, "The Idea of *Dhātu-vāda*," *448*.

45 Matsumoto, "*Tathāgata-garbha* Is Not Buddhist," *167*.

46 Matsumoto, "Response," *205–7*.

47 Matsumoto, "*Tathāgata-garbha* is Not Buddhist," *168*.

48 Matsumoto, "Response," note 9. In addition to the texts quoted in Hakamaya's article referred to by Matsumoto, see also the *Pañcavijñānakāyasaṃprayuktā-manobhūmi* of the *Viniścayasaṃgrahaṇī* (Pek. No. 5539, vol. 110 [Zi] 82b6–7, cited in note 28 above). It should be noted that even in the *Ratnagotravibhāga, dhātu* and *gotra* are equivalent. See Hakamaya, "A Critique of the Structure of Faith in the *Ratnagotravibhāga*," 268, n. 28.

49 Matsumoto, "Response."

50 The Sanskrit reads:

> *tatra dhātu-puṣṭiḥ katamā | yā prakṛtyā kuśala-dharma-bīja-sampadam niśritya pūrva-kuśala-dharmâbhyāsād uttarôttarāṇām kuśala-dharma-bījānām paripuṣṭatarā paripuṣṭatamā utpattiḥ sthitiḥ* | iyam ucyate dhātu-puṣṭiḥ |*
> (Wogihara, 80.12–5; Nalinaksha Dutt, ed., *Bodhisattvabhūmi* [Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 1978], 56.23–5)

* Wogihara has *utpatti-sthitiḥ*, but I follow Dutt.

51 Wogihara, 3.23; 4.18; 5.13–4; 6.6; 6.19–20; 7.26; 8.22; 8.27; 9.9; 10.1; 10.6. Compare the following:

> *iha bodhisattvo gotra-vihārī prakṛti-bhadra-saṃtānatayā prakṛtyā bodhisattva-guṇair bodhisattvârhair kuśalair dharmaiḥ samanvāgato bhavati*
> (*Bodhisattvabhūmi,* Wogihara, 318.13–5)

52 Matsumoto, "Response," above.

53 The Sanskrit reads:

> *sarveṣāṃ ca buddha-dharmāṇāṃ gotra-vihārī bodhisattvaḥ bīja-dharo bhavati. sarva-buddha-dharmāṇām asya sarva-bījāny ātmabhāva-gatāny āśraya-gatāni vidyaṃte* (*Bodhisattvabhūmi,* Wogihara, 318.18–21)

In Yogacara terminology, both *ātmabhāva* and *āśraya* basically mean "body." It is clear that *gotra* (= *bīja*) stays in our physical existence, not in transcendental "*prakṛti*."

We should also note that *dharmatā* does not necessarily refer to something transcendent. Walpola Rahula points out some interesting passages in this regard: "A little snake, according to its habit, *attano dhammatāya*, comes to the hermitage of an ascetic. Here the word *dhammatā* is used just to indicate the snake's habit of going about." And concerning the story in which Devadatta rolled down a rock and a splinter hit the Buddha's foot, he remarks "Nāgasena says: 'But that splinter did not fall of its own nature (automatically, *attano dhammatāya*), but it fell down owing to Devadatta's act." See his "Wrong Notions of *Dhammatā (Dharmatā)*," in L. Cousins, A. Kunst, and K. R. Norman, eds., *Buddhist Studies in Honour of I. B. Horner* (Boston: Reidel, 1974), 182–3.

I find the use of the word *dharmatā* in the passage of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* very close to the way it is used in these examples. Simply put, it means that bodhisattvas are endowed by nature with a superior six-sense-basis. I do not believe that *dharmatā* refers to anything monistic in this context.

[54] Matsumoto, "Response."

[55] "The Idea of *Dhātu-vāda*," *201–2.*

[56] *Vibhāṣā*, T 27.65b5–24; Kawamura Kōshō 河村孝照, *Ubu no Budda ron* 有部の仏陀論 [Buddha theory in the Sarvāstivāda school] (Tokyo: Sankibō Busshorin, 1975), 351–3.

[57] See note 25 of my "The Idea of *Dhātu-vāda*," *443–4.*

[58] Matsumoto, "Response."

[59] See "The Idea of *Dhātu-vāda*."

[60] Matsumoto, "The *Śrīmālādevī Sutra* and Ekayana Theory," 300–4.

[61] The Tibetan reads:

> *bcom ldan 'das nyan thos dang | rang sangs rgyas kyi theg pa rnams ni | theg pa chen po la yang dag par 'du ba'i slad du ste | … | bcom ldan 'das de ltar na theg pa gsum po 'di dag ni theg pa gcig kho na'i grangs su mchi'o || bcom ldan 'das theg pa gcig rtogs pas | bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub rtogs par 'gyur ro ||* (Pek. No. 760[48], vol. 24['i], 264b2–4).

This passage is also quoted in Matsumoto, "The *Śrīmālādevī Sutra* and Ekayana Theory," 305.

[62] In Matsumoto's opinion, Mahayana must be chosen by rejecting the two vehicles ("exclusive one vehicle"). Claiming that the practice of two vehicles is at the same time the practice for the buddhahood ("unifying one vehicle") is a wrong view. See "The *Lotus Sutra* and Japanese Culture," *392–3.*

[63] Matsumoto, "The *Śrīmālādevī Sutra* and Ekayana Theory," 307.

[64] "The *Śrīmālādevī Sutra* and Ekayana Theory," 313.

[65] See "The Idea of *Dhātu-vāda*."

The Core Elements of Indian Buddhism Introduced into Tibet

[1] For details see Paul Demiéville, *Le concile de Lhasa: Une controverse sur le quiétisme entre bouddhistes de l'Inde et de la Chine au VIIIe siècle de l'ère chrétienne* (Paris: Collège

de France, Institut des Hautes Études Chinoises, 1987, original 1952). See also my *Makaen no zen* 摩訶衍の禅 [The Ch'an of Mo-ho-yen], in *Kōza Tonkō* 8, *Tonkō Bukkyō to zen* 敦煌仏教と禅 (Tokyo: Daitō Shuppansha, 1980).

[2] This text was discovered among the Tun-huang manuscripts and has been catalogued by P. Pelliot as No. 4646, and by A. Stein as No. 2672. A critically annotated text is contained in Hasebe Yoshikazu 長谷部好一, "Doban Bukkyō to zen" 吐番仏教と禅 [T'u-fan Buddhism and Zen: A study of "The Ratification of True Mahāyāna Principles for an Abrupt Awaking [*sic*] to the Truth]," *Aichi Gakuin Daigaku Bungakubu kiyō* 1 (1971): 70–88; references to this text are to the page and column numbers of this critical edition.

[3] See my "Indo Bukkyō ni okeru 'hōben'" インド仏教における「方便」 [*Upāya* in Indian Buddhism], *Tōhō* 3 (1987): 52–69.

[4] See sDe dge 16, ff. 121a–132b; Peking 739, ff. 161b–175b. The issue is discussed specifically in sDe dge 16, f. 126a and Peking 739, f. 168a. The idea that bodhi-wisdom, not liberation, is the goal is clearly stated at sDe dge 16, f. 130b5 and Peking 739, f. 173a6.

[5] See sDe dge 3917, ff. 62a–63a; Peking 5312, ff. 67a–68b. I will discuss this section below.

[6] See my "Sanrin shōjō no fuse" 三輪清浄の布施 [The perfect extinction of three substantial attachments in the act of "giving"]. *Naritasan Bukkyō Kenkyūjo kiyō* 15 (1992): 577–608.

[7] The most important passage in the *Suttanipāta* that explains the content of the nirvana of a saint is in verse 355:

> The noble teacher, the greatest of the five ascetics, said, "He has severed the deluded attachments to name and form in this world. He has severed the flow of dark malignancy, which he had fallen into for a long time."

This verse also uses the phrase "name and form." If this phrase is understood as limited to "individual existence," that would mean that the saint still had deluded attachments toward physical existence, and that would mean that he had not yet severed the latent consciousness or propensity to view things substantially, referred to here as "the flow of dark malignancy."

[8] The idea that all things arise and perish almost instantaneously.

[9] See my essay "'Gense rieki' to 'genze riyaku'" 「現世利益」と「げんぜりやく」 ["Mundane benefits" and "benefiting the world"], *Tosho* 9 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1993): 16–19.

[10] See the chapter on "Arousing the Bodhi-mind" (*Hotsu-bodaishin*) in the 12-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō,* pp. 332–42. See also Terada and Mizuno, eds. *Dōgen*, vol. 2, 371–81.

[11] Cf. *Tarkajvālā*, sDe dge 3856, f. 146b6 and f. 147a3; Peking 5256, f. 159b4 and 160a1. See also my article on "The Perfect Extinction of Three Substantial Attachments in the Act of 'Giving'," 579–80.

[12] Dharmakīrti, in his *Pramāṇavārttika* vv. 285–86, says that "reality is directly perceived by the yogin." See Tozaki Hiromasa 戸崎広正, *Bukkyō ninshikiron no kenkyū* 仏教認識論の研究 [Studies in Buddhist epistemology] (Tokyo: Daitō Shuppansha, 1979),

vol. 2, 376–80. See also my essay, "Shāntarakushita no chūgan" シャーンタラクシタの中観 [Śāntarakṣita's interpretation of the Madhyamaka doctrine]. *Naritasan Bukkyō Kenkyūjo kiyō* 11 (1988): 641–82.

[13] Verses 756 and 757 of the *Suttanipāta* speak of "names and forms" and "illusory existences" that have no reality:

> Look. The gods and people of this world take as a self that which is not a self, become attached to name and form, and take this as reality. (756)
>
> What they take as that [in one moment], and what they take as [the same] that [in the next moment], are not the same. For the next "what" is indicated by that, the first "what" becomes an empty illusion. What passes away is truly an illusion. (757)

yena yena hi maññanti, tatos taṃ hoti aññathā, taṃ hi tassa musā hoti,
mosadhammaṃ hi ittaraṃ.

[14] In the famous opening of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, Nāgārjuna uses "the four negations of substantial apparition" to point out that things do not arise from themselves, from others, from both, or without a cause.

[15] See Saegusa Mitsuyoshi 三枝充悳, *Chūron geju sōran* 中論偈頌総覧 [An overview of the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*] (Tokyo: Daisan Bunmeisha, 1985), 38:

> *gataṃ na gamyate tāvadagataṃ naiva gamyate* |
> *gatāgatavinirmuktaṃ gamyamānaṃ na gamyate* ||
>
> First, one cannot walk in a place that is past. Of course one cannot walk in a place where one has not yet gone. And one cannot walk in a present place that is distinct from what is past, and what will come, and where one is going.

[16] See sDe dge 12, ff. 169b–170a; Peking 734, ff. 182b–183a; Vaidya, *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, pp. 152–3. See also my "Hannyakyō ni nyoraizō shisō ga tokarete iru ka" 『般若経』に如来蔵思想が説かれているか [Is *tathāgata-garbha* taught in the *Prajñāpāramitā* sutras?], in *Indogaku, mikkyōgaku kenkyū* 『インド学密教学研究』, *Miyasaka Yūshō Hakase koki kinen ronbunshū* 宮坂有勝博士古稀記念論文集 [Essays in honor of Dr. Miyasaka Yūshō] (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1993), 306–7; p. 327, n. 17; 330, n. 19.

[17] See Saegusa, *An Overview of the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, 4:

> *anirodhamanutpādamanucchedamaśāśvatam* |
> *anekārthamanānārthamanāgamamanirgamam* |
> *yaḥ pratītyasamutpādaṃ prapañcopaśamaṃ śivam* |
> *deśayāmāsa saṃbuddhastaṃ vande vadatāṃ varam* ||

See my "Nihon ni tsutawanarakatta chūgan tetsugaku" 日本に伝わらなかった中観哲学 [The Madhyamaka philosophy that was not transmitted in Japan], *Shisō* 802 (1991): 4–29.

[18] For details on the historical background see my essay, "Nikanbon yakugo shaku (jo) no kenkyū" 二巻本訳語釈（序）の研究 [A study of (the preface of) the *sGra sbyor bam po gnyis pa*], *Naritasan Bukkyō Kenkyūjo kiyō* 4 (1979): 1–24.

[19] See Vaidya, *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, 3, 27; sDe dge 12, f. 3a7; Peking 737, f. 3b5; T No. 227, 537b. See my essay, "Is *Tathāgata-garbha* Taught in the *Prajñāpāramitā* sutras?" 300–1, and 326 n. 13.

[20] For details see my essay, "Nihon ni tsutawanarakatta chūgan tetsugaku" 日本に伝わらなかった中観哲学 [The Madhyamaka philosophy that was not transmitted in Japan], *Shisō* 802 (1991): 4–29, esp. 10–18, as well as my discussion in "Daijō Bukkyō kyōri no yurai" 大乗仏教教理の由来[The origin of Mahayana Buddhist doctrine], *Shisō* 824 (1993): 73–81.

[21] sDe dge 3885, f. 59a–b; Peking 5285, f. 55a–b.

[22] See my essay, "Engishō no fukken" 縁起生の復権 [Śāntarakṣita's final interpretation of *pratītyasamutpāda*], *Naritasan Bukkyō Kenkyūjo kiyō* 14 (1991), 1–57.

[23] See P. Demiéville, *Le Concile de Lhasa*, pp. 348ff. I believe Lamotte's translation of *pratyavekṣā* as "l'analyse" is incorrect; the Tibetan *so-sor rtags pa* means "confirming."

[24] *Thugs* (*/sems*) *su chud* refers to the accumulation of "seeds" of consciousness in the *ālaya*-consciousness, the latent consciousness where the momentum of the flow of causal relationships on "now" is conserved for a certain lapse of time, to arouse directly afterward the mental apparition, modified with other elements, that is perceived as the "present time" [during a short span of the most recent past].

[25] See the "Zazengi" and "Zazenshin" chapters of the *Shōbōgenzō* in Kawamura Kōdō 河村孝道, et al., eds., *Shōbōgenzō* 正法眼蔵 (in *Dōgen Zenji zenshū* 道元禅師全集 [Collected works of Dōgen], Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1991, 100–12); Terada and Mizuno, *Dōgen*, vol. 1, 126–7.

[26] See my essay, "The Perfect Extinction," 583–98.

The Meaning of "Zen"

[1] [Translator's note: The word "zen" in the lower case refers to dhyana meditation. The capitalized "Zen" refers to the somewhat mystical use of the term popular in some circles in the West (and Japan) to refer to an ambiguous, universal, supra-verbal, ineffable "Way."]

[2] See, for example, Ui Hakuju 宇井伯寿, *Zenshūshi kenkyū* 禅宗史研究 [Studies in the history of the Zen school] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1935), 2.

[3] See, for example, Fujita Kōtatsu, 藤田宏達, "Genshi Bukkyō ni okeru zenjō shisō" 原始仏教における禅定思想 [The theory of dhyana meditation in early Buddhism], in Satō Mitsuo Hakase Koki Kinen Ronbunshū Kankōkai, ed., *Satō Mitsuo Hakase koki kinen Bukkyō shisō ronsō* 佐藤密雄博士古稀記念仏教思想論叢 [Essays on Buddhist thought in honor of Dr. Satō Mitsuo] Tokyo: Sankibō Busshorin, 1972), 298.

[4] Hirakawa Akira explains this point as follows:

> Buddhism taught the "three learnings" of the precepts, concentration, and wisdom. Wisdom was placed in a superior position vis-à-vis the practice of concentration. This indicates that the truth cannot be discovered only through the practice of dhyana. Dhyana is the psychological tempering of the mind, and in itself it is blind. The truth can be realized only when the eye of wisdom is attained.

A History of Indian Buddhism, 25. [The translation of this passage has been redone in the interest of the present context. —Translator.]

[5] For a more detailed discussion of this point see my *Pratītyasamutpāda and Emptiness*, 239–48.

[6] [Concerning the debate between Mo-ho-yen and Kamalaśīla, see "The Core Elements of Indian Buddhism Introduced into Tibet" in this volume, pages *220–41*. In the full Japanese version of this essay, Matsumoto takes this up in some detail, and also treats the idea of "no-thought" (無念) propounded by the Ch'an patriarch Shen-hui (684–758), the preeminent figure of the Southern School of Ch'an Buddhism, concluding that Shen-hui also denies the validity of conceptual thought. —Translator]

[7] For details see Fujita, "The Theory of Dhyana Meditation in Early Buddhism," and Lambert Schmithausen, "On Some Aspects of Descriptions or Theories of 'Liberating Insight' and 'Enlightenment' in Early Buddhism," *Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien* 12 (1981): 199–250.

[8] Mo-ho-yen says that "conceptualizing…obstructs the wisdom of omniscience that is inherent in all sentient beings." Here "obstruct" can be interpreted as a translation of *āvaraṇa*, which means "a covering." Thus "conceptualizing" is presented as a function that "covers" or "hides" the wisdom inherent in all sentient beings. This is the pattern of thinking that emphasizes "liberation" by seeing "the wisdom inherent in all beings" as primary and "concepts" as secondary. This "inherent wisdom" is identified as the wisdom of the Buddha, which Mo-ho-yen speaks of as "the wisdom of the Omniscient" (*sarvajña-jñāna*) and as "Buddha-nature."

[9] The first two clearly include the term *saṃjñā*; the third uses the phrase *nimitta* but with the same meaning; see Schmithausen, "Theories of 'Liberating Insight' and 'Enlightenment' in Early Buddhism," 236, n. 133: "*animitto cetosamādhi* is substituted for *saññāvedayitanirodha* in the *anupūrvavihāra* pattern. The equivalence of the two terms seems to be supported by the fact that at least in the Sanskrit Abhidharma tradition the *nimitta*s are the typical objective correlate of *saṃjñā*,…the absence of *nimitta*s consequently implying cessation of *saṃjñā*."

[10] Within the scheme of the nine progressive stages of dhyana, these two were assigned to the third and fourth stages of the four concentrations of no-form.

[11] Fujita, "The Theory of Dhyana Meditation in Early Buddhism," 305.

[12] Nakamura Hajime 中村 元, *Genshi Bukkyō no shisō* 原始仏教の思想 [Early Buddhist thought], vol. 2 of *Nakamura Hajime senshū* 中村元選集 [Selected works of Nakamura Hajime] (Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1971, 14 vols.), 235.

[13] See the *Suttanipāta*, verses 874 and 1070–1072; Eng. trans, 102, 123.

[14] Saddhatissa translates this passage (*The Sutta-nipāta*, 102):

> "There is a state where form ceases to exist," said the Buddha. "It is a state without ordinary perception and without disordered perception and without no perception and without any annihilation of perception. It is perception, consciousness, that is the source of all the basic obstacles."

[15] See Nakamura, *Early Buddhist Thought*, 232–4. Earlier Nakamura admits that "in early Buddhism the practice existed of striving for the state of 'nonpossession,' probably influenced by non-Buddhist ways of thinking like Jainism…" (231).

[16] Fujita, "The Theory of Dhyana Meditation in Early Buddhism," 307–8.

[17] Fujita also argues that this theory of the four stages of dhyana trance is of non-Buddhist origin. See his "The Theory of Dhyana Meditation in Early Buddhism," 304–5.

[18] My translation; see also The Pali Text Society translation, *The Book of the Discipline* (*Vinaya-Piṭaka*), Volume IV (*Mahāvagga*), trans. I. B. Horner, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul (1982), 1–2.

Critical Buddhism and Dōgen's *Shōbōgenzō*: The Debate over the 75-Fascicle and 12-Fascicle Texts

[1] Kawamura Kōdō 河村孝道, *Eihei kaizan Dōgen zenji gyōjō: Kenzei-ki* 永平開山道元禅師行状—建撕記 [The *Kenzei-ki*: The travels of Dōgen] (Tokyo: Taishūkan, 1975), 79–80.

[2] Terada and Mizuno, eds., *Dōgen*, vol. 2, 496.

[3] See Ishii Shūdō 石井修道, "Saigo no Dōgen—Jūnikanbon *Shōbōgenzō* to *Hōkyōki*" 最後の道元—十二巻本『正法眼蔵』と『宝慶記』 [The final Dōgen: The 12-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō* and the *Hōkyōki*], in Kagamishima and Suzuki, eds., *Issues Concerning the 12-fascicle Shōbōgenzō*, 319–74.

[4] The 12-fascicle text (an English translation can be found in Yokoi Yūhō, *Zen Master Dōgen* [Tokyo: Weatherhill, 1975]) includes the following fascicles: Shukke kudoku 出家功徳, Jukai 受戒, Kesa kudoku 袈裟功徳, Hotsubodaishin 発菩提心, Kuyō shobutsu 供養諸仏, Kie buppōsōbō 帰依仏法僧宝, Jinshin inga 深信因果, Sanjigo 三時業, Shime 四馬, Shizen biku 四禅比丘, Ippyakuhachihōmyōmon 一百八法明門, and Hachidainingaku 八大人覚.

[5] Matsumoto, *Pratītyasamutpāda and Emptiness*, 8.

[6] In this essay I am primarily dealing with issues in Dōgen studies and with those who have critiqued the Critical Buddhist view of the 12-fascicle text. However, there have been numerous other responses, including those by Lambert Schmithausen, Takasaki Jikidō, Hirakawa Akira, and Sueki Fumihiko (a former student of Tamura Yoshirō and a leading scholar in Tendai studies), and to these Hakamaya ("The Japanese and Animism") has responded in part.

[7] Part of the impetus behind Critical Buddhism and other reform movements within the Sōtō sect was a widespread sense of dismay with statements at a 1979 World Conference on Religion and Peace by Machida Muneo, a representative of the Sōtō sect, who denied that there was Buddhist discrimination against *burakumin*. These comments caused an uproar that reverberated into many levels of the Sōtō institution, from scholarship to the ritual activities of priests. See also Bodiford, "Zen and the Art of Religious Prejudice," and Ishii Shūdō, "Recent Trends in Dōgen Studies," *Komazawa Daigaku Zen Kenkyūjo nenpō* 7 (1990): 219–64. On the ritualized marginalization and scapegoating of the *burakumin* in Japanese society, see Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney, *Monkey as Mirror: Symbolic Transformations in Japanese History and Ritual* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987).

[8] For example, Richard DeMartino has commented on the fact that when he interviewed D. T. Suzuki in the mid 1960s for *The Asahi Journal* (14 March 1965), Suzuki insisted that Buddhism practiced compassion based on "motherly love," but seemed unwilling to acknowledge a problematic side of Buddhism in society, such as discrimination or acquiescence to militaristic nationalism.

[9] King, *Buddha Nature,* 170.

[10] Hakamaya, *Hongaku shisō hihan*, 142.

[11] See Peter N. Dale, *The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness.*

[12] See Abe Masao, *A Study of Dōgen: His Philosophy and Religion* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992); Tamura, *Thought of the New Buddhism of Kamakura* and "Critique of Shōshin and Dōgen"; Yamauchi, *Dōgen's Zen and the Tendai Hongaku Tradition*; Ikeda Rosan 池田魯参, *Dōgengaku no yōran* 道元学の揺籃 [The cradle of Dōgen studies] (Tokyo: Daizō Shuppan, 1991).

[13] There is no record of Dōgen's teaching in Kamakura other than twelve Japanese poems included in his *waka* collection. Several revisionist historians have conjectured that Dōgen made the trip at the request of patrons rather than the Hōjō, though the traditional explanation has become part of the sect's hagiography.

[14] See Carl Bielefeldt, "Recarving the Dragon: History and dogma in the study of Dōgen," in *Dōgen Studies*, ed. William R. LaFleur (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1985).

[15] See Hakamaya, *Dōgen and Buddhism*, 245–88, esp. 249.

[16] Hakamaya also has a lengthy discussion of the role of *sange* in *Shushōgi*, a summary of Dōgen's philosophy created by modern Sōtō priests. It is interesting to note that Dōgen's death *gāthā* is quite similar to that of his Chinese mentor, Ju-ching, except that Dōgen omits the phrase *zaigo* that Ju-ching uses to refer to a recognition of his own evil karma. On the other hand, Dōgen does discuss the role of repentance in light of evil karma in the 75-fascicle's "Keiseisanshoku." Furthermore, the topic of *sange* is quite important in many aspects of Buddhism and Japanese religion from T'ien-t'ai meditative practices to medieval popular Buddhist literature to the modern philosophy of Kyoto school thinker Tanabe Hajime.

[17] See Nara, ed., *From Buddha to Dōgen*; Kagamishima and Suzuki, eds., *Issues Concerning the 12-Fascicle Shōbōgenzō.*

[18] See especially the bibliographical record by Tsunoda Tairyū 角田泰隆, "Jūnikanbon *Shōbōgenzō* no kenkyū dōkō 十二巻本『正法眼蔵』の研究動向 [Trends in the study of the 12-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō*], in Kagamishima and Suzuki, eds., *Issues Concerning the 12-Fascicle Shōbōgenzō*, 458–72.

[19] An influential article cited by both Kawamura and Hakamaya is by Sugio Gen'yū 杉尾玄有, "Dōgen zenji no jiko-tōdatsu no go-shōgai to *Shōbōgenzō* no shinka: Jūnikanbon ni yotte 'Ippyaku-kan' o omou" 道元禅師の自己透脱の御生涯と『正法眼蔵』の進化—十二巻本によって「一百巻」を思う [Dōgen's lifelong goal to overcome the self and the development of the *Shōbōgenzō*—Thoughts on the '100 fascicle' and the 12-fascicle text], *Shūgaku kenkyū* 27 (1985): 7–12.

[20] See Kawamura Kōdō, et al., eds., *Shōbōgenzō*. In *Dōgen zenji zenshū* 道元禅師全集 [Collected works of Dōgen](Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1991), and Kawamura Kōdō, *Shōbōgenzō no seiritsu-shiteki kenkyū* 正法眼蔵の成立 史的研究 [Studies on the formation of the *Shōbōgenzō*] (Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1987); Ishii Shūdō, *Chūgoku Zenshūshiwa: Shinji* Shōbōgenzō *ni manabu* 中国禅宗史話—真字『正法眼蔵』に学ぶ [Stories on the history of the Chinese Ch'an school from the Chinese *Shōbōgenzō*] (Kyoto: Zen Bunka Kenkyūjō, 1988); Heine, *Dōgen and the Kōan Tradition: A Tale of Two Shōbōgenzō Texts* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994).

[21] Kawamura Kōdō, "Dōgen to *Shōbōgenzō*: Jūnikanbon to wa nanika" 道元と『正法眼蔵』—十二巻本とはなにか [Dōgen and the *Shōbōgenzō*: The significance of the 12-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō*], in Nara, *From Buddha to Dōgen*, 231.

[22] Hakamaya, "The Meaning of the 12-Fascicle *Shōbōgenzō* in Dōgen," 238–49.

[23] See Etō Sokuō 衛藤即応, ed., *Shōbōgenzō*, 3 volumes (Tokyo: Iwanami Bunko, 1939–1943).

[24] Some of the confusion concerning the different versions is traceable to Tokugawa-era disputes between Tenkei Denson, who supported the 60-fascicle text, and Manzan Dōhaku, who supported the 75-fascicle text.

[25] The chart on page 278 is a flowchart of editing and editions of *Shōbōgenzō* texts from Hakamaya, *Dōgen and Buddhism*, 192, influenced by categories developed in Mizuno Yaoko 水野弥穂子, "Kohon *Shōbōgenzō* no naiyō to sono sōgo kankei: Rokujūkan *Shōbōgenzō* no seikaku o saguru tame ni" 古本『正法眼蔵』の内容とその相互関係—六十巻『正法眼蔵』の性格をさぐるために [The contents of the old *Shōbōgenzō* text: In search of the characteristics of the 60-fascicle text], *Shūgaku kenkyū* 15 (1973): 68–73.

[26] Terada and Mizuno, *Dōgen*, vol. 2, 418.

[27] Terada and Mizuno, *Dōgen*, vol. 2, 317–18.

[28] Itō Shūken 伊藤秀憲, "Jūnikanbon *Shōbōgenzō* no senjutsu to sono ito ni tsuite" 十二巻本『正法眼蔵』の撰述とその意図について [The compilation and purpose of the 12-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō*]" (in Kagamishima and Suzuki, eds., *Issues Concerning the 12-Fascicle Shōbōgenzō,* 1991, 378), also points out an affinity on the topic of reading and interpreting sutras with the 75-fascicle "Nyorai zenshin" (complete body of Tathāgata).

[29] According to the Mumonkan verse, in Shibayama Zenkei, *Zen Comments on the Mumonkan* (New York: Mentor, 1974), 34.

> Not falling, not ignoring:/Odd and even are on one die./Not ignoring, not falling:/Hundreds and thousands of regrets!

[30] Terada and Mizuno, *Dōgen*, vol. 2, 232–33.

[31] Terada and Mizuno, *Dōgen*, vol. 2, 433.

[32] Ishii Shūdō, "Recent Trends in Dōgen Studies," 227.

[33] Terada and Mizuno, *Dōgen*, vol. 2, 437.

[34] See Matsumoto, "Deep Faith in Causality: Thoughts on Dōgen's Ideas."

[35] Another way of framing the issue of Dōgen's relation to *nyoraizō* thought, suggested by Matsumoto, is to distinguish Dōgen's later view from three perspectives: (1)

all things have Buddha-nature, therefore one must practice but the goal appears unattainable; (2) Buddha-nature encompasses all things, therefore one need not practice because the Buddha-nature is already present; (3) Buddha-nature is actualized by practice, therefore one must continue to practice. Dōgen's early standpoint is reflected in view (3) as a refutation of (1) and (2), but even this view does not sufficiently emphasize the retributive consequences of karmic conditioning (Matsumoto, "Deep Faith in Causality: Thoughts on Dōgen's Ideas," 589–90).

[36] Kagamishima, "Jūnikanbon *Shōbōgenzō* no ichizuke" 十二巻本『正法眼蔵』の 位置づけ [The place of the 12-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō*]. In Kagamishima and Suzuki, eds., *Issues Concerning the 12-fascicle Shōbōgenzō*, 7.

[37] Kagamishima, "The Place of the 12-Fascicle *Shōbōgenzō*," 13.

[38] See the preface of Ishii Shūdō, *Studies on the History of the Ch'an School during the Sung Period*. Hakamaya (*Critiques of Original Enlightenment*, 347) responds to some aspects of the Ishii position and cites an influential article by Mizuno Yaoko 水野弥穂子, "*Hōkyōki* to Jūnikan *Shōbōgenzō*: Toku ni 'Jinshin inga' kan ni tsuite," 『宝慶記』と十二巻『正法眼蔵』—とくに「深信因果」巻について [The *Hōkyōki* and the 12-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō,* especially the chapter on "Jinshin inga"], *Shūgaku kenkyū* 21 (1979): 27–30.

[39] The *Hōkyōki*, Dōgen's record of his conversations with Ju-ching between 1225–1227, was discovered posthumously and may not have been recorded by Dōgen until late in his career, after he received a copy from China of Ju-ching's recorded sayings. According to traditional accounts, he found these to be disappointing and unworthy of preserving the true legacy of his master's essential teachings.

[40] For example, Ishii Shūdō, "The later Dōgen: The 12-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō* and the *Hōkyōki*]," in Kagamishima and Suzuki, eds., *Issues Concerning the 12-fascicle Shōbōgenzō,* 335–6, points out that at the same time Dōgen was criticizing Hung-chih's view as exemplary of the denial of causality in the "Jinshin inga" fascicle, he was also emulating the Sung master's poetry in his own "moon-viewing" (*tsukimi*) verse in the *Eihei kōroku* collection (10.47), the calligraphy of which accompanies Dōgen's famous self-portrait.

[41] According to the counting of Ishii Shūdō, "The Later Dōgen," 328–30, Dōgen delivered 281 of his total of 531 sermons in the last five years of his life.

[42] According to Ikeda, the number of citations from traditional Buddhist and Zen texts in the following fascicles is: "Shukke" 5, and "Shukke kudoku" 21; "Den'e" 4, and "Kesa kudoku" 11; "Hotsumujōshin" 6, and "Hotsubodaishin" 10; "Daishugyō" 3, and "Jinshin inga" 9; "Sanjigo" (60-fascicle) 12, and "Sanjigo" (12-fascicle) 15. See his "Shinsō Jūnikanbon *Shōbōgenzō* no kōsō to kadai" 新草十二巻本『正法眼蔵』の構想と課題 [The structure and problems of the 12-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō*], in Kagamishima and Suzuki, eds. *Issues Concerning the 12-fascicle Shōbōgenzō*.

[43] See Ishii Seijun 石井清純, Jūni-kanbon *Shōbōgenzō* to *Eihei kōroku*: "Hyakujō yako" no hanashi o chūshin to shite 十二巻本『正法眼蔵』と永平広録—「百丈野狐」の話を中心として [The 12-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō* and the *Eihei kōroku*: The "Hyakujō yako" story]. *Shūgaku kenkyū* 30 (1988), 257–62; Matsuoka Yukako 松岡由香子, Shinsei no Dōgen: Jūni-kan-

bon *Shōbōgenzō* o megutte 新生の道元—十二巻本「正法眼蔵」をめぐって [The newly-reborn Dōgen: In light of the 12-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō*]. *Zen Bunka Kenkyūjo kiyō* 19 (1993): 65–151; see also Matsuoka Yukako, "The contemporary meaning of the 12-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō*."

44 See Bernard Faure, "The Kyoto School and Reverse Orientalism" in Fu and Heine, eds., *Japan in Traditional and Postmodern Perspectives,* 254–55.

45 See Akizuki Ryōmin, *New Mahāyāna: Buddhism for a Post-Modern World*, tr. James W. Heisig and Paul L. Swanson (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1990), 55; Ichikawa Hakugen 市川白弦, *Bukkyōsha no sensō-sekinin* 仏教者の戦争責任 [The Buddhists' war responsibility] (Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1970); Christopher Ives, *Zen Awakening and Society* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1992).

46 T No. 1545, 27.592a–593b.

47 Kyoko Motomochi Nakamura, trans. *Miraculous Stories from the Japanese Buddhist Tradition: The Nihon ryōiki of the Monk Kyōkai* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1973), 29–34.

48 See Damien Keown, *The Nature of Buddhist Ethics* (London: Macmillan, 1993); David J. Kalupahana, *Causality: The Central Philosophy of Buddhism* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 1975), 89–146; Hirakawa, *A History of Indian Buddhism*, 170–219.

49 See Matsumoto, "Deep Faith in Causality: Thoughts on Dōgen's Ideas," 610–20.

50 See Shimada Hiromi 島田裕巳, *Kaimyō: Naze shigo ni namae o kaeru no ka* 戒名—なぜ死後に名前を変えるのか [Posthumous names: Why do we change our names after death?] (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1991), 67–97; Nakao Shunbaku 中尾俊博. *Bukkyō to sabetsu* 仏教と差別 [Buddhism and discrimination] (Kyoto: Nagata Bunshōdō, 1985), 115–36.

51 Nakao, *Buddhism and Discrimination*, 70–114.

52 See Mark C. Taylor, *Erring: A Postmodern A-Theology* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984).

53 See Gustavo Benavides, "Religion and the Modernization of Tradition in Latin America," in Charles W. Fu and Gerhard Spiegler, eds., *Religious Issues and Interreligious Dialogues* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1989).

Is Critical Buddhism Really Critical?

1 This point has been fully developed by Robert Gimello in his Ph.D. dissertation "Chih-yen (602–668) and the Foundations of Hua-yen Buddhism" (Columbia University, 1976), 214–77.

2 See chapter 8 of my *Tsung-mi and the Sinification of Buddhism.*

3 See chapter 7 of my *Tsung-mi and the Sinification of Buddhism.*

4 See chapter 9 of my *Tsung-mi and the Sinification of Buddhism.*

5 That is, (1) a Buddha hidden within a lotus, (2) honey surrounded by bees, (3) a grain of rice within its husk, (4) gold lost in the dirt, (5) treasure hidden under the

ground, (6) the seed from which a great tree grows, (7) a golden image wrapped in a foul garment, (8) the womb of an outcaste woman impregnated by a king, and (9) a golden image within the earthen mold in which it is cast (see T 16.457a–460b).

[6] See Lambert Schmithausen, "On Some Aspects of Descriptions or Theories of 'Liberating Insight' and 'Enlightenment' in Early Buddhism," *Alt- und Neu-Indische Studien* 12 (1981): 199–250.

[7] See T. Griffith Foulk, "The 'Ch'an School' and Its Place in the Buddhist Monastic Tradition" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1987).

[8] See Luis Gómez, "Proto-Mādhyamika in the Pāli Canon," *Philosophy East and West* 26 (1976): 137–65.

Metaphysics, Suffering, and Liberation

[1] For a critical self-reflection on the relationship between Buddhist studies and colonialism in line with Edward Said's *Orientalism* (New York: Vintage, 1978), see the introduction to Donald S. Lopez, Jr., "At the Feet of the Lama," in his *Curators of the Buddha*.

[2] See David Kolb, *The Critique of Pure Modernity* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1986). Habermas proclaims that "Hegel inaugurated the discourse of modernity. He introduced the theme—the self-critical reassurance of modernity. He established the rules within which the theme can be varied—the dialectic of enlightenment." See Jürgen Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1987), 50.

[3] Jürgen Habermas develops his postmetaphysical conceptions of reason and subjectivity in response to Dieter Heinrich's question, "What is metaphysics—what is modernity?" See Jürgen Habermas, *Postmetaphysical Thinking* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992).

[4] In the essay "The Age of the World Picture," Heidegger lists five characteristics of the modern world: the mathematical science of nature, machine technology, the loss of the gods, the attempt at universal formation for everyone, and the conversion of the realm of art to that of aesthetic experience. See Kolb, *The Critique of Pure Modernity*, 121.

[5] Martin Heidegger, *Nietzsche IV: Nihilism* (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1982), 28.

[6] This view is shared by many scholars. In *The Hermeneutic of Postmodernity* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988), G. B. Madison writes:

> Representationalism has been the game from Descartes up to our twentieth-century positivists and analysts. As Heidegger observed in his essay "The Age of the World Picture," the two ontological characteristics of modernity are the world's becoming a picture or representation and, simultaneously, man's becoming a representing subject in the midst of mere objects. (x)

[7] Habermas, *The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity*, 27.

[8] In the *Der Spiegel* interview of 1966, Heidegger said, "Only a god can save us. The sole possibility that is left for us is to prepare a sort of readiness, through thinking and poetizing, for the appearance of the God or for the absence of the god in the time of

foundering (*Untergang*); for in the face of the god who is absent, we founder." See "Only a God Can Save Us: *Der Spiegel*'s Interview with Martin Heidegger," *Philosophy Today* (Winter 1976): 277.

[9] See Theodor W. Adorno, *Negative Dialectics* (New York: Continuum, 1983), 361.

[10] Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, n. 8, 278.

[11] For Heidegger's conception of modernity and technology, see Kolb, *The Critique of Pure Modernity*, 144–50.

[12] Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 367.

[13] Quoted in Zoltan Tar, *The Frankfurt School* (New York: Schocken Books, 1985), 175.

[14] Adorno, *Negative Dialectics*, 26, 31. Habermas also points out that Adorno attempts "to rescue the moment of the nonindentical from the assaults of instrumental reason" (*Postmetaphysical Thinking*, 122).

[15] Habermas, *Postmetaphysical Thinking*, 28, 116–17.

[16] Jürgen Habermas, "Modernity versus Postmodernity," *New German Critique* 22 (1981), 9.

[17] Habermas, *Postmetaphysical Thinking*, 120.

[18] Habermas, *Postmetaphysical Thinking*, 8, 31.

[19] See Hakamaya, *Critical Buddhism* and "Critical Philosophy versus Topical Philosophy"; see also other chapters in this volume.

[20] See Malcolm David Eckel, "The Ghost at the Table: On the Study of Buddhism and the Study of Religion," *Journal of the American Academy of Religion* 72/4 (1994): 1095–6. In this article Eckel reads Critical Buddhism as a form of essentialism.

[21] See Hakamaya, *Critiques of Original Enlightenment*, 8–10; see also Swanson, "Why They Say Zen Is Not Buddhism," above, pages *13–14*.

[22] See Matsumoto, *Pratītyasamutpāda and Emptiness,* 5–8, 67–68; see also Swanson, "Why They Say Zen Is Not Buddhism," *3–29*.

[23] Hakamaya clearly equates postmodernism with irrationalism and anti-modernism or anti-Cartesianism. See his *Critical Buddhism*, 6, 21. In his criticism of Tsuda Shin'ichi's interpretation of the notion of "dharma," Matsumoto expresses his objection to the Heideggerian ontological difference between *Sein* and *Seiendes*. See *Pratītya-samutpāda and Emptiness*,, 65–70.

[24]Lü Ch'eng 呂澂, "Nei-yüan fo-hsüeh wu-k'o chiang-hsi kang-yao chiang-chi" 內院佛學五科講習綱要講記 [Lectures on the syllabi of the five-course series in the Buddhist Institute] (1943), in *Lü-cheng fo-hsüeh lun-chu hsuan-chi* 呂澂佛學論著選集 [Collected works on Buddhism by Lü Ch'eng], vol. II (Chi-nan: Ch'i-lu Books, 1991), 609–11.

[25] For O-yang's criticism of Chinese Buddhism, see Lan Chi-fu 藍吉富. "Hsien-tai chung-kuo fo-chiao te fan-ch'uan-t'ung ch'ing-hsiang" 現代中國佛教的反傳統傾向 [Anti-traditionalism in modern Chinese Buddhism], in Lan Chi-fu, *Erh-shih shih-chi te chung-jih fo-chiao* 二十世紀的中日佛教 [Chinese and Japanese Buddhism in the twentieth century] (Taipei: Shin-wen-feng, 1991), 3–5.

[26] Lü Ch'eng 呂澂, "Kuan-hsing yü chuan-i" 觀行與轉依 [Meditation and transformation], in *Lü-cheng fo-hsüeh lun-chu hsuan-chi*, Vol. III, 1378.

[27] Lü Ch'eng 呂澂, "Shih-lun chung-kuo fo-hsüeh yu-kuan hsin-hsing te chi-pen ssu-hsiang" 試論中國佛學有關心性的基本思想 [On the fundamental concepts of mind/nature in Chinese Buddhism] (1962), in *Lü-cheng fo-hsüeh lun-chu hsuan-chi,* vol. III, 1416–17. For more bibliographical information, see my "Fo-chiao chë-hsüeh k'o-i shih i-chung p'i-p'an chë-hsüeh ma? 佛教哲學可以是一種批判哲學嗎? [Can Buddhist philosophy be considered a kind of critical philosophy?], in Shih Heng-ch'ing 釋恆清, ed., *Fo-chiao ssu-hsiang te chi-ch'eng yu fa-chan* 佛教思想的傳承與發展 [The heritage and future of Buddhist thought] (Taipei: Tung-ta, 1995), 599–619.

[28] Lü Ch'eng, "Shih-lun chung-kuo fo-hsüeh yu-kuan hsin-hsing te chi-pen ssu-hsiang," 1418–22.

[29] Nishitani Keiji, *Religion and Nothingness,* Jan Van Bragt, trans. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 11.

[30] Nishitani, *Religion and Nothingness*, 14.

[31] Nishitani, *Religion and Nothingness*, 88.

[32] Heidegger's "destruction" of Western metaphysics can be seen as a form of antifoundationalism and antisubjectivism.

[33] Nishitani, *Religion and Nothingness*, 109.

[34] Nishitani, *Religion and Nothingness*, 110.

[35] I have modified Jan Van Bragt's translation slightly; Nishitani, *Religion and Nothingness*, 110.

[36] In Hakamaya Noriaki's understanding, the philosophy of the Kyoto school is indebted to German Idealism and the Buddhist doctrine of original enlightenment and therefore has succumbed to a mysticism of the ineffable Absolute. See *Critical Buddhism*, 49, 78–80.

[37] Nishitani, *Religion and Nothingness*, 106–107.

[38] Nishitani, *Religion and Nothingness*, 252.

[39] Nakamura Yūjirō 中村雄二郎, *Nishida Kitarō* 西田幾多郎 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1983); see also quotations in Hakamaya, *Critical Buddhism*, 12.

[40] "Our conventional expectations about literary genres tempt us to treat Bhāvaviveka's text as an example of what we call 'philosophy' and to mine it for the epistemological and ontological arguments that establish his connection with other recognizable 'philosophers.' But this expectation obscures the narrative context in which the arguments are placed." See M. D. Eckel, *To See the Buddha: A Philosopher's Quest for the Meaning of Emptiness* (San Francisco: Harper, 1992), 26.

[41] Eckel, *To See the Buddha*, 2, 7.

[42] Eckel, *To See the Buddha*, 66–7.

[43] 三年逢一閏, 鷄向五更啼. Quoted in Nishitani, *Religion and Nothingness*, 191.

[44] The emptiness of place or the place of emptiness is also exemplified in Eckel's analysis of the "palace" metaphor in three stages. First, the steps that lead to the top of the palace represents stages in the process of reasoning that leads from conventional knowledge to the ultimate truth. Second, the palace turns out to be illusion when it is seen by one who stands at the top of the palace. Third, the enlightened one (who stands at the top of the palace) uses the image of palace as an *upāya* for heuristic purposes. This interpretation clearly shows that the criticism directed toward Topical Buddhism is not sustainable because the metaphor of place or topos is never seen in the sense of "substance." Rather, it denotes the "life-world" in which we act, think, eat, and die. See Eckel, *To See the Buddha*, 23.

[45] K. N. Jayatilleke, *Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1963), 430.

[46] In the conclusion of *Religion and Nothingness* (285), Nishitani sums up the Western conceptions of freedom and equality, the cornerstone of liberalism and democracy, as the products of self-centered subjectivism. He goes on to propose his ideas of "true freedom" as "an absolute autonomy on the field of emptiness" and "true equality" as "the reciprocal interchange of absolute inequality," "an equality in love." For Nishitani's position on the issue of "overcoming modernity" during the war, see Minamoto Ryōen's essay on "The Symposium on 'Overcoming Modernity'," in Heisig and Maraldo, *Rude Awakenings*, 217–20.

Thoughts on *Dhātu-vāda* and Recent Trends in Buddhist Studies

[1] I do not know exactly when Hakamaya Noriaki and Matsumoto Shirō began their critique of *tathāgata-garbha* thought and *hongaku shisō*, but the first time I myself ran across it was in Hakamaya's "Thoughts on the Ideological Background of Social Discrimination."

[2] A text quoted as the basis for the *Mahāyāna-saṅgraha*, but not extant.

[3] *Sutra of Neither Increase Nor Decrease*, T No. 668, 16.466–8.

[4] I have published an expanded discussion of this topic under the title "'Mushi jirai no kai' no saikō" 「無始時来の界」再考 [A reexamination of *anādhikāliko-dhātuḥ*] in *Suguro Shinjō Hakase Koki Kinen Ronbunshū* 勝呂信靜博士古稀記念論文集 [Festschrift for Dr. Suguro Shinjō] (Tokyo: Sankibō Busshorin, 1996), 41–59.

[5] Skt. *āryadharmahetutvād dharmadhātuḥ*; see *Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya*, ad v. I, 16.

[6] *Saṃyuttanikāya* II, 25 (*Nidana-samyutta*, 20, *paccaya*); see also T 2.84b.

[7] See Tachikawa Musashi 立川武蔵, *Chūron no shisō* 中論の思想 [The philosophy of the *Middle Treatise*] (Tokyo: Hōzōkan, 1994), 226.

[8] The idea that the enlightened are endowed with, or have as their "body," the five qualities of keeping the precepts, samadhic concentration, wisdom, liberation, and the insight of liberation.

[9] *Aṅguttaranikāya*, I, 286; no equivalent in the Chinese canon.

[10] *Saṃyuttanikāya* II, 106; T 2. 80c.

[11] *Saṃyuttanikāya* II, 1–11; T 2.101c.

[12] For a more detailed discussion see my essay *Bukkyō shisō ron* 仏教思想論 [Theories on Buddhist thought] (Iwanami Kōza Tōyō Shisō Series 9. Tokyo: Iwanami, 1988).

[13] A shift in emphasis from impersonal Dharma to personal Buddha is one of the characteristics of early Mahayana scriptures. That is, the Buddha was required to be an eternal refuge (*sarana*) for believers, one who teaches dharmas in order to lead people to the highest enlightenment that is equal to that of the Buddha. Such a concept appears in the *Lotus Sutra*, for example, as the Tathagata of Immeasurable Life (chapter 16). Also, it is symbolically given the names of the Buddha Amitāyus (immeasurable life) and Amitābha (immeasurable light) in the *Sukhāvativyūha*. Theoretical absolutization of the Buddha followed this through identification with the *dharmadhātu*.

[14] I am referring here to Matsumoto's *Critical Studies on Zen Thought*.

[15] See Hakamaya Noriaki, *Dōgen and Buddhism*.

[16] See Kagamishima and Suzuki, eds., *Issues Concerning the 12-fascicle Shōbōgenzō*.

A Reexamination of Critical Buddhism

[1] Included in this volume, pages *165–73*.

[2] Partially translated in this volume, pages *314–20*.

[3] For details on this incident and the subsequent Sōtō efforts with regard to discrimination, see William Bodiford, "Zen and the Art of Religious Prejudice."

[4] See the contribution by Steve Heine to this volume, *251–85*.

[5] See Hakamaya, *Critiques of Original Enlightenment*, 9–10.

[6] See Yamaguchi Zuihō, *Tibet*. See also the essay by Yamaguchi included in this volume, *220–41*.

[7] Outside the Sōtō sect, Itō Zuiei 伊藤瑞叡 of the Nichiren sect has expressed sympathy with Critical Buddhism; see his essay "Hongaku shisō hihan to kyōsō shōretsu shugi ni tsuite" 本覚思想批判と教相勝劣主義について [Critical Buddhism and judging the relative superiority of teachings] in the pamphlet attached to *Hayashima Kyōshō chosakushū* 早島鏡正著作集 14 (Tokyo: Sekai Seiten Kankō Kyōkai, 1996), 11–14.

[8] See Itō Takatoshi, *Critical Studies on Chinese Buddhism*, and Ishii Shūdō, *Studies on the History of the Ch'an School during the Sung Period*.

[9] See, for example, Tsuda Shin'ichi 津田真一, *Hannya-kyō* kara *Kegon-kyō e* 般若経から華厳経へ [From the *Prajñāparamitā Sutra* to the *Avataṃsaka Sutra*], *Narita-san Bukkyō Kenkyūjo kiyō* 11 (1988): 291–395.

[10] For details on the exchange between Tsuda and Matsumoto, see chapter 4 of Matsumoto, *Pratītyasamutpāda and Emptiness*. See also Tsuda Shin'ichi, "Dhātu no honshitsu no kōzō" Dhātuの本質の構造 [The fundamental structure of *dhātu*] *Bukkyōgaku* 36 (1994): 101–32.

[11] See Ueda Shizuteru 上田閑照, *Dōgen* 道元 (Tokyo: Chūō Kōronsha, 1995), 208–51. After Ueda, the most recent critique of Hakamaya's interpretation of the *Shōbōgenzō* is Matsuoka Yukako's "The contemporary meaning of Dōgen's 12-fascicle *Shōbōgenzō*."

[12] The essay "Rethinking Japanese Buddhism" originally appeared in 1988.

[13] See my *Studies in Early Heian Buddhist Thought*.

[14] Reprinted in my *Essays in Japanese Buddhist Intellectual History*.

[15] See my *Studies in Early Heian Buddhist Thought* and "Myōe no baai" 明恵の場合 [In the case of Myōe] (*Series higashi Ajia Bukkyō* 4. Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1995).

[16] See my "Ajia no naka no Nihon Bukkyō" アジアの中の日本仏教 [Japanese Buddhism in an Asian context], *Nihon no Bukkyō* 2 (1995): 2–24 (reprinted in *Bukkyō—Kotoba no shisōshi* 仏教—言葉の思想史 [Buddhism: A philosophical history of language], Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996).

[17] See He Yan-sheng 何 燕生, "Dōgen no Shinjō-sōmetsu-ron hihan ni kansuru ichi shiten" 道元の心常相滅論批判に関する一視点 [One perspective on Dōgen's criticism of the theory of the "constancy of the mind and the extinction of marks"], *Shūkyō kenkyū* 69/3 (1995): 125–47.

[18] For a good introduction to the *Jisshū yōdō ki* see Carl Bielefeldt, "Filling the Zen shu: Notes on the *Jisshū yōdō ki*," *Cahiers d'Etrême-Asie* 7 (1993–1994): 221–48.

[19] See P. Gregory, "Tsung-mi and the Problem of *Hongaku shisō*," *Komazawa Daigaku Zenkenkyūjo nenpō* 5 (1994): 1–50, as well as his contribution to the present volume, pages *302–13*.

[20] See the preface to Ishii Shūdō 石井修道, *Dōgen Zen no seiritsushi-teki kenkyū* 道元禅の成立史的研究 [Studies in the formation of Dōgen's Zen] (Tokyo: Daizō Shuppan, 1991).

[21] *The Blue Cliff Record*, T. Cleary and J. Cleary, trans. (Boston: Shambhala, 1992), 391.

[22] See Hakamaya, *Critiques of Original Enlightenment*, 289; chart given above, *89*.

[23] For details see my "Japanese Buddhism in an Asian Context," 17–24.

[24] For details see Takeuchi Yoshimi 竹内 好, *Takeuchi Yoshimi zenshū* 竹内好全集 [The collected works of Takeuchi Yoshimi], vol. 5 (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1981), and Mizoguchi Yūzō 溝口雄三, *Hōhō to shite no Chūgoku* 方法としての中国 [China as a method] (Tokyo: Tōkyō Daigaku Shuppankai, 1989).

[25] See Mizoguchi, *China as a Method*, 130–41.

Thoughts on the Ideological Background of Social Discrimination

[1] This essay is of a piece with a number of other essays I published in 1985, "Observations on Norinaga's Critique of Buddhism," "Norinaga's Critique of Ryōbu Shinto," and "The Definitive Standpoint for Understanding Dōgen." The present essay began as a presentation to the Joint Conference of the Special Section of the Sōtō Sect's Doctrinal Advisory Committee, a research group that worked with the Sōtō Sect

Consultation on Integration within the Sōtō Sect Headquarters for the Protection of Human Rights. Judging that its goals had been met, the Joint Conference was dissolved on 6 October 1985, while the Special Section concluded that the eight original members (Okabe Kazuo, Kosaka Kiyū, Nakano Tōzen, Ishii Shūdō, Itō Takatoshi, Itō Shūken, Matsumoto Shirō, and I), together with three new members (Katayama Ichirō, Ikeda Rentarō, and Kanazawa Atsushi), would continue our research.

2 Umehara Takeshi, "The Japanese Development of Buddhism."

3 Motoori Norinaga, *Kuzubana* くず花, in *The Complete Works of Motoori Norinaga*, vol. 8, 178–9. See also my *Critiques of Original Enlightenment*, 37.

4 See Ishikawa Rikizan 石川力山, "Chūsei Sōtō kirigami no bunruishiron" 中世曹洞 切紙の分類試論 [Categorizing medieval Sōtō documents], published in four parts in two journals: *Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyōgakubu Kenkyūjo kiyō* 41 (1983) and 42 (1984), and *Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyōgakubu ronshū* 14 (1983) and 15 (1984). *Kirigami* were "notes" or "memos" transmitted from master to disciple together with oral or esoteric teachings; they included instructions in the various functions of a temple priest, including memorial services and necrologies, both of which were often conducted with the explicit aim of perpetuating social discrimination.

5 "Karma of the three times" refers to three kinds of karma according to the time when the results of one's actions will be experienced, namely in this life, in the next life, or in subsequent lives. This understanding of karma was substantialized and applied to the various conditions of life in the present world, hence it raises numerous questions regarding its reinforcement of fatalism.

6 On the compilation of the *Shushōgi*, see Mizuno Kōgen 水野弘元, *Shushōgi kōwa* 修証義講話 [Lectures on the *Shushōgi*] (Tokyo: Sōtōshū Shūmuchō, 1968), 3–21. See also Mizuno, *Shushōgi fukyō no tame no gaido bukku* 修証義布教のためのガイドブック [A guidebook for teaching the *Shushōgi*] (Tokyo: Sōtōshū Shūmuchō, 1990), 9–41; for an English translation see Mizuno, "Principles of Practice and Enlightenment of Soto Sect [*sic*]," in *Outlines of the Doctrine and History of the Sōtō Sect* (Tokyo: Sōtō Shūmin, 1934).

7 Itō Shūken 伊藤秀憲, "Meijiki shūhō *Shushōgi* shiryō" 明治期宗報『修証義』資料 [Materials on the *Shushōgi* from the Meiji period] (Materials for the January 30th meeting of the Joint Conference of the Special Section, unpublished). All three terms come from the "Sanjigo" chapter of the *Shōbōgenzō*; the source for the *caṇḍāla* is the *Ching-tê Ch'uan-têng-lu* (Jpn. *Keitoku dentōroku*). *Ōmon* and *funan* have been traced to the *Mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra*.

8 心常相滅. This is the notion that the original nature of the mind is eternally abiding and unchanging, and that it is merely the mind or body in its phenomenal aspect that is born and passes away. It exhibits a strong philosophical form of monism in which all phenomena return to a single original nature or original substance.

9 Ōkubo Dōshū 大久保道舟, ed., *Kohon kōtei Shōbōgenzō* 古本校定正法眼蔵 [An annotated *Shōbōgenzō*] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1971), 738–9. English translation adapted from *A Complete English Translation of Dōgen Zenji's Shōbōgenzō* by Kōsen Nishiyama and John Stevens, vol. 1, 155.

[10] See Hazama Jikō, *The Development and Characteristics of Japanese Buddhism*, especially the chapter entitled "Studies on the 'Theory of the Eternal Mind and Perishable Phenomena' in the Kamakura Period," 298–318. Although his research was published in 1948, it was only very recently that it began to attract the attention of Sōtō Dōgen scholars. Etō Sokuō's 衛藤即応 *Shōbōgenzō josetsu—Bendōwa gikai* 正法眼蔵序説—弁道話義解 [Introduction to the *Shōbōgenzō*—Commentary on the "Bendōwa"] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1959), for example, did not take this up as an important issue.

[11] See Yamauchi Shun'yū, *Dōgen's Zen and the Tendai Hongaku Tradition*.

[12] Although it is not a very discerning work, see Suda Michiteru 須田道輝, "Senni gedō ni tsuite" 先尼外道について [On the heretic Senika], *Shūgaku kenkyū* 3 (1961): 112–16.

[13] The first clear example of the term "original enlightenment" appears in the *Awakening of Mahayana Faith*, but under the influence of the idea of *tathāgata-garbha* as an "original enlightenment" of the original nature or original substance that corresponds to the eternal mind, it passed over into the whole of Chinese and Japanese Buddhism, and even passed into the general East Asian worldview. Concerning the influence of the doctrine of original enlightenment on *honji-suijaku* (manifestation of the Buddhas as kami), for example, see Nishida Nagao 西田長男, *Nihon Shintōshi kenkyū* 日本神道史研究 [Studies in the history of Shinto] (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1978), vol. 4, 96–8. Note, however, that the influence that the traditional, positive understanding of the doctrine of original enlightenment as an egalitarian philosophy has had on scholars' judgments must be taken into consideration. Nishida (see page 163) gives a good example of the close relationship between the doctrine of original enlightenment and *honji-suijaku* from vol. 36 of the *Taiheiki*. Besides its impact on a work of literature such as this, one of the most important characteristics of the idea of original enlightenment is its attempt to explain the phenomenal world from the starting point of an original enlightenment that is the primordial and self-evident origin of all things.

[14] See the Sōtō sect newsletter *Shūhō* 宗報 390 (1913): 12.

[15] Ōkubo, *Annotated Shōbōgenzō*, 680 (vol. 3, 101).

[16] Ōkubo, *Annotated Shōbōgenzō*, 678 (vol. 3, 98–9).

[17]See Kosaka Kiyū's unpublished manuscript distributed for the February 29th meeting of the Joint Consultation of the Special Section. In particular, the understanding of *fumai inga* 不昧因果 and *furaku inga* 不落因果, the former of which, according to the "Deep Belief in Causality" (*jinshin inga*) chapter of the *Shōbōgenzō*, leads to a profound belief in the principle of cause and effect, while the latter leads to a denial of cause and effect, is an issue of central importance for Sōtō doctrine, and relates to the question of the inevitability of cause and effect.

[18] Ōkubo, *Annotated Shōbōgenzō,* vol. 1, 140–6.

[19] The original Japanese translated here tentatively as "true nature of the transmission" is *jūjō no mottai* 従上の物体. This phrase is not well known as a technical term in the Sōtō tradition, and cannot be found in Zen dictionaries. I surmise that it indicates the true nature beyond which (従上) there is no other nature (勿体). But I am not confident of this reading, and it may simply refer to "the most important matter of all."

Ichidaiji innen 一大事因縁, translated here as the "most important matter of cause and condition," is derived from *eka-kṛtya* from chapter 2 of the *Lotus Sutra*, where it means the "sole object" for which the Buddha is said to have appeared in the world.

[20] Harada Sogaku 原田祖岳, *Kaitei shinpan* Shushōgi *kōwa* 改定新版修証義講話 [Lectures on the newly revised *Shushōgi*] (Obama: Daiunkai, 1953), 50; *Shushōgi* No. 3, 16.

[21] On the Sōtō sect and the "five ranks" see the materials prepared by Ishii Shūdō for the 26 October 1985 meeting of the Sōtōshū Shūgaku Taikai.

[22] Kishizawa Ian 岸沢惟安, *Sandōkai Kattōshū: Hōkyōzanmaika kōwa*, 参同契葛藤集–宝鏡三昧歌講話 [Lectures on the *Sandōkai Kattōshū: Hōkyōzanmaika*] (Tokyo: Daihōrinkaku, 1971), 50.

[23] Kishizawa, *Lectures*, 54.

[24] Kishizawa, *Lectures*, 54–5.

[25] Arai Sekizen 新井石禅, *Inga rekizen zen'aku jūrai* 因果歴然善悪十来, in *Arai Sekizen zenshū* 新井石禅全集 [Collected works of Arai Sekizen](Tokyo: Arai Sekizen Zenshū Kankōkai, 1929–1931), vol. 8/2, 51.

[26] Sāṃkhya is one of the "six schools of Indian philosophy" that posits the two principles of pure spirit (*puruṣa*) and matter (*prakṛti*) in order to explain the arising of world into existence. Although this dualism is different from the doctrine of original enlightenment, it is very similar in asserting that effects are already existent in the cause, that is, that all results already exist in the basic matter (*prakṛti*) that is their root cause. As a form of monism, the doctrine of original enlightenment is also similar to the theories of *ātman* and *brahman*.

[27] For a critical appraisal see my "Critical Notes on the *Awakening of Mahayana Faith*."

[28] See unpublished manuscript by Itō Takatoshi on "Chūgoku ni okeru gōhōrinnesetsu to shinfumetsuron" 中国における業報輪廻説と神不滅論 [The theories of karmic rebirth and the immortal spirit in China] prepared for the 27 April 1985 meeting of the Joint Conference of the Special Section. Ishii Shūdō focused on the problem with particular regard to the history of the Chinese Ch'an school in his "Jinken to gō—Shūkyō to buraku sabetsu o fukaku kangaenakatta hansei to shite no shiteki memo" 人権と業—宗教と部落差別を深く考えなかった反省としての私的メモ [Human rights and karma—A private memo on regret over not having deeply considered the issue of religion and buraku discrimination], unpublished manuscript distributed as material for the 1 March 1985 meeting of the Joint Conference of the Special Section.

[29] See *Kōbō Daishi zenshū* 弘法大師全集 [Collected works of Kōbō Daishi] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan), vol. 5, 189–94. See also my "Observations on Motoori Norinaga's Critique of Buddhism," 127–9.

[30] Although this point has been fully investigated by the study group, I would mention only two published reports on these topics. Matsumoto Shirō, in his "The *Śrīmālādevī Sutra* and Ekayana Theory" focuses on the *Śrīmālādevī Sūtra* as a scripture representative of the doctrine of *tathāgata-garbha* (or, in Matsumoto's terms, *dhātuvāda*) in order to study the doctrine of original enlightenment in contrast to the idea of emptiness. Yamaguchi Zuihō's "Tibetan Studies and Buddhism" clarifies the differences

between the Tibetan Buddhism, where a correct tradition of emptiness is preserved, and Chinese Buddhism, which is rooted in the doctrine of original enlightenment, arguing that Dōgen is closer to the former. Both are excellent articles for understanding the idea of original enlightenment.

[31] See Okabe Kazuo's unpublished manuscript, "*Shushōgi* seiritsu zengo no Bukkyōkai no jōsei"『修証義』成立前後の仏教界の情勢 [The world of Buddhism before and after the *Shushōgi*], distributed as materials for the Joint Conference of the Special Section meeting of 26 March 1985.

[32] Motoori Norinaga, *Tōmonroku* 答問録, in *Works of Motoori Norinaga*, vol. 1, 526–7.

[33] See my "Observations on Norinaga's Critique of Buddhism."

[34] Ōkubo, *Annotated Shōbōgenzō*, 616 (vol. 3, 164). This phrase is also quoted in the *Shushōgi*, although I do not know whether or not it means the same thing there.

[35] Komori Ryūhō 小森龍邦, *Gō: Shukugōkan to ningen kaihō* 業—宿業観と人間解放 [Karma: Fate and human liberation] (Osaka: Kaihō Shuppansha, 1984), Buraku Kaihō Shinsho 12, 2.

[36] After completing this paper, I came across the following in Komori Ryūhō, *Shutaiteki bukkyōsha no michi* 主体的仏教者の道 [The way of the subjective Buddhist] (Tokyo: Sōtōshū Shūmuchō, Sōtōshū Booklets, Religion and Social Discrimination Series No. 3, 1985), 35–6:

> This logic [that humanity has a weakness for putting up with evil structures], in the wrong hands, can lead to the simple conclusion that "given this tendency, there is nothing to be done," and thus to an affirmation of the inevitability of social discrimination. One must not repeat such theories lightly. They should not be spoken except in a way that supports their understanding in a religious context. I do not mean to make such ideas the exclusive right of religion, however. An environment characterized by a spirit of deep concern for the philosophy of life might also, for example, be suitable. Lacking such a setting, people are likely to respond, "Well, if humanity is possessed of such a weakness, then what more is there to say? If discrimination has its roots in human nature, it is simply a matter of the survival of the fittest. If things don't change in the animal world, then the same holds true for the human world."

Buddhism and the Kami

[1] Max Weber, "Science as a Vocation," 135ff, 145ff. The Japanese translation of this essay appeared in July of 1936, closely following the February 26th Incident, and one can only speculate on the impact it had on Japanese scholars of the time.

[2] I first heard of this theory from Okabe Kazuo, and linked it with the theory of *tathāgata-garbha* as one of the "two enemies" that I singled out for critique in the Second Special Section of the Sōtō Doctrinal Advisory Committee.

[3] Umehara Takeshi 梅原 猛 and Yamamoto Shichihei 山本七平, "Tennō: Kono kyodai naru nazo" 天皇—この巨大なる謎 [The emperor: This giant riddle], *Voice* (1985), April Special Supplement, 156; emphasis added.

[4] Kuroda Toshio 黒田俊雄, ***Rekishigaku no saisei*** 歴史学の再生 [Historiographical reflections] (Tokyo: Azekura Shobō, 1983), 37.

[5] In contrast to the kind of National Studies that seeks to extract a pure Japanese culture through the elimination of all foreign elements (a sort of "culture by subtraction"), Umehara's approach, as he himself acknowledges, is to search for the unique principles of Japanese culture by studying how foreign influences such as Buddhism or Confucianism have been changed or adapted in Japan (a sort of "multiplication" theory of Japanese culture). See his *Nihongaku kotohajime* 日本学事始 [The beginning of Japanology] (Tokyo: Shūeisha Bunko, 1985), 41. In this way Umehara seems to be saying in effect that his brand of Japanology differs from the sort of National Studies that glorifies and absolutizes Japan, and thus his presents no danger. I do not believe this.

[6] From Nakasone Yasuhiro 中曽根康弘 and Umehara Takeshi 梅原 猛, "Shōwa rokujūichinen o mukaete: Sekai bunmei no nagare to Nihon no yakuwari" 昭和六十一年を迎えて—世界文明の流れと日本の役割 [Looking towards the sixty-first year of the Shōwa Era: The flow of world culture and the role of Japan], *Bungei Shunjū*, February 1986, 291.

[7] Nakasone Yasuhiro, "Zensairoku: Nakasone Shushō 'Chiteki suijun: Kōen 全採録—中曽根首相「知的水準」講演 [The complete transcript of Prime Minister Nakasone's "Speech on Intellectual Standards"], *Chūō kōron* (January 1986): 159–60.

[8] The establishment of the center was realized through the auspices of Prime Minister Nakasone, who was sympathetic to the ideas of these Kyoto scholars, beginning with Umehara, who was chosen as the center's first director. See also Hakamaya, "Critique of the Kyoto School," 71–6; and Hayakawa Kazuo 早川和男, "Shūsen no hi ni omou" 終戦の日に思う [Thinking about the day the war ended], *Nippon no kagakusha* 21/10 (October 1986), which typifies the all-too-rare criticism that this aroused.

[9] Umehara's emphasis on *tathāgata-garbha* thought is well known. See, for example, his newspaper column "The Japanese Development of Buddhism," criticized by Hakamaya in his "Thoughts on the Ideological Background of Social Discrimination." See also Umehara and Yamamoto, "The Emperor: This Giant Riddle," 158.

[10] Nakasone and Umehara, "The Sixty-first Year of the Shōwa Era," 300.

[11] Nakasone and Umehara, "The Sixty-first Year of the Shōwa Era," 297.

[12] Nakasone, "Speech on Intellectual Standards," 162.

[13] There is of course really no need to interpret the Buddhahood of non-sentient beings as a uniquely Japanese contribution. Hakamaya has already noted the relation of this idea to the thought of Chi-tsang and the San-lun school. See also his "Thoughts on the Ideological Background of Social Discrimination," 158, and "The Anti-Buddhist Character of *Wa* and the Antiviolent Character of Buddhism."

[14] See, e.g., Nakasone and Umehara, "The Sixty-first Year of the Shōwa Era," 294–5.

[15] *Kokutai no hongi*, 93–4; emphasis added. Words in parentheses appear in the original English translation; those in square brackets indicate interpolations by the translator of the present essay.

[16] *Kokutai no hongi*, 97–8.

[17] Nakajima Kenzō 中島健蔵, ***Shōwa jidai*** 昭和時代 [The Shōwa Era] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shinsho, 1957), 125–6. See also Kamata Shigeo 鎌田茂雄, "Kegon tetsugaku no konponteki tachiba" 華厳哲学の根本的立場 [The fundamental standpoint of Kegon philosophy], in Kawada Kumatarō 川田熊太郎 and Nakamura Hajime 中村 元, eds., *Kegon shisō* 華厳思想 [Kegon thought] (Kyoto: Hōzōkan, 1960), 448–9, n. 5.

[18] *Kokutai no hongi*, 134.

[19] *Kokutai no hongi*, 94–5.

[20] Kawabata Yasunari 川端康成, "Utsukushii Nihon no watashi" 美しい日本の私 [Japan the beautiful and myself]. English trans. by E. G. Seidensticker, *Japan the Beautiful and Myself* (Tokyo: Kodansha, 1969).

[21] *Kokutai no hongi*, 96.

[22] The *Kokutai no hongi* also has it that the Japanese Tendai school taught that "grasses, trees, and land all possess Buddha-nature."

[23] "This should probably be taken as showing the bridge between his thought and real life, for although both were directly connected, he reserved the freedom to remove it if the need arose in order to avoid friction or conflict between the two. He seems to be saying that 'this is my real meaning'." Kobayashi Hideo 小林秀雄, *Motoori Norinaga* 本居宣長 (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1977), 28. Compare Hakamaya, "Observations on Norinaga's Critique of Buddhism," 110–12.

[24] See Hakamaya, "Observations on Norinaga's Critique of Buddhism," 120–1.

[25] This is my interpretation of Hakamaya's theory; Hakamaya does not himself explicitly state that Norinaga is similar to Dōgen.

[26] Towards the end of *Naobinomitama,* Norinaga speculates whether "some person" might not ask if "the path of the kami is not the same as China's Lao-tzu and Chuang-tzu." He shows that he did in fact recognize the general similarity between his ideas and the naturalism of Taoism: "Taoists became fed up with the Confucian wisdom and turned to the natural, thus indicating the similarity" (*Collected Works of Motoori Norinaga*, vol. 9, 62). Tsuda Sōkichi 津田左右吉 has gone to some length to show how after the time of Kamo no Mabuchi (1697–1769) scholars of National Studies were indeed influenced by both anti-Confucianism and Taoism. See his *Nihon no Shintō* 日本の神道 [Japanese Shinto] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1949), 248–68. Tsuda also sees Norinaga's thought as affirmative of the established order and lacking in practical efficacy (see especially 266–8).

[27] *Collected Works of Motoori Norinaga*, vol. 9, 50.

[28] *Collected Works of Motoori Norinaga*, vol. 9, 59–60.

[29] See the cassette tape number II of Kobayashi Hideo 小林秀雄, "Bungaku no zakkan" 文学の雑感 [Literary impressions] (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1985).

[30] In order to get the full flavor of these comments the reader is referred to the fuller context in Mishima Yukio 三島由紀夫, *Tōron: Mishima Yukio versus Tōdai Zenkyōtō* 討論三島由紀夫vs.東大全共闘 [Debate: Mishima Yukio versus the Zenkyōtō of Tokyo University] (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1969), 93–5.

[31] I am referring to my friend Kanazawa Atsushi, though my understanding might stray from his intended meaning.

[32] See, for example, Mishima Yukio's *Bunka bōeiron* 文化防衛論 [In defense of culture] (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 1969), 46, 49, 59.

[33] I consider Nishida's use of the expression "the self-identity of absolute contradictories" to be part of the problematic I am discussing, and at some future date would like to lock horns with his philosophy as such.

[34] See, for example, Nakasone, "Speech on Intellectual Standards," 159.

[35] Mishima, *Debate: Mishima Yukio and the Zenkyōtō*, 67.

[36] Mishima Yukio, *The Temple of Dawn*, trans. by E. Dale Saunders and Cecilia Segawa Seigle (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1973), 104.

[37] I find this translation a bit strange; "individualized thinking" is a more literal rendering of 個有の思想.

[38] Mishima, *The Temple of Dawn*, 25–6; emphasis added.

[39] See Noda Yoshiyuki 野田良之, *Eiyokō* 栄誉考 [Thoughts on honor] (Tokyo: Misuzu Shobō, 1986), 76.

[40] *Uchimura Kanzō zenshū* 内村鑑三全集 [The complete works of Uchimura Kanzō] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1983), vol. 33, 415.

[41] Hori Tatsuo, "Jūgatsu" 十月 [October], in *Hori Tatsuo zenshū* 堀辰雄全集 [The Collected Works of Hori Tatsuo] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1977), vol. 3, 133–4. The piece was written in 1942. I would argue that Origuchi Shinobu, who influenced Hori Tatsuo, also understood pure Japanism as a philosophy of death, but there is no room to enter into that discussion here.

* Postscript (September 1996): After writing this paper I have encountered the writings of the so-called Frankfurt school. I must point out that the meanings of the terms "objective" and "subjective" as used at the beginning of my essay are not the same as those used in the writings of the Frankfurt school, and I admit now that to some extent my use of the terms is invalid. I hope to address this issue in the future.

Tendai *Hongaku* Doctrine and Japan's Ethnocentric Turn

[1] See "Thoughts on the Ideological Background of Social Discrimination," *339–55.*

[2] Here I depart from some of my own previous work in rendering *hon* in the term *hongaku* with the awkward but less limiting English term "originary." The particular disadvantages of terms such as "innate" or "inherent" or "original" have been noted (see Swanson, *Tendai Buddhism in Japan*, 74), and "originary" would seem to encompass the meanings of these terms in a way that need not carry their limited nuances. The term also implies a dimension that cuts across time and space and that embraces the affirmation of the here-and-now.

[3] In another essay I have referred to an ontological critique and a socioethical critique as two prongs of Critical Buddhism (*Originary Enlightenment: Tendai Hongaku*

Doctrine and Japanese Buddhism [Tokyo: International Institute for Buddhist Studies, 1996]). This paper offers historical considerations. See also Hakamaya, *Critiques of Original Enlightenment*, 209–26; *Critical Buddhism*, 275–304.

[4] The conventional translation "emperor" is imprecise, and I will simply use "Tennō" (Heavenly Ruler) in this paper.

[5] See Tamura, *Introduction to the History of Japanese Buddhism*, for an account of the history of Japanese Buddhist thought with a focus on the development of Tendai *hongaku shisō* and its pervasive influence in Japanese culture. See also Tamura, "Japanese Culture and the Tendai Concept of Original Enlightenment."

[6] See the works of Tamura Yoshirō, Paul Groner, Jacqueline Stone, Sueki Fumihiko, and Ruben L. F. Habito in the Bibliography at the end of this volume.

[7] *Shinnyo-kan*, in Tada et al., eds., *The Texts of the Tendai Original Enlightenment Tradition*, 120–21.

[8] *Shinnyo-kan*, in Tada et al., eds., *Texts*, 148.

[9] See Tamura, "Critique of Original Enlightenment Thought in Shōshin and Dōgen."

[10] See Tamura, *Thought of the New Buddhism of Kamakura*; Sueki, *Essays in Japanese Buddhist Intellectual History.*

[11] See Kuroda, *State and Religion in Medieval Japan* and *Society and Religion in Medieval Japan.*

[12] Kuroda's theses have gradually become widely accepted, though younger scholars (including some of Kuroda's own disciples) point out the need for further refinements and revisions in his views on the power structure of medieval Japanese society. On "orthodoxy" and "heterodoxy" and the role of *hongaku shisō* in medieval society, see Sasaki Kaoru 佐々木馨, *Chūsei kokka no shūkyō kōzō* 中世国家の宗教構造 [The medieval state and religious structure] (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1988); and Taira Masayuki 平雅行, *Nihon chūsei no shakai to Bukkyō* 日本中世の社会と仏教 [Buddhism and medieval Japanese society] (Tokyo: Hanawa Shoten, 1992). See also the *Kuroda Toshio Commemorative Volume*, a special issue of the *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* (Fall 1996, 23/3–4), edited by James Dobbins and Suzanne Gay.

[13] Delmer M. Brown and Ichirō Ishida, trans., *The Future and the Past: A Translation and Study of the Gukanshō, an Interpretative History of Japan Written in 1219* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979), 19.

[14] See Sasaki Kaoru, "Shinkoku shisō no chūseiteki tenkai" 神国思想の中世的展開 [Medieval developments in the theory of the "Land of the Gods"], in Kuroda Toshio 黒田俊雄, ed., *Kokka to Tennō* 国家と天皇 [State and Tennō] (Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1987), 183–224; Kuroda Toshio 黒田俊雄, "Chūsei kokka to shinkoku shisō" 中世国家と神国思想 [Medieval state and *shinkoku* thought], in Kawasaki Tsuneyuki 川崎庸之, et al., *Nihon shūkyōshi kōza* 日本宗教史講座 [Lectures in the history of Japanese religions] (Tokyo: San-ichi Shobō, 1959); and Takahashi Miyuki 高橋美由紀, *Ise Shintō no seiritsu to tenkai* 伊勢神道の成立と展開 [The formation and development of Ise Shinto] (Tokyo: Daimeidō, 1994), 191–207, for nuances in the development of *shinkoku* thought. The actual content of the term *shinkoku* varies in the different documents and reveals stages of devel-

opment, and thus the most apt English translation has to be determined in every case. For example, before the *Jinnō shōtōki*, "(a) land of the gods" would be most apt, but in this treatise, for reasons this paper will also indicate, "the divine land" or even "divine country" is arguably more fitting. It is only in nineteenth and twentieth century usages that "divine nation" (referring to the Japanese nation-state since the Meiji Restoration) would be an acceptable translation.

[15] Paul H. Varley, trans., *A Chronicle of Gods and Sovereigns: Jinnōshōtōki of Kitabatake Chikafusa* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 55.

[16] Varley, *A Chronicle of Gods and Sovereigns*, 218.

[17] See Michele Marra, "The Conquest of Mappō: Jien and Kitabatake Chikafusa" *Japanese Journal of Religious Studies* 12 (1985): 330–36, for further elaboration of Chikafusa's "overcoming" of the theory of the Latter Days of Dharma.

[18] "To rule" here is to be understood in a very broad sense, in view of the tenuous role exercised by the "reigning" Tennō within the context of the changing structures of power throughout different stages of Japan's history.

[19] Varley, *A Chronicle of Gods and Sovereigns*, 230.

[20] Nagahara Keiji 永原慶二 and Kasamatsu Yūshi 笠松宏至, *Jinnō shōtōki* 神皇正統記 [A chronicle of gods and sovereigns], in Nihon no Meicho 9 (Tokyo: Chūo Kōronsha, 1971), 431. My translation. Varley's translation (*A Chronicle of Gods and Sovereigns*, 230) reads, "The gods have pledged to succor the people, and in this sense the people of the country all belong to the gods."

[21] Jacqueline Stone, *Ideas of Original Enlightenment*, shows how this sense of sacredness of the land comes at the aftermath of the foiled Mongol invasions.

[22] Varley, *A Chronicle of Gods and Sovereigns*, 61.

[23] Varley, *A Chronicle of Gods and Sovereigns*, 49.

[24] See standard histories of this period, including Kuroda Toshio 黒田俊雄, *Mōko shūrai* 蒙古襲来 [Mongol invasion], Nihon no Rekishi 8 (Tokyo: Chūo Kōronsha, 1965); Kozo Yamamura, *The Cambridge History of Japan, Vol. 3, Medieval Japan* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). See also Asao Naohiro 朝尾直弘, et al., *Iwanami kōza: Nihon tsūshi* 岩波講座—日本通史 [Iwanami lectures on Japanese history], vol. 8, Chūsei 中世 [Medieval period] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1994), 2, for accounts of these tumultuous times and the different perspectives among historians.

[25] Hanawa Hokiichi 塙保己一, ed. *Zoku Gunsho ruijū* 続群書類従 [Classified collections of Japanese classics, continued]. Tokyo: Zoku Gunshoruijū Kanseikai, 1929 (Rev. ed. 1959, 1975), vol. 1, 395.

[26] Hanawa, *Zoku Gunsho-ruijū*, vol. 1, 416.

[27] Hanawa, *Zoku Gunsho-ruijū*, vol. 1, 386.

[28] Sueki Fumihiko, et al., eds. *Shintō taikei* 神道大系, Ronsetsu-hen 論説編 4, Tendai Shintō 天台神道 2 (Tokyo: Shintō Taikei Hensankai, 1991), 406.

[29] Sueki et al., eds., *Shintō taikei*, 410.

[30] Sueki et al., eds., *Shintō taikei*, 418.

[31] For details see Sadakata Akira, *Shumisen to gokuraku: Bukkyō no uchūkan* 須弥山と極楽—仏教の宇宙観 [Mt. Sumeru and paradise: Buddhist cosmology]. (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1973).

[32] I use the terms "real" and "provisional" to translate *honji* and *suijaku*, referring to a key theory on the relationship of the (indigenous) Japanese divinities to the Buddhas (i.e., of Indian origin). See Murayama Shūichi 村山修一, *Honji-suijaku* 本地垂迹 (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 1974), for a well-documented historical account of this theory.

[33] See Takahashi, *Formation and Development of Ise Shinto*, 45, for the various theories on the dating of this document.

[34] Ōsumi Kazuo 大隅和雄, ed., *Chūsei Shintō ron* 中世神道論 [Medieval Shinto treatises], Nihon Shisō Taikei 19 (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1977), 32.

[35] For details see the chapter on Buddhism and ethnocentrism in Sueki, *Essays in Japanese Buddhist Intellectual History*, 94–124.

[36] See Ōsumi, *Medieval Shinto Treatises*, 209–51.

[37] See Tamura, *Essays on Hongaku Shisō*, 443–455, and Sueki, *Essays in Japanese Buddhist Intellectual History*, 347–71, both dealing with *hongaku* influences on the development of Shinto theory.

[38] The *Kokutai no hongi* makes explicit reference to the *Jinnō shōtōki* and quotes its opening lines proclaiming Japan as Land of the Gods. See Hall, ed., Gauntlett, trans., *Kokutai no hongi*, 104.

[39] The so-called *Nihonjinron*, or discourse on Japanese identity, which became a dominant topic in the seventies just as Japan reached the pinnacle of economic power, provides a glimpse of such attitudes behind the statements of the protagonists. For a penetrating study of this discourse see Peter N. Dale, *The Myth of Japanese Uniqueness.*

The *Lotus Sutra* and Japanese Culture

[1] See "The Doctrine of *Tathāgata-garbha* Is Not Buddhist," *165–73.*

[2] See Hirakawa, *History of Indian Buddhism*, 284–5.

[3] See Hirakawa Akira, *Shoki Daijō to Hokke shisō* 初期大乗と法華思想 [Early Mahayana and Lotus thought], Hirakawa Akira Chosakushū 平川彰著作集 6 (Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1989), 322; see also pages 394–5, 435.

[4] For the Sanskrit text see H. Kern and B. Nanjio, eds., *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, Bibliotheca Buddhica 10, 1908–1912 (reprinted in Japan, 1977). I have followed the modern Japanese translation of Kariya Sadahiko 苅谷定彦 in *Hokke-kyō ichibutsujō no shisō* 法華経一仏乗の思想 [The *Lotus Sutra* and the idea of the One Buddha Vehicle] (Osaka: Tōhō Shuppan, 1983), 156. For a translation of these verses from the Chinese, see Hurvitz, *Lotus Sutra*, 34.

[5] Hirakawa adds, however, "it seems to me that the term *bodhisattva-yāna* was not used in early Mahayana" (*Early Mahayana and Lotus Thought*, 321).

[6] English translation by Hurvitz, *Lotus Sutra*, 34.

[7] From Ōkubo Dōshū 大久保道舟, ed., *Dōgen zenji zenshū* 道元禅師全集 [The collected works of Zen Master Dōgen] (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobō, 1970), vol. 2, 424–5. English translation adjusted from Masunaga Reihō, *A Primer of Sōtō Zen: A Translation of Dōgen's Shōbōgenzō Zuimonki* (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1971), 107.

[8] See Kariya, *One Buddha Vehicle*, 153. The four-vehicle (or "four carts") theory claims that there are four vehicles: the original three of the sravaka, pratyekabuddha, and bodhisattva, plus the fourth Buddha vehicle, based on the parable of the burning house in the *Lotus Sutra*. The three-vehicle (or "three carts") theory claims that the bodhisattva vehicle is the Buddha vehicle, thus giving only three vehicles.

[9] See Fuse Kōgaku 布施浩岳, *Hokkekyō seiritsushi* 法華経成立史 [A formative history of the *Lotus Sutra*] (Tokyo: Daitō Shuppan, 1934), 231.

[10] See Kariya, *One Buddha Vehicle*, 231.

[11] For a well-organized and brief outline of the subject, see Nomura Yōshō 野村耀昌 "Ichibutsujō no shisō" 一仏乗の思想 [One Buddha vehicle thought], in *Kōza Daijō Bukkyō 4 Hokke shisō* 講座大乗仏教 4 法華思想 (Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1983), 160–5. An essay by Fujita Kōtatsu 藤田宏達, "One Vehicle or Three," *Journal of Indian Philosophy* 3 (1975): 79–166, is an excellent study on the subject. Kariya, *One Buddha Vehicle* is also known as a creative and useful contribution to this subject. However, he emphasizes the difference between Mahayana and *buddhayāna*, so in this sense his position is closer to the four-vehicles theory. Tamura Yoshirō's popular paperback on the *Lotus Sutra* (1969) also leans to the side of the one vehicle as "unification" of the three.

[12] See Kariya Sadahiko 苅谷定彦, "Hokke-kyō to nyoraizō-setsu: Issai shujō shikkai bosatsu to shitsu-u busshō" 法華経と如来蔵説—一切衆生悉皆ぼさつと悉有仏性 [The *Lotus Sutra* and the teaching of *tathāgata-garbha*: "All sentient beings are bodhisattvas" and "all beings have Buddha-nature"]. In *Mori Mikisaburō Hakase shōju kinen* 森三樹三郎博士頌寿記念, *Tōyōgaku ronshū* 東洋学論集, 1979), 1127–40.

[13] Hirakawa, *Early Mahayana and Lotus Thought*, 398.

[14] See the *Lotus Sutra*, T 9.9c.

[15] Hirakawa, *Early Mahayana and Lotus Thought*, 316.

[16] For details see the translation of my article "The Doctrine of *Tathāgata-garbha* Is Not Buddhist" in this volume, *165–73.*

[17] For further details, see my "The *Śrīmālādevī Sutra* and Ekayana Theory," 312.

[18] See my essay, "The Ekayana Theory in Yogacara," 305.

[19] See Takasaki, *The Formation of Tathāgata-garbha Thought*, 487.

[20] See the essay "Critique of the the *Vimalakīrti Sutra*" in Hakamaya, *Critiques of Original Enlightenment*, 227–35.

[21] See T No. 1519, 26.10b; see also T 26.7b25–29.

[22] From the eighth chapter on "The Receipt of Prophecy by Five Hundred Disciples," Hurvitz, *Lotus Sutra*, 160; T 9.28a.

[23] From the fifth chapter on "Medicinal Herbs," Hurvitz, *Lotus Sutra*, 109; T 9.20b.

[24] See Kariya, *One Buddha Vehicle*, 307–12.

[25] See Kariya, *One Buddha Vehicle*, 337–59.

[26] See my "The *Śrīmālādevī Sutra* and Ekayana Theory."

[27] See Suemitsu Yasumasa 末光愛正, "Kichizō no jōbutsu-fujōbutsu-kan II" 吉蔵の成仏不成仏観 II [Chi-tsang's view of those who can and cannot attain Buddhahood], *Komazawa Daigaku Bukkyōgakubu ronshū* 18 (1987): 358–62.

[28] Contrary to current opinion, I believe that Chi-tsang's standpoint is *dhātu-vāda* and that it is a grave mistake to believe that Chi-tsang and his Sanlun school transmitted the authentic Indian Madhyamika tradition of *śūnyavāda*. On this issue see Itō Takatoshi's essay on "Seng-chao and Chi-tsang" (in *Critical Studies on Chinese Buddhism*, 279–300) and my article "Critical Thoughts on Sanlun Teachings." Hirai Shun'ei 平井俊榮, *Hokke genron no chūshakuteki kenkyū* 法華玄論の註釈的研究 [Commentarial studies on the *Fa-hua hsüan-lun*] (Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1987), 46–66, shows that the purpose of Chi-tsang's commentary on the *Lotus Sutra* was to prove that the two teachings of "all beings have Buddha-nature" and "the eternal dwelling of the Dharma body (*dharmakāya*)" were taught in the *Lotus Sutra* as well as in the *Mahāparinirvāṇa Sutra*. This shows that Chi-tsang's position lies within the purview of *dhātu-vāda*.

[29] Hirakawa, *Early Mahayana and Lotus Thought*, 509–10.

[30] See Hirakawa Akira, *Shoki Daijō Bukkyō no kenkyū* 初期大乗仏教の研究 [Studies in early Mahayana Buddhism] (Tokyo: Shunjūsha, 1968), 778–811. See also Hirakawa Akira, "The Rise of Mahayana Buddhism and Its Relationship to the Worship of Stūpas," *Memoirs of the Research Department of the Toyo Bunko* 22 (1963): 57–106.

[31] Hirakawa, *Early Mahayana and Lotus Thought*, 401.

[32] Hirakawa, *History of Indian Buddhism*, 297.

[33] Fuse, *Formative History*, 238–39, 245, 253.

[34] See my "Liberation and Nirvana" in *Pratītyasamutpāda and Emptiness*, 191–224.

[35] DN II, 100.

[36] DN II.164.

[37] For a more detailed analysis of this issue, see my essay, "The Prajñāpāramitā Sutras and *Tathāgata-garbha* Thought" in *Pratītyasamutpāda and Emptiness*, 265–6.

[38] See the Sanskrit text, Kern and Nanjio, *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, 231.8–11 and 339.6–8. For details see Kariya Sadahiko, "Hokkekyō ni okeru shari: *Śarīra* to *dhātu*," 法華経における舎利—*Śarīra* と *dhātu* [Relics in the *Lotus Sutra*: *Śarīra* and *dhātu*], *Indogaku bukkyōgaku kenkyū* 14/1 (1965): 176–79; and Tsukamoto Keishō 塚本啓祥, "Indo ni okeru buttō shinkō to hokkekyō no kōshō" インドにおける仏塔信仰と法華経の交渉 [The relationship between stupa veneration and the *Lotus Sutra* in India], in his edited collection, *Hokkekyō shinkō no shokeitai* 法華経信仰の諸形態 [Various forms of *Lotus Sutra* faith] (Kyoto: Heirakuji Shoten, 1976), 45–9 and 59–62.

[39] See Kern and Nanjio, *Saddharmapuṇḍarīka*, 249.5.

[40] See Kariya Sadahiko, "Hokkekyō kenhōtō-bon ni tsuite" 法華経見宝塔品に ついて [The apparition of the jeweled stupa], *Indogaku bukkyōgaku kenkyū* 11/1 (1962): 138–9. Cf. Hirakawa, *Early Mahayana and Lotus Thought*, 509, where Hirakawa's

understanding is based on the pre-emended text.

[41] See Toda Hirofumi 戸田宏文, "Bonbun Hokke-kyō kō" 梵文法華経考 [Some thoughts on the *Lotus Sutra*], *Bukkyōgaku* 7 (1979), 4.

[42] See Kariya, "Relics in the *Lotus Sutra*," 179, n. 4.

[43] T No. 1718, 34.129a19–20.

[44] See Asai Yōrin 浅井要麟, *Nichiren Shōnin kyōgaku no kenkyū* 日蓮聖人教学の研究 [Studies on the teachings of Nichiren Shōnin] (Kyoto: Heirakuji Shoten, 1945), 226–41, 287–315. See also Kitagawa Zenchō 北川前肇, *Nichiren kyōgaku kenkyū* 日蓮教学研究 [Studies on Nichiren's teachings] (Kyoto: Heirakuji Shoten, 1987), 190–718.

[45] This is not a merely academic question. Totalitarianism was propagated in Japan, not so long ago, on the basis of the idea of *hokkai engi* 法界縁起 (*dharma-dhātu-pratītyasamutpāda*) derived from the *Avataṃsaka Sutra* and Hua-yen thought, which in turn was established in China through the influence of *tathāgata-garbha/ dhātu-vāda* thought. As a form of monism, this way of thinking tends to lead to totalitarianism.

[46] Note that, in my opinion, monotheism is not a form of monism (*dhātu-vāda*), but is closer to the structure of "one-vehicle" thought in requiring a specific choice, while polytheism corresponds to monism that unifies manifold objects on a single basis. For further discussion on this issue, see my essay in "Buddhism and the Kami," *356–73.*

[47] For a detailed criticism of Umehara's theories on Japanese culture, see Hakamaya, "Buddhism and the Kami," 99–112, and my "Buddhism and the Kami." For further remarks on the ideal of *wa,* see Hakamaya, "Critique of Prince Shōtoku's Ideology of Harmony," 1989.

[48] See the essay in this volume by Yamaguchi Zuihō, "The Core Elements of Indian Buddhism Introduced into Tibet," *220–41.*

[49] For further details see my "The Thought of the *Lotus Sutra*" (1995).

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